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This thesis examines Serbia’s changing approach to dealing with the Kosovo question since 2012. The 
claim of Serbia that Kosovo is an indivisible part of its territory has been anchored in the institutional 
framework of the country ever since the Kosovo war (1998-1999). Serbia’s attachment to Kosovo is not 
only an institutional matter, but is also woven into the cultural fabric of the Serbian political collective. It 
resonates with the Kosovo myth, the main element of which is the physical and symbolic claim to 
Kosovo. Since Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, countering Serbia’s claim to Kosovo, the 
Serbian Government has struggled to accommodate this state of affairs with its EU integration process 
guided by the incentive of the Brussels dialogue for normalizing relations between the two entities. 
I study the Brussels dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo as a dynamic process of contestation of 
meaning. It is conceptualized as a contact zone that both enables and constrains the re-articulations of 
the constitutive Other, either as an enemy (through antagonism) or as an adversary (through agonism). 
The thesis particularly inquires how the Serbian Government led by the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) 
since 2012 has re-articulated Kosovo within the Brussels dialogue. It locates two central moments in this 
process: adopting the Brussels agreement in 2013, and re-introducing the idea of partitioning Kosovo 
along ethnic lines as a solution to the Kosovo-Serbia dispute in 2018, both of which are understood as 
myths. 
The theoretical and methodological contribution of the thesis lies in the re-conceptualization of “myth”. 
While existing studies of myth in the context of Kosovo-Serbia relations have been focusing on the 
Kosovo myth, this thesis considers the Kosovo myth as a sedimented discourse, guided by a discourse 
theoretical lens. This discourse has turned into a social imaginary in Serbia, a horizon of meaning that 
defines and constrains what is said, felt, and otherwise practiced concerning Kosovo. The social imaginary 
structures the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse based on Serbia’s physical and symbolic claim to Kosovo, 
which is deeply rooted in the political and cultural life in Serbia. In 2018, it was re-articulated into the 
idea of partition for Serbia to retain its claim to Kosovo. Making a claim to only a portion of the territory, 
Northern Kosovo, the partition leaves outside of contestation the “mythologically” laden central and 
Southern Kosovo where the sites that embody the Kosovo myth, the Serbian medieval monasteries, are 
located. A deconstructive reading of the Kosovo myth developed in this thesis reveals that the main 
discursive element that connects the Kosovo myth, the Kosovo social imaginary, and the idea of partition 
is territoriality. 
The thesis argues for a distinction between an ontological and empirical dimension of myths. As an 
ontological concept, myth specifically relates to an attempt to repair a dislocated discourse and potentially 
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embodies an alternative political project that promises to fix what is broken. As such, myths do not only 
relate to past events, such as most of the scholarship on national myths would conceptualize it, but also 
to anchoring future but not yet realized political projects. Hence, the category of myth in this thesis is 
reserved for the Brussels agreement, and the idea of partition, since both emerged from dislocations as 
means to repair them. Developing a novel approach, the thesis highlights specifically temporal, material 
and affective dimensions of myth for discourse-theoretically inspired scholarly discussions to stress the 
necessity of myths for meaning-making. Myths are generated whenever we attempt to escape the 
constraints of a dislocated discourse by imagining alternative orders. Empirically, the thesis examines 
how the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse becomes dislocated through Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence and is “repaired” by the two myths that resulted from the Brussels dialogue. Hence, this 
thesis also makes an empirical contribution to the field of Southeast European studies, by introducing a 
discourse-theoretical, performative/material, and affective dimension in mythmaking. 
Apart from operationalizing the elaborate theoretical framework I developed, the empirical aim of the 
thesis was to demonstrate that even the most entrenched discourses, such as the “Kosovo is Serbia” 
discourse, are not resistant to change under the right circumstances. In the empirical analysis, the thesis 
focuses on the various representations of Kosovo in Serbian political discourse and draws attention to 
the re-articulation of political frontiers. It argues that the main transformation relates to the question of 
who constitutes the political “us” and “them”, recognizing a clear shift from the agonistic discourse in 
2013 (which emphasizes the “sharing” of Kosovo with Kosovo Albanians) to an antagonistic discourse 
in 2018 (which emphasizes a total separation between the two ethnic groups as the only solution). In this 
analysis, two central nodal points emerge: “territory” and “the people”. The thesis demonstrates how 
these elements have been reconstituted over time and how this process enabled the deepening of the 
divide between Serbia and Kosovo, which could have implications for the Brussels dialogue and for 
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1.1 Short Historical Overview: Kosovo in Serbia’s Political Discourse since 2008 
“We had already lost Kosovo in 2008 when they declared independence.” (President of  Serbia, 
Aleksandar Vučić, in an interview with Dnevnik 2, 27.12.2018)1 
The relations between Serbia and Kosovo have been complicated throughout history, particularly 
in terms of  ownership of  the territory of  Kosovo. The statement above made by the President of  
Serbia only illustrates this complexity, particularly since 2017, because many political figures have 
voiced a conflicting array of  statements about the position of  Kosovo within a wider political 
discourse in Serbia. On the one hand, Kosovo forms the bedrock of  Serbia’s nationalist discourses 
and can be seen as a signifier that grounds articulations of  Serbian identity itself. Particularly as of  
the nineteenth century, as Čolović (2017) argues, the Kosovo myth – i.e., the narratives surrounding 
the Battle of  Kosovo from 1389 between Christian forces led by Serbian Prince Lazar 
Hrebeljanović and Ottoman forces led by the Sultan Murad I – has been developed into a particular 
discourse that has served the interests of  nationalist ideologists until today. Čolović (2017, 20) 
understands the Kosovo myth as a “sacralized story of  the Battle of  Kosovo formed in the 
nineteenth century in the framework of  nationalist discourses, that is, nationalism as a political 
religion.” This means that the Kosovo myth and Serbian nationalism are intrinsically tied (see 
Bieber 2002), as well as that Kosovo as a place is raised to a sacralized position in the Serbian 
political collective (Ejdus and Subotić 2014). This has resulted in the myth’s re-articulation into 
other discursive constellations, such as the claim that “Kosovo is Serbia”, which has marked Serbian 
politics since Slobodan Milošević and is still present, embedded in political decision-making, not 
the least its inscription in the Constitution of  Serbia. 
On the other hand, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008, an event that has 
created a dislocatory2 effect on the unity of  the abovementioned claim that Kosovo is Serbia. This 
is evident in Serbia’s engagement in the so-called Brussels dialogue, which was initiated after the 
International Court of  Justice (ICJ) deemed Kosovo’s declaration of  independence as not being 
contrary to international law (International Court of  Justice 2010). After the ICJ decision was 
announced, Serbia, under EU pressure, called for new negotiations on Kosovo in the UN General 
Assembly (GA), and on 9 September 2010, the GA adopted Resolution 64/298 (United Nations 
General Assembly 2010) that welcomed “the readiness of the European Union to facilitate a 
                                                          
1 All translations of quotes throughout this thesis were made by the author. 
2 In simple terms, dislocation can be explained as a moment of crisis, a certain event that changes the way we view and 
talk about a certain issue. For an explanation of the concept of dislocation anchored in discourse theory, see the 
subchapter 1.3 Theoretical Framework. 
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process of dialogue between the parties [Serbia and Kosovo].” The dialogue was supposed to be 
“a factor for peace, security and stability in the region” and “promote cooperation, achieve progress 
on the path to the European Union and improve the lives of the people” (ibid.). This was the 
dialogue’s mandate, and the official EU-mediated talks began in March 2011 and came to be known 
as the Brussels dialogue. 
At first glance, it seems that the Brussels dialogue, the purpose of  which was to solve the conflict 
between Serbia and Kosovo – the former claiming that Kosovo is part of  it, and the latter claiming 
it is an independent state – stands in direct opposition to the “Kosovo is Serbia” claim. This is 
evident in the fact that the international community does not accept either of  those two options 
as the norm, meaning that one smaller part of  the world recognizes the first claim by Serbia, and 
the other larger part the second claim by Kosovo as legitimate. The Brussels dialogue was aimed at 
solving this deadlock, pointing to a solution that would be found either somewhere in the middle 
(both Serbia and Kosovo make concessions to their claims), or in an attempt to make Serbia 
recognize Kosovo as independent, which the majority of  countries in the world have done. The 
second option would be more likely, since the balance of  power is tipped in favor of  recognizing 
Kosovo’s independence in the international arena, with all major Western powers (USA, UK, 
Germany, France etc.) supporting it, while a few (Russia, China etc.) opposing it. 
When the First Agreement of  Principles Governing the Normalization of  Relations between 
Serbia and Kosovo was reached on 19 April 2013 – the so-called Brussels agreement – it was hailed 
by the EU as a historic agreement, while at the same time being hailed as a reinforcement of  Serbia’s 
ownership of  Kosovo, and a reinforcement of  Kosovo’s independence by the two parties, 
respectively. For Serbia, led by a majority government of  the Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska 
napredna stranka, abbreviated as SNS), the Brussels agreement was an attempt to accommodate the 
dislocatory effect of  Kosovo’s proclamation of  independence. By adopting it, Serbia would not 
recognize Kosovo and would be able to maintain some form of  control and practice statehood 
there through the establishment of  the Association/Community of  Serb-majority Municipalities 
(A/CSM), which was one of  the agreement’s main components. However, as the implementation 
of  the A/CSM has been stalled for years, being blocked by the Kosovo Constitutional Court in 
2015, it became evident that the Brussels agreement did not yield the desired effects and Serbia 
began to seek an alternative resolution. This alternative resolution came to be articulated as the 
idea of  partition, which was also termed as an exchange of  territories between Serbia and Kosovo, 
or land swap. As part of  it, Serbia would get Northern Kosovo3, a predominantly Serb-populated 
area that most of  the Brussels agreement addresses, in exchange for Kosovo receiving the Presevo 
                                                          
3 Northern Kosovo consists of four municipalities under the Kosovo framework: North Mitrovica, Leposavić, Zvečan 
and Zubin Potok, all of which have both Serbia-sponsored and Kosovo-sponsored institutions and leadership in place. 
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valley, a majority Albanian-populated area in the Southeastern part of  Serbia. While in 2012 and 
2013, the dominant idea of  the Brussels dialogue for solving or at least mitigating the conflict, was 
the Brussels agreement, particularly its A/CSM component, the dominant idea in 2017 and 2018 
was partition, or to some extent delineating Northern Kosovo from the rest and a re-bordering of  
the region. 
In light of  the previously mentioned Kosovo myth and its re-articulation into the claim that 
Kosovo is Serbia, it seems that particularly the idea of  partitioning Kosovo along ethnic lines stands 
in opposition to a meta-discourse that has for so long dominated Serbia’s approach to dealing with 
Kosovo. However, what is intriguing about partition is the fact that Serbia does not simply want to 
give up Kosovo, but rather metonymically transposes its claim to entire territory onto only a 
portion of  it, namely Northern Kosovo. This is significant for the way we can discuss the Kosovo 
myth, in its various re-articulations, as not only pertaining to a distinct discourse that originated in 
the 19th century, as Čolović (2017), and many others have argued (Atanasovski 2019; Bakić-Hayden 
2004; Pavlović 2019; Pavlović and Atanasovski 2016), but as a discourse whose elements get woven 
into other articulations, such as the claim that Kosovo is Serbia, or Serbia’s claim to Northern 
Kosovo. I will unpack these distinctions in the next subchapter. 
1.2 Rationale of Research: Questions, Aims and Main Contributions 
In this thesis I have asked how Serbia’s claim to Kosovo, which is the key element of  the Kosovo 
myth, has been re-articulated by the Serbian Government when the SNS first came to power in 
2012 and started engaging in a political dialogue with Kosovo in Brussels. This main, broadly 
conceived research question can be broken down into subquestions. For instance, I have asked how 
the political frontiers between “us” and “them” have been re-articulated within this process and 
how the Brussels dialogue has both constrained and enabled this re-articulation. I have asked how 
material articulations, such as Serbia’s institutional framework in Serbia and Kosovo, have grounded 
Serbia’s claims, and how affective structures that underpin Serbia’s political practice toward Kosovo 
have changed. Mainly, I have focused on illuminating the discursive, material and affective 
transformations of  Serbia’s claim to Kosovo within the Brussels dialogue. I argue that this has 
occurred against the background of  the dislocatory effect of  Kosovo’s declaration of  
independence on the unity of  the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse, which is anchored by a strong 
claim to the territory of  Kosovo, inscribed in Serbia’s Constitution. Furthermore, the Brussels 
dialogue has served as a political contact zone to contest and renegotiate this claim (as an arena for 
dealing with dislocation), which has led the SNS to come up with different “solutions” that would 
mend the dislocated “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse (what I refer to as “myths” in this thesis): The 
Brussels agreement and the idea of  partitioning Kosovo (territorially claiming Northern Kosovo).  
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Starting from the above, the aim with this thesis is to contribute to current scholarship in three 
ways. I will introduce the contributions briefly after which I will devote three separate sections to 
a more detailed literature review within this subchapter (1.2). Firstly, my research offers another 
perspective to the way the Kosovo myth has been studied so far. Research in this area typically 
treats the Kosovo myth as a narrative with certain fixed boundaries and reference points in the past 
(Atanasovski 2019; Bakić-Hayden 2004; Čolović 2017; Pavlović 2019; Pavlović and Atanasovski 
2016). Most works treat it as a story with political implications that has its origins in the tales of  
the Kosovo Battle (Bakić-Hayden 2004; Čolović 2017; Judah 2000; Pavlović 2019; Pavlović and 
Atanasovski 2016), in which Prince Lazar, by deliberately losing the Battle against the Ottomans, 
ensures an eternal place for all Serbs in Heaven. This is where the term “Heavenly people” (nebeski 
narod in Serbian) comes from, which is often heard in Serbian nationalist rhetoric to designate the 
special status of  Serbs as a chosen people (Anzulović 1999). Connecting to the tales of  the Battle 
of  Kosovo, the Kosovo myth has been discussed in relation to Serbian nationalism, particularly to 
the Milošević regime (see Bazić 2012; Bieber 2002, Čolović 2017), to describe how Milošević 
managed to mobilize Serbian nationalist sentiments in the wake of  Yugoslav disintegration. There 
is also a strand of  literature that offers a more historical perspective on the myth, applying a critical 
approach that sees the myth as contingent, sometimes more and sometimes less important for 
Serbian elites and state politics throughout history (see Pavlović 2019; Pavlović and Atanasovski 
2016; Pešić 2019). Less scholarship has been produced on the topic of  the Kosovo myth and how 
it features in contemporary politics of  Serbia (see Ejdus 2020; Vranić 2019), since it is often 
discarded as an “issue of  the past”. It is entirely absent from discussions on the subversion of  
dominant hegemonic orders, characterizing the Kosovo myth and its re-articulations as a 
hegemonic order par excellence. This is a gap I aim to fill with my thesis. Additionally, by contrast to 
the named scholarship, I question the understanding of  the Kosovo myth as a narrative and 
highlight the relationality and iterability of  the Kosovo myth, focusing on the rearticulation of  its 
elements into other discursive constellations and how they are performed. I do so by relying on a 
discourse-theoretical ontological framework and a deconstructive reading of  the Kosovo myth and 
will address it in the introduction, since it plays a significant role in my thesis, grounding my further 
claims. 
Secondly, I aim to contribute to the study of  national myths (Abizadeh 2004; Bouchard 2013; 
Michael 2010; Miller 1997; Morden 2016; Smith 1999) through a performative, discourse-
theoretical approach which questions the narrativized conception of  national myths that mainly 
sees myths in terms of  fictionalized accounts of  factual events that are important as stories of  
origins for certain nations. Subchapter 2.1 will be devoted to a more elaborate discussion of  this 
issue. In the rest of  Chapter 2, I have given a systematic exploration of  myth as both an ontological 
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and ontic category, something that current literature on discourse theory has not addressed and 
that scholarship on national myths neglects to pay attention to. Ontologically, I examined the 
concept of  myth through the lens of  temporality, by combining theories of  performativity (Butler 
1988; Butler 1990; Butler 1993), psychoanalysis (Evans 1999; Lacan 1962; 1977; Stavrakakis 1999; 
2007; 2017) and post-structuralist discourse theory (Laclau 2005; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Palonen 
2020). Myth also functions as an ontic category, the articulations of  which I will also empirically 
demonstrate in my case-study material. The ontic understanding of  myth has been more prevalent 
in discourse theory, using it as an analytical category (Montesano Montessori 2011), a particular 
logic/process (Marttila 2015), or a narrative with a particular form (Casullo 2020). An ontological 
understanding of  myth can also be recognized but mainly related to its ideological function in 
discourse, as a type of  concealment (Freeden, Sargent and Stears 2013; Ryan 2006; Torfing 1999). 
By contrast, I start from one of  Laclau’s (1990) seminal works in which he elaborates on myths 
and social imaginaries and connect these notions with his later work on empty signifiers (Laclau 
1996b; 2005), recognizing similarities. This ontological reconceptualization allowed me to address 
in my analysis not only the discourses the claim to Kosovo is embedded in, but also to focus on 
affectivity, fantasy and materiality (as dimensions of  a discourse), by combining previously 
uncombined post-Laclaudian methodological frameworks (see subchapter 1.4). Specifically, I have 
focused on two re-articulations of  the claim to Kosovo in two distinct moments by the Serbian 
Government, aimed at mending the dislocated discourse of  Kosovo being Serbia, namely the 
Brussels agreement from 2013 and the idea of  partition/ exchange of  territories from 2018 (as 
explained below). The former is part of  what I have termed the community discourse, and the 
latter is part of  the partition discourse, both of  which form wider discursive-affective-material 
constellations within which the re-articulations of  the claim are positioned. To simplify, they can 
be understood as contextual discourses. I refer to “discourses” instead of  “discursive-material-
affective constellations”, since the post-structuralist notion of  discourse refers to both the form and 
the force of  discourse, encompassing discursive, material and affective practices at once, as already 
recognized by Laclau (2005, 101). 
Thirdly, I aim to make a contribution to current discussions in the field of  Southeast European 
political studies and provide an analysis of  how mythmaking in Serbia and the Brussels dialogue 
converge. Namely, mythmaking in Serbia, specifically related to Kosovo, and EU integration have 
so far been examined mainly as separate and distinct practices. The former has been examined 
mainly in connection to nationalism and/or religion in Serbia (Bazić 2012; Bieber 2002; Čolović 
2002; 2017; Ejdus and Subotić 2014; Listhaug, Ramet and Dulić 2011; Pešić 2019), while the latter 
forms its own strand of  literature connected to Europeanization and EU integration (Anastasakis, 
Caplan and Economides 2013; Bieber 2013; Börzel 2011; Džankić, Keil, and Kmezić 2019; 
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Mladenov and Stahl 2015; Pickering 2011). I intend to bridge this gap and examine how elements 
of  the Kosovo myth, specifically Serbia’s claim to Kosovo, get re-articulated as part of  the Brussels 
dialogue in an effort to both advance Serbia’s EU integration and preserve Kosovo within Serbia. 
In terms of  scholarship on the Brussels dialogue, most of  the works examine the process as an 
EU-led mediation effort and from the perspective of  international relations (Baracani 2020; 
Beysoylu 2018; Bieber 2015; Ejdus 2014; Economides and Ker‐Lindsay 2015; Gashi, Musliu, and 
Orbie 2017; Guzina and Marijan 2014; Troncota 2018; Yabanci 2016), sidelining discourse-
theoretical and cultural perspectives. These perspectives are important because they both pay 
attention to how governments negotiate with each other in an effort to gain something in return, 
and illuminate how some sedimented4 practices, can still prevail such as Serbia’s claim to Kosovo, 
even though they might seem irrational. They also pay attention to individual actors and how they 
re-produce these sedimented practices. My thesis offers a unique insight into this dynamic, since 
no scholarship has provided a discourse-theoretical and cultural studies examination or analysis of 
the Brussels dialogue. It puts forward a conceptualization of  the Brussels dialogue as a political 
contact zone and illuminates how different social imaginaries of  both maintaining Kosovo as 
Serbian and finally joining the European Union entangle as part of  the Brussels dialogue, which 
serves as a larger context/arena for negotiation of  meaning, encounter with the “other” and their 
potential re-articulation. On the one hand, a political contact zone serves the purpose of  extending 
the possible horizons of  meaning to include previously unnamed political options as a means to 
solve the Kosovo-Serbia dispute, a goal that it partially fulfills at different moments. On the other, 
it should also serve the purpose of  stabilizing these resulting meanings around common nodal 
points for all parties involved, a goal which it fails to fulfill. I argue that this is one of  the main 
reasons the dialogue has stalled since 2018 and even after nine years of  talks, no sensible solution 
has yet been found and fully implemented. Hence, the Brussels dialogue is marked by both 
opportunities and constraints for contestation. 
In the following segments, I will elaborate on the main three contributions named above and 
discuss the previous literature in greater detail and how my thesis contributes to further production 
of  knowledge in these three areas. Some contributions, such as the second one, will also be devoted 
greater attention in Chapter 2, because they constitute the basis of  my theoretical argument. 
The Kosovo Myth Re-articulated 
The first step towards elaborating a deconstructive reading of  the Kosovo myth is to problematize 
the notions of  performativity and articulation. This thesis has been guided by the assumption that 
                                                          
4 The notion of sedimentation in discourse theory refers to a partial fixation and naturalization of discourse. When 




there is no discourse that precedes articulation or performative acts, but that discourses emerge in 
a constitutive interplay between performative practices and articulation. I utilize the theory of  
performativity and discourse theory to demonstrate this. Performativity refers to the notion that 
discourses produce the effects that they name (see Butler 1988; 1990; 1993), meaning that there is 
no identity of  subjects per see, no essence, but that which we might call identity (gender or 
otherwise) is constituted through a “stylized repetition of  acts” (Butler 1988, 519) that make the 
abstraction of  normative discourses appear natural. Butler has demonstrated this claim in her 
conception of  gender as a performative practice, one which needs to be re-constituted time and 
again and which through this repetition creates a type of  sedimentation which we then call gender 
(Butler 1993). This sedimentation is a fixation of  meaning which has the appearance of  being 
“natural”, or unchangeable, but in fact, it is merely a repetition (or re-articulation) of  a normative 
discourse on gender. In my thesis, I have not solely referred to performativity as a bodily practice, 
but as a material one, since the body is also considered to be material (see Carpentier 2018a). 
Butler’s theory of  performativity has been used in contexts other than gender studies, such as 
performative statehood (Koskenniemi and Grzybowski 2015; Vulović 2020; Weber 1998), or banal 
(Billig 1995) and everyday nationalism (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008) to explain the constitutivness 
of  discursive practices and sedimentation, bodily or otherwise material. 
There is no discourse that precedes performative acts, but discourse and performative practice are 
constitutive of  each other (Palonen 2018b), meaning that there cannot be one without the other 
and that they do not appear in some sort of  sequence. In a nutshell, this indicates that meaning is 
not a given, and it does not follow from any type of  inherent property of  the signifier, but that it 
is constituted as an interplay between discourse and practice in a contingent manner, always subject 
to change and internal reconstitution. This way of  understanding the relation between discourse 
and performative practice places the notion of  articulation at its center, as DeLuca has recognized. 
He claims that “in a world without foundations, without a transcendental signified, without given 
meanings, the concept of  articulation is a means to understanding the struggle to fix meaning and 
define reality temporarily” (DeLuca 1999, 334). There are no discourses “out there” that are waiting 
to be re-produced, but articulatory practices (re-)produce connections between so-called 
“elements” (as possible units of  meaning in a field of  discursivity) and “moments” (as discursive 
units with a particular meaning) fixed and materialized as part of  a discourse (see Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985). Articulation is therefore a practice that is central to any meaning-making process. For 
instance, performing gender time and again can be understood as a type of  articulation that aims 
to sediment or fix the meaning of  gender that is constitutive of  a particular discourse. In other 
words, performing discourses through practices of  articulation that simultaneously constitute these discourses is key. 
It is also important to stress that precisely the repetitive nature of  performative acts is what opens 
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up the possibility of  subjects to dis-articulate from certain discourses and (re-)articulate into new 
ones through acts of  subversion (Butler 1993), however, always constrained by the discourses they 
already inhabit and perform. This is what Butler has called “performative agency”, explaining that 
failure is constitutive of  performativity, i.e., failure to produce its desired effects: “performativity 
never fully achieves its effect, and so in this sense ‘fails’ all the time; its failure is what necessitates 
its reiterative temporality, and we cannot think iterability without failure” (Butler 2010, 153, italics 
in the original). If  this were not the case, we would forever live in a world which would be 
impossible to change, always performatively re-producing given discourses and re-subjectivating 
into them. However, this is not the case, since all discourses are contingent sets of  articulations, 
some of  which sometimes appear more sedimented, naturalized, or fixed than others (see Butler 
1994; Laclau 1990; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Marchart 2007).  
Having established the importance of  articulation for meaning-making and performativity, I can 
now problematize the re-articulation of  the Kosovo myth, which has informed the meaning of  the 
signifier “Kosovo” in Serbia, laden with affective investment, anchored in conceptions of  Serbian 
statehood and nationhood, and sedimented in the material practices of  the Serbian Government. 
Current scholarship sees the Kosovo myth as a distinct and relatively fixed narrative, with its origins 
in the tales of  the Kosovo Battle of  1389, an epic oral and literary canon that focuses on re-telling 
the story of  how Prince Lazar ensured an eternal place in Heaven for the Serbs by losing the Battle. 
It is conceived as a narrative that has certain boundaries and references (Bakić-Hayden 2004; 
Čolović 2017; Judah 2000; Pavlović 2019; Pavlović and Atanasovski 2016), the references always 
being to the Kosovo Battle and Prince Lazar losing it for the sake of  his people. Even though there 
is nothing wrong per se in conceptualizing the myth in this manner, it does neglect the relationality 
of  the myth and how its elements can be re-articulated into other discursive constellations that 
have little to do with the Battle itself. Thus, my thesis focuses on the iterability of  the Kosovo myth, 
its re-articulations and how certain elements of  it can be woven into other discursive constellations 
– a strategy that follows a deconstructive impetus as I have elaborated below. 
Additionally, the Kosovo myth has been discussed in connection to Serbian nationalism, 
particularly in relation to the Milošević regime and how the narratives surrounding the Battle of  
Kosovo from 1389 have been appropriated for these political discourses (see Bazić 2012; Bieber 
2002; Čolović 2017). Particularly Bieber (2002) focus on different dimensions of  the relation 
between the Kosovo myth and Serbian nationalism, such as: the myth’s incorporation into the 
“commemorative calendar of the nation” (ibid., 96) by remembering the Kosovo battle once a year 
on 28 June, St Vitus Day (Vidovdan); the symbolic and physical claim to Kosovo as a territory; and 
the myth’s establishment of a “historical continuity between the contemporary Serbian nation and 
the ‘Serbs’ of the Middle Ages, suggesting a perennial nation” (ibid.). Similarly, Čolović (2017) 
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discusses the Kosovo myth as a narrative that has been used and abused by many political figures 
in Serbia throughout modern history, offering a specifically cultural account of  its genesis and 
pointing to the fact that the Kosovo myth, albeit being an important national myth, is not an 
omnipotent political tool. There is also a strand of  scholarship dealing with the historical origins 
and reproduction of  the myth, applying a critical approach to demonstrate the historic contingency 
of  the claim to Kosovo (see Pavlović 2019; Pavlović and Atanasovski 2016; Pešić 2019). Particularly 
Pešić (2019) illuminates the relationship between “contemporary notions of  discourse” which she 
anchors in Fairclough and Wodak’s and Foucault’s understanding of  discourse as a social practice, 
and myths as “narratives related to historical events” that can problematize the relationship 
between (true) historical events and (fictional) stories, having an “explanatory, didactic intention, 
inherent in every myth” (ibid., 359). Less scholarship has been produced on the topic of  the 
Kosovo myth and how it features in contemporary politics of  Serbia since 2008 (see Ejdus 2020; 
Vranić 2019), since it is often discarded as an “issue of  the past”. It is entirely absent from 
discussions on the subversion of  dominant hegemonic orders, since the sedimented Kosovo myth 
is considered to be a hegemonic order par excellence. By paying attention to the re-articulations of  
the Kosovo myth, my thesis offers an insight into how Kosovo can be articulated in a counter-
hegemonic manner by the Serbian Government. 
As indicated earlier, I scrutinized the assumption of  the Kosovo myth as a fixed narrative which 
has certain boundaries and references and focus rather on the Kosovo myth in its re-articulations, 
with a distinct presupposition guiding the post-foundational theoretical framework of  this thesis, 
namely that there is no discourse that precedes articulation. Post-foundational theory encompasses 
an understanding of  the world in terms of  contingency, recognizing that any foundation in the 
social is only contingently grounded (Marchart 2007). I employ the terms post-foundational theory 
and discourse theory interchangeably, the former primarily when I talk about contingency and 
contingent foundations, and the latter when I refer to discourse as an ontological category which 
is prevalent in post-structuralist theory (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). It is important to stress that 
discourse theory is post-foundational, which is why the terms can be used interchangeably. For the 
purposes of  this thesis, performativity through repetition and its constitutive failure is key. This is 
based on a Derridean deconstructive reading of  the “Kosovo myth”, by which the very repetition 
of  a discourse creates a dissonance between the “originary” statement and what is repeated 
(citationality), carrying traces of  the original message into the practice of  repetition (Derrida 1988). 
The very act of  articulation establishes the Kosovo myth anew each time it is brought about, leaving 
room for constitutive gaps of  possibility for disarticulating and re-articulating it in a new light. 
Therefore, performativity is a central framework of  this thesis, since it explains how the Kosovo 
myth can be conceptualized as both a sedimented narrative, and how its meaning can be re-
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constituted in various re-articulations. It should be emphasized that deconstruction has not been 
used as a method in this thesis, but I merely rely on a deconstructive reading of  the Kosovo myth 
as an entry point into the discussion on originality and repetition. 
The “Kosovo myth” as a sedimented narrative can be conceived of as a social imaginary (as a 
discourse-theoretical concept) that structures the field of intelligibility and represents a horizon of 
inscription of various social demands (Laclau 1990). In other words, the “Kosovo myth” as it has 
been predominantly discussed is not a “myth” per se in the discourse theoretical vocabulary, but is 
a specific, sedimented discourse with its distinct elements. I argue that this discourse has turned 
into a social imaginary, i.e., a horizon of possible meanings for political practice in Serbia, 
delineating what can be practiced or felt in relation to Kosovo. The main element of the Kosovo 
imaginary is its territorial claim to Kosovo and up until very recently, it was almost unimaginable 
to articulate Kosovo as not Serbian nor Serbia’s, with political actors from the entire spectrum 
subscribing to this demand (see Spasojević 2016; Vranić 2019). This only became a question of 
debate with the introduction of the idea of partition in 2017 and 2018. What I regard as “myth” on 
an ontic level in this thesis refers to specific articulations that are aimed at mending dislocated 
discourses (Laclau 1990), while at the ontological level, myths are necessary meaning-making 
operations that help us imaginarize alternative discourses to the hegemonic ones. Therefore, I see 
the Brussels agreement and the idea of partition as myths, which I are elaborated on during the 
course of the thesis. 
Since the “Kosovo myth” as a distinct narrative has been already addressed in current scholarship 
(Bazić 2012; Bakić-Hayden 2004; Bieber 2002; Čolović 2017; Pavlović 2019; Pavlović and 
Atanasovski 2016; Pešić 2019), my aim has been to focus on the re-articulations of this narrative in 
its two forms: the social imaginary which situates the “Kosovo is Serbia” claim, and the counter-
hegemonic discourse of partition, aiming to institute an alternative imaginary. What follows is my 
analytical understanding of the “original” Kosovo myth and the following two re-articulations: 
1) The Kosovo myth as a sedimented discourse, or a specific narrative, in which the tales 
surrounding the Battle of Kosovo are articulated as a “founding moment” (Bull 2016; Savage 
2012) of Serbian statehood and nationhood. In this respect, it is a sedimented discourse 
because its meaning is relatively fixed and uncontested. 
2) The re-articulation of the specific sedimented discourse into a social imaginary that 
structures the claim that “Kosovo is Serbia” (what I will call the “Kosovo is Serbia” 
discourse throughout this thesis). This articulation acts as a “founding moment” of Serbian 
nationalist politics since Slobodan Milošević, precisely because the territoriality of Kosovo 
is its nodal point. In this sense, it is also a sedimented discourse, inscribed into the 
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institutional framework of Serbia. Within this discourse, Kosovo is part of contestations 
on Serbia’s sovereignty over and statehood in Kosovo. I identify this discourse as dislocated 
because of Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, and it is sutured5 with the myth 
of the Brussels agreement that forms a new objectivity on the basis of the dislocated 
discourse. This new objectivity that the Brussels agreement is part of, is a new discourse 
on “community” and sharing Kosovo with the Albanians, and it dominated in 2013. 
3) The re-articulation of the “Kosovo is Serbia” claim into a counter-hegemonic discourse on 
partitioning Kosovo along ethnic lines and transposing the territorial claim to Northern 
Kosovo. The Kosovo social imaginary is substituted with an alternative vision of the 
future, in which European integration takes precedence. This move can be recognized as 
a synecdoche, a tropological replacement of a totalizing claim to Kosovo with a particular 
one that takes its place of universality (pars pro toto). As part of this political project, 
Northern Kosovo (as part of Kosovo) stands to counter-hegemonically displace the 
previous claim and embody the fantasy of “restoring” what is lost about Kosovo, at least 
in some shape or form. This articulation dominated the discursive field in 2017 with the 
so-called “internal dialogue on Kosovo” and primarily 2018, with a heightened focus on 
the idea of partition. 
More broadly, one could argue that all these re-articulations could be analytically grouped under 
discourses on Kosovo, since this particular signifier is what they all have in common, although their 
discursive structures and affective implications are different. In summary, if  it is always possible to 
re-articulate something anew, then why do I focus on these three specific articulations listed above? 
They are dominant re-articulations which I have recognized in my analysis and have drawn from 
the material. I have recognized them as “founding moments” of  various dominant discourses and 
political projects that re-appear in different instances and entangle with each other. 
Myth from the Perspective of  Discourse Theory 
Building on Laclau’s (1990) definition and distinction between myths and imaginaries, discourse 
theoretical scholarship has predominantly addressed myth as the ideological function of  hegemony 
(see Freeden, Sargent and Stears 2013; Ryan 2006; Torfing 1999). The discourse-theoretical 
conception of  myth differs from the more “canonical” conception of  Barthes, in that it represents 
an “alternative to the logical form of  the dominant structural discourse” (Montesano Montessori 
2011, 172). Barthes, on the other hand sees myths as “secondary representation[s] which 
                                                          
5 In the discourse-theoretical vocabulary, to suture a dislocation means to “repair” it. If a dislocation is perceived as a 
crisis, then handling that crisis is suturing it. For instance, one could cover over a dislocation with an alternative 
discourse that may or may not be feasible. 
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transform[s] a meaning into form, often with the function to mystify ideologies” (ibid). Barthes 
argues that myths are forms of  ideological distortions of  reality (Barthes 1972), the aim of  which 
is to hide the contingency of  the narrative they address and present it as natural. But as Bottici 
(2007, 207) notes, it is problematic to rely on the notion of  “distortion of  reality” since even 
“[n]arrative history is […] intrinsically distorting in this sense because it presents as ‘facts’ that 
which is instead the constructed spectacle of  a narrative.” This can be related to the psychoanalytic 
understanding of  reality in Lacanian terms6, in which the “Real” cannot ever fully be captured, 
since it lies beyond and is irreducible to the symbolic order of  human communication (Evans 
1996). 
Since the vagueness of  the definition of  the concept of  myth in discourse theory has been 
identified before (Montesano Montessori 2011; Norval 2000), the aim of  this thesis is also to bring 
more clarity into this concept from a discourse-theoretical point of  view. There are three notable 
examples trying to do just that. For instance, Casullo (2020) has explored myths as populist 
narratives with a particular logic and narrative structure glorifying the leader as the hero. Marttila 
(2015, 37) has discussed “mythification” as “a general logic of  stabilization and justification that 
attaches a particular discourse to the imaginary of  its objective necessity.” Mythification conceals, 
at least partially, the contingent nature of  social reality, which is similar to Barthes’ conception. 
However, I will argue that concealment is not the ultimate goal of  mythification, but that the 
production of  myths is necessary for meaning-making per se, since I also conceive of  myths as 
empty signifiers, driving any political project or discourse further and potentially accommodating 
a range of  demands (see Chapter 2). Lastly, Montesano Montessori (2011, 172) has operationalized 
myths as analytical concepts in discourse analysis, whereby myths can be identified as 
representations of  “an alternative to the status quo.” 
Given all this, more clarity in terms of  defining this concept is needed, specifically in regard to how 
myth relates to temporality, which none of  the works above address – that is, how it relates to past 
events, hegemonic interventions in the present and how it helps future hegemonic projects be 
driven further politically. The connection between myths from national pasts and their function for 
the politics of  the present and future has been problematized extensively in literature on 
nationalism (Abizadeh 2004; Bouchard 2013; Michael 2010; Miller 1997; Morden 2016; Smith 
1999). However, this strand of  the literature does not go beyond the notion of  myths as specific 
narratives that get taken up by certain actors and imbued with specific meanings deemed important 
for the nation. This thesis asks whether myths should be understood only as narratives and offers 
an alternative reading inspired by discourse theory, supported with psychoanalysis and – 
                                                          




sporadically – performativity. It argues for the constitutivness of  myths for meaning-making as 
such. Even though discourse theory is the starting point of  this argument, the notion of  myth loses 
its importance in discourse theoretical work after one of  Laclau’s seminal works, the 1900 book 
New Reflections on the Revolution of  our Time, which is also evident in the sporadic discussions of  myth 
by the discourse theorists mentioned above. Hence, as mentioned previously, this thesis makes 
another contribution to literature in that it illuminates the aspect of  temporality specifically, 
contrasts it to spatiality, and opens a broader dialogue between discourse theory and psychoanalysis 
in bringing in concepts such as empty signifiers, fantasy and enjoyment to discuss the temporal 
dimension of  myths. In Chapter 2, I elaborate on my theoretical framework and pay particular 
attention to myth as an ontological category. 
The Nexus between Mythmaking, Kosovo and EU Integration in Serbia 
Mythmaking in Serbia and EU integration have so far mainly been examined as separate and 
distinct fields. The former is examined mainly in connection to nationalism in Serbia (Bazić 2012; 
Bieber 2002; Čolović 2002; 2017; Ejdus and Subotić 2014; Listhaug, Ramet and Dulić 2011; Pešić 
2019), while the latter forms its own strand of  the literature. It focuses on the Europeanization 
paradigm and/or the transformative power of Europe (Anastasakis, Caplan and Economides 2013; 
Börzel 2011; Mladenov and Stahl 2015) which also connects to EU conditionality in the Western 
Balkans (Bieber 2013; Džankić, Keil, and Kmezić 2019; Pickering 2011), to state-building and 
reform in the Western Balkans (Biermann  2013; Börzel 2013) and international relations studies 
which problematize the influence of  EU and non-EU countries in the Western Balkans (Bechev 
2017; Bieber and Tzifakis 2020; Janez 2019). In terms of  scholarship on the Brussels dialogue, 
most works examine the nexus between EU integration of  Serbia and its dealing with the Kosovo 
question as part of  it (Beysoylu 2018; Bieber 2015; Economides and Ker‐Lindsay 2015; Ejdus 
2014; Gashi, Musliu, and Orbie 2017; Guzina and Marijan 2014; Obradović-Wochnik and Wochnik 
2012; Troncota 2018) or focus on local Kosovo perspectives (Visoka 2017; Yabanci 2020). Some 
pay more attention to the Serbian perspective on the Kosovo issue instead of the dialogue itself 
(Economides and Ker‐Lindsay 2015; Obradović-Wochnik and Wochnik 2012), and some more 
attention to EU actorness and its mediation efforts between Serbia and Kosovo (Baracani 2020; 
Bergmann 2019; Gashi 2020; Gashi, Musliu, and Orbie 2017; Visoka and Doyle 2016). Some works 
give a distinctly narrativized perspective of the dialogue (Troncota 2018), examining how counter-
EU narratives and local resistance allows actors in Kosovo to shape the dialogue process. However, 
no scholarship has provided a discourse-theoretical examination or analysis of the Brussels 
dialogue. While there are works that employ critical discourse analysis to analyze the case of 
Kosovo-Serbia relations and the Brussels dialogue (Gashi 2020; Gashi, Musliu, and Orbie 2017), 
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they nonetheless focus on the EU’s role in the entire process and how the EU discursively asserts 
power in the dialogue. 
In addition, some recent works have focused on how Kosovo has been articulated within the 
Serbian public discourse since it declared independence in 2008, providing an ontological security 
perspective on Serbia’s anxiety over losing Kosovo (Ejdus 2020) and how Kosovo is used in 
populist discourses in Serbia (Vranić 2019). Vranić (2019), Spasojević (2016) and Dragojlov (2020) 
have examined how specific political parties in Serbia have articulated Kosovo in the last few years, 
with Dragojlov (2020) paying particular attention to the SNS. One recent piece of work has focused 
on a cognitive linguistic analysis of metaphors and metonymy that Serbian politicians use to refer 
to Kosovo within the Brussels dialogue (Rasulić 2020) and by doing so paid particular attention to 
the changes in the way Kosovo has been articulated since the Brussels dialogue. However, none of 
these works problematize the Kosovo myth in its re-articulations, and how it is discussed and 
practiced within the Brussels dialogue, illuminating the connection between the myth and Serbia’s 
EU integration process. Thus, this thesis fills the gap in the literature that has been left by relying 
on conventional critical discourse analysis methods (Gashi 2020; Gashi, Musliu, and Orbie 2017; 
Rasulić 2020) that see discourse as purely linguistic and one of many social practices. In turn, my 
work relies on an understanding of discourse as a practice that not only encompasses language, but 
also materiality and affectivity as well. Discourse can thus mean both a structure, a system of 
meanings (discourse in the traditional post-structuralist understanding, see Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985)), and a practice, an articulation that establishes relations between elements (linguistic or 
otherwise) and creates meaning. A post-structuralist, Essex school understanding of discourse has 
only been marginally applied to the context of Southeast European studies, in studies of populism 
(Brentin and Pavasović Trošt 2016), media studies (Trivundža and Vezovnik 2020), or migration 
(Vezovnik 2012), but none related to Kosovo-Serbia relations. This discourse-theoretical 
perspective is important because it allows us to deconstruct the false dichotomy between language 
and action in the political sphere. Additionally, this lens allows us to give a holistic view of material, 
linguistic as well as affective changes that have happened in the re-articulation of the Kosovo myth 
since the Brussels dialogue began. This way, we can shed light onto seemingly “irrational” political 
practices that are constantly challenged by material circumstances, such as Serbia’s claim to Kosovo 
as part of its territory in the wake of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, and map out how they 
are sustained. It also allows us to conceptualize some of the elements of the myth, such as the claim 
to Kosovo, as sedimented discourses and map out under which conditions sedimentations can be 
re-activated. The Brussels dialogue is thus understood as a wide political contact zone (Pratt 2008; 
Yüksek and Carpentier 2018) within which a re-articulation of sedimented discourses can occur, as 
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will be demonstrated throughout this thesis. I will pay particular attention to this conceptualization 
in Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
Before I begin, I will firstly attempt to bring some conceptual clarity to my work, since myth is 
both an ontological category (based on a discourse-theoretical and psychoanalytic framework) and 
an ontic one, which I have also used in my analysis. As already indicated, on an ontic level I 
distinguish between two specific myths, one of the Brussels agreement, and one of partitioning 
Northern Kosovo, both of which are aimed at suturing the dislocated “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse 
– a discourse that is structured by the Kosovo imaginary in Serbia. Hence, what has been 
traditionally conceptualized as the “Kosovo myth” in a narrative sense (see Bieber 2002; Čolović 
2017; Daskalovski 2003; Ejdus and Subotić 2014; Pavlović 2009; Pavlović and Atanasovski 2016), 
this thesis sees as a distinct discourse, a discourse that forms a social imaginary in Serbia which 
structures the “Kosovo is Serbia” claim as its first re-articulation. Finally, this claim is re-articulated 
into the idea of partition, which forms its second re-articulation. In my analysis I particularly focus 
on these two re-articulations, as elaborated earlier, since this is the novel part of my research, as 
the “Kosovo myth” as a narrative has already been extensively discussed. 
On the other hand, myth is an ontological category that is tied both to the sedimentation of social 
orders, as well as to driving (yet unrealized) political projects further, because it allows us, through 
fantasy, to transpose our desires onto a space of inscription (in the future) that promises to fulfill 
them. Crucial to the ontological understanding of  myth is the concept of  dislocation. As Torfing 
explains, dislocation can be defined as “the emergence of  an event, or a set of  events, that cannot 
be represented, symbolized, or in other ways domesticated by the discursive structure – which is 
therefore disrupted” (Torfing 1999, 148). Carpentier insists that this dislocatory event is (also) 
material, not only discursive, which I will elaborate on in Chapter 2. For now, it suffices to say that 
in Laclau’s (1990) reading, a myth emerges when a structure is dislocated to make sense of  the 
dislocation (as an alternative reading of  the emerged situation), by incorporating it into the given 
structure. Alternatively, when the myth fails in suturing the dislocation, the structure falls apart and 
needs to be articulated anew.  
Following from this, in a discourse-theoretical sense, myth represents a “plane of  inscription”, 
which “involves forming a new objectivity by means of  the re-articulation of  the dislocated 
elements” (Laclau 1990, 61). This “new objectivity” can be a (re-)interpretation of  past events that 
have been central to the self-articulation of  a community, or a re-articulation of  a dislocation 
and/or its incorporation into the dominant structure, or the forming of  a new (counter-
)hegemonic project that promises to “repair” any discursive or material dislocation and constitute 
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the full closure of  a community’s self-identity. I will explain that since dislocations are constitutive 
of  any discursive formation, myths are also constitutive of  meaning-making. A myth can hence act 
as a “bridge” between discursivity and material spatiality, in that it constitutes a “principle of  
reading” or interpretation of  potentially dislocated discursive and material structures into a 
meaningful whole again. I will expand on this in Chapter 2, but at this point, it is necessary to 
distinguish between two concepts: imaginary as in social imaginary (Laclau 1990) already explained 
above, and imaginarization (Glynos and Stavrakakis 2008) as an intrinsic operation of mythmaking 
that is constitutive of driving political projects forward. I will further elaborate on this in Chapter 
2, as well as provide a detailed account of my theoretical framework situated in post-foundational 
discourse theory and psychoanalysis. 
A social imaginary, as Laclau explains, emerges because myths are essentially always incomplete. 
The “mythical space is constituted as a critique of the lack of structuration accompanying the 
dominant order” (Laclau 1990, 62), which is aimed at suturing the dislocation that reveals this lack 
of structuration. For this case study, the dislocation that revealed the lack of structuration of the 
“Kosovo is Serbia” discourse was Kosovo’s proclamation of independence. This prompted the 
creation of new mythical spaces of representation aimed to suture this dislocation, namely the myth 
of the Brussels agreement in 2013 and the myth of partition/exchange of territories in 2018, as 
promises (critiques of the dominant order) that would solve the issue of two mutually opposing 
claims to Kosovo. Since the full constitution of any order is impossible and society can only be 
contingently grounded (see Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Marchart 2007), the attempt of a myth to 
fulfill what it promises is always going to remain impossible. It is in this moment that social 
imaginaries emerge since any particular myth will have its content constantly reconstituted due to 
the failure to fulfill its promise of suturing the dislocated order. As Laclau mentions, the 
“incomplete character of the mythical surfaces of inscription is the condition of possibility for the 
constitution of social imaginaries” (Laclau 1990, 63), which act as horizons that represent “the very 
form of fullness” (ibid., 64) of a social order that is dislocated, onto which subjects can inscribe 
any demand or any dislocation. The Kosovo-myth-turned-social-imaginary represents this form of 
fullness and structures the Kosovo is Serbia claim, since this claim is the one thing that should not 
be disputed and forms an imperative practice of Serbian politics to date, evident in its 
sedimentation in the Serbian institutional framework, not the least the Constitution. What is 
evident in my analysis is that subjects, particularly the SNS, start to destabilize the mythical promise 
of fullness of the social imaginary that Kosovo is Serbia, meaning that a logic of its dissolution is 
recognizable in the attempts to generate two new myths mentioned above: the Brussels agreement 
and the subsequent idea of partition/ exchange of territories. This is why the new government 
practices can be termed counter-hegemonic, since they aim to institute a new discourse that 
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counters a hegemonic one. Generally, the Kosovo imaginary is supplemented with an imaginary of 
EU membership, which starts to structure the “field of intelligibility” (Laclau 1990, 64) promising 
to solve all of  Serbia’s problems in terms of  the dislocation generated by Kosovo’s proclamation 
of  independence. In this sense, social imaginaries can be conceived of  as relatively undisputed 
meta-discourses or overarching discursive concepts that partly form and are present in other 
discourses, motivating and constraining different practices of  social subjects. Put simply, they form 
horizons of  meaning and practice. 
At this point it is important to mention that the distinction between myths and imaginaries can 
never be entirely clear-cut, since our social reality constantly moves between acts of  sedimentation 
(aiming to maintain a social order) and acts of  politicization (aiming to uproot it and institute an 
alternative order). However, what this thesis aims to emphasize is the political aspect of  
mythmaking, focusing on practices that destabilize orders in an attempt to re-institute something 
alternative. To this end, having discussed social imaginaries as meta-discourses, I can move on to 
discuss imaginarization as a political operation constitutive of  mythmaking, which enables social 
subjects to drive yet unrealized political projects further. I will do this with the help of  
psychoanalytic theory.  
A concept that is essential for understanding imaginarization is fantasy. Based on a Lacanian 
reading, fantasy does not merely refer to imagination, but represents an image that is always part 
of  a signifying structure (Evans 1996, 61-62). This means that fantasy is not opposed to reality (as 
imagination would be in other psychoanalytic theory, such as Melanie Klein7), but is situated within 
reality itself  (Daly 1999). For Lacan, the subject is constituted by a lack introduced by the symbolic 
order we are born (and thrown) into: the symbolic order emerges because it is impossible for us to 
represent “the Real”. Our experience of  the symbolic is always “out of  joint”, whereby we are 
always attempting to reconstitute this lost fullness but eventually fail to do so (which is the 
constitutive lack of  subjectivity). This is where fantasy comes into play. As Daly (1999, 223) argues, 
fantasy “functions as a basic structuring principle which enables, in the first place, the formulation 
of  desire within the symbolic order and the establishment of  some kind of  identification within 
the ‘empirical’ world of  infinite possibilities.” Referring to Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of  the 
“impossibility of  society”, meaning that any hegemonic formation can only be contingently 
realized and that the full closure of  social identity is impossible, a fantasy is precisely a promise of  
fulfillment of  all desires or the overcoming of  an obstacle that stands between the fulfillment of  
these desires (see Chapter 2). Without this false promise of  a solution to our issues, political 
                                                          
7 For a discussion on how Melanie Klein’s psychoanalytic theory can be applied in political science, specifically how 
projection and introjection relate to shaping of collective identities, see for instance: Gallager, Julie. 2017. Zimbabwe's 
International Relations: Fantasy, Reality and the Making of the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
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projects would not be conceivable, that is, nobody would “buy into” them. Additionally, were the 
final closure of  social identity possible, we would not need political projects at all but would live in 
a utopian society resolved of  all conflict. Daly (1999, 224) argues that  
at the level of  fantasy, society [its full closure] is regarded as possible; as something which is 
ultimately achievable through a certain overcoming of  specified impedances. In this way, 
ideology subsists in the fantasy of  establishing a final consistency, of  suturing the 
unsuturable, by providing straw enemies—‘fictional’ embodiments of  a transcendental 
lack/impossibility—which ‘if  only they could be eliminated’ would enable the realization of  
harmonious reconciliation. It is at the level of  fantasy that the loss of  social harmony is 
experienced, in terms of  theft and/or sabotage. 
Hence, a central practice of  generating myths as part of  expanding (counter-)hegemonic projects 
that promise the resolution of  a conflict in terms of  suturing a lost unity of  identity is fantasy or 
imaginarizing that a particular symbolic object can take the place of  representing the solution to the 
named problems identified and opposed by the said (counter-)hegemonic order. It is here that I 
will introduce the notion of  the empty signifier (Laclaudian vocabulary) and the objet petit a 
(Lacanian vocabulary) as incarnations of  an absent fullness, an absence that is the cause of  our 
desire and enables a political project to proceed, offering promises that subjects want to invest 
themselves in (see Chapter 2). As mentioned before, in 2013, this symbolic object (or myth) was 
the Brussels agreement, and in 2018, it was the idea of  re-bordering Kosovo and Serbia along 
ethnic lines. Hence, myths emerge in moments of  trying to accommodate a dislocation, they do 
not originate in the past, although they might draw from past events and discourses, such as the 
case of  partition will demonstrate. What these myths differ in is the way they establish and re-
articulate political frontiers between Serbs and Albanians, as well as frontiers within the Serbian 
political collective. Whereas part of  imagining that the Brussels agreement would solve the dispute 
was the notion that Serbs and Albanians would “share” Kosovo and live next to each other in 
peace, if  not with each other (evident in the idea of  the A/CSM), the myth of  partition was 
constituted through separation. Namely, an essential part of  this mythmaking was imagining a 
future in which Serbs and Albanians would be territorially and ethnically separated from each other. 
A historic and unsolvable antagonism between the two groups was identified as the main source 
of  conflict and the only way to resolve it would be to entirely separate them. The myth of  partition 
also introduced a simplification of  political space in terms of  public support of  or opposition to 
partition, in which only those elements of  Serbian society who supported it were considered 
legitimate, casting out any opposition. I will demonstrate this in greater detail in the empirical 
Chapters 5 and 6.   
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1.4 Methodological Premises 
The methodological premises of this thesis rely on the discourse-theoretical assumption that there 
is no “distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 107) 
and that they all form what the post-structuralist approach of Laclau and Mouffe has termed 
discourse: “a totality which includes within itself the linguistic and the non-linguistic” (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1990, 100). That means that materiality can also be analytically considered to be part of 
discourse (Carpentier 2018a) as well as affectivity (Stavrakakis 2007). All social practices are 
discursive, because there is no meaning outside of discourse. Additionally, discourses do not have 
a transcendental center of fixity, but are always (momentarily) anchored around specific 
articulations or nodal points (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). This is what has been referred to as 
contingency or contingent foundations of our social reality. As DeLuca (1999, 334) recognizes, “in 
a world without foundations, without a transcendental signified, without given meanings, the 
concept of articulation is a means to understanding the struggle to fix meaning and define reality 
temporarily” (DeLuca 1999, 334, emphasis added). For Palonen (2018b, 182), following DeLuca 
and Laclau and Mouffe, “articulation is a practice, and hence, [. . .] speech and writing also have a 
meaning-conveying or transforming function” – ergo, discourse is not only a totality but also an 
articulatory practice. This assumption defines the way I approach my material in this thesis. 
Additionally, I draw from Butler’s performativity theory to explain how discourses are sustained: 
if articulation is central to meaning-making, performativity explains the way discourses produce the 
effects that they name (see e.g., Butler 1993). Discursive practices need to be continuously 
performed for meaning to exist at all. Hence, performativity explains how discourses are sustained 
through repetition and embodiment, as well as sedimentation in the material world, but it also 
points towards the constitutive gaps left by practices of repetition, making discursive and material 
change possible. Given all this, I methodologically combine aspects of three post-Laclaudian 
approaches to analysis: the psychoanalytically inspired discourse analysis of the force of discourse 
focusing on jouissance (enjoyment), fantasy (Stavrakakis 2007; Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras 2006), 
and fantasmatic logic (Glynos and Howarth 2007) and drawing from studies of affect (Ahmed 
2004; Sjöstedt Landén 2011); the “Brussels school” that utilizes discourse-theoretical analysis 
(DTA) and also focuses on the relation between discursivity and materiality (Carpentier 2017; 
2018a; Carpentier, De Cleen and Van Brussel 2019); and the “Helsinki school” which focuses on 
rhetoric and performativity, understanding meaning-making as tropological by relying on Laclau’s 
later work on rhetoric (Palonen 2018b). DTA makes use of sensitizing concepts, that is, concepts 
that support the interpretation of social phenomena when doing qualitative research (Carpentier, 
De Cleen and Van Brussel 2019). The primary sensitizing concept is discourse, and the secondary 
concepts are “articulation, nodal point, floating signifier, and subject position, but also contingency 
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and overdetermination, chain of equivalence (and difference), antagonism, agonism, hegemony, 
and social imaginary” (ibid., 13). Since sensitizing concepts are not there to foreclose the analysis, 
but rather to guide the researcher to look at phenomena through particular lenses, I have brought 
additional sensitizing concepts into the analysis, drawing from the works of Marttila (2015; 2018) 
and his post-structuralist discourse analysis (PDA), or from cultural studies of affect (Ahmed 2004; 
Williams 2015). Introducing these concepts helps to flesh out how discursivity, materiality, and 
affectivity work together in social analysis. Therefore, I find this combination particularly suitable, 
since it allows me to pay attention to the nexus between them, considering both the spatial aspect 
of discourse (and mapping out its elements), and the temporal aspect of it (by looking into what 
affectively and materially sustains counter-hegemonic articulations and projects and how dominant 
structures can be changed). 
In light of this decision, it is important to mention why I have not relied on more established 
approaches to discourse analysis, such as critical discourse analysis (CDA), and the discourse-
mythological approach based on CDA developed by Kelsey (2017). As Jørgensen and Phillips 
(2002) and Glynos et al. (2009) argue, the main difference between discourse theoretical analysis à 
la Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and critical discourse analysis (which also relates to discourse historical 
analysis) à la Fairclough and Wodak (1997) is in their perception of discursive practices. Critical 
discourse analysis relies on a distinction between discursive and social practices, understanding 
discourse as only one among many social practices. By contrast, discourse theoretical analysis sees 
all social practices as discursive (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 7) and understands discourse as 
constitutive of social reality (ibid., 20) instead of just one dimension of it. Discourse theoretical 
analysis is particularly suitable for analyzing discourse on a macro-level, illuminating how structures 
enable and constrain our field of action. As Carpentier and De Cleen (2007, 277) argue, following 
Van Dijk’s (1997, 3) definition of discourse studies as “talk and text in context”, discourse 
theoretical analysis examines a macro-context of analysis and understands text in the broadest 
possible meaning of the word, encompassing linguistic and non-linguistic elements. Although it 
does not conflate materiality and discourse, discourse theory does argue that we can only 
understand and grasp the material through discourse – relying on the idea that meaning is only 
created within discourse, making it an ontological as well as ontic category (Carpentier, De Cleen 
and Van Brussel 2019). As I have already mentioned, by conducting a macro-analysis of discursive, 
material and affective structures and practices, I am able to focus on the moments they intersect, 
instead of doing a much more micro-level inspired analysis like CDA would provide the tools for, 
focusing on linguistic elements. Additionally, as I ontologically adapt the position of discourse 
theory that discourse is both linguistic and non-linguistic (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Marttila 2018), 
this approach allows me to analyze discursivity, materiality and affectivity as a cohesive whole, and 
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how they all relate to my central theoretical and analytical concept – myth. Since Kelsey’s (2017) 
approach sees myth only as an ideological concept and treats it as an ontic category, the framework 
does not fit my agenda. 
Data Collection 
In my analysis, I relied on official EU, UN and government documents that are relevant to the 
Brussels dialogue, Serbia’s EU integration process and Serbia’s position towards Kosovo. These 
range from the official EU membership negotiation framework, such as Chapter 35, EU progress 
reports on Serbia, the so-called Brussels agreement (First Agreement of Principles Governing the 
Normalization of Relations) and all subsequent agreements reached in Brussels, such as the 
agreement on the Mitrovica bridge etc. (59 documents in the corpus). I also rely on a range of 
documents from Serbia’s institutional framework, such as the Constitution, different parliamentary 
declarations on Kosovo being Serbia, as well as government decisions and platforms (26 
documents in the corpus). Most of this material is available online, with few exceptions that I 
gathered during my visit to the Government Office for Kosovo and Metohija in November 2017. 
The documents only provide information on the matters that were agreed on in the dialogue 
(relatively stabilized meanings), but they do not provide insight into the process of meaning-making 
(contestation). I have therefore relied on media sources to grasp this dynamic. To map out the 
contestations around Kosovo and bring forward all of the relevant actors in the public discourse, 
I mainly relied on two media sources: one is the most watched news TV program in Serbia, the 
second Dnevnik (Dnevnik 2) airing on the public broadcaster every day at 19:30; the other is the 
online news outlet Danas. Both outlets have publicly available archives online, which I went through 
to collect the material manually. The final corpus consists of 844 transcripts of individual TV 
programs from Dnevnik 2, and 4842 collected written news stories from Danas, from July 2012 to 
December 2018, all mentioning or discussing Kosovo. Additionally, for more context, I conducted 
four semi-structured interviews with subjects involved in the dialogue on Kosovo, namely the 
former directors of the Serbian team Borko Stefanović and Marko Đurić, as well as the head of the 
parliamentary group on Kosovo Milovan Drecun and one former representative of the Serbian 
community in Kosovo gathered around Lista Srpska, Ljubomir Marić. These interviews are only 
used in a contextual manner. I have also in my researcher’s capacity visited Northern Kosovo in 
June 2017 and July 2019 to map out the field and get a better sense of the political climate there. 
Emerging Discourses 
Analytically, I have mapped out two distinct discourses that have emerged from the data. I have 
termed them the community discourse and the partition discourse respectively, and the empirical 
part of the thesis is also structured around them (Chapters 5 and 6). There are also other discourses 
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that I have identified, such as the discourse on self-victimization in Serbia and the discourse on a 
historic animosity between Serbs and Albanians that the community and partition discourse 
intersect with, but they are used contextually and can be found in Chapter 4. The community 
discourse dominated the discursive field of the Brussels dialogue in late 2012 and in 2013, anchored 
by the Brussels agreement seeking to transform antagonistic relations between Serbs and Albanians 
into agonistic (what is understood by the A/CSM and the idea of sharing Kosovo). The partition 
discourse dominated the Brussels dialogue in the second half of 2017 and in 2018, when President 
Aleksandar Vučić initiated the so-called “internal dialogue on Kosovo” which, arguably, sought to 
find an alternative solution to the Brussels agreement whose implementation stalled. 
Following the sensitizing concepts approach laid out above, I focused on specific articulations by 
different hegemonic actors whose function it is to uphold or destabilize a certain order in specific 
moments. As already explained in the theoretical premises above, myths are aimed at both suturing 
dislocations (stabilizing orders) or generating momentum for imagining alternative (counter-
)hegemonic orders that would replace existing ones. Specific articulations act as myths and provide 
a viable analytic lens to grasp this dynamic. These articulations can be material as well, especially if 
they are aimed at stabilizing the given order (or suturing a dislocation). In my analysis, institutions 
of the Republic of Serbia can be perceived as articulations of such a material kind, specifically when 
they are aimed at upholding the “Kosovo is Serbia” claim. But also, specific communities, such as 
the Serb community in Kosovo, can act as (relatively stable) material articulations that uphold this 
claim, especially within the framework of the envisioned A/CSM in Kosovo. In turn, in the 
partition discourse, the territory of Northern Kosovo acts as a material articulation that aims to 
destabilize the status quo and institute an alternative reading of Kosovo for Serbia, one that is 
anchored in physical ownership and the re-bordering of a piece of land, rather than the symbolic 
ownership of the entire territory of Kosovo). Important for this is the notion of performativity, 
especially in light of performing Serbia’s claim to statehood in Kosovo through these institutions, 
communities, and territories, a concept I will devote more attention to in Chapter 2.8 
Rhetorical tropes such as metaphor and metonymy (via synecdoche) are brought into the analysis 
to explain on a macro-level how the two myths mentioned here relate to the dislocated discourse 
of Kosovo is Serbia, and how they aim to mend the dislocation. The Brussels agreement from 2013 
aims to conceal the dislocated structure metaphorically, maintaining the unity of the Kosovo is 
Serbia discourse, while the idea of partition as a counter-hegemonic project aims to displace the 
dislocated structure entirely and institute a new order. 
                                                          
8 For a detailed analysis of Serbia’s performative statehood in Kosovo in 2017 and 2018 in light of the partition talks, 
see Vulović (2020). 
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Apart from focusing on different discursive and material articulations, I also focus on hegemonic 
subjects, particularly the Serbian Government attempting to accommodate the previously 
mentioned dislocation within the framework of the Brussels dialogue. In different moments in 
time, those hegemonic subjects (or “protagonists” in Marttila’s (2015) vocabulary of post-
foundational discourse analysis) are linked to other subjects who are either their “helpers” (subjects 
supporting the attainment/maintenance of ethical ideals) or “opponents” (subjects within the same 
discourse opposing/endangering the attainment of ethical ideals). Additionally, opponents who lie 
outside the given discourse constituting it are called “antagonistic others” and represent threats or 
dangers to the attainment/sustainment of certain ethical ideals. In my analysis, these can also be 
agonistic others, as will be explained later. I will demonstrate in my analysis how the political 
frontiers between who lies within and outside the discourse can shift quickly, especially since 2017 
when the SNS started tightening its grip on the institutional framework in Serbia, gaining absolute 
parliamentary majority and Aleksandar Vučić winning the presidency. 
As a thread running through my analysis, apart from discursive/symbolic analysis (the form of 
discourses), I also explore the issue of affects, that is, the force behind sustaining or challenging 
different discourses (affective investment in Laclaudian terms). The Lacanian notion of jouissance will 
be problematized here, as well as the political implications of articulated emotions aimed at 
sustaining or challenging antagonistic boundaries (politics of emotions, see Ahmed (2004)), and 
lastly, the attempts to change the “structures of feeling” (Williams 2015) that constitute the Kosovo 
discourse.  
1.5 Ethics and Researcher’s Position 
As my data consists of  publicly available sources (from EU, UN and other government documents, 
in addition to online news articles and a daily news show), the data collection itself  has no 
significant ethical implications. The four interviews I conducted with high-level officials are meant 
as supportive material, because I conducted them to improve my understanding of  the political 
context of  my study. As the interviews do not constitute public discourse, they are only used 
consultatively, if  anything is missing from the general context. All respondents I interviewed were 
public figures and have given me their statements in their official public capacity, for which I have 
obtained verbal informed consent.  
In this thesis, an additional aim was to provide a subjectivity statement on my personal ties to the 
Serb community in Northern Kosovo. Namely, I was born in Mitrovica when it was still part of 
Yugoslavia and even though I left Kosovo to pursue my education in 2009, I still maintain regular 
contact with my closest family and friends still living there. Additionally, my father was mayor of  
Zubin Potok (one of  the four North Kosovo municipalities) between 2013 and 2019, which helped 
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me to gain access to the four interviewees I mentioned above and might have helped in enhancing 
the interviewer-interviewee relationship. I have not used additional information provided (if  any 
was provided) to me by my father or close family in my analysis, which is based on publicly available 
sources and my own contextual knowledge of  the area. However, I acknowledge that this 
relationship has helped me gain access where other researchers might have encountered difficulties, 
since the Serb community in the North is quite a closed one. I also acknowledge that my coming 
from this region could have influenced the way I see and understand certain political contestations. 
After all, the Brussels dialogue is a complex negotiations framework and the relations between 
Serbia and Kosovo are still fairly complicated, with many issues still contested between the two 
parties. Serbia’s policies towards Kosovo and any resulting agreements might have a tangible impact 
on the lives of  my family members who still live there. Therefore, as a researcher, I cannot escape 
the context I was born in, but what I can do is diligently follow the highest standards of  scholarly 
practice and conduct thorough discourse analysis. Since I have not lived in Kosovo since 2009 and 
have been educated in Germany and am pursuing my doctoral program in Finland, I maintain a 
critical distance to the topic of  my research. The final judgement on my impartiality and objectivity 
is left to the reader.  
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 1, the introduction, has problematized my 
research question and the main arguments of the thesis and offered a literature review to situate 
these arguments in three areas: research on the Kosovo myth, research on myth from a discourse-
theoretical point of view and research in Southeast European studies on the nexus of EU 
integration and mythmaking around Kosovo in Serbia. It provided a concise overview of the field, 
explained my rationale of research as well as introduced some main theoretical and methodological 
concepts, which will be elaborated further throughout the thesis. 
Chapter 2 is devoted to theoretical discussions in which I delve deeper into the meanings of 
particular key concepts used in this thesis. I open with an overview of the body of literature on 
national myths and elaborate on how myths can ground different communities through drawing 
political frontiers, which this thesis sees as a populist logic of us-building. This is followed by 
further elaborations on how myth is related to questions of structure and change, performativity, 
temporality and psychoanalytic concepts of jouissance and fantasy. Here I attempt to provide a 
thorough examination of the central concept of myth from the perspective of post-foundational 
discourse theory and psychoanalysis, through utilizing Lacanian concepts of fantasy, jouissance 
(enjoyment) and desire, and connecting them to Laclau’s notion of the empty signifier. 
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Chapter 3 is devoted to an overview of my methodology, which follows a discourse-theoretical and 
performative approach to data, by discussing materiality and affectivity as well. This 
methodological triangulation of discourse, materiality and affect is a novel framework that can be 
applied to other contexts as well. Here, I explain in greater detail what issues I focus on in the 
analysis and how I proceeded with data collection and analysis. The central analytical concepts 
(sensitizing concepts) that I use are, first and foremost, discourse (which is also an ontological 
concept in discourse theory), discursive materiality, articulation, myths, empty and floating 
signifiers, nodal points, politics of emotion, structures of feeling, jouissance and fantasy, hegemonic 
actors (also termed protagonists), antagonistic and agonistic others, and similar. These sensitizing 
concepts can be viewed as heuristic devices that help me to grasp the dynamics of meaning-making 
in the context of my analysis (Carpentier, De Cleen and Van Brussel 2019). 
Chapter 4 is both a contextual and an analytical chapter, in which I provide an overview of Kosovo 
and its position within the wider field of Serbian politics specifically since 2008, when Kosovo 
declared independence. Here, the Kosovo imaginary is explained in greater detail, particularly how 
it intersects with other discourses, such as the discourse of self-victimization in Serbia or the 
discourse of a historic animosity between Serbs and Albanians. Next, I provide an overview of the 
Brussels dialogue and through an analytical lens, explain its function as a political contact zone 
bringing a range of subjects together who are engaged in hegemonic contestation about fixing the 
meaning of Kosovo not only in their respective domestic political fields, but also transnationally. 
Here I attempt to demonstrate how these two levels of national and transnational entangle in the 
contact zone of the Brussels dialogue and how various subjects subscribe into these discourses and 
attain particular subject positions. The contact zone not only enables the contestation of a given 
issue in order to expand the horizon of possible meanings, but it also constraints the contestation 
in certain respects. A particular solution to the Kosovo issue would have potential implications for 
the territorial integrity of many non-recognizing states, which is why a potential solution needs to 
be adaptable to a range of discursive contexts. 
Chapter 5 is an analytical chapter in which I discuss how the community discourse is held together, 
anchored by the nodal point of the people, particularly the Serb community in Kosovo (via the 
A/CSM) and defined by an agonistic relation to Kosovo Albanians. I explain how the Brussels 
agreement from 2013 was adopted as a means to accommodate the dislocation of Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence while still holding the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse together. I 
examine how Serbia’s claim to Kosovo is performed in various aspects, namely through 
institutional integration into the Kosovo framework (A/CSM), through Serbia’s own institutional 
framework, and through an array of subjects, such as the Srpska lista (the dominant Serb-led party 
in Kosovo, supported by Belgrade) and other members of the Serb community in Kosovo. I also 
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devote a part of this chapter to the politics of emotions pursued by the Serbian Government in 
their effort to re-articulate the Serbian-Albanian relationship and finalize the chapter with an 
analysis of the various subjects’ positionalities and how they are constituted within this discourse 
as “leaders” and “brave” political actors. 
Chapter 6 is the final analytical chapter in which I explain how the partition discourse emerged as 
a response to the lack of implementation of A/CSM. This chapter outlines two main hegemonic 
interventions of the Serbian Government in light of re-articulating its claim to Kosovo in 2017 and 
2018: 1) transforming Serbian-Albanian relations from agonism (which was characteristic of the 
community discourse) to antagonism and articulating them as relations between two peoples across 
territories, not just between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians; 2) abandoning the fantasmatic claim to 
ownership of entire Kosovo as a means of holding the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse together and 
instead focusing on claims to physical ownership, material ownership of a territory through the 
possibility of exerting governance (substituting one fantasy with another). To unpack the first 
transformation, aiming to politicize the question of territory in Northern Kosovo, the chapter 
addresses, firstly, how the conflict itself is articulated, secondly, how the many antagonistic Others 
are articulated, followed by, thirdly, how the political “us” is articulated. These articulations follow 
a populist logic (Laclau 2005) and polarize Serbia’s political field. To unpack the second 
transformation, I focus on two issues: firstly, I address the internal dialogue on Kosovo from 2017 
as a destabilizing moment aiming to politicize previously sedimented meanings, that is “de-
mythologize” and “de-emotionalize/rationalize” Serbian politics towards Kosovo; secondly, I 
address how this de-mythologization and rationalization of the Kosovo question was tied to a new 
vision of Serbia’s future, a future in which Serbia is economically prosperous and part of the EU, 
for the realization of which the “mythological approach” to Kosovo poses an obstacle. This vision 
is guided by the generation of a new myth as an empty signifier – a “compromise” solution that 
would ensure that both Serbia and Kosovo are equally satisfied and dissatisfied, that would lift all 
the obstacles in Serbia’s path towards joining the EU, and that would ensure an economically viable 
future for Serbia and the coming generations. The idea of partition takes the place of representing 
this compromise, with the body of President Vučić acting also as an empty signifier embodying a 
potential compromise solution. 
Chapter 7 provides the conclusion of the thesis, attempting to bring together these conflicting 
claims in different moments in time, while also exploring what these contestations might mean for 
the future of Serbia’s politics under the leadership of the SNS. Even though the analysis focuses 
mainly on the period from 2012 to 2018 (after which the Brussels dialogue was put on hold), 
discussions on the issue of Kosovo in Serbia continued, although they remained fairly uncontested 
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outside the contact zone of the dialogue, turning them into a “monologue” of sorts.9 This is why 
they are not included in the analysis, but it becomes evident that the issue of Kosovo turns into a 
defining subject of contestation for the leadership of the SNS during their rule. Kosovo still has 
major mobilizing potential in Serbia that is generated (and performed) at different defining 
moments – it is not a constant. As a social imaginary, it remains uncontested until it is destabilized 
or questioned by certain practices. This is evident in the recent violent protests before the Serbian 
Parliament in 2020, in which some protestors from the opposition sang the famous song “Oh 
Kosovo, Kosovo!” (Oj Kosovo, Kosovo!) and shouted “Arrest Vučić!” and “Traitor!” as a sign of Vučić 
treacherously “handing over” Kosovo against the people’s will (Danas 2020, 8 July). Even though 
the protests were not directly aimed at Vučić’s politics towards Kosovo, but came about as a 
reaction to the coronavirus lockdown measures and increasingly authoritarian governance, Kosovo 
was articulated in a chain of equivalence as a demand against defining issues of Vučić’s rule. The 
conclusion also provides a problematization of what the thesis has succeeded to achieve, and what 
it could not address. I also provide avenues for future research.  
                                                          
9 The Brussels dialogue officially continued in mid-2020, but without contestations on territory, returning it more to 
the previous discussions on A/CSM. Apart from that, the so-called “economic normalization” of Serbian-Kosovar 
relations was driven as a parallel process by the USA, with one agreement signed in the White House between Belgrade 
and Pristina in September 2020. Since this is an ongoing process, I have not included it in the analysis, which instead 
will conclude with the stalemate of December of 2018. Including the current contestations would bring nothing new 
to the analysis, since no solution has yet been found and no new myths have been articulated. 
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2 Theoretical Framework 
 
My thesis has implications for the understanding of  myth as a theoretical concept, by 
problematizing the notion of  temporality. I have relied on discourse theory and psychoanalysis to 
do that. Myth not only relates to past events, which is how it is examined in the literature on national 
myths but can indeed be part of  political projects aimed at becoming hegemonic (in the future). It 
is here that the link between dislocation and fantasy becomes important, since for any myth to be 
successful at suturing dislocation, it has to offer a promise of  fulfilling fantasies and closing lacks 
in the order that the dislocation might have revealed. I argue that myths in the form of  empty 
signifiers act as those promises, promises embodied by a specific signifier that points to an absence. 
It anchors a larger discursive-affective structure (what I have called “new objectivity” relying on 
Laclau (1990)) aiming to replace the dislocated one. Its fulfillment is projected onto a future state 
of  affairs. As such, myths are not only ideological (covering over a lack) but are necessary for 
meaning-making in general. I will problematize this argument throughout this chapter, which will 
be structured as follows: firstly, I will situate my argument within the national myth strand of  
literature, and take a look at political myths as well, which helps open up the discussion on 
temporality. Secondly, I will illuminate the important aspects of  structure and change, and how the 
institution of  “new objectivities” is even possible and under what conditions. After that, I will 
move on to discuss spatiality and temporality, which also relates to structuration and change, and 
tie it more closely to my conception of  myth anchored in a Laclaudian and psychoanalytic 
understanding. Subsequently, I devote significant attention to the two modalities of  myth that I 
understand as dialectical, namely myths as a new objectivity (inverted imaginarization of  the 
dislocated order) and myths as empty signifiers (incarnating the promise of  suturing a lack in the 
order). I conclude with a deeper analysis of  psychoanalytic concepts such as desire, fantasy and 
enjoyment, which all help me explain the logic of  how myths operate and how they remain 
convincing to the subjects performing them and subscribing to their promises. 
2.1 From National Myths to Discourse Theory: Building Community through 
Antagonistic and Agonistic Articulations 
As I have already indicated in the introduction, the dominant strand of  scholarship on myth relates 
to studies of  nationalism, in which we speak of  national myths. The role of  national myths in 
constituting collective identities such as nations is undeniable. One only needs to turn to the 
“classics” of  this body of  literature, such as Anthony Smith (1999) and his notion of  myths of  
ethnic descent as building blocks of  articulating a sense of  shared nationhood, a common “place 
of  origin”. Hylland Eriksen (2004) wrote about myths of  common descent as well, and their 
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institution as founding moments of  nations, as well as ethnic groups beyond the national level. 
Michael (2010) addresses ideological uses of  history for nationalist purposes, while Alonso (1994) 
focuses on representations of  the past marked by myths that structure present and future 
nationalist politics. Morden (2016) addresses the emotional architecture of  national myths and 
introduces narratives and their emotional dimension to explain the potency of  national myths. 
Bouchard (2013), also touching on the emotional aspect of  myth, provides four characteristics of  
national myths: myths are constituted by both truth and fiction; myths speak to specific histories 
but also assume universal forms; myths have emotional power through which they obtain a sacred 
position; and myths produce energy that compels individuals and collectives to act, either towards 
maintaining a status quo or advocating change. Bouchard (ibid.) also refers to myths as anchors, 
based on specific events that can act as founding moments of  nations. Firstly, the conception of  
myths as anchors, and all the above-mentioned conceptions of  myth, are closely connected to Jan 
Assmann’s understanding of  myths as specific readings of  history, namely that “[m]yth is past that 
has been condensed into founding story” (Assmann 1990, 10). This story anchors a political 
collective into either a specific territory, or a specific historical moment. Secondly, what nationalism 
studies’ elaborations on myths also share is that they conceptualize myths as narratives, or readings 
of  certain factual or imagined events, which are then brought about as the founding moments of  
different collectivities, such as nations and ethnic groups. These narratives have specific boundaries 
and can be related to different political practices, much as the previously mentioned traditional 
understanding of  the “Kosovo myth”. Thirdly, they often distinguish between “factual” events and 
“fictional” ones, assuming a distinction between factual reality, and our representations of  it. 
However, this is not the manner in which discourse theory in my reading would conceptualize 
myths, as indicated in the introduction. To start with the last point above, discourse theory assumes 
that we can never grasp the “factual” reality behind our representations, but that this reality is 
inevitably structured by the discursive dimension of  the social. This means that the “truth” does 
not simply exist “out there”, but that we are born and socialized into the symbolic order of  
discourse which we can never escape. This assumption already problematizes the question of  what 
a myth might be, often understood as “hybrid” fictional-factual elaborations of  the past that serve 
a political purpose. If  we can never actually go beyond discourse and grasp what we might call 
“reality”, we can only rely on this discursive order to make sense of  the world. We can contrast this 
with the previously mentioned understanding of  myth by Barthes (1972), who defines myths as 
“secondary representation[s] which transform[s] a meaning into form, often with the function to 
mystify ideologies” (ibid), arguing that myths are forms of  ideological distortions of  reality which 
aim to hide the contingency of  the narrative they address and present it as natural. While this might 
be one aspect of  myth, Bottici (2007, 207) rightfully notes that it is problematic to rely on the 
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notion of  “distortion of  reality” since even “[n]arrative history is also intrinsically distorting […] 
because it presents as ‘facts’ that which is instead the constructed spectacle of  a narrative.” This 
not only relates to history and readings of  the past, but is also constitutive of  the way we 
understand the world and offers a distinct ontological position. To utilize the Lacanian distinction 
between the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary order (see below), the Real cannot ever fully be 
captured, since it lies beyond and is irreducible to the symbolic order of  human communication, 
i.e. discourse (Evans 1996). 
Myths, then, are not simply a hybrid fictional-factual narrative, but they emerge in situations in 
which our discursive order is confronted with something it cannot fully make sense of  and 
represent cohesively. That is, when discursive structures are decentered by dislocations, alternative 
representations emerge that attempt to re-introduce sense into the decentered structures. These 
alternative representations might of  course be anchored in already-established narratives of  past 
events, but they can also be something new, or a re-activation of  previously available options that 
did not quite succeed in instituting themselves into the dominant discursive order. Hence, the 
boundary between what is “real” and what is discursive is blurred by discourse theory and only 
reinforced by bringing in psychoanalytic theory to support it. Myths as articulations are 
simultaneously projected into a future state of  being, one in which the dislocation would be solved, 
i.e., a situation in which a particular difficulty can be overcome has to be imaginarized. Since no 
discourse is ever fully centered but it can only appear as contingently centered through nodal points 
and the establishment of  hegemony (commonly known as the “structural undecidability” of  the 
social) and, consequently, since dislocation is constitutive of  social orders (Laclau 1990), the 
production of  myths is inevitable for meaning-making. Myths constitute a dimension of  meaning-
making per se, since each hegemonic order will inevitably encounter a moment of  destabilization, 
i.e., a dislocatory event – nothing can ever stay the same, which is the main point about contingency. 
This is a dimension of  myth that has not been investigated in discourse theory so far. 
The conception above already indicates a temporal understanding of  myth, since for any 
articulation aimed at mending a dislocated order to be effective, it has to offer something that the 
current order cannot. This temporal dimension of  myth is already present in the strand of  literature 
dealing with political myths, including Bottici (2007) Bottici and Challand (2014) and Bell (2003). 
Studies focusing on political myths emphasize that myths are used to project the existence of  a 
certain community into the future. For instance, Tudor (1972, 91) claims that political myths can 
be divided into foundation myths and eschatological myths. The former myths explain “the present 
in terms of  a creative act that took place in the past. This act is sometimes sufficiently remote to 
be little more than a legend, but, in most cases, it is an actual and often quite recent historical event 
which has been dramatized for the purposes of  political argument.” Such myths “lend themselves 
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especially to arguments justifying a status quo” (ibid., italics in the original), which can also be applied 
to the Kosovo myth as the founding moment of  Serbian statehood and nationhood (the first 
analytical articulation I mention), as well as its re-articulation into the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse, 
which is aimed at preserving Serbia’s hegemonic claim to Kosovo in terms of  territory (the second 
analytical articulation). On the other hand, eschatological myths tell a story of  a new order as 
projected into the future, sometimes “being the complete reversal of  a certain state of  affairs within 
the world. The old order is abolished and the new order comes into being, but the world as such 
remains” (ibid., 92). This can be applied in the context of  the third analytical articulation I 
mentioned, the counter-hegemonic project of  partitioning Kosovo as part of  a new vision of  
Serbia’s prosperous future without a conflict with Kosovo. 
Similarly, Bottici (2007, 179), building up on Tudor’s work on political myths, claims that political 
myth 
can be defined as the work on a common narrative by which the members of  a social group 
(or society) make significance of  their political experiences and deeds. Consequently, what 
makes a political myth out of  a simple narrative is not its content or its claim to truth […] 
but the fact that this narrative creates significance, that it is shared by a group and that it 
affects the specifically political conditions in which this group operates. 
By political conditions Bottici means “provisionally the conditions concerning the struggle for the 
distribution of  power and resources which can, as a last resort, have recourse to physical force” 
(ibid., 180). Contrary to Tudor, who claims that what makes myths specifically political is their 
subject matter, namely that they deal with politics (Tudor 1972, 17), Bottici and Challand (2013, 
92) claim that what makes them political is their orientation towards action, as “invitation[s] to act 
here and now”, “precisely because they address the specifically political conditions of  a social 
group.” I want to add that the political should not only concern itself  with the struggle for the 
distribution of  resources and power, as the previous authors argue, but with struggles over fixing 
meaning, as will be elaborated throughout this thesis. 
A specifically temporal as well as spatial dimension of  myth can be found in Bell’s (2003, 75) 
conception of  national mythscapes, which he defines as a “discursive realm, constituted by and 
through temporal and spatial dimensions, in which the myths of  the nation are forged, transmitted, 
reconstructed and negotiated constantly.” The spatial dimension “tends to be rooted in particular 
constructions of  an often-idealized bounded territory, for example a romanticized national 
landscape” (ibid., 76), which can also be found in the articulation of  the Kosovo myth as the 
founding moment of  Serbian statehood, since Kosovo is considered to be the origin of  the 
medieval Serbian state. However, it can also be recognized in the construction of  Northern Kosovo 
during 2017 and 2018 as an idealized bounded territory, the (re-)incorporation of  which into 
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Serbian state borders would act as the founding moment of  an alternative political future for Serbia 
marked by prosperity and the resolution of  the Kosovo issue. Bell argues that the temporal 
dimension of  the mythscape denotes “a historical span, a narrative of  the passing of  years, […] a 
narrative that is most likely to include inter alia a story of  the origins of  the nation and of  
subsequent momentous events and heroic figures” (ibid., 75). Bell adds that myths “subsume all 
of  the various events, personalities, traditions, artefacts and social practices that (self) define the 
nation and its relation to the past, present and future” (ibid.), which hints at the notion that myths 
do not only pertain to past events, but that they constitute the given collective’s relation to the 
present and future, i.e., that they have a temporal dimension. 
Two things can be concluded at this point. Firstly, conceptions of  myths as temporal categories as 
outlined above still “narrativize” them, i.e., they focus on myths as discourses with specific nodal 
points, which this thesis understands as the ontic dimension of  myth. As mentioned before, I take 
issue with understanding myths as narratives, because as I have argued, myths are constitutive of  
meaning-making and are not merely nodal-points that anchor discourses. This is the ontological 
dimension of  myth I have mentioned in the introduction and which I elaborate on later in this 
chapter. Secondly, myths, when they act as nodal points or anchors of  specific collectivities, not 
only do so for national collectives, but also for any other type of  political collective. They also 
simultaneously constitute these collectives through their anchoring effect. I want to argue that these 
collectives in the form of  nations, as Bell (2003) mentions, are not pre-existing entities that can 
post factum articulate their relationship to the past, present or future, but that they are formed in 
the very act of  naming. Laclau (2005) has referred to the unity of  a collective as the retroactive 
effect of  naming. Apart from Laclau, it is also useful to consider Brubaker’s understanding of  
nationhood as an event here, whereby he claims that “instead of  focusing on nations as real groups, 
we should focus on nationhood and nationness, on ‘nation’ as […] contingent event” (Brubaker 
1996, 7). He articulates nationness as “an event, as something that suddenly crystallizes rather than 
gradually develops, as a contingent, conjuncturally fluctuating, and precarious frame of  vision and 
basis for individual and collective action, rather than as a relatively stable product of  deep 
developmental trends in economy, polity, or culture” (ibid., 19). It is evident that Brubaker also 
places an emphasis on articulation and naming as constitutive of  building communities – even 
though he only speaks of  nations – and renounces an essentialist understanding of  this category. 
Hence, myth, or the “work on myth”, highlighting its processual character (Blumenberg 1985), can 
be conceptualized as constitutive of  the “making” of  nationness and other collectives. Even the 
most sedimented discourse needs to be performed, i.e., re-constituted time and again, its “borders” 
re-articulated and shifted time and again to have meaning. This performativity that is intrinsically 
tied to meaning-making opens up the possibility for the re-constitution of  elements of  a 
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sedimented discourse. Performativity can best be grasped through analyzing moments that 
constitute discursive collectives such as nations. As Palonen (2018a, 396) argues, “[m]oments enable 
us to grasp the significant processes of  identification and disidentification as well as challenges to 
and establishment of  new structures of  meaning.” This thesis argues that myth can be constitutive 
not only of  the making (or better yet, naming) of  a national community, which is predominantly 
how the Kosovo myth has been explored so far, but of  the naming of  political communities 
gathered around the support for a particular party’s vision, that is, the SNS and President Vučić as 
a leader more specifically (see Chapter 6). 
What performatively constituting a community involves is the operation of  boundary-drawing, that 
is, articulating who lies within and who is outside the given discourse. This is also crucial for the 
ontic understanding of  myth, since myths as concrete articulations and solutions to dislocations 
(myths as signifiers) also aim to (re-)draw political frontiers and problematize who lies within the 
particular solution and who lies outside it. The political frontier between the inside and the outside 
of  the discourse is an antagonistic one (Laclau and Mouffe 1985), which Mouffe (2005) later 
extended by incorporating an agonistic view of  it. That is, a community is built by extending the 
logic of  equivalence between signifiers in the same chain under the empty banner of  the people 
(Laclau 2005) or the nation, for instance – this way sedimenting the political frontier between the 
signifiers of  the chain and what gets excluded from it, simplifying the political space. On the other 
hand, the logic of  difference counteracts the logic of  equivalence by diversifying the political space 
and expanding it to include a greater degree of  complexity (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). The two 
logics often operate simultaneously. 
Building on discourse theory, having done extensive research on inter-community building in the 
Cypriot context, Carpentier summarizes the nodal points of  antagonism and agonism into the 
following: antagonism is defined by a radical difference between the in-group and the out-group, 
the homogenization of  the self, and by enemy destruction, whereas agonism is defined by 
“conflictual togetherness”, pluralization of  the self, and peaceful and non-violent interaction 
(Carpentier 2018b, 155). Put simply, while antagonisms rest on an articulation of  the Other as 
enemy, as somebody who “prevents me from being totally myself ” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 122), 
agonism rests on an articulation of  the Other as an adversary, a legitimate opponent whose ability 
to speak and be heard is recognized, and is prevalent in democratic discourses (Mouffe 2005). The 
antagonistic articulation of  the Other simplifies the political space into “us” and “them”, relying 
on a homogenization of  the us (Carpentier 2018b), while the agonistic articulation of  the Other 
allows for a more heterogeneous understanding of  political activity, in which the “us” is not 
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exclusively defined by the opposition to the Other and where the “us” is more pluralized.10 
However, these political boundaries are never entirely fixed and Carpentier calls for an analytical 
incorporation of  a structural and temporal coexistence of  agonism and antagonism (ibid.), bearing 
in mind that sedimented political frontiers can get re-articulated as well. For the context of  my 
study, this means that “[e]ven relatively stable identity formations, [such as national identifications] 
when encountering a dislocatory event, entering a state of  crisis or a ‘critical juncture’, often lose 
the appearance of  stability and fullness” (Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras 2006, 150). In these 
situations, “they can only attempt to retain their hegemonic status by blaming someone else, even 
a previously friendly outgroup. This is why scapegoating, the sinister type of  difference as exclusion 
and demonization, always remains a real possibility inscribed at the core of  any identity claim” 
(ibid.). 
Relying on the elaborations of  agonism and antagonism, I will now problematize how mythmaking 
is necessary for community building through illuminating the relation between antagonism, 
agonism and a populist logic of  community building. I follow Laclau’s (2005) argument of  
populism as a political logic of  articulation that unifies disperse claims under the empty banner of  
the people. This conception was later elaborated on by Palonen (2020) as a logic of  us-building 
that is constitutive of  politics as such, that has a distinct form but not a content, and that constitutes 
an us through drawing political frontiers amplified by affects to what lies beyond the frontier. 
Conceptualized in this manner, a populist logic governs any form of  community-building, be it 
nationalist or otherwise democratic, since a group can only attain an identity in a relational manner, 
which in discourse theory is understood as the relational ontology of  meaning (see Marttila 2015). 
This is a very de-essentialized reading of  populism, which enables us to discuss how group identity 
is built under the banner of  a nation, a democratic society, or – when the social space is simplified 
and polarized to the extreme – under the banner of  a leader (Laclau 2005). In this sense, populism 
should not be understood as “the goal of  politics, but as the way in which political meanings are 
made, constituted and grounded”, as “a process where foundations are challenged, where new 
dichotomies and divisions are introduced, and where the contingent and ultimately ungroundable 
figure of  the people is performed” (Palonen 2020, 56). 
In agonistic articulations of  the Other in society, the social space is pluralized, that is, the “us” is 
not solely built around the opposition to a “them” that entirely constitutes their identity, but the 
group’s identity is constituted in a heterogeneous manner (Carpentier 2018b). Many different social 
                                                          
10 There is also the concept of heterogeneity that Laclau (2005) introduces to discuss the social as not only comprised 
of antagonistic or agonistic relations. For things to be meaningful in discourse, which occurs through establishing 
relations between elements, some things need to be left meaningless. Since the field of discursivity is comprised of an 
infinite number of discourses, not all discourses can be meaningful for certain constellations at once. For a greater 
discussion on the topic of heterogeneity and how it relates to myth, see Chapter 2.3. 
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actors are recognized as having a legitimate claim to represent their political demands and claim to 
represent the group as such. This is typical of  democratic discourses, in which the polarization of  
society in not too pronounced. While the community discourse of  2013 cannot be identified as 
entirely democratic, the myth of  the Brussels agreement was able to unify diverse demands in 
Serbian society, as well as in Kosovo, since the provisions of  the agreement were articulated in an 
ambiguous manner. The Brussels agreement as a myth was thus also able to unify the Serbian 
nation in a heterogeneous manner, seeking “national consensus” on the Kosovo question, since 
many parties from the entire political spectrum seemed to support its implementation in the 
beginning. The report on the agreement was adopted with a large majority in the Serbian Parliament 
(see Chapter 5). Simultaneously, it allowed critical voices from the opposition to emerge and sought 
not to abolish differences between them, but to unify them under the same politics towards Kosovo 
among many other differences, be it economic policy, or EU integration. This was possible because 
the Brussels agreement was able to cover over the dislocating effects of  Kosovo’s independence 
on the sedimented discourse that Kosovo is Serbia, which seemingly remained untouched, since 
the Brussels agreement did not problematize Kosovo’s status as an independent state. Thus, myths 
are powerful tools for articulating a sense of  unity in society, such as the Kosovo myth as a national 
myth has done for unifying the Serbian national political collective since Milošević. However, there 
are degrees to its polarizing logic, with the Brussels agreement managing to unify the political 
collective in a pluralistic, heterogeneous manner, while the idea of  partition unified it in a 
homogeneous manner. 
In antagonistic articulations of  the Other in society, the social space is inevitably simplified, reduced 
to an opposition between us and them that comes to define the group’s identity. This is where the 
logic of  populism as a frontier-drawing principle becomes more visible, since it has an effect on 
the simplification of  political difference and often polarization of  society. Governed by the logic 
of  equivalence, diverse claims are brought together under the umbrella of  one signifier, united by 
a common issue, disregarding the differences between them. This can occur when a leader assumes 
the sole right of  representing the entire chain of  demands, and thus constitutes the in-group as 
only those who subscribe to this logic of  representation. In Chapter 6, I discuss how in 2017 and 
2018 the social space for debating the Kosovo issue became increasingly polarized in Serbia, 
governed by a simplified populist logic of  us-building around the support for the leader, President 
Aleksandar Vučić. By offering a Laclaudian account of  populist logic in Serbia, I contribute to a 
growing literature on populism in Serbia, which has so far mainly been examined from a historical 
point of  view (Berend 2020; Grdešić 2019; Stojarová and Vykoupilová 2008), with the exception 
of  Vranić (2019) offering a more contemporary account. 
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In such situations of  extreme polarization and incarnation of  ideals by one person, the production 
of  myths is deemed legitimate and can carry support only if  it is articulated by the leader themself, 
which is the case with the myth of  partition discussed in Chapter 6. The myth of  partition 
constituted the articulation of  the Albanian Other as antagonistic and allowed for Serbs to be 
constituted as “true” or “proper” members of  the nation if  they supported the leader’s politics. 
The “us” was built around support for Vučić and his ideas (such as partition), while all others, be 
it domestic opposition parties, some members of  the civil society, or even Serbs in Kosovo, were 
articulated as the antagonistic Others. Thus, in the partition discourse, community is not built 
around heterogeneous affiliations with the nation or the state, but around affiliation with one 
person, which resembles authoritarian regimes (Bieber 2020). 
Having explained my main theoretical argument and contextualized it with theory on national 
myths and political myths, I am now able to move on to the problematization of  my main argument 
on myth as an ontological category. I will do so by, firstly, outlaying a basic understanding of  
structure and change in discourse theory, where I will elaborate on performativity theory and how 
it allows us to think of  discursivity and materiality as constitutive of  one another. After that, I move 
on to my elaboration of  myth as new objectivity and empty signifier, by bringing in psychoanalytic 
concepts of  jouissance and affectivity, fantasy and desire. This will allow me to move on to my 
methodological framework, which explicitly emphasizes the nexus between discursivity, materiality 
and affectivity. 
2.2 Structure and Change in Discourse Theory: Repetition, Re-articulation, 
Performativity  
As indicated in the introduction, this thesis will look at how new structures are articulated as a 
result of  dislocations, such as the Brussels agreement, and how existing structures are re-articulated 
into something different, that is, how counter-hegemonic projects are formed. The latter of  these 
will specifically pay attention to the processuality of  such a project, that is, its making in relation to 
already existing structures. This attempt inevitably leads us to a discussion of  structures and their 
change, specifically when we look at sedimented structures such as the Kosovo imaginary in Serbia. 
Post-structuralist discourse theory presumes that we as social subjects inhabit structures and are 
determined by them, although not fully determined. A central concept here is discourse, which 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) define as a structured “totality which includes within itself  the linguistic 
and the non-linguistic” (Laclau and Mouffe 1990, 100), rejecting “the distinction between discursive 
and non-discursive practices” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 107). As mentioned in the introduction, 
the term discourse denotes a structure as well as a practice. While discourse theory acknowledges 
that the material and the discursive are structurally different (see Carpentier 2018a), it implies that 
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all meaning is constituted within discourse, hence all social practices only become meaningful to us 
through discourse. This is why it is such a central category. To explain this notion in psychoanalytic 
terms, it is useful to think of  the discursive in terms of  the symbolic order as defined by Lacan 
(see Evans 1996). Namely, Lacan distinguishes between the order of  the Symbolic, which is the 
order of  language, or the order of  discourse, which we need to talk about the order of  the Real, 
which is ultimately ungraspable. As Stavrakakis (2017, 83) explains, “every human [being] becomes 
a subject in language” since it agrees to be “represented by the signifier”. Even though the signifier 
offers a relatively stable representation of  subjectivity, when subjects enter this symbolic realm of  
discourse as children, they sacrifice a real “‘singularity’ of  the subject” which can never be returned 
(ibid.) – though our lives will be about an attempt to re-capture this lost enjoyment in the Real 
(jouissance, as will be explained later). 
The Real in Lacanian theory is what lies beyond the Symbolic, something we cannot grasp directly, 
and which resists symbolization. In Evans’ words (1996, 163), “[t]he real is ‘the impossible’ (S11, 
167) because it is impossible to imagine, impossible to integrate into the symbolic order, and 
impossible to attain in any way.” The Real can be opposed to “reality”, as our attempt to speak of  
or represent the Real. As Stavrakakis (2017, 83) argues, “the emergence of  the subject in the socio-
symbolic terrain […] presupposes a division between reality (which denotes social construction 
and representation) and the real (a concept designating whatever escapes such representation).” 
Furthermore, “[r]eality is dynamic and meaningful, but ultimately, limited and alienating; the real, 
however, denotes what insists beyond – but also within – this reality by lacking nothing. Reality, the 
psychosocially overdetermined materiality of  the signifier always attempts to symbolise the real of  
human and physical nature” (ibid.). In other words, what we might call reality is in a Lacanian sense 
only an attempt to represent and symbolize the Real, but the Real is un-representable and un-
symbolizable – our attempts will always fail. Thus, we need to satisfy ourselves with reality (our 
construction), instead of  the Real, the Unknowable. 
The Real is thus also connected to the material, and hence to the body. Since the Real cannot be 
symbolized, symbolization introduces “‘a cut in the real’ in the process of  signification: ‘it is the 
world of  words that creates the world of  things” (Lacan 1977, 65). This resonates with Laclau and 
Mouffe’s (1985) idea that the material can only be grasped through language, that is, that social 
practices only have meaning within discourse (i.e., the symbolic in Lacanian terms). Apart from the 
real and the symbolic, Lacan also introduces the order of  the imaginary, which Evans (1996, 84) 
defines as “the realm of  image and imagination, deception and lure. The principal illusions of  the 
imaginary are those of  wholeness, synthesis, autonomy, duality and, above all, similarity. The 
imaginary is thus the order of  surface appearances which are deceptive, observable phenomena 
which hide underlying structure; the affects are such phenomena.” The imaginary is related to the 
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concept of  the mirror stage in psychoanalysis, when a child recognizes its image in the mirror for 
the first time. This practice forms the ego of  a subject by them “identifying with the counterpart 
or specular image” (ibid.) they recognize in the mirror. This means that identification is a central 
aspect of  the imaginary order, prompting us to identify with different discourses throughout our 
lives seeking to bridge this initial split resulting from the process of  ego formation in the mirror 
stage. Hence, the mirror stage as a political concept is not about children or childhood, but about 
explaining our need to identify with a range of  hegemonic formations/projects (such as 
nationalism, for instance) that make it seem as if  our identity is “whole”. The imaginary order 
serves us to uphold the illusion or fantasy of  “wholeness” of  identity, camouflaging the never-
ending endeavor of  identification that will inevitably fail to constitute our identity fully (see also 
subchapter 3.1 on “split subject” and “subject as lack”). This means that fantasy is part of  the 
imaginary order, as a constitutive practice of  identification which is driven by a false promise of  
suturing the constitutive lack of  identity, of  providing us with a missing part that would restore it 
and make us whole again. As Copjec (1989, 242) explains, the “missing part […] is the absence 
around which the subject weaves its fantasies, its self-image, not in imitation of  any ideal vision but 
in response to the very impossibility of  ever making visible this missing part.”  
The imaginary is also structured by the symbolic, whereby Lacan is implying that language has both 
a symbolic and an imaginary dimension: the signifier is part of  the symbolic order whereas the 
signified, or better yet, the process of  signification, is part of  the imaginary order (Evans 1996). 
This is important to remember when discussing the process of  imaginarization I mentioned in the 
introduction, which can also be related to what Benedict Anderson (2006) has called “imagined 
communities” in a nationalism studies context. However, Anderson does not unpack this process 
or ontologically problematize it, which is what my aim is with psychoanalysis. The process of  
imagining, of  signifying, of  trying to constitute a community’s full identity (which is never given 
due to the constitutive lack of  subjectivity) is necessary for driving any political project further. 
Without imagining a better alternative (future) reality to the one already given, change would not 
be possible at all.  
Having explained the three orders introduced by Lacan and how they relate to discourse theory, I 
can now move on to discuss how discursive (i.e., Symbolic) orders are being upheld by subjects and 
why certain discourses have such a sedimented grip on the subjects constituting them. Here it is 
useful to turn to Butler’s theory of  performativity, and specifically the concept of  mimicry or 
mimesis. Performativity refers to the notion that discourses produce the effects that they name (see 
Butler 1988; Butler 1990; Butler 1993), meaning that there is no identity of  subjects per see, no 
essence, but that what we might call identity (gender or otherwise) is constituted through a “stylized 
repetition of  acts” (Butler 1988, 519) that make the abstraction of  normative discourses appear 
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natural. Butler has demonstrated this claim in her conception of  gender as a performative practice, 
one which needs to be re-constituted time and again and which through this repetition, creates a 
type of  sedimentation which we then call gender (Butler 1993). This sedimentation is a fixation of  
meaning which has the appearance of  being “natural”, or unchangeable. I have used performativity 
here not only to denote practices of  the body, and discourses producing the effects that they name 
in bodies, but to expand it to include materiality (which the body is part of). Butler’s theory of  
performativity explains how “regulatory norms” (hegemonic discourses) “work in a performative 
fashion to constitute the materiality of  bodies” (Butler 1993, 2), which in my view can be expanded 
onto any other type of  materiality, since the materialization of  norms has to do with power and 
hegemony. It is here that Butler’s thinking is informed by Foucault and his idea that discourses have 
material effects, producing “practices that systematically form the objects of  which they speak” 
(Foucault 1972, 49). This means that discourses do not simply represent the objects of  which they 
speak through signs, but they constitute them, which was also emphasized by Palonen (2018b) and 
her account of  Butler’s performativity theory in connection to Laclau and Mouffe. As Butler 
argues, matter is not a surface upon which we can act, but a “process of  materialization that stabilizes 
over time to produce the effect of  boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter” (Butler 1993, 9, italics in the 
original), which has to do with Foucault’s notion of  the “materializing effects of  regulatory power” 
(ibid., 9-10). 
Overall, performativity is here to help us understand how discourses are sustained in sedimentation, 
material or otherwise. This has also been done in, for instance, performative statehood theory (see 
Koskenniemi and Grzybowski 2015; Visoka 2018; Vulović 2020; Weber 1998), in which 
performativity has been used to explain how dominant discourses on statehood are used to 
performatively constitute statehood itself, through bodies, institutions, legal texts etc. It emphasizes 
that what we call the “state” does not exist independently of  our discourses about it – ergo, our 
claims have material effects. The same notion of  performativity can be found in Billig’s (1995) idea 
of  banal nationalism, which he explains as routinized practices that sustain national identification, 
or in the study of  everyday performative practices that constitute the sedimented discourses of  
nationhood (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). 
Furthermore, there is no discourse that precedes performative acts, but discourse and performative 
practice are constitutive of  each other (Palonen 2018b), meaning that there cannot be one without 
the other and that they do not appear in some sort of  sequence. In a nutshell, this indicates that 
meaning is not a given, and it does not follow from any type of  inherent property of  the signifier, 
but that it is constituted as an interplay between discourse and practice in a contingent manner, 
always subject to change and internal reconstitution. This way of  understanding the relation 
between discourse and performative practice places the notion of  articulation at its center, as DeLuca 
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has recognized. He claims that “in a world without foundations, without a transcendental signified, 
without given meanings, the concept of  articulation is a means to understanding the struggle to fix 
meaning and define reality temporarily” (DeLuca 1999, 334). There are no discourses “out there” 
that are waiting to be re-produced, but articulatory practices (re-)produce connections between so-
called “elements” (as possible units of  meaning in a field of  discursivity) and “moments” (as 
discursive units with a particular meaning) fixed and materialized as part of  a discourse (see Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985). In other words, articulation refers to the idea “that people give meaning to the 
world around them by combining and connecting certain words, objects, ideas, and concepts in 
specific ways when they speak or act. When such combinations are repeated […], the patterns they 
constitute start forming a stable structure, which we eventually recognize as the social world” 
(Jacobs 2018, 298). Articulation is therefore a practice that is central to any meaning-making process. 
For instance, performing gender time and again can be understood as a type of  articulation that 
aims to sediment or fix the meaning of  gender that is constitutive of  a particular discourse. The 
same can be said for performing statehood or nationhood, as an articulation of  an ideal of  
statehood or nationhood in any particular cultural context that aims to stabilize its meaning through 
re-iteration, sedimentation in the material world, as well as materialization of  bodies, constituting 
national communities that in turn perform these discourses. It is after all people that perform 
discourses and constitute what we call the social world, within which materiality acquires meaning. 
In other words, performing discourses through practices of  articulation that simultaneously constitute these 
discourses is key. 
If  we conceptualize our social reality in this manner, then this leads us to the following questions: 
if  everything is a performative practice of  something already given, how does change happen in 
such circumstances? This also relates to the re-iteration of  the Kosovo myth. Here it is important 
to stress that precisely the repetitive nature of  performative acts is what makes it possible for 
subjects to dis-articulate from certain discourses and (re-)articulate into new ones through acts of  
subversion (Butler 1993), however always constrained by the discourses they already inhabit and 
perform. This is what Butler (2010) has called “performative agency”, explaining that failure is 
constitutive of  performativity, i.e., failure to produce its desired effects: “performativity never fully 
achieves its effect, and so in this sense ‘fails’ all the time; its failure is what necessitates its reiterative 
temporality, and we cannot think iterability without failure” (Butler 2010, 153, italics in the original).  
Iterability is crucial for understanding how naturalized discourses are cited (and performed through 
the body and the material) by subjects. It can be understood as re-articulation of  something familiar 
(i.e., taking naturalized discourses as the basis), into something else, something different from what 
is already familiar, whose meaning both differs and defers from the already familiar. This is commonly 
understood as différance (see Derrida 1982; Derrida 1988, Hollywood 2002), a Derridean concept 
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Butler heavily relies on. It can be summarized as the repetition of  the same, but always different: 
“to be repeated, the mark must always also differ and defer from that which it cites” (Hollywood 
2002, 106). I have mentioned the Kosovo myth as one articulation that gets re-articulated into 
different other structures, such as the Kosovo is Serbia claim and the counter-hegemonic project of  
partitioning Northern Kosovo – all of  which can be understood as re-iterations (re-articulations) 
of  the normative, sedimented discourse I have mentioned. Even the Kosovo myth as a narrative is 
a re-articulation of  something prior, namely a historic event – the Battle of  Kosovo – that gets 
embedded into the nationalizing political projects of  the Serbian elites and later the Serbian state 
throughout history (see Pavlović 2009; Pavlović and Atanasovski 2016). This prompts us to think 
about the notion of originality, which leads us to a discussion of mimesis. 
Apart from performativity as a meta-practice, central to understanding how subjects maintain the 
structures they inhabit is mimesis, or mimicry, which refers to repetition. Derrida’s take on mimesis, 
which Butler relies on, is particularly important, by which he explains the relation between 
“originality” and “copy.” In his work, the notion of  the original, or the original story, and its copy, 
is deconstructed and put into question. By referring to his notion of  différance, every imitation 
(mimesis) is a supplement (Derrida 1997, 144) which is something different or dissimilar from the 
notion being imitated. Derrida goes even a step beyond in ‘The Double Session’ claiming that 
imitation, or mimesis, is something unique in itself: it should not be reduced to or defined as 
anything particular, because “[w]e are faced […] with mimicry imitating nothing; faced, so to speak, 
with a double that doubles no simple, a double that nothing anticipates, nothing at least that is not 
itself  already double” (Derrida 1981, 206). Further, every text (defined in the broadest, Derridian 
sense, which includes speech and writing) is in a mimetic relationship with other texts, meaning 
that there is no initial or original writing. There is no reference of  mimesis outside of  itself, which 
makes it a logic that defies the very idea of  an origin and a subsequent copy. 
By deconstructing the notion of  the original (and its copy), it is no wonder that Butler relies on 
Derrida and his notion of  différance. The theory of  performativity, after all, clearly points out that 
naturalized discourses and performative practices constituting them are intrinsically tied together, 
and do not occur in a sequence but are constitutive of  one another. Hence, when Butler speaks of  
re-iteration, or performativity of  such discourses, she presupposes that citing these discourses 
simultaneously constitutes them and in doing so, the bodies of  subjects citing them. The practice 
of  citation also refers to imitation, or miming, as Bell (1999) points out in her reading of  Butler’s 
notion of  mimesis. As she elaborates (ibid., 137), “[g]ender is an embodied performativity that 
attempts to mime the impossible ideals of  the public and social discourse, the historically 
sedimented conventions that demand one displays a gendered subjectivity.” This not only refers to 
subversions of  the gendered norms, but also to performativity of  hegemonic heterosexual norms, 
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in which “the ideals that are being mimed are impossible to mime completely” (ibid., italics in the 
original), pointing to the idea that imitating these norms is always an approximation, the full 
constitution of  which is never finally possible. This is what Butler means when she claims that 
performativity always ultimately fails to achieve its effects (see above, Butler 2010). Hence, the 
subject positions that are being offered by these gendered discourses, through the performativity 
of  which our gendered bodies are constituted, are taken up through “miming” the ideals that they 
are supposed to represent (Bell 1999). Miming in this sense would not necessarily have to be 
conscious (like performing one’s gender is not always a conscious act), but would involve the 
repetition of  sedimented norms, and sedimentation implies that we forget the “origin” of  the 
norms being mimed. 
Mimicry as embodied repetition (performativity of  normative discourses) can explain why the 
Kosovo is Serbia discourse is so entrenched and upheld (taken up) by the Serbian national 
community. As Butler argues, performing hegemonic ideals of  heterosexuality is policed, as it 
constitutes a hegemonic norm whose boundaries are controlled. This performativity of  
heterosexuality constitutes the subjects as part of  the (gendered) communities they aim to maintain. 
Likewise, those who traverse these boundaries are judged or even punished (Butler 1997), as Butler 
elaborates on her example of  homosexuality. Questioning sedimented norms, above all those that 
have bodily effects on the subjects constituting them “brings with it ostracism, punishment and 
violence” (Butler 1991, 24). Repetition and miming have the effect of  further consolidation of  
normative discourses, and the Kosovo is Serbia discourse can be deemed to be one of  them. The 
re-iteration of  this discourse is consolidated by structures of  feeling (Williams 2015) about Kosovo, 
which include love for Kosovo as the origin of  Serbian statehood and nationhood, pride in fighting 
for and defending Kosovo from internal and external threats throughout history, as well as spite 
and disdain for anybody who tries to take Kosovo away (see also Chapter 3). Through miming and 
ritualizing a certain response to threats decentering the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse, subjects are 
constituted as members of  the Serbian national community, ergo their nationhood as Serbs is 
reinforced. Questioning these norms and responses would be ostracizing and even dangerous, as 
Butler (1991) argues. 
However, there are certain practices that do put in question the unity of  sedimented discourses, 
for instance the Brussels agreement form 2013 itself, in which Serbia has recognized the 
institutional and legal authority of  Kosovo’s state institutions. At the same time, Serbia has also 
claimed that Kosovo is a province of  Serbia, due to the sedimentation of  the “Kosovo is Serbia” 
discourse, which is hard to escape. In post-foundational discourse theory, this particular 
“contradiction” has often been characterized as the issue of  self-transgression (see Glynos 2003; 
Glynos 2008b), in which subjects seem to simultaneously affirm an ideal (for instance that Kosovo 
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is Serbia) and at the same time transgress it (for instance that Serbia recognizes Kosovo’s authority 
and subjectivity). This issue is explained with the Lacanian notion of  enjoyment (jouissance), which 
Glynos (2008b) terms “self-transgressive enjoyment” by which subjects seem to (unconsciously) 
enjoy the self-transgressive activity. This is because the practice of  transgression can bind a 
community closer: “what sustains a community may be not simply a shared identification with an 
official ideal […], but also an identification with a common form of  transgression (from which we 
procure enjoyment)” (Glynos 2003, 9, italics in the original). This means that even though it might 
be an obvious fact that Kosovo has its own state institutions in place and aims to consolidate its 
statehood nationally and transnationally, the common practice of  transgressing this fact by the 
Serbian political community by virtue of  adhering to and performing the “Kosovo is Serbia” 
discourse, further consolidates that same discourse and the community’s sense of  cohesion. 
Transgression can in this sense also be conceived as a practice of  miming, namely imitating a 
common form of  transgression of  and by an entire community, which serves to further consolidate 
their sense of  identity. 
Having discussed how dominant discourses are upheld, and how the subjects upholding them are 
simultaneously being constituted as members of  that given order/community, I can now move on 
to the re-articulation of  these norms, or substitution of  hegemonic projects. As Butler (2010) 
mentions, failure is a necessary part of  performativity and each hegemonic project is inevitably 
going to be faced with its limits of  signification (Laclau 1990). When such a situation occurs, it is 
for two reasons, as Marchart (2014) argues: either because of  the (re-)emergence of  antagonism 
that questions the integrity of  the given discourse, or due to dislocation, which points to an event 
that cannot be symbolized or accommodated by the given structure. In this setting, counter-
hegemonic projects emerge that recognize the failure of  the dominant structure to constitute itself  
fully and offer something different in response. However, a counter-hegemonic project cannot 
simply radically substitute a hegemonic one, since the transformation of  entrenched narratives 
always needs to occur gradually, against the background of  these sedimentations. As Stengel and 
Nabers (2019, 259) rightfully point out, to be successful, any new hegemonic project, or counter-
hegemonic project, needs to be credible in light of  already sedimented practices that constitute a 
given societal order and not clash with it. For instance, 
Discursive orders are usually not created from scratch but in a field partially structured by 
sedimented practices, that is, discursive practices that have become institutionalized to such 
an extent that their origin in political struggles have been forgotten. They are taken for 
granted as if  they are, and have always been, without alternative (ibid.). 
Such a project also needs to demonstrate that it recognizes the mistakes and failures of  the previous 
discourses and to hold “within it the (ultimately unavoidably empty) promise to (this time!) fully 
repair the dislocated structure (which however is ontologically impossible). This is the mythical 
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element of  any hegemonic project, as it functions as an incarnation of  a fully constituted ‘perfect 
society’ that cannot really ever be reached” (ibid.). 
2.3 Spatiality and Temporality in Discourse Theory: Dislocation, Antagonism and 
Political Moments  
As already hinted, structures change when they cannot accommodate an ever-increasing amount 
of  antagonism and dislocation that emerge. This leads us to a discussion of  spatiality and 
temporality, specifically how these two concepts relate to structure and change. This is important 
for my later discussion on myth as an ontological category because I argue that myth can be 
conceived in terms of  both structure (space) and dislocation (time). I explain the structural aspect 
of  myth through the notion of  “objectivity” and the temporal aspect through the empty signifier 
which is tied to fantasy. Discourse theory has an unorthodox approach to the issues of  spatiality 
and temporality, in that it – simply put – conceptualizes space in terms of  structuration and 
repetition (relative stability), and time in terms of  dislocation and de-structuration (change). This 
way, space and time are articulated as two constitutive opposites (Laclau 1990), similarly to Laclau 
and Mouffe’s (1985) notion of  politicization and sedimentation.11 Most importantly, Laclau 
provides an elaborate account of  spatiality and temporality in his 1990 book New Reflections on the 
Revolution of  our Time, an account that has been further elaborated on by Stavrakakis (2011) and 
Marchart (2014). 
As indicated above, Laclau’s notion of  spatiality and temporality has to do with signification, or 
what can be symbolically represented through discourse, and its limits, which are revealed by 
dislocatory events. In this sense, Laclau (1996b, 39) posits that dislocation reveals the limits of  
signification and places it in the order of  the Real (in Lacanian ontology), which he even explicitly 
mentions: 
we are trying to signify the limits of  signification – the real, if  you want, in the Lacanian 
sense – and there is no direct way of  doing so except through the subversion of  the process 
of  signification itself. We know, through psychoanalysis, how what is not directly 
representable – the unconscious – can only find as a means of  representation the subversion 
of  the signifying process. 
Dislocation can be described as “an encounter with the Real order”, as opposed to antagonism, 
which “falls on the side of  the imaginary–symbolic order of  reality (denoting the relation between 
different but already articulated discursive projects fighting for hegemony)” (Stavrakakis 2007, 74). 
Stavrakakis (ibid., italics in the original) described dislocation as “an index of  the negative dimension of  
the real as limit of  discourse” since certain events challenge the stability and presumed fixity of  a 
                                                          
11 Marchart (2014) has extensively elaborated on this parallel, pointing to space and time correlating with Laclau and 
Mouffe’s concepts of the social and the political. 
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discursive order with issues that cannot be represented within that same order – revealing its limits. 
The positive dimension of  the real Stavrakakis describes as empty signifiers (Laclaudian 
vocabulary) or objets petit a (Lacanian vocabulary), which is something I will return to when I discuss 
the logic of  myths (subchapter 2.6). At this point, it is also important to stress that dislocation (or 
disruption) is not the Real per se, as the Real is not representable: “the real-in-itself  cannot be 
disruption or lack. Disruption is certainly one way of  showing the constitutive inability of  the 
symbolic to represent the real, of  demonstrating the symbolic order’s lack of  resources. But that 
can only mean that the real should rather be thought of  as a ‘lack of  lack’” (ibid.). 
Considering all this and returning to Laclau’s notion of  temporality, he claims that “dislocation is 
the very form of  temporality. And temporality must be conceived as the exact opposite of  space. 
The ‘spatialization’ of  an event consists of  eliminating its temporality” (Laclau 1990, 41). He 
defines space as “[a]ny repetition that is governed by a structural law of  successions” (ibid.) which 
also includes physical space because it subscribes to the same logic. As Marchart (2014, 274, italics 
added) also mentions, “[e]very form of  relationality – even the relation of  successive temporal 
moments – produces space, spatializes time”, which Laclau (1990, 42) would also call a “reduction 
of  time to space.” How these two dimensions interplay, Laclau (ibid.) describes in the following 
manner: 
Through dislocation time is overcome by space. But while we can speak of  the 
hegemonization of  time by space (through repetition), it must be emphasized that the 
opposite is not possible: time cannot hegemonize anything, since it is a pure effect of  
dislocation. The ultimate failure of  all hegemonization, then, means that the real – including 
physical space – is in the ultimate instance temporal.  
Once again, Laclau brings in the Lacanian notion of  the Real to explain how dislocation and 
temporality are connected: the Real is not time per se, but it is temporal, since it always finds its 
way into the Symbolic (into discourse) and disrupts it due to the Symbolic’s inherent inability to 
represent it. Every structure is already dislocated, meaning that dislocation is constitutive of  our 
social reality. Simply put, there is always potential for change since any structure is only contingently 
grounded. This leads Laclau to argue that “dislocation is the very form of  possibility” (ibid.), 
making it one of  the central concepts in discourse theory and helping us to explain how change 
occurs on a structural level. As Laclau (ibid., 42-43) elaborates: 
with dislocation there is no telos which governs change; possibility therefore becomes an 
authentic possibility, a possibility in the radical sense of  the term. This means that there must 
be other possibilities, since the idea of  a single possibility denies what is involved in the very 
concept of  possibility. As we have seen, because structural dislocation is constitutive, the 
dislocated structure cannot provide the principle of  its transformations. The dislocated 
structure thus opens possibilities of  multiple and indeterminate rearticulations for those 
freed from its coercive force and who are consequently outside it. 
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Since dislocations open up opportunities for re-articulations of  structures – “freeing” subjects 
from the structure’s coercive forces – Laclau subsequently argues that dislocation is “the very form 
of  freedom”, since “freedom is the absence of  determination” (Laclau 1990, 43). If  every structure 
is already dislocated – if  dislocation is constitutive – then we are “condemned” to be free in these 
particular moments when the contingency of  structures is revealed by dislocatory events, when we 
aim to re-articulate them. Marchart (2014, 276) explains this constant need for repetition and re-
articulation, for maintaining (spatial) structures and rearticulating them in political (temporal) 
moments through a Derridian lens: 
Laclau […] is very well aware of  the fact that mere repetition of  the identical is quite simply 
impossible (Derrida 1988). Within the field of  the discursive – the order of  differences – 
there will never be a return of  exactly the same differential position, since every iteration will 
be characterized by aberrations and displacements of  the very element iterated. Laclau aims 
at this idea with his concept of  dislocation. 
Stavrakakis (2011, 304) recognizes that Laclau conceptualizes the political through a temporal 
metaphor (“the political as the moment of  the original institution of  the social, as the moment of  
reactivation and antagonism, as the event of  dislocation”) and the social through a spatial metaphor 
(as a “of  surfaces of  inscription and sedimentation”). Consequently, building on Laclau’s notion 
of  temporality and spatiality, Marchart (2014, 272, italics in the original) argues that space and time 
(or the social and the political) are “both […] different (if  not self-differencing) aspects of  one and 
the same phenomenon: antagonism.” Firstly, Marchart (2014, 277, emphasis added) elaborates on 
dislocation as “both precondition and result of  the antagonistic construction of  social identity”, since 
dislocation is constitutive of  any discourse – or in Marchart’s (2014, 277) words, “there is no place 
without dislocation.” As Laclau (1990, 39) has argued, “every identity is dislocated insofar as it 
depends on an outside which both denies that identity and provides its condition of  possibility at 
the same time.” This leads Marchart to put antagonism at the center of  his argument on how space 
and time are to be conceptualized, as different modes of  it. However, one needs to point out that 
articulating dislocation as both a precondition and a result of  antagonism points to an ontological 
relation between these two concepts, where we cannot think of  the one without the other. Equally, 
they are not in a successive relationship to each other, but in a constitutive one. Antagonism is part 
of  the Symbolic (discursive order of  our social world), while dislocation is part of  the Real order, 
of  temporality, implying a constitutivness of  change for any articulated structure. It is also 
important to address here the critique voiced by some scholars on the confusion introduced by 
antagonism as delimiting all structures (Norris 2002; Norris 2006) and the fact that antagonism 
cannot be both causing and resolving dislocations (Thomassen 2005a; 2005b). This is not what 
Marchart argues. His argument is the other way around: that dislocation is a precondition as well 
as a result of  antagonism, and I will explain this in the following way. My argument is that a 
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dislocation can only be a dislocation if  there is an antagonistic political frontier articulated between 
the discourses (one that dislocates and one that is dislocated). This is not to say that our social 
world is comprised solely out of  antagonistically articulated discourses. Laclau resolves this issue 
by introducing the concept of  “heterogeneity” (Laclau 2005), as Jacobs (2018) also recognizes. 
Heterogeneity implies that there is always a multitude of  discourses that are left meaningless for 
the discourse we are looking at, for instance a liberal and protectionist discourse on trade might be 
in an antagonistic relationship to each other, but they are in a heterogeneous relationship to a 
Marxist discourse on economic production which bears no weight for contesting the meaning of  
trade in these two previous discourses (see Jacobs 2018). In essence, “heterogeneity as a concept 
expresses the idea that meaning can only be achieved if  some things are left meaningless. For a 
structure of  moments to be meaningful, some elements have to be excluded […]. These excluded 
elements can either be meaningful in another discourse, or they can be meaningless altogether” 
(ibid., 306). Hence, the relationship between a heterogeneous discourse and the discourse we are 
looking at is not political, since the discourse is meaningless to the understanding of  the one we 
are looking at. There is no contestation of  meaning going on there and the discourses are in no 
way opposed. For a political relationship to exist between them, they need to be opposed to each 
other antagonistically, i.e., a political frontier needs to be articulated between them. This is the only 
way a dislocation can be perceived as a dislocation at all to a structure in question, because it is 
meaningful, because it decenters the meanings produced by the dislocated discourse. 
Both antagonism and dislocation lie outside of  a discourse in question. As we have seen, the 
dislocated structure cannot provide principles for its own transformation, so social subjects re-
articulating it must always be located outside of  the structure. Meaning, they need not uphold that 
same structure but can subscribe to a different, alternative one that would do one of  the two 
following things: either mend the dislocation by incorporating it into the given structure (whereby 
the particular dislocation would cease to be a dislocation and the subjects could again subscribe to 
the structure as coherent), or replace the structure with the alternative one altogether (resulting in 
a dissolution of  that very structure). Finally, we experience dislocations in the form of  events that 
cannot quite be “integrated into the horizon of  expectations” (Marchart 2014, 277), that clash with 
our sedimented practices of  social life. As the social and its sedimentations are conceptualized in 
terms of  space, any such event would need to be the opposite of  spatial, namely temporal. As 
Marchart (2014, 278) argues, “[o]nly an event which is of  essentially temporal nature will dislocate 
the spatial arrangements of  the social. The temporal aspect of  the event will get eliminated to the 
extent to which it is inscribed into the repetitive processes of  sedimentation.” As a final result of  
his theoretical elaboration, Marchart (2014, 278) summarizes his conception of  time and space in 
the following: “[w]e can […] define space à la Laclau as a relationally articulated system whose 
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original institution resulted from an act of  radical negativity (i.e., antagonism) which later became 
forgotten but in any moment can be reactivated through an experience of  dislocation, i.e., time.” 
Both Marchart (2014) and Stavrakakis (2011) have mentioned critical geography’s critique of  such 
a conceptualization of  space and time, mainly by Massey (2005; 1992) and Kohn (2003), who 
criticize Laclau’s ignorance of  the productive aspect of  space, claiming that space is not only about 
repetition and maintaining the status quo, but also about transformative practice and has an 
emancipatory potential. However, as we have seen in Marchart’s (2014) argument above, it is more 
useful to conceptualize space and time as modes of  the same thing, instead of  two separate things, 
because they are both constitutive of  the same practice. Similarly, Stavrakakis (2011, 318) 
emphasizes this relation between space and time, calling it the “irreducible constitutivity of  the 
space-time dialectic.” By further developing the idea of  a “radical act” as explained by Žižek (1998; 
2002), he means to point out that a completely voluntarist act that would entirely change a social 
constellation is impossible. On the contrary, to understand the act, we need to consider the temporal 
dimension of  event-ness, not simply events as space, as time being reduced to space in the ultimate 
instance. To do that, we need a “paradoxical topology of  a space permitting and encouraging its 
reformulation through continuous re-acts, a truly democratic space. And an ethics of  contingency 
and responsibility acknowledging that in this open-ended game there are no guarantees” 
(Stavrakakis 2011, 316). Stavrakakis’s re-conceptualization of  the space-time dialectic leads him to 
the following two conclusions. On the one hand, “there can be no politicization in isolation from 
the field of  spatial representation” (ibid., 313), meaning that temporality in the form of  dislocation 
“can only be felt negatively through the disruption of  space” and that antagonism is ultimately a 
spatial representation. On the other hand, every dislocation has to go through a “trial by space” 
(Lefebvre 1991, 416), meaning that even though change of  existing hegemonic structures requires 
the emergence of  a dislocatory event, if  the event is not incorporated into, accommodated by or 
replacing the existing discursive structure, it remains simply a “simulacrum”. I will relate this issue 
below to the Imaginary order as per Lacan and explain how myths aim to be translated into spatial 
structures (upon which they cease to be myths) if  they are not to simply remain imaginarizations 
represented by empty signifiers. 
Having defined antagonism as a spatial representation, Stavrakakis (2017) also introduces another 
way of  thinking about dislocation and antagonism – through the lens of  the three Lacanian orders, 
as I have mentioned above. Antagonism would be part of  the Symbolic-Imaginary order already 
articulated and represented within the (spatial) objectivity of  discourse, whereas dislocation would 
be part of  the order of  the Real, a temporality which in the last instance always dislocates 
contingently sedimented discourses. However, rather than thinking of  antagonism and dislocation 
as two non-intersecting things, it is more productive to think of  them as mutually constitutive, as 
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Marchart (2014) has already pointed out and as I have also argued. It is perhaps more fruitful to 
explore what limits these two concepts reveal, instead of  what they might represent. After all, as 
Laclau (1990, 17, italics in original) has already pointed out, “antagonism is the limit of  all objectivity.” 
Since identity cannot be expressed in positive terms but requires the “denial of  forces opposed to 
it” (ibid., 32), Laclau describes antagonism as a negative force that “denies my identity in the strictest 
sense of  the word” (ibid., 18). Furthermore, “as objectivity presupposes the positivity of  all its 
elements, the presence of  inherent negativity of  a ‘constitutive outside’ means that the social never 
manages to fully constitute itself  as an objective order. The ‘outside’ is thus a radical outside, without 
a common measure with the ‘inside’” (ibid.). Ultimately, antagonism reveals the contingency of  any 
objectivity, any discursive order we might have constructed, the same as dislocation reveals the 
ultimate failure of  the Symbolic to represent the Real (see Stavrakakis 2017). There will always be 
a lack that cannot be represented (symbolized) which will lead to any objective order’s ultimate re-
articulation due to dislocatory events and political re-activations of  antagonism. This is what Laclau 
means when he says that dislocation reveals the limits of  signification. As Marchart (2014) argues, 
the source of  a dislocation can be antagonism, since it represents the constitutive radical outside 
of  a given order. This is something that will become very clear on the examples of  my case study 
(see Chapters 5 and 6). The very discourse of  “Kosovo is Serbia” becomes dislocated because an 
antagonistic force – a radically incommensurable negativity that lies outside and constitutes the 
identity of  subjects subscribing into this discourse – decides to declare independence. The 
dislocatory event emerges specifically because of the negotiations within the Brussels dialogue (see 
Chapter 4): if  there were no negotiations, each party would simply not interact which could leave 
the integrity of  their own discourses intact, i.e., the discourse on Kosovo’s independence and the 
discourse on Kosovo being Serbia could be in a heterogeneous relationship. However, the need to 
engage with one another within the Brussels dialogue, and the material challenges caused by the 
non-intersecting discourses for the lives of  the people in Kosovo, is what causes this structure to 
be destabilized and the antagonism to be reactivated. Thus, the Brussels dialogue can be 
understood as an arena for negotiating dislocations. The antagonism is subsequently re-articulated 
into an agonism, which is later reversed into antagonism because the agonistic articulation failed 
to produce the desired effects. As summed up by Laclau (1990, 39), dislocations “on the one hand, 
[…] threaten identities, [and] on the other, they are the foundation on which new identities are 
constituted.” 
The very same engagement in the Brussels dialogue and the necessity to either accommodate the 
dislocation into the given structure (the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse) or replace the structure 
altogether with something alternative, results in the production of  myths (Laclau 1990). Myths are 
on the one hand aimed at mending the dislocation, as hegemonic articulations of  a “new 
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objectivity” through the re-articulation (and re-positioning) of  dislocated elements (Laclau 1990, 
61). On the other hand, as Stavrakakis (2011) has argued, any new hegemonic articulation has to 
go through a trial by space to be representable in the social, so myths inevitably have a temporal 
aspect as they involve political re-articulation. The crystallization of  myths into an objectivity, to 
paraphrase Laclau, and how this process is specifically driven forward by social subjects is 
something that Laclau has not paid particular attention to in his 1990 book New Reflections on the 
Revolution of  our Time. It seems that Laclau rather abandons the notion of  myth in favor of  focusing 
on the notion of  empty signifier (Laclau 1996b), by relating it to Lacan’s concept of  objet petit a. 
This is an aspect that I am going to elaborate on in my thesis, since discourse theory and 
psychoanalysis do provide us with the tools to talk about this phenomenon. Apart from myths as 
“new objectivity”, myths can simultaneously be conceptualized as empty signifiers, since the re-
articulation of  dislocated elements can also be seen as a generation of  a “space of  inscription” that 
would promise to suture the lost/dislocated unity of  the discourse in question. Hence, myths 
generated due to dislocations have the ultimate goal to mend the dislocation and be structured and 
sedimented within social reality (upon which they cease to be myths and simply become part of  
the social order). In a Lacanian sense, I argue that myths are located in a movement between the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic order, as particular representations or signifiers of  imaginarized 
discourses that involve the employment of  fantasy. Once they “collapse” into the symbolic order 
of  sedimented social reality, they cease to be myths – they are myths only as far as they are political 
and contested within discourse, seeking to be instituted within the social. This will be elaborated on 
in the following two subchapters. Although I discuss myths as new objectivity and myths as empty 
signifiers separately, these two dimensions should be conceived of  as constitutive. The spatial 
potential of  myths (their ability to be instituted as part of  our social reality), and their temporal 
dimension (standing in place for yet unrealized political constellations) act in connection to one 
another, not in separation. This means that a myth is simultaneously a new objectivity and an empty 
signifier: an empty signifier because it incarnates in a single signifier (that we can empirically 
analyze) the promise of  suturing the dislocation through pointing to an alternative, imaginarized 
“objectivity”, one which is affectively – and potentially materially – underpinned. 
2.4 Myths as “New Objectivity” 
In my reading, Laclau’s (1990) notion of  myths as forming of  a “new objectivity” by re-articulating 
elements of  the dislocated structure can be conceived of  in spatial terms. This new objectivity does 
not only refer to an “objectivity” that people who subscribe to might deem as true, that 
simultaneously exists with the dislocated objectivity, ideologically covering over the dislocation 
(which would be in line with Barthes’ conception of  myth and how Laclau’s conception has been 
traditionally understood). The new objectivity also relates to the promise of  mending the 
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dislocation by offering an imaginarized alternative order, a political (temporal) emphasis that has 
been missing from discourse-theoretical discussions of  myth, which constitutes myth as an 
ontological category. This can occur in two ways. On the one hand, the myth incarnating a new 
objectivity might change the dislocated structure by repositioning some of  its elements, concealing 
the dislocation (ideological aspect), but on the other hand, it could also substitute the dislocated 
order with something else, resulting in the dissolution of  the dislocated order. In the first instance, 
the relation between the dislocated objectivity and the new objectivity offered by the myth 
incarnating it is metaphorical, i.e., the myth “speaks” for the dislocated objectivity and “ignores” 
it, so to say. In the second instance, the relation between those two is paradigmatic, since one order 
is being displaced by another one. 
Returning to the spatiality of  myths as new objectivity, I argue that they are spatial because myths 
are created as an inverted image of  the dislocated order and are thus ordered as well. This new 
objectivity can be perceived in terms of  a discourse, whose elements can be mapped out, with the 
empty signifier as the driving force behind it, as a nodal point incarnating a promise of  suturing a 
lack that the dislocated order is revealed to have. In other words, myths as new objectivity are spatial 
as far as the imaginarized discourse they are part of  represents a “new objectivity”, i.e., a yet 
unrealized spatial configuration the elements of  which can be mapped out. In turn, myths aim to 
become sedimented in social reality, which sometimes involves material underpinnings. Translating 
myths into institutions can be an example of  such an underpinning, but at the moment in which 
myths become sedimented in the “objectivity” of  the social world, in the instance in which they 
withstand a “trial by space”, they cease to be myths. This is why I argue that myths can be 
recognized in the movement between the Imaginary and the Symbolic order, since once they 
become sedimented and materially underpinned, they have fulfilled their function of  suturing a 
dislocation and cannot be considered myths anymore. 
Above all else, Laclau has articulated his theory of  myths as new objectivity in light of  spatiality, 
by focusing on how this new objectivity mends the dislocation by representing possible new spatial 
configurations in the social. As such, “the mythical space is constituted as a critique of  the lack of  
structuration accompanying the dominant order” (Laclau 1990, 62). This lack of  structuration 
becomes evident when a dislocation occurs, whereby structural dislocation becomes the 
“‘objective’ condition for the emergence of  myth” (ibid., 61). As Laclau (ibid., italics added) argues, 
“The ‘work’ of  myth is to suture that dislocated space through the constitution of  a new space of  
representation. Thus, the effectiveness of  myth is essentially hegemonic: it involves forming a new 
objectivity by means of  the rearticulation of  the dislocated elements. Any objectivity, then, is merely 
a crystallized myth.” Even though Laclau lays the foundation for elaborating myths as ontological 
categories, when he claims that “any objectivity is merely a crystallized myth”, discourse theory 
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does not problematize it further and relies on the ideological function of  myth. On the other hand, 
I argue that myths are necessary for meaning-making in general, since in the hegemonization of  
any order, in the establishment of  an “objectivity”, of  a (spatial) discursive structure, myths need 
to be generated. Sometimes, these myths become crystallized in the social and when they succeed, 
when they pass the ‘trial by space’, they become part of  the spatial configuration as such (ceasing 
to be myths). In such cases, they have succeeded to mend the dislocation by, for instance, getting 
incorporated into the given order, which is consequently expanded. After all, myths as spaces of  
representation do not bear “a relation of  continuity with the dominant ‘structural objectivity’” 
(ibid.), hence the moment they are absorbed into the given structure, they are no longer myths. 
This can be demonstrated on the example of  the Brussels agreement as a myth that would mend 
the dislocated “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse (see Chapter 5). The 15 points of  the agreement 
represent practices that would enable Serbia to continue to claim formal sovereignty over Kosovo, 
never recognizing its independence, while at the same time acknowledging that Kosovo has a 
certain degree of  international subjectivity and institutional control over Northern Kosovo. One 
of  the more prominent practices of  the above would be the Association/Community of  Serb-
majority Municipalities (A/CSM) (points 1 to 6), which was ultimately never realized, remaining 
purely a myth. Other provisions of  the agreement, such as the integration of  the judiciary (point 
10) and the agreement on telecommunications (second part of  point 13) have been implemented, 
becoming part of  the ‘structural objectivity’.  
In this sense, myths can be conceived of  as complex discursive-material-affective structures that 
work towards re-instituting a given order’s center of  fixity, mending dislocations. They are 
discursive-material structures because they create new objectivities (spaces of  representation) that 
are to be realized in response to the de-structuring effects of  the hegemonic order in question (as 
dislocation is constitutive). In other words, the trial by space also involves material underpinnings 
to achieve sedimentation successfully. They are affective as subjects who generate and uphold the 
mythical spaces of  representation do so because they promise to offer them a fulfillment of  
demands what the dominant order cannot or has failed to do. In this sense, “the mythical space 
has the dual function of  expressing its concrete content and representing ‘fullness’ as such” (ibid., 
66). The concrete content refers to the specific discursive-material alternatives to the given order, 
whereas the representation of  fullness as such is what sustains them and what maintains a grip on 
subjects (see a discussion on “fantasmatic logic” in subchapter 2.6). This affective component will 
be further elaborated in the next subchapter (2.6), in which I focus on myths as empty signifiers. 
Laclau (1990, 65) already provides hints in this direction, by claiming that “imaginary signifiers 
forming a community’s horizon [broadly accepted myths] are tendentially empty and essentially 
ambiguous,” creating a parallel between myths and empty signifiers. 
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This discussion is important, as myths as objectivity inevitably have a temporal dimension, since as 
we have seen in Stavrakakis’s (2011) account, space is in a dialectic relationship with time and 
dislocation is constitutive of  any (spatial) order. Similarly, the relation between myths as objectivity 
and myths as empty signifiers is a dialectical one as well. As subjects, we cannot produce complex 
discursive-material structures that are affectively sustained (in response to de-centered hegemonic 
orders) without a particular position in the field of  discursivity (among many differential positions) 
assuming the function of  representing the universal, of  promising to mend the dislocation and 
“restore” a once lost fullness of  the community or order in question. This is where the notion of  
the empty signifier comes in, and what will follow is a specifically psychoanalytically inspired 
account of  it, focusing on categories of  fantasy and enjoyment (jouissance). What conceptualizing 
myths as empty signifiers brings into the discussion is an account of  the political logic of  mythmaking, 
focusing on moments that challenge a particular order and/or attempt to institute a different one, 
not simply “cover over” a dislocation. It gives us tools to talk about the particular transformations, 
from mending a dislocation by generating empty signifiers that drive political projects further in an 
aim to replace existing ones, to the moments of  their crystallization into specific discursive (spatial) 
constellations. In the case of  the former, an account of  the political logic of  this practice would be 
required, whereas in the case of  the latter, describing the social logic would be necessary.  As myths 
are created as an inverted image of  the dominant order, so do empty signifiers embody that which 
is absent from the order, an absence or lack they promise to fill, but which they inevitably fail to 
accomplish. Ultimately, this discussion is about problematizing both the spatial (structural/social) 
and temporal (political) aspects of  myth, while bearing in mind that a myth has both a spatial and 
a temporal dimension. 
2.5 Myths as “Empty Signifiers” 
As mentioned above, myths as new objectivities as discussed by Laclau (1990) are aimed at mending 
dislocated orders by re-articulating their elements; they are generated to uphold dislocated 
structures by incorporating the dislocation into the given discourse, and re-centering the discourse 
anew. This involves an ideological dimension of  concealment, an aspect which I have aimed to 
broaden with a paradigmatic substitution which would point towards a political dimension of  myth 
and imaginarizaton. Thus, myths can also be understood as empty signifiers (in which I supplement 
the new objectivity angle with a political/temporal angle) and aim to replace the dislocated structure 
entirely, having to forego a trial by space to become hegemonic and sedimented in the social, upon 
which they are no longer myths. These are, I argue, the two modalities of  myth. Of  course, once a 
myth is articulated, its promise is always “restorative”: it promises to restore the supposed fullness 
and fixity of  the dislocated order, or to restore the lost fullness through instituting an alternative 
order, one which is the inverted image of  the dislocated one. My argument is that both empty 
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signifiers and spatially mapped out imaginarizations of  new objectivities that form a dialectic 
relationship are needed to suture or address a dislocation. The analysis should preferably focus on 
the synthesis of  these two dimensions and the concept of  myth I elaborate in this thesis 
encompasses both perspectives. Myths are simultaneously empty signifiers (specific nodal 
points/signifiers that can be analyzed) and new objectivities, since the empty signifier incarnates 
an imaginarized structure that is an inverted image of the dislocated order. 
Consequently, one has to bear in mind precisely this relationship between the two aspects of  myth, 
since myth as “new objectivity” (as an imaginarized discourse) needs empty signifiers that would 
stand in place of  that same discourse and drive its political project further. By promising to suture 
a dislocated/lacking fullness, empty signifiers act as the glue of  a political project or movement. 
Their ultimate promise is an inverted image of  the hegemonic (spatial) objectivity graspable in the 
social, a promise that is equally spatial and temporal, and that strives for establishing hegemony. 
This is how the two aspects of  myth work together to institute an alternative order to the dislocated 
one that is in crisis, so to speak. 
At this point, it is important to explain exactly what I mean by empty signifiers. Discourse theory 
presupposes that the social is a lacking structure (based on Lacan’s notion of  the lacking subject, 
see Chapter 3). Namely, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) argue that any social discourse lacks a 
transcendental foundation, a center of  fixity, which in turn enables an infinite play of  articulations 
and meanings to co-exist and compete for hegemony, aiming to become sedimented and offer, at 
least contingently, a center of  fixity (anchored around nodal points). This is what in discourse 
theory is commonly known as the structural undecidability of  the social. As Howarth (2015, 11) 
points out, “[t]he struggle for hegemony is […] conceived in terms of  the production of  ‘empty 
signifiers’, which function to represent the ‘absent fullness’ of  an ontologically lacking social order.” 
The impossibility to produce an object (a signifier) that would essentially stand for an entire system 
is a “positive impossibility”, an impossibility of  the Real, to which the “x of  the empty signifier 
points” (Laclau 1996b, 40). Laclau (1995, 89) has explained it in terms of  presence and absence: in 
a situation of  “generalized social disorder […] ‘order’ becomes the name of  an absent fullness, and 
if  that fullness is constitutively unachievable it cannot have any […] form of  self-representation. 
‘Order’ thus becomes autonomous vis-à-vis any particular order insofar as it is the name of  an 
absent fullness that no concrete social order can achieve.” ‘Order’ is the x of  the Real that the 
empty signifier points to, while simultaneously failing to represent it fully, since any particular order 
will never be able to incarnate the absent fullness – the absent fullness will always remain in the 
order of  the Real, essentially an ideal that is un-representable in the Symbolic, thus by any particular 
order. Laclau further explains that the “fullness is present […] as that which is absent and needs as 
a result to be represented in some way” (ibid.), which is why Laclau calls the empty signifier a 
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positive impossibility of  signification, and Stavrakakis (2007), as mentioned above, the positive 
dimension of  the Real. As only particular contents (signifiers) under certain circumstances can 
represent the absence of  fullness, a particularity comes to represent an impossible universality 
implied by an equivalential chain of  signification. The relation “by which a certain particular 
content overflows its own particularity and becomes the incarnation of  the absent fullness of  
society” (Laclau 1995, 89), of  a universality unifying the chain of  signification into an equivalential 
order, is what Laclau calls hegemony, or a hegemonic relation (see also subchapter 3.1). Thus, the 
production of  empty signifiers is necessary for instituting hegemonic orders, and specifically the 
‘presence of  an absence’ that the empty signifier embodies is what makes it so conceptually closely 
connected to Laclau’s elaboration on myths. 
As mentioned above, the absences in the symbolic order are precisely what dislocations reveal, so 
the production of  myths, as I have outlined above in Laclau’s (1990) account is what social subjects 
need to make sense and cover over a dislocation. Since dislocations are constitutive of  any order, 
myths are necessary for meaning-making. Myths promise to restore and/or introduce an absent 
fullness from the given order into the order anew, or replace the order with an alternative that 
would not be lacking (a promise which is ultimately unachievable). Along this line of  argument of  
incomplete/lacking orders we all inhabit, empty signifiers are introduced to explain how partial 
fixations of  meaning (through nodal points) are even possible: “empty signifiers provide the 
symbolic means to represent these essentially incomplete orders” (Howarth 2015, 12) and incarnate 
or embody the absent fullness of  these orders. Empty signifiers thus succeed to hold together an 
entire chain of  diverse signifiers that embody diverse demands, by extending the equivalential logic 
of  the chain of  signification (Laclau 1996b) and striving to represent a universality through their 
particularity. 
Hence, any hegemonic operation, be it the institution of  a (counter-)hegemonic project, or the 
articulation and construction of  a community, a people, requires the production of  empty 
signifiers. In this sense, empty signifiers incarnate or stand for a community’s or a project’s absent 
fullness. In populist discourses, specifically in those ones where an “assemblage of  heterogeneous 
elements [is] kept equivalentially together only by a name”, this equivalential logic can lead to 
“singularity, and singularity to identification of  the unity of  the group with the name of  the leader” 
(Laclau 2005, 100). The name or the body of  the leader can become an empty signifier, something 
which will also become evident in Chapter 6 of  my analysis, in which Aleksandar Vučić as a leader 
can be seen as an empty signifier incarnating a solution to the Kosovo-Serbia dispute, whatever 
particular content it might take on. 
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In essence, my argument is that myths have the form of  a structure, a spatial system that can be 
mapped out (what I have called an imaginarized discourse), that can become sedimented in the 
social and cease to be a myth but “reality”. However, their logic is that of  an empty signifier i.e., 
temporal. What helps us explain this complex notion is Lacan’s ontology of  the three orders: the 
Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary. Myths always operate between the Imaginary and the 
Symbolic but are caused by the Symbolic’s encounter with the Real (dislocation). Since myths are 
not sedimented in the social, they are part of  the psychic economy of  subjects trying to make sense 
(and repair) a dislocated discourse they inhabit and sustain. In this sense, it is evident that they are 
part of  the Imaginary order. As Laclau says, “the subject is only [a] subject insofar as s/he mediates 
between both spaces [mythical space and the space of  the structural objectivity]” (1990, 61), 
claiming that the subject is constitutively a metaphor. By this he means that “[t]he subject (lack 
within the structure) only takes on its specific form of  representation as a metaphor of  an absent 
structure” (ibid., 63), a (mythical) structure the subject has created because of  the lack of  
structuration in the dominant spatial objectivity. On the other hand, since myths operate between 
the Imaginary and the Symbolic order, the notion of  the empty signifier helps us explain how 
specific signifiers (that are part of  the Symbolic) attempt to take on the place of  representing an 
absent fullness, which makes us able to talk about them, conceive of  them and consequently, 
empirically analyze them. At the same time, we must always bear in mind the structural impossibility 
of  the Symbolic to represent the Real, as well as the Imaginary order’s structuration by the 
Symbolic. 
2.6 The Logic of Myths: Fantasy, Enjoyment (Jouissance), Desire, Objet petit a 
As mentioned before, the logic of  myths is that of  an empty signifier (which has a distinctly 
political/temporal implication) and the form is that of  a structure or space, which can also be 
mapped out analytically into a discourse and which the empty signifier incarnates and “condenses”. 
In this sense, a myth is an empty signifier, which can be recognized as part of  the discourse (as a 
positivized absence), but which also embodies this absence and provides (with its promise to suture 
the absence) ways of  identifying with the discourse it incarnates. Various contents can also 
underpin myths, which are in different performative moments brought about and embedded into 
discursive contestations, more or less “competing” with the dislocated structure (as its inverted 
image). These contents that underpin myths can be fantasies (revealed by empty signifiers as 
embodiments or incarnations of  fantasies) yet to be sedimented in the social, fantasies that promise 
to suture the dislocated order and “restore”/introduce social fullness that the order was revealed 
to lack. They are hegemonic operations and are political in the proper sense of  the word. If  a 
fantasy fails to be accommodated by the dominant social structure, it has failed the “trial by space” 
(Stavrakakis 2011), thus remaining an imaginarized, unrealized project. However, fantasies do not 
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just appear out of  thin air, but are a complex invocation of  the desire to restore the once lost 
enjoyment we as subjects had before entering social relations. To unpack these three entangled 
concepts – fantasy, enjoyment, desire – I will focus on psychoanalytic theory, specifically on 
discourse theorists such as Yannis Stavrakakis (1999; 2007; 2011; 2017). 
Let me start with desire. As Stavrakakis argues (Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras 2006, 151; see also 
Stavrakakis 2007), desire emerges because of  so-called symbolic castration, that is, the “sacrifice 
of  a pre-symbolic jouissance qua fullness, which is prohibited upon entering the social world of  
linguistic representation. It is only by sacrificing her/his pre-symbolic enjoyment that the social 
subject can develop her/his desire,” which includes the desire to identify with political projects, 
discourses, ideologies and so forth. This pre-symbolic jouissance can never be re-captured, since we 
as subjects are constituted within discourse (i.e., the Symbolic) and cannot escape it. In this respect, 
jouissance is part of  the order of  the Real, forever outside our reach and means of  symbolic 
representation. However, as social subjects we never cease to desire to re-capture it, so jouissance 
can also be understood as the “imaginary promise of  recapturing our lost/impossible enjoyment 
which provides the fantasy support for many of  our political projects and choices” (Stavrakakis 
and Chrysoloras 2006, 151). For instance, the politics of  utopia promises just that – to deliver a 
state of  affairs in which we no longer experience any symbolic loss, and which will restore the lost 
fullness of  our being (see Stavrakakis 1999, 99-121). In essence, fantasy has a temporal function – 
be it a fantasy of  a future state in which all our difficulties are overcome, or a fantasy of  restoring 
a “lost” state from the past that fulfills the same function in the future. It is what sustains desire 
and enables us to project our desire onto real or imaginary structures that promise to deliver social 
fullness – it enables acts of  identification. Myths are part of  these fantasmatic operations that 
promise to repair a given order that is dislocated, restore social fullness. Ergo, they have a 
fantasmatic underpinning. Myths, as outlined before, emerge in a concrete situation when a 
hegemonic order becomes dislocated due to an event that cannot be accommodated by it. But 
fantasies are not merely myths. Fantasies provide the imaginary support for the sustainment of  
different hegemonic orders. In other words, all hegemonic orders are built on fantasies which form 
their bedrock, since “fantasy operates so as to conceal or close off  the radical contingency of  social 
relations” (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 147). Thus, following a discourse theoretical and 
psychoanalytical reading, fantasy and myth differ inasmuch as the former is a constitutive element 
of  political identification, whereas the latter emerges in specific situations, that is, as a result of  
dislocatory events. On the one hand, as specific fantasies underpin specific hegemonic orders (such 
as the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse), if  that order is dislocated, the fantasmatic underpinning also 
needs to be re-articulated accordingly. On the other hand, myths as results of  dislocations are also 
underpinned by specific fantasies, be it that of  the hegemonic order or an alternative one. It is thus 
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important to distinguish between myths, fantasies and imaginaries here as well. Social imaginaries, 
as I have mentioned earlier, structure the field of  intelligibility, delimiting what can be felt or 
practiced around a specific issue. I have mentioned the Kosovo social imaginary that structures the 
political practice of  the Serbian Government and the affective investment of  subjects into this 
imaginary. It is thus more sedimented than a myth, and in Laclau’s (1990) understanding, a social 
imaginary occurs when a myth becomes sedimented and starts to structure the field of  intelligibility, 
able to accommodate a range of  diverse demands. This has happened with the Kosovo myth that 
turned into a social imaginary structuring the practices of  the Serbian political collective since 
Milošević. Fantasy thus underpins any of  these structures, be it myths or imaginaries, since it is 
part of  the affective economy of  subjects. As my case study will reveal, the myth of  the Brussels 
agreement from 2013 is underpinned by the same fantasy as that which sustains the hegemonic 
discourse of  “Kosovo is Serbia” and thus the Kosovo social imaginary (see Chapter 5), while the 
myth of  partitioning Northern Kosovo is underpinned by an alternative fantasy, namely the fantasy 
of  economic and political progress as part of  gaining EU membership, that would ensue only if  
Serbia re-articulated its claim to Kosovo to only a portion of  its territory. 
Apart from fantasy, “what sustains desire, what drives our identification acts, is also our ability to 
go through limit-experiences related to a jouissance of  the body. Otherwise, without any such 
experience, our faith in fantasmatic political projects […] which never manage to deliver the 
fullness they promise – would gradually vanish” (Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras 2006, 151). The 
crucial point is that through these limit-experiences of  jouissance of  the body, we partially experience 
what the political project or discourse in question might deliver if  it were “fully” realized. As 
Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras (2006, 152) continue, “fantasy sustains desire by performing a delicate 
balancing act.” Fantasy, on the one hand, “promises a harmonious resolution of  social antagonism, 
a covering over of  lack. Only this way it can constitute itself  as a desirable object of  identification” 
(ibid.). This is the beatific dimension of  fantasy (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 147), which is always 
accompanied by a horrific dimension, one which “foretells of  disaster if  the obstacle proves 
insurmountable.” The horrific dimension is evident in the construction of  the Other who has 
stolen our enjoyment from us, thus preventing us from re-capturing it – what Žižek has referred 
to as “theft of  enjoyment” typical of  racist discourses (see Žižek 1993). By constituting the Other 
as a thief  of  our enjoyment, fantasy (Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras 2006, 152) 
preserves our faith in the existence and the possibility of  recapturing our lost enjoyment – a 
faith enhanced by the partial enjoyment we get from our experience – but projects its full 
realization onto the future, when we will manage to get it back from the Other who has 
stolen it from us. This way enjoyment is kept at a ‘healthy’ distance, not too far but not too 
close either; close enough to support the appeal of  an object of  identification but far enough 
from letting us entertain the vision of  full satisfaction as an imminent possibility, something 
that would kill desire, induce anxiety, and put identification processes in danger. 
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Thus, fantasy has a paradoxical/dual structure: it embodies on the one hand a “fantasmatic, 
imaginarized jouissance” fueling desire, but one that can only “operate as an object of  desire […] 
insofar as it is posited as lacking/stolen” (ibid., 153). This dialectic between presence and absence 
has already been thematized by Stavrakakis (2017) and mentioned previously in subchapter 2.3 in 
terms of  dislocation being the negative dimension of  the Real. Returning to that notion, 
Stavrakakis mentions the positive dimension of  the real as being incarnated by the empty signifier 
(Laclau’s definition) or the objet petit a (Lacanian definition). Stavrakakis (2017, 90) argues that the 
lack of  the Real – be it our incapability to fully represent the Real, or the lack of  the “real”, pre-
symbolic enjoyment (jouissance) – must be somehow positivized in order for our social world to 
have any consistency. He calls this positivization an imaginarization, articulating an indivisible link 
between the order of  the Imaginary and our ability to represent anything in discourse, i.e., the 
Symbolic. The function of  fantasy is precisely “to imaginarise lack” and its attempt at doing that is 
incarnated in the objets petit a, the object-cause of  desire: embodying “simultaneously the pure lack, 
the void around which the desire turns and which, as such, causes the desire, and the imaginary 
element which conceals this void, renders it invisible by filling it out” (Žižek 1994, 178-9). The objet 
petit a can thus be read against Laclau’s notion of  the empty signifier, which also embodies the 
“presence of  an absence” in discourse qua a particular signifier standing in its place via a hegemonic 
operation. Thus, the function of  myth, it can be argued, is to incarnate lack – contrasting it to the 
notion that fantasy functions to “imaginarise lack.” “[I]n fantasy the presence of  an absence (the object-
cause of  desire, the empty signifier) represents and, at the same time, masks the ultimate absence of  
presence (of  a pre-symbolic jouissance as fullness, as lack of  lack)” (Stavrakakis 2007, 78). However, 
this is not the entire picture, since objets petit a carry an affective dimension. As Stavrakakis (2017, 
91) argues, “through the intervention of  empty signifiers qua objets petit a, linguistic articulation 
acquires an extra dimension, which is necessary for its sedimentation and hegemonic appeal 
through its affective investment. This is how jouissance enters the picture to interact with language. 
Together, they produce discourse”. Laclau also recognizes this affective dimension of  discourse by 
referring to its form and force, the linguistic/structural dimension and the dimension of  affective 
investment (see Chapter 3). What epitomizes the objet petit a in my case study is Kosovo itself, which 
incarnates the “lost enjoyment” of  the Serbian national community, the restoration of  which 
promises to suture a primordial lack (something that can never be achieved and was never really 
there in the first place – due to the impossible fullness of  society). The two myths – the Brussels 
agreement via the A/CSM and the idea of  partition via “re-gaining” Northern Kosovo – act as 
empty signifiers and have emerged as a result of  dislocation, attempting to symbolize the 
impossible fullness underpinned by the fantasy of  restoring in some shape or form the lost object-
cause of  desire promising to fulfill jouissance – Kosovo.  
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3 Methodological Framework 
 
Broadly defined, the analysis portrayed in this thesis is based on a discourse-theoretical approach 
that was originally developed by Essex school theorists such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. 
Often, discourse-theoretical approaches refer to themselves as post-foundational analysis, basing 
this claim on the contingent foundations of our social reality that Laclau and Mouffe have so often 
emphasized (see Marchart 2007). Such analysis was further developed by Thomas Marttila (2015) 
into an empirical research program of post-foundational discourse analysis (PDA), employing 
concepts such as nodal points, floating signifiers, and discursive regimes onto concrete empirical 
analysis. The main starting point is the relational ontology of meaning that PDA and other 
discourse-theoretical approaches subscribe to, which is “based upon the assumption that an 
object’s conceived meaningfulness can only originate from the discourse – that is the relational 
arrangement of meaning-conveying objects – in which the so-called practices of articulation locate 
this object” (Marttila 2015, 19). Apart from Marttila’s approach, there are many other approaches 
that have the Essex school as their starting point (named below), some advocating for the 
development of a research program, such as the Marttila model, and others maintaining that post-
foundational analysis should “remain open to a certain degree of theoretical and methodological 
anarchism” (Palonen and Sundell 2019, 77). I advocate for the latter and have chosen to combine 
methodologically aspects of three post-Laclaudian approaches to analysis. Firstly, the 
psychoanalytically inspired discourse analysis of the force of discourse focusing on jouissance, fantasy 
(Stavrakakis 2007; Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras 2006), and fantasmatic logic (Glynos and Howarth 
2007) and drawing from studies on affect (Ahmed 2004; Sjöstedt Landén 2011). Secondly, the so-
called “Brussels school” that calls their approach discourse-theoretical analysis (DTA) and that 
focuses on the relation between discursivity and materiality through a knotted model (Carpentier, 
De Cleen and Van Brussel 2019; Carpentier 2017; Carpentier 2018a). Thirdly, the “Helsinki school” 
which focuses on rhetoric and performativity, understanding meaning-making as tropological by 
relying on Laclau’s later work on rhetoric (Palonen 2018b). All those approaches are introduced 
against the background of already established ways of conducting post-structuralist discourse 
analysis, which is for instance evident in Marttila’s (2015; 2018) work, or as laid out by the Essex 
school relying on the works of Laclau and Mouffe (Glynos et al. 2009; Howarth and Stavrakakis 
2000). 
In particular, the Brussels school of DTA has emphasized a sensitizing concepts approach to data 
analysis, advocating for a combination of qualitative content analysis methods with the primary 
and secondary sensitizing concepts used in DTA, such as discourse (primary), and articulation, 
nodal points, empty signifiers, myths, imaginaries etc. (all secondary concepts). These 
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combinatorial efforts could be termed “anarchist” by some, but I find them particularly suitable 
for my analysis, since it allows me to pay attention to the nexus between discursivity, materiality and 
affectivity and how they relate to myths. It allows me to consider both the spatial aspect of 
discourse (the mapping out of its elements), and the temporal aspect of it (by looking into what 
sustains counter-hegemonic articulations and projects and how dominant structures can be 
changed). 
If applying sensitizing concepts and tropological moves on the discursive field in an analysis can 
illuminate the form of discourse, then the force of discourse can be illuminated through an analysis 
of affect and fantasmatic logic. This analytical lens allows me to focus specifically on the force of 
discourse instead of just form, something that Laclau recognized in his later work (Laclau 2005, 
110), and look at the affective dimension of discursive investment of subjects (Stavrakakis 2017) 
into myths and hegemonic projects. Laclau’s call for further exploration of the affective dimension 
of discourse is partly based on the critique of psychoanalytic scholars such as Slavoj Žižek (1989, 
124-125) who claims that any study of ideology should be conducted on two levels: the discursive 
level, which reveals how an ideological field is structured around nodal points and floating 
signifiers, and the level of enjoyment, which should reveal the way an ideology grips its subjects 
and produces enjoyment in them – a process which is internal to the field of meaning. Similarly, 
my analysis will focus on the discursive level, mapping out the spatial constellation of the discourses 
in question, as well as focusing on sedimentation and material underpinnings, while simultaneously 
paying attention to the force of discourses. This includes a look into the fantasmatic logic (Glynos 
and Howarth 2007) of myths grounding hegemonic projects, as well as into sedimented “structures 
of feeling” (Williams 2015) that accompany the sustainment of certain discourses and the “politics 
of emotion” (Ahmed 2004) that reinforce, but also help re-articulate political frontiers between the 
insiders and the outsiders of a discourse – the re-articulations of antagonistic and agonistic Others. 
Instead of focusing on micro-level analysis of any particular discourses (for instance, how sentences 
are structured), the analytical lens outlined above allows me to pay attention to structure and change 
on a macro-level. For instance, the rhetoric-performative approach to analysis developed by 
Palonen (2018b) offers me rhetorical tools to talk about the modalities in which myths relate to 
dislocations.  





Table 1: Methodological Framework of Discursive-material-affective Analysis 
In the next subchapters, I focus on each of these three elements, namely discourse-theoretical, 
material, and affective analysis as separate dimensions of the social phenomena I am looking at. 
DTA mostly features the work of the Brussels and the Helsinki schools, material analysis features 
the Brussels school with elements of Marttila’s PDA, and affective analysis features the Essex 
school’s work on fantasmatic logic and fantasy, with additional sensitizing concepts borrowed from 
cultural studies.  
3.1 Discourse-theoretical Analysis (DTA) 
DTA as elaborated by the Brussels school is an attempt to translate the ontological framework of 
discourse theory into a methodological framework by relying on Blumer’s original conception of 
sensitizing concepts (Carpentier and De Cleen 2007). As they explain, sensitizing concepts “are not 
intended to dominate and foreclose the analysis, but are kept in the back of the mind of the analyst 
and provide support when interpreting particular social realities and applying the categorization 
logics of qualitative analysis” (Carpentier, De Cleen and Van Brussel 2019, 13). The primary 
sensitizing concept is discourse, since it is a crucial ontological and ontic category in this 
framework. Discourse theory offers a range of secondary sensitizing concepts, such as 
“articulation, nodal point, floating signifier, and subject position, but also contingency and 
overdetermination, chain of equivalence (and difference), antagonism, agonism, hegemony, and 
social imaginary” (ibid.), and these concepts can be read as heuristic devices that help the analyst 
Discursive-material-affective Analysis 
Form of Discourse 
 
Brussels school: 
Discourse-Theoretical Analysis (DTA): sensitizing concepts (identifying 
discourses, nodal points, articulations, equivalences, myths etc.). 
Focus on materiality: material dimension of dislocations, institutions as 
anchoring or challenging discourses, political/ethnic groups as objects 
rather than subjects (homogenization practices), symbolic places or 
objects, borders etc. 
Helsinki school: 
Tropological moves on the discursive field (metonymic, paradigmatic): 
how myths relate to dislocations. 
Focus on performativity: how discourses are performed by subjects, 
processuality of meaning-making. 
Force of Discourse Affects, fantasmatic logic, psychoanalysis (Essex school): 
Additional sensitizing concepts brought into analysis: politics of emotion 
(Ahmed 2004), structures of feeling (Williams 2015), fantasy. 
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interpret the social phenomena at hand. I particularly focus on the following concepts and devices: 
myths, dislocations, imaginaries, articulation, nodal points, discursive relations (equivalence and 
difference), floating signifiers, political reactivation/institution, empty signifiers, hegemony, 
performative practice, catachresis, naming, metonymy (synecdoche), metaphor and paradigmatic 
substitution, hegemonic subjects, fantasmatic logic and fantasies, politics of emotion, and 
structures of feeling. I have brought the last three concepts into the analysis as sensitizing concepts, 
since they allow me to take account of affects as the force of discourse. However, they relate to 
affective analysis and will be explained in detail further below. 
Myths, as explained, are a central ontological as well as analytical category. Analytically, myths are 
particular signifiers that can be identified in the course of a discourse analysis, and they specifically 
relate to suturing dislocations, as this thesis suggests. Hence, I identify two myths: the myth of the 
Brussels agreement, which was supposed to suture the dislocation that Kosovo’s independence 
generated for the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse; and the myth of partition, as an alternative way of 
suturing the dislocation by substituting it with another, more centered discourse of partition. In 
my theoretical chapter, I have talked about the spatiality of myths, which can be analytically 
understood as various nodal points that anchor an imaginarized discourse, for instance the myth 
of the Brussels agreement being anchored by the A/CSM. The spatiality of myths is also reflected 
in their destabilizing effects on sedimented (spatialized) discourses, so any attempt to map out how 
a discourse is structured and re-structured is a spatial endeavor, as will become evident in the 
empirical chapters. The temporality of myths is reflected in them acting as empty signifiers, 
encapsulating an absent fullness and driven by the fantasy of a state to come, which is often 
contrasted with a past state of affairs (particularly evident in the idea of partitioning Kosovo in 
Chapter 6). I will not explain myths and imaginaries further, since I have already done so in the 
previous chapters, and Chapter 4 is entirely devoted to the Kosovo social imaginary. I will also 
refrain from repeating myself about dislocations, although I will elaborate on the material aspect 
of dislocations in the next subchapter on material analysis (3.2). 
Articulation, as already explained in the introduction, is a central category of discourse theory and 
discourse-theoretical analysis. Articulatory practices (re-)produce connections between so-called 
“elements” (as possible units of  meaning in a field of  discursivity) and “moments” (as discursive 
units with a particular meaning) fixed and materialized as part of  a discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985). These fixations are never finite, as every discourse is only contingently grounded. They are 
also partial, as no discourse can institute itself  as a coherent totality, but a speck of  its contingency 
is always revealed by the existence of  antagonisms and dislocations. As DeLuca (1999, 334) argues, 
“in a world without foundations, without a transcendental signified, without given meanings, the 
concept of  articulation is a means to understanding the struggle to fix meaning and define reality 
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temporarily.” This fixation of  meaning occurs through nodal points, as moments of  fixing the 
discourse around specific signifiers (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Relying on Palonen (2018a), I have 
also previously recognized that nodal points carry a temporal dimension (they are processual) and 
can be thus conceptualized as “discursive elements that anchor and materialize a certain discourse 
[…] in a certain symbolic moment. Any moment of  institution of  a discourse and any articulation 
that anchors that discourse can be seen as a nodal point” (Vulović 2020, 332). This category will 
be frequently used in the analysis, since discourses are organized and stabilized around nodal points. 
Nodal points are organized through discursive relations between them, building chains of  
equivalence and difference (see subchapter 2.1). Equivalence relates to nodal points being 
equated through a logic of  commensurability in relation to a common outside or antagonism, while 
difference relates to the opposite: it dissolves chains of  equivalence by weakening an antagonistic 
frontier (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000). In addition, signifiers whose meaning is not stabilized 
across different, opposing discourses are termed “floating signifiers” (Howarth and Stavrakakis 
2000; Laclau and Mouffe 1985) and they are crucial analytical categories for describing 
contestations of meaning. This will become evident in Chapter 4. 
In order to explain practices of political institution/reactivation, we need to turn to Laclau’s 
discussion of the political and the social. Even though no discourse can be based upon its full or 
total closure of  meaning, some discourses appear more stable than others, some accommodate a 
wide range of  discursive identities that support them. In post-foundational discourse theory, our 
social world is conceived of  as always potentially moving between sedimentation of  meaning 
(accepting things at face value) and acts of  politicization that reveal the contingent nature of  
sedimented meanings (or reactivation of  sedimented notions). As Laclau (1999, 146) claims, “we 
live in a world of  sedimented social practices. The moment of  reactivation consists not in going 
to an original founding moment, […] but to an original contingent decision through which the 
social was instituted. This moment of  the institution of  the social through contingent decisions is 
what I call ‘the political’.” In other words, “the more the ‘foundation’ of  the social is put into 
question, the less the sedimented social practices are able to ensure social reproduction, and the 
more new acts of  political intervention and identification are socially required” (Laclau 1994, 4). It 
is precisely this “instituting dimension – constitutive of  social practices” (ibid.; see also Laclau 
1996a, 47) that Laclau calls the political. Political practices, then, are those practices that aim to 
institute or stabilize certain meanings. This can be compared to Glynos and Howarth’s concept 
of  political logics, which “emphasize the dynamic process by which political frontiers are 
constructed, stabilized, strengthened, or weakened and disarticulated” Glynos (2008a, 278).  
However, an absolutely fixed meaning is not possible (only a partial fixing through nodal points), 
because of  the contingency of  our social world: “a total political institution of  the social can only 
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be the result of  an absolute omnipotent will, in which case the contingency of  what has been 
instituted – and hence its political nature – would disappear. The distinction between the social and 
the political is thus ontologically constitutive of  social relations” (Laclau 1990, 35). 
Performative practices, as explained in the theoretical chapter, are those citational practices that 
help sustain and materialize certain discourses. They thus relate to sedimentation of  meaning, but 
they also have a reconstitutive character, since every repetition opens up the possibility for the 
performative re-articulation of  dominant discourses, as Butler (2010) explains. This resonates with 
Laclau’s notion of  the political and the social as ontologically constitutive of  social relations. In 
this study, performative practices refer to those articulatory practices that help institute and 
maintain a certain dominant discourse on statehood, such as the Serbian Government’s claim to 
Kosovo being Serbian, which is performed through the institutional framework, the Serb 
community in Kosovo, and the establishment of  new institutions in Kosovo, such as the A/CSM. 
Thus, performativity relates to the materialization of  discourses and the practices that sustain it. 
Since it is a citational practice, performativity also relates to the body, specifically the body of  the 
leader, when for instance citational practices of  previously significant moments performed by past 
leaders (such as Slobodan Milošević’s speech at Gazimestan in 1989) are cited and re-constituted 
in a different spatial moment, namely in North Mitrovica by Aleksandar Vučić in 2018. Such 
moments re-constitute the leader, as well as the materiality of  the space in which they are 
performed, in a new light. In this case, Northern Kosovo would be performed as politically 
significant, by contrast to Milošević performing Southern Kosovo as politically significant 30 years 
prior. 
These practices also relate to hegemony, or hegemonic projects, which I often refer to in this 
thesis. According to Howarth (2015), discourse theory offers at least three ways of  understanding 
hegemony, developed gradually by Laclau (and Mouffe) over the years. I will refer to two of  them. 
The second model of  hegemony refers to a “special type of  articulatory practice that constitutes 
social formations” (Howarth 2015, 8), one that established contingent relations between discursive 
elements which stabilizes their meaning. It is an attempt to articulate a decision “taken in an 
undecidable terrain [of  the social]” (Laclau 1993, 545), which aims to dominate the field of  
discursivity contingently. The third one, which this thesis mainly relies on, builds on Laclau’s usage 
of  Lacanian and Derridean theory. Here, hegemony is understood as a process in which “one 
difference” in a signifying chain of  discursive elements, “without ceasing to be a particular 
difference, assumes the representation of  an incommensurable totality” (Laclau 2005, 70), 
assuming the place of  universality. As Laclau argues, “the universal, lacking any means of  direct 
representation, obtains only a borrowed presence through the distorted means of  its investment 
in a certain particularity” (Laclau 2006, 648). Laclau maintains that “fullness can only be touched 
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through a radical investment in a partial object—which is not a partiality within the totality but a 
partiality which is the totality” (ibid., 651) referring to the Lacanian notion of  objet petit a and its 
overlaps with what he has called the logic of  hegemony (see also Laclau 2005). This discursive 
move of  a particularity assuming the place of  representing the totality of  the signifying chain the 
heterogeneous elements of  which it manages to unify is a tropological one (Laclau 2014), meaning 
that rhetoricity is not a form of  language use, it is not solely about persuasion, but it is constitutive 
of  meaning-making per se, ergo of  politics. This aspect will be explained in greater detail below, 
when I discuss metonymy and metaphor. 
The discussion on particularity and universality leads us to the empty signifier, which I have 
already explained in my theoretical chapter. Laclau argues that tropological substitution is the 
ground of politics itself, when he claims that “rhetorical mechanisms […] constitute the anatomy 
of the social world” (Laclau 2005, 110). Namely, if politics functions based on instituting 
hegemonic formations and as explained above, hegemony is nothing more than one element of a 
signifying chain (a particularity) taking up the space of representing an incommensurable totality 
(replacing it, embodying the entire chain), then tropological substitution or replacement is at the 
heart of politics itself. Laclau argues that when an element assumes its hegemonic role, it loses its 
specificity and “becomes something on the order of an empty signifier, its own particularity 
embodying an unachievable fullness” (Laclau 2005, 71), naming something that is both impossible 
and necessary. Laclau (2014, 65) further adds that “what names the set cannot be part of it. What 
the rhetorical turn would add to this argument is that the term naming the set would be one of the 
particular elements of that set that splits its own identity between its own particularity and its role 
of signifying ‘the totality’. It is this double role that is at the root of all topological displacement.” 
Hence, “If the empty signifier arises from the need to name an object which is both impossible 
and necessary, […] the hegemonic operation will be catachrestical through and through” (Laclau 
2005, 72). Catachresis in Laclau’s work is termed “the common denominator of rhetoricity as 
such” (ibid., 71) pointing to a constitutive gap in all systems of meaning, such as our symbolic 
system of language. (Symbolic) representation will always be rhetorical, since we would need to 
express something that the literal term would not transmit. This is why catachresis is constitutive 
of meaning-making per se, because meaning-making revolves both around an ontological 
impossibility and around the necessity of naming things that are ‘‘essentially unnamable’’ (Laclau 
2005, 71) – ergo, it relies on the production of empty signifiers. Thus, catachresis in my analysis is 
evident in the (empty) signifier of a “solution” to the dispute between Serbia and Kosovo, mediated 
by Brussels. This “solution” is something that is essentially unnamable, so we need the production 
of empty signifiers that would take the place of representing this unnamable “thing”, as we do not 
know yet what that could possibly be. The signifiers that would take the place of representing the 
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unnamable solution are evident in two myths I have indicated before: The Brussels agreement the 
idea of partitioning Northern Kosovo (although the latter is rather a re-activation of an older idea). 
These hegemonic operations would be catachrestical in Laclaudian terms – the entire political 
process of the Brussels dialogue revolves around articulating a signifier that would embody this 
solution, that is, naming the “unnamable” since many attempts have been made, but no solution 
has yet been found. Generally, naming as an articulatory practice is very important for my analysis, 
since it entails an “act of gathering that articulates together a set of heterogeneous discursive 
elements” (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 187, italics in the original), whereby it can tap into a variety 
of discourses that are prevalent and that a number of social subjects affectively subscribe into. By 
the practice of naming, the named object is constituted as a new object that is able to represent a 
multitude of demands and reconcile the achievement of contradicting elements, as Howarth and 
Griggs (2006, 41) explain, defining naming as a “moment of catachresis par excellence” (see also 
Palonen 2006, 117-120; Palonen 2018b on catachresis). The way issues are named also has to do 
with upholding a given discursive and material practice (since it is a social logic) and must be 
understood in connection to performativity. Certain discourses are (re)constituted by the act of 
naming time and again, which opens up spaces for their re-articulation and change (a practice that 
can be understood as a political logic). 
Having explained catachresis as the basis of rhetoricity as such, I will now move on to explain 
metaphor and metonymy as tropes that define political practice per se. Based on Laclau, Howarth 
and Griggs (2006) argue that 
Rhetorical categories are at once important for both fleshing out the ontology of discourse 
theory, and as a means of analysing texts and linguistic practices. With respect to the former, 
for example, the concept of a hegemonic practice is understood principally as a metonymical 
operation in which a particular group or movement takes up demands articulated by 
contiguous groups – a student movement, for example, begins to organize and address 
workers’ demands – or extends one set of demands into adjacent spheres, as when workers’ 
struggles come to symbolise the demands of an entire nation […]. By contrast, the 
stabilisation of such practices into a hegemonic form or order, each organised around an 
empty signifier, is metaphorical in that it involves the creation of new meaningful totalities 
via the disarticulation and replacement of previously existing formations. 
In Laclau’s (2014) work, metaphor and metonymy refer to the two axes of language, the 
syntagmatic and the paradigmatic. The syntagmatic axis relies on a combination of signifiers based 
on a relation of contiguity (metonymy), whereas the paradigmatic axis relies on the substitution of 
signifiers based on a relation of analogy (metaphor). He claims that “hegemony means the passage 
from metonymy to metaphor, from a ‘contiguous’ starting point to its consolidation in ‘analogy’” 
(Laclau 2014, 22). Hence, a metonymic operation would involve a hegemonic or instituting practice 
(the political, as Laclau has argued), whereas a metaphoric operation would involve the stabilization 
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of such practices into a sedimented order, as Howarth and Griggs (2006) have argued above. As 
politics constantly moves between acts of politicization and sedimentation, these operations are 
intrinsically tied. However, in terms of analyzing hegemony (both as political practice and the 
sedimentation of orders), Laclau names one trope that is central to it, one that involves a 
metonymic relation of contiguity: synecdoche. Synecdoche refers to a “move[s] on [the] discursive 
field” whereby the move is dictated by a logic of articulation that is not always “fully conscious or 
actor derived” as Palonen (2018b, 181) argues in her elaboration of a rhetoric-performative 
approach to discourse analysis. Synecdoche is a trope that refers to a part representing the whole 
(ibid., 183), or in Laclau’s writing, when one particular signifier in a signifying chain takes the place 
of representing the totality of that chain (pars pro toto). As Baysha (2018, 236) argues, “synecdoche 
appears as a structural necessity of any hegemonic discourse”, since as I have explained, hegemony 
involves precisely this type of operation. If synecdoche refers to a part representing the inevitably 
failed wholeness/unity of identity (particularity standing for universality), then in the 2013 
discourse, this “part” representing the claim to the whole is embodied by the signifier “the Serb 
community” (that is the people). Namely, the myth of the Brussels agreement as a means to mend 
the dislocation, involves the creation of a “new objectivity” in which Serbia’s universalizing claim 
to Kosovo has been embodied by the Serb community in Kosovo (synecdochic move) and all 
efforts have been directed towards preserving that community in Kosovo. This is what the Brussels 
agreement was supposed to achieve through the establishment of A/CSM. In a sense, the Serb 
community (the people) simultaneously functions as an empty signifier representing this totality. 
In 2018, on the other hand, we have “Northern Kosovo” (territory) as a signifier that is the part 
representing this universality, i.e., Serbia’s universalizing claim to Kosovo. Generally speaking, we 
have a metonymical move (synecdoche, part representing the whole) originally from territory (the 
entire Kosovo, universalizing claim) to people (the Serb community), and back to territory again 
(Northern Kosovo). People and territory are part of the same chain of equivalence (through a 
relation of contiguity) that forms Serbia’s claim to Kosovo. 
Synecdoche is evident in the entire analysis, as moves substituting one signifying chain for a single 
signifier are part of these contestations within the Brussels dialogue. Several political projects are 
“fighting” for hegemony, so to speak, with the Brussels agreement and A/CSM being one that has 
at least partially attained hegemony and become fixed around different nodal points, such as the 
institutional integration in Northern Kosovo (local elections, judicial integration, integration of the 
police force etc.). 
“Zooming out” from individual hegemonizing practices (such as the synecdochic moves explained 
above) to the sedimentation of hegemonic orders and the mentioned question of how myths relate 
to dislocations, we can recognize two practices that are evident in the two temporal moments of 
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2013 and 2018: concealment and displacement, both of which are tied to the concept of myth as a 
“new objectivity” and “empty signifier”. The following section will be devoted to this analytical 
distinction. 
As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, myth as a means of mending a dislocation can be conceptualized 
in terms of a new objectivity and an empty signifier. A myth (as imaginarized objectivity sustained 
by an empty signifier) can co-exist with the dislocated structure as a means to “ignore” or conceal 
it (metaphorically speaking), claiming that the structure is not dislocated at all. This is what the 
Brussels agreement has tried to achieve. Here we can speak of hegemony that is (at least partly) 
sedimented, as I have mentioned before. Laclau (2014, 16) talks of distortion as opposed to 
dislocation in this regard, claiming that 
dislocation is constitutive, […] [hence,] the very notion of a metaphysical closure has to be put 
into question. But the notion of distortion involves something more than mere dislocation 
– namely, that a concealment of some sort takes place in it. […] [W]hat is concealed is the 
ultimate dislocation of what presents itself as a closed identity, and the act of concealment 
consists in projecting onto that identity the dimension of closure that it ultimately lacks. 
He adds that “the distortive operation consists precisely in […] projecting into something that is 
essentially divided the illusion of a fullness and self-transparency that it lacks” (Laclau 2014, 15). 
This so-called “illusion” can be conceived of as a myth that covers over or conceals the dislocated 
structure and offers a fully coherent story to the subjects that are affectively invested in the 
dislocated discourse. In a sense, this myth metaphorically “substitutes” the reading of the dislocated 
structure offering a new discursive-material-affective reality that makes sense to the subjects 
sustaining it, promising a unified/closed identity, free of dislocation (what was supposed to be 
offered by the Brussels agreement’s full implementation). Since this new reality’s 
coherence/closure will always be revealed by the same dislocation (and antagonisms) as ultimately 
failing, it will never entirely succeed in substituting it, but merely to conceal it, to cover it over by 
offering something alternative. 
When a myth as part of an imaginarized discourse (new objectivity) fails to accommodate an ever-
increasing set of dislocations and social demands, a new myth needs to be generated. For instance, 
the central part of the Brussels agreement, the A/CSM, was never implemented, and after 
participating in the Kosovo local elections in 2013, the Serb community leaders in Kosovo (backed 
by the Serbian Government) were increasingly unwilling to make further concessions and fully 
integrate into Kosovo state structures. Since the Brussels agreement has not succeeded to mend 
the dislocation, Serbian hegemonic actors have articulated a new myth, one that would not simply 
co-exist with the dislocated discursive-material structure, but would hegemonically displace it 
(entirely, through paradigmatic substitution). By replacing the dislocated structure, it would 
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denounce that same structure, recognizing its dislocated nature, not merely covering it over. This 
recognition would inevitably result in the structure’s falling apart, meaning that the “Kosovo is 
Serbia” discourse would be denounced and displaced by something entirely new (on a paradigmatic 
level). Within this movement, synecdoche is easily recognizable, since this new project embodying 
a part of Kosovo (Northern Kosovo) that would replace Serbia’s totalizing claim to entire Kosovo 
involves a metonymic relation of contiguity between these two elements. Within the partition 
discourse of 2018, a part – Northern Kosovo – comes to represent the whole, i.e., Serbia’s totalizing 
claim to Kosovo. After all, Serbia would not simply recognize Kosovo as independent and abandon 
its hegemonic claim to it but replace it with a claim to only one of its parts, namely Northern 
Kosovo. Within this constellation, the dislocated “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse would inevitably 
fall apart, as the paradigmatic replacement would involve recognizing Kosovo as an independent 
state. However, even though the discursive move was paradigmatic, it was never fully realized, that 
is the partition discourse has not successfully replaced the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse. Therefore, 
we can only analyze it as a hegemonic practice (a sedimenting order), a myth, not a sedimented 
order, or metaphoric fixation in Laclau’s words. 
Lastly, we can turn to hegemonic subjects as a sensitizing concept used to illuminate the 
positionality of actors in discourse and their ability to engage politically with discourses. I will also 
introduce the notion of the “split subject”, which is essential for understanding identificatory 
practices of social subjects with different discourses and their subjectivation into them, which can 
help us discuss agency in post-structuralist terms. In this tradition, the subject is not understood as 
a pre-given fixed entity, but “subjectivity qua social subjects’ socially meaningful existence comes 
into being as the subsequent outcome of their definition in a discourse” (Marttila 2015, 74). Thus, 
we do not precisely speak of identity, but rather of identification as a practice through which we 
“attain” an identity within a specific discourse we subjectivate into. Equally, we can dis-identify 
with certain discourses and identify with others, sometimes simultaneously identifying with 
seemingly opposing discourses. The concept of identification is there to help us grasp the dynamic 
process of identity-building as never finite and never fully fixed. An attention to discourse and 
discursive identities brings us to the notion of the subject position (in contrast to the notion of the 
subject). A subject position is more-or-less an empirical category, since in ‘[the general field of 
objectivity,] there are only subject positions’ (Laclau 1990, 61) – a “subject” will in discourse-
analytical terms always escape our grasp. This means that we should focus on discourses as ‘surfaces 
of inscription’ of different subjects’ ‘identities’ through acts of identification. Here we can speak of 




Marttila (2015, 75) also points out that identification also involves an “‘affective’ attachments to 
discourses and discursively conceptualized subject roles.” This affective dimension brings us to 
psychoanalysis and the notion of the “split subject” (or barred subject) and “subject as lack”. The 
Lacanian conception of subjectivity assumes that the subject is divided or alienated from itself 
through the subject’s entering the symbolic order of language. This split is constitutive of 
subjectivity as such, and the subject will always affectively yearn to cover over or mend this radical 
split through acts of identification. As Glynos and Stavrakakis (2008, 261) argue, “[s]ubjectivity in 
Lacan’s work […] is linked not only to lack but also our attempts to eliminate this lack that, 
however, does not stop re-emerging” which is what identification is all about. What conceptualizing 
the subject in terms of split and lack means for social research is that “it avoids attributing to 
subjectivity a positively defined essence (such as a privileged notion of true interests/needs or a 
certain type of inherent rationality)” (ibid., 260).  
In the attempts to mend a dislocation, articulate a counter-hegemonic project and offer new means 
of identification for social subjects around alternative nodal points, different subjects assume the 
role of “protagonists” (Marttila 2015) in offering these means of identification. Laclau (2000) 
maintains that a subject emerges as a political actor when a dislocated structure cannot 
accommodate a range of previously stabilized identifications, prompting these actors to identify 
themselves with new structures and reorganize or institute them. This is what hegemonic practice 
is all about, since these (particular) actors take upon themselves the task of speaking for an entire 
community, for instance a nation. As I have already mentioned before, a hegemonic relationship 
requires that a particular group takes at least some degree of representation of universality, say for 
a community as a whole. A hegemonic subject thus is a subject that would take upon themself 
this task of embodying a universality, which in my analysis would be state actors (representing a 
whole national community, such as presidents, institutional representatives) a party (in my case the 
SNS, incarnating the two myths of the Brussels agreement and partition), an individual (such as 
Aleksandar Vučić) or other institutional (such as the EU) or cultural actors (such as the Serbian 
Orthodox Church – SOC). As the discursive field of trying to solve the Kosovo-Serbia dispute 
occurs in a transculturally entangled arena (the contact zone of the Brussels dialogue), these actors 
can range from EU representatives and Serbia’s state and party leaders, to state representatives of 
Russia, China or Serbia’s neighboring countries. However, these actors are only contextually 
analyzed, since the focus of this thesis lies on the SNS-majority and SNS-led government’s re-
articulation of Kosovo within the Brussels dialogue. However, what the contextual analysis will 




Having explained how the symbolic and affective constitution of subjectivity work, I will now 
move on to elaborate a few analytical categories that will be used in the analysis when trying to 
identify particular subject roles (Marttila’s vocabulary) or subject positions (Laclau’s vocabulary). 
Marttila’s (2015, 132-134) has elaborated a topology of discursive identities, in which he expands 
on the relation between different subject roles and their position within a discourse. What Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985) would call nodal points of a discourse, Marttila names “ethical ideals” 
(paramount values and ideals embodied by nodal points), and discursive limits would be designated 
by “antagonistic others” (opponents and threats that endanger the attainment and sustainment of 
the ethical ideals and lie outside the discourse, constituting it). The subject positions are divided 
into “protagonists” (champions/protectors of the ethical ideals), “helpers” (subjects supporting 
the attainment/maintenance of ethical ideals) and “opponents” (subjects within the same discourse 
opposing/endangering the attainment of ethical ideals). Protagonists would thus be hegemonic 
subjects, or those who stabilize and institute (counter-)hegemonic orders. These categories will be 
brought up in the following Chapter 4 and embedded in the two identified discourses: the 
community and the partition discourse. It will become evident that in the community discourse, 
there was a greater number of heterogeneous hegemonic subjects trying to stabilize meanings 
around the Brussels agreement, whereas in the partition discourse, this heterogeneity is not so 
visible. In 2018, Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić started to take on a more prominent role 
when it came to re-articulating the signifier of Kosovo, hegemonizing the political field around 
who supports his political vision (helpers) and who opposes it (opponents and antagonistic 
Others). The most visible re-articulation of subjects revolved around how Kosovo Albanians and 
Albanians in general are positioned. Whereas in 2013, Serbian hegemonic subjects tried to articulate 
the relationship between Serbs and Albanians in a more heterogeneous manner as increasingly 
agonistic (particularly because of the Brussels agreement which emphasizes cooperation between 
the communities), in 2018, Albanians were articulated as antagonistic forces lying outside “our” 
discursive project and attempt to block the attainment of “our” ethical ideals, hindering “our” full 
constitution of identity. 
3.2 Material Analysis 
As mentioned earlier, discursive materiality is one of the sensitizing concepts I have used, and it 
primarily refers to institutions; political, or ethnic groups that are articulated as objects rather than 
subjects in a discourse; symbolic places or objects; and bordering practices. Laclau’s conception of 
discourse does not make a distinction between “ideas” and their “material conditions”, but rather 
“encompass[es] all dimensions of social reality and not just the usual practices of speaking, writing, 
and communicating” (Howarth 2004, 265).  
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Carpentier has elaborated precisely how the discursive and the material are entangled through the 
discursive-material knot, in which the material is necessary to make sense of the discursive 
(Carpentier 2018a). He explains the knot as a “nonhierarchical ontology that theorizes the knotted 
interactions of  the discursive and the material as restless, contingent, sometimes incessantly 
changing shapes and sometimes deeply sedimented” (ibid., 160). On the ontic level of  social 
practices, Carpentier uses the notion of  the assemblage which enables us to grasp “how the flows 
that characterize the social, with their endless range of  possibilities to become fixated and to fixate, 
are arrested and channeled into particular combinations of  the discursive and the material” (ibid., 
161). While Carpentier maintains that materiality can only be meaningful within discourse, he adds 
that assemblages “have a materiality that invites for particular meanings to be attributed to them, 
and that dissuades other particular meanings from becoming attributed to them” (ibid., 164). This 
means that materials extend “an invitation to be discursified, or to be integrated in discourses, in 
always particular ways” (ibid.), for instance when a novel does not simply produce or determine 
meaning on its own, but when it invites the reader to identify with certain aspects of  it or characters 
in it. Given that materiality is always already invested with meaning, “discourses impact on the 
production of  materials, not only to give meaning to them but also to co-determine their 
materiality” (ibid.). 
Apart from the invitation that the material extends to subjects to privilege the attribution of  certain 
discourses to them over others, dislocation is another aspect that is central to the discursive-material 
knot. Dislocation is a central concept that has already been explained in the introduction of  this 
thesis, but it is further elaborated here in light of  its material aspects. As mentioned, Torfing has 
characterized dislocation as “the emergence of  an event, or a set of  events, that cannot be 
represented, symbolized, or in other ways domesticated by the discursive structure – which is 
therefore disrupted” (Torfing 1999, 148). Carpentier insists that this dislocatory event is also 
material, not only discursive, referring to material change that would have the potential to dislocate a 
certain discourse: “[a]n event, in its materiality, dislocates a discourse because this discourse turns 
out to be unable to attribute meaning to the event, while the event simultaneously invites for its 
incorporation into this discourse” (2018a, 163). This type of  dislocation is fairly evident in the case 
study of  this thesis, namely the dislocation to the unity of  the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse that 
emerged as a result of  Kosovo’s declaration of  independence from 2008. This dislocation is 
material in that the institutions of  the Republic of  Kosovo have been present in Kosovo since 
2008 (becoming even more sedimented with the UNMIK’s acknowledgment of  their authoritative 
power to govern Kosovo in 2012), which materializes the discourse of  Kosovo’s independence, 
i.e., Kosovo as a separate Republic, not a province of  Serbia. Given that these institutions are a 
material effect of  dislocatory discourses, they “invite” their incorporation into the dislocated 
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discourse, which is evident in the attempt to “bridge” this dislocatory event and incorporate it into 
the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse through the adoption of  the Brussels agreement from 2013 (see 
Chapter 5). The material change that resulted from the gradual adaptation of  different aspects of  the 
Brussels agreement (although never implemented in its entirety) gradually foreclose the possibility 
of  certain discourses (such as the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse) to be attributed to them, and 
privileged the attribution of  alternative discourses, such as the discourse on Kosovo’s 
independence. If  there are (relatively) functioning institutions in place in Northern Kosovo and 
otherwise that have been formed under the framework of  the Republic of  Kosovo, then it becomes 
ever more difficult to claim the opposite, namely that Kosovo is still a province of  Serbia. This 
resulted in an attempt to “replace” one hegemonic project (maintaining the entire Kosovo as part 
of  Serbia) with an alternative one in 2017 and 2018, namely the attempt to partition Northern 
Kosovo from the rest of  Kosovo and incorporate it into the state framework of  Serbia, while 
acknowledging the rest of  Kosovo as independent, either formally or informally. Hence, material 
change is a gradual process and is always bound to the constitutive discourses that govern its 
materialization. This is why it is so important to look at both moments of  attempting to suture the 
dislocation of  Kosovo’s independence (the two myths I mentioned) and their effects on the unity 
of  the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse. The partition discourse of  2017 and 2018 would probably 
not have come about in the form that we know of, had it not been for the initial attempt to suture 
the dislocation with the Brussels agreement of  2013. It is the material change that resulted from 
the Brussels agreement – namely acknowledging and partially establishing the institutional authority 
of  Kosovo central institutions in Northern Kosovo as well as the Southern “enclaves”12 – and the 
lack of  material change – namely establishing the A/CSM – that enabled the articulation of  
partition in the first place.  
As for institutions, Marttila sees them through the lens of discursive sedimentation, which can be 
explained as a form of social “forgetting” of the contingency of discourses that helped institute 
them. Sedimentation “can to some extent explain the temporal stability of discourses and the social 
orders they motivated” (Marttila 2015, 63). Hence, institutionalization can be understood as a form 
of sedimentation, together with materialization and subjective internalization (habitualization). 
Institutions are formed in the process of discursive repetition and ritualization and can refer to “all 
kinds of social bodies with the socially accepted authority to sustain and implement the validity of 
particular discourses, regulate social access to subject roles, and sanction and control social subjects’ 
                                                          
12 For a more detailed discussion of Serbia’s institutional framework in the so-called enclaves in the South, see Dahlman 
and Williams (2010). The term is used to refer to areas in Kosovo south of the river Ibar with a homogeneous Serb 
population which are relatively institutionally independent from the Kosovo framework. However, this has begun to 
change with the adoption of the Brussels agreement in 2013 and nowadays, Serbs there tend to institutionally rely on 
the Kosovo state framework, except, for instance, when it comes to health or schooling. 
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adherence to presupposedly natural courses of both linguistic and pragmatic actions” (ibid., 65). 
Apart from institutions, bodies can also be considered as material (Carpentier 2018a), so the 
practices of homogenizing different bodies into specific ethnic and political groups can be 
considered as material practices. The same applies to bordering practices, in which material 
delineation (establishing walls, barricades etc.) is used to draw political frontiers between groups. 
Additionally, the materiality of certain places (such as Northern Kosovo) invites certain meanings 
to be attributed to them in a contingent manner (Carpentier 2018a), favoring the investment of 
certain meanings (such as partition) over others (such as integration into the Kosovo institutional 
framework). This will become evident in the course of the empirical analysis, especially in the ways 
that Serbia performs its claim to Kosovo (Chapter 5). 
3.3 Affective Analysis 
As a thread running through my analysis, apart from discursive/symbolic analysis (the form of 
discourses), I also explore the issue of affects, that is the force behind sustaining or challenging 
different discourses (affective investment in Laclaudian terms). As Laclau mentions, affect is not 
something added to signification, but any social whole “results from an indissociable articulation 
between signifying and affective dimensions” (Laclau 2005, 111). “Affect (that is, enjoyment 
[jouissance]) is the very essence of investment”, as Laclau (ibid., 115) continues. Similarly, Stavrakakis 
(2007, 21) points out that “[s]ymbolic power and authority finds its real support in the emotional 
dynamics of fantasy and (partial) enjoyment. Likewise, no social and political change can be 
effectively instituted if it is pursued merely at the level of knowledge, through transformations in 
consciousness.”  
The prominent spot of affect in discourse analysis Stavrakakis (2017) explains with the following: 
“through the intervention of empty signifiers qua objets petit a, linguistic articulation acquires an 
extra dimension, which is necessary for its sedimentation and hegemonic appeal through its 
affective investment. This is how jouissance enters the picture to interact with language. Together, 
they produce discourse.” Given my previous elaboration of myths as empty signifiers anchoring 
imaginarized discourses, affectivity is intrinsically tied to mythmaking inasmuch as for any myth to 
have an appeal for subjects, to “convince” them to subscribe to it in parallel to or instead of the 
dislocated structure, it needs to incite an affective response. This is why myths can “grip” subjects 
and why they become affectively invested in the discourses and fantasies promised by myths. 
Glynos and Howarth introduce the analytical category of fantasmatic logic to explain how 
discourses grip subjects and motivate them to act. They are called fantasmatic because the analysis 
of this type of logic would primarily focus on fantasies that sustain certain discourses, on the 
beatific promises of such fantasies, and on the horrific consequences that loom if the promises are 
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not fulfilled (Glynos and Howarth 2007). As Glynos (2008a, 278.) mentions, “fantasmatic logics 
concern the force behind [signifying] operations. Fantasmatic logics thus contribute to our 
understanding of  the resistance to change of  social practices (the ‘inertia’ of  social practices), but 
also the speed and direction of  change when it does happen (the ‘vector’ of  political practices).” 
Glynos and Howarth (2007) argue that a central aspect of  maintaining a fantasmatic order is fantasy 
in Lacanian terms. As Glynos (2008a, 283) points out: 
[T]he logic of  fantasy names a narrative structure involving some reference to an idealized 
scenario promising an imaginary fullness or wholeness (the beatific side of  fantasy) and, by 
implication, a disaster scenario (the horrific side of  fantasy). This narrative structure will 
have a range of  features which will vary from context to context, of  course, but one crucial 
element is the obstacle preventing the realization of  one’s fantasmatic desire. In Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, realizing one’s fantasy is impossible because the subject (as a subject of  
desire) survives only insofar as its desire remains unsatisfied. But the obstacle, which often 
comes in the form of  a prohibition or a threatening Other, transforms this impossibility into 
a ‘mere difficulty’, thus creating the impression that its realization is at least potentially 
possible. […] In sum, the logic of  such a fantasmatic narrative is such that it structures the 
subject’s desire by presenting it with an ideal as well as an impediment to the realization of  
that ideal. 
The fantasy of  a full closure of  identity of  a subject, which in the end can never be achieved fully, 
is what drives any political project further. For instance, the politics of  utopia, as Glynos and 
Stavrakakis (2008, 261) have already recognized, provides an example of  a narrative which promises 
to “[capture] our lost/impossible enjoyment”, offering fictions or “(imaginarizations) of  a future 
state in which the current limitations thwarting our enjoyment will be overcome.” More often than 
not, this lack of  enjoyment is “attributed to someone who has ‘stolen it’”, for instance in nationalist 
narratives: “The identity of  the evil ‘Other’ who prevents the nation from recouping the enjoyment 
it has lost shifts as a function of  historical context. It may be a foreign occupier, […], immigrants 
[…] etc. […] [F]antasy fosters the solidarity of  the national community, consolidates national 
identity, and animates national desire” (ibid., 262). 
Adding to this, my case study demonstrates that the fantasy of  restoring the full enjoyment of  a 
social group both fosters a sense of  national cohesion, or supports political articulations of  the 
collective as a nation, and encompasses the constitution of  a political “us” that is centered around 
a political party or a leader, which may or may not be ideological. This is the case with the 
aforementioned SNS, as will be explained in the empirical chapters. 
Jouissance has already been explained in Chapter 2, but it is important to re-introduce it here in 
relation to the empirical analysis. The supposedly lost enjoyment of having Kosovo as part of 
Serbia, Kosovo as the cradle of Serbdom, is what fuels the identification with the Kosovo is Serbia 
discourse and why it still has such potency. The fantasy of “restoring” Kosovo promises to suture 
this primordial lack, to restore an enjoyment “we” once had. Ultimately, this promise is doomed 
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to fail since jouissance can never be fully attained and the lack in the subject (and by extension the 
community) never sutured, since it is an ontological condition of subjectivity itself. The promise 
of “restoring” Kosovo through attaching Northern Kosovo to Serbia and giving up the rest 
promises to fulfill a different fantasy: one that would solve all of Serbia’s problems, advance the 
country economically and secure its future within the European Union. The fantasmatic logic goes: 
if only we could attain Northern Kosovo instead of the lost cause of fighting for all of Kosovo, we 
would have it all – maintain at least part of Kosovo as Serbian, solve the Kosovo-Serbia dispute, 
prosper economically because of increased stability and investment, and secure EU membership 
in the near future. As Stavrakakis (2007, 196) argues, “almost all political discourse focuses on the 
delivery of the ‘good life’ or a ‘just society’, which are, both, fictions of a future state in which 
current limitations thwarting our enjoyment will be overcome.” Hence, the promise of restoring 
the once lost jouissance cannot be fulfilled, since there is always going to be a remainder of the 
dislocation or of antagonism present revealing the contingency of the neat structure the fantasy 
promises to bring, and the imaginarized jouissance it promises to deliver. However, imaginarized 
jouissance is not the only thing that sustains desire, but also the ability of political projects to deliver 
partial experiences of enjoyment of the body. Namely, in certain instances, the demands and desires 
of subjects subscribing to a certain project coincide, which is experienced as jouissance of the body 
(Lacan 1962, seminar of 2 May). These limit-experiences of bodily enjoyment on a national level 
can be a win for the national football team, or winning a war (Stavrakakis 2007, 197). In my case 
study, the conclusion of the Brussels agreement that the Serbian Government has described as a 
win for Serbia amidst international pressure, the so-called “Kosovo is Serbia” train that was sent 
from Belgrade to Mitrovica in 2017 incarnating the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse, and the 
commemoration of the ethnically-motivated riots in Kosovo against mainly Kosovo Serbs on 17 
March 2004 can be seen as experiences of partial enjoyment. They incite a bodily enjoyment 
because of defiance, because all of these practices defy and contest the dominant Kosovo Albanian 
perceptions on the statehood of Kosovo, on their sovereignty and on the righteousness of their 
efforts towards self-determination. This is also addressed in the empirical chapters. 
Although fantasmatic logic is a dynamic process and identifying the structure of fantasies that 
underpin a given discourse is useful for analysis, Glynos and Howarth’s framework does not 
provide us with the tools to grasp affective signifiers used in discourse, which can explain why 
certain discourses have a significant emotive impact on subjects. This is why I bring Sara Ahmed’s 
(2004) cultural politics of emotion into the analysis, since it explains how words “stick” to bodies 
and material spaces and form them as affective objects, bringing about certain habitualized 
emotions attached to them each time they are articulated. Looking at the politics of emotion can 
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also help us to grasp how antagonistic Others are re-articulated into agonistic ones, and hence, how 
political frontiers are re-drawn. 
Stavrakakis (2007) also draws parallels between discourse theory and Ahmed’s (2004, 60) politics 
of emotion, who recognizes that “some words stick because they become attached through particular 
affects”, operationalizing the notion of stickiness of emotions. Emotions in her Derridean reading 
emerge as signs, the repetition of which conceals their material and historic context of production 
– the sign, through repetition, becomes detached from its context, carrying traces of it. Certain 
words accumulate meaning via repetition over time, and through this repetition, they generate 
bodily affects which carry a specific bodily value or incite response. Emotions as signs “stick” to 
bodies and produce the “effects that they name” (ibid., 92), in a Butlerian sense. This is how bodies 
become grouped or labeled as dangerous, hostile, adversary etc., which is how the politics of 
emotion produces and re-draws frontiers between “us” and “them” – which will become 
particularly evident in my empirical chapters. The stickiness of emotions can also explain the 
sedimentation of affects attached not only to bodies, but also to material spaces such as Kosovo, 
which has been articulated as an emotionally important place for Serbs throughout history. 
This leads us to a discussion of the structural (sedimented) aspect of affectivity, for which I rely on 
the concept of “structures of feeling”, coined by Raymond Williams, which can be defined as 
“specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling against thought, but 
thought as felt and feeling as thought […]. We are then defining these elements as a ‘structure’: as 
a set, with specific internal relations, at once interlocking and in tension” (Williams 2015, 23). 
Structures of feeling can be conceptualized as sedimented ways of feeling about a certain issue in 
society. The structures of feeling about Kosovo in Serbian political practice have mainly been about 
love for the holy land of Kosovo as a site of the origin of Serbian nationhood and statehood since 
medieval times. They have also been about the love for the remaining Serbian people there in the 
present, who are often articulated as defenders of everything that is Serbia and Serbian in Kosovo. 
These structures are also about the honor of defending Serbia and Serbian ideals in this holy land, 
or what has been referred to as Prince Lazar’s pledge: a pledge not to give up Kosovo because giving 
it up would mean giving up a part of the soul of the Serbian nation. Additionally, spite (inat in 
Serbian) and defiance also form a part of these structures of feeling around Kosovo, as it explains 
why Serbs will never give it up: to spite the Kosovo Albanian struggle for self-determination, to 
spite and defy the hegemonic West, who have unjustifiably supported Kosovo’s independence even 
contrary to international law. Spite relates to a discourse on geopolitical self-victimization of Serbia 
(see Vranić 2019), who has suffered under the unjust practices of great powers in their alignment 
with the politics of self-determination of Kosovo Albanians. What Vučić’s counter-hegemonic 
project of partition from 2018 attempts to do is not only re-articulate the discursive-material 
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structures around Kosovo, but also the structures of feeling that constitute them. Vučić’s call for 
“rationalizing” the Kosovo question evident in the internal dialogue from 2017 prompts a 
rethinking of the emotional attachment to Kosovo in Serbian politics. 
These structures of feeling constitute any discourse, but like all structures, they are contingent, and 
looking into the politics of emotion that destabilizes these structures is key to understanding how 
subjects might disarticulate from them. It is also imperative to look at the fantasies that support 
such articulations, which is why I have brought all three concepts into the analysis as sensitizing 
concepts to analyze the social phenomena at hand. 
What will follow in the next segment is a description of the research procedure I employed. I will 
also illuminate how traditional qualitative content analysis tools, as the Brussels school advocates, 
have been employed to categorize practices and form the two main analytic discourses, the 
community and the partition discourse (Chapters 5 and 6). 
3.4 Methodological Premises of Discourse Theory and Research Procedure 
In order to explain the methodological premises of discourse theory, I will rely on two significant 
works, Glynos and Howarth’s (2007) Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory and 
Marttila’s (2015) Post-Foundational Discourse Analysis that builds on Glynos and Howarth’s work. 
Both have further developed the insights of discourse theory into methodological application. For 
instance, Glynos and Howarth (2007) have contrasted the contextualized self-interpretation that is 
typical of hermeneutic approaches with their own concepts of critical explanation – political, social 
and fantasmatic logics – which enable the researcher to “carve out a critical space external to, yet 
within,  the practice or regime under study” (82), thus emphasizing that critical explanation always 
has “an ontical and an ontological impulse” (15) rooted in radical contingency and the 
incompleteness of any social order, which discourse theory argues for. The operation of logics is 
situated between contextualized self-interpretation and positivism, so we would not speak of 
causality nor of the subjective experience of reality, but rather of logics. Following on this, Marttila 
(2015) has pointed out a few methodological premises of post-foundational discourse analysis. This 
type of analysis is based on an understanding of  the world that “denies the possibility of  ‘subjective’ 
and ‘immediate’ experiences of  reality and argues that every first encounter with an object is 
necessarily influenced by the socio-cultural context of  that encounter” (ibid., 105). It is also based 
on an assumption that there is a constitutive link between discourses and different subjects’ 
practices of  articulation. It implies that “all social practices – including the practices of  scientific 
inquiry – are supported, motivated and rationalized against the background of  explicit/implicit and 
acknowledged discourses” (ibid., 110). What empirical research should mainly do, in Marttila’s view, 
is “render visibility to the general discourse that determines subject roles’ general context of  
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appearance and the particular order of  discourse that conceptualizes a subject role” (ibid., 95). 
Such research should also be methodologically holistic, and one way to achieve this is to rely on a 
theory-driven construction of  the studied phenomena, that is, to operationalize “theoretical 
propositions into corresponding analytical concepts and categories” (ibid., 112). Even though such 
methodological frameworks are theoretically motivated, it is important to bear in mind that the 
analytical grammar developed is also empirically applicable by sensitizing the theoretical concepts. 
This resonates with the work of  the Brussels school, which calls for bringing in additional concepts 
if  the empirical material reveals the necessity for them. These concepts are middle-range concepts, 
theory inspired but empirically malleable, which is also reflected in the emphasis on the politics of  
emotion and structures of  feeling that I have advocated for above. 
In terms of research procedure, Marttila (2015, Chapter 8) suggests that a researcher should start 
with problematizing, that is, identifying a research puzzle or a question that they want to answer. 
What follows is a first attempt to identify regimes of practice – as rather stable systems of practices 
that give rise to social structures – such as human and non-human, symbolic and material practices. 
From this, one can identify relatively regular patterns of practice that a limited group of subjects 
produce that can also be sedimented, like social imaginaries, institutional arrangements and 
hegemonic discourses. In this step, it will also become visible how discourses and material 
arrangements subjectivate various subjects into their subject roles/positions, and how and why 
these subjects might be attached to these discourses. Here, it is useful to refer to fantasmatic logic 
and specific fantasies that underpin any discourse. Lastly, the researcher would conduct a contents-
related analysis of the compiled data, that is, identify how a discourse is structured through nodal 
points, empty and floating signifiers, fleeting and more stable articulations such as material ones, 
which is specifically useful when one is looking at contestations of meaning, such as those 
portrayed in this thesis. To identify discursive change, one would rather focus on de-stabilizations 
of meaning and articulatory practices instead of regimes of practice, because those regimes might 
not have been established yet. One would also pay attention to the shifting political frontiers in a 
discourse, for instance from antagonism to agonism and vice-versa. 
In order to structure the empirical material around discourses, I have relied on a combination of 
identifying regimes of practice and qualitative content analysis techniques, for which I used a 
flexible coding scheme to identify articulations of the Other, the subject of contestation (Kosovo), 
nodal points such as “territory” or “the people” which anchor specific discourses, affective 
investment into discourses (for instance, when Kosovo is articulated as an emotional issue), etc. 
Building from my primary research question – how the Serbian Government re-articulated its claim 
to Kosovo within the Brussels dialogue – I observed in my data that in 2013, there was a relatively 
stable regime of articulating Kosovo as Serbian while at the same time recognizing that the Brussels 
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agreement opened up the possibility for recognizing the Albanian Other as a subject Serbia 
negotiates with, rather than an object of contestation in the negotiations. This prompted me to 
identify shifting political frontiers, with increasing articulations of the Albanian Other as an 
adversary instead of an enemy. The latter insight emerged through content analysis, since I coded 
for subjects and the ways the Other has been articulated. I additionally observed that in 2017 and 
2018, the rapprochement that was made between Serbia and Kosovo in the Brussels dialogue was 
overshadowed by antagonistic articulations of the Albanian Other and a relatively stable regime of 
practice that was characterized by ethnic separation and calls for partition. The political logic 
driving this shift further had to do with issues of territoriality. Here, territory becomes contested 
as opposed to how to organize the lives of people living in Kosovo. Hence, I have termed these 
two dominant discourses the “community” and the “partition discourse” and organized my 
empirical chapters around them. 
Following my content analysis, I have organized the empirical chapters along the dominant themes 
(that were often repeated by subjects and encountered in the material) that have emerged through 
coding: what nodal points anchor the “community” and “partition” discourse, what fantasies 
underpin the two discourses, how the dislocation was accommodated through two distinct myths, 
how articulatory claims to Kosovo have been performed in various discursive and material 
practices, how political frontiers were drawn through affective articulations, as well as how agonism 
was increasingly transformed into antagonism through articulating the conflict between the Serbs 
and Albanians as perennial and insurmountable, which in turn resulted in a more significant 
polarization of Serbian politics (and beyond) into two camps: those who supported the idea of 
partition and those who opposed it, who were discursively cast out of the political collective. 
To illustrate this dynamic further in my empirical chapters, I have attempted to portray the most 
prominent articulations and subjects propagating them. I selected the quotes because they 
oftentimes condensed several themes into one or a few sentences, making them illustrative 
examples of larger claims and themes. As for validity, discourse-theoretical analysis relies on 
internal or introspective validation, since it rejects the belief that there is objectively “valid” 
scientific knowledge (see Marttila 2015). Hence, instead of claiming that my analysis is a “true” and 
objective representation of what “really” happened from 2012 to 2018, I aim to critically scrutinize 
and reflect on the conditions under which the data was selected and generated and the empirical 
results emerged. There is always a selection bias when discourse analysis is conducted, since the 
researchers themselves choose what data to use and “identify” certain discourses over others that 
they might deem more important or representative in their own assessment of the social 
phenomena they study. 
82 
 
Hence, the following and last subchapter will be devoted to my selection methods and data used. 
I will portray the manner in which I collected my empirical material and explain my motivation for 
relying on that specific material. I will also devote attention to the implications of using media 
material as representational and problematize the relation between media- and government-
produced texts. I will also give a more detailed illustration of my coding scheme and illustrate how 
the codes can even be used quantitatively to say something more about the discursive shifts that 
occurred from 2013 to 2018. 
3.5 Data Collection and Approach to Data 
In my analysis, I relied on official EU, UN and government documents that are relevant to the 
Brussels dialogue, Serbia’s EU integration process and Serbia’s position towards Kosovo. These 
range from the official EU membership negotiation framework, such as Chapter 35, progress 
reports, the so-called Brussels agreement (officially called the First Agreement of Principles 
Governing the Normalization of Relations) and all subsequent agreements reached in Brussels (59 
documents in the corpus). I also relied on documents from Serbia’s institutional framework, such 
as the Constitution, several parliamentary declarations on Kosovo being Serbia, as well as 
government decisions and platforms (26 documents in the corpus). Most of this material is 
available online, with a few exceptions of documents I gathered during my visit to the Government 
Office for Kosovo and Metohija in November 2017. Since these documents do not provide insight 
into the contestation of meaning that helped institute them, I rely on the public discourse given by 
the media, which also helps me map out all relevant actors. For this, I relied on two media sources: 
firstly, the most watched news TV program in Serbia, the second Dnevnik (Dnevnik 2) airing on the 
public broadcaster RTS (Radio-televizija Srbije) every day at 19:30; secondly, the online news outlet 
Danas. Both outlets have publicly available online archives, which I went through manually to 
collect the material. The final corpus consists of 844 transcripts of individual shows from Dnevnik 
2, and 4842 written news stories from Danas, all relating to or mentioning Kosovo, from July 2012 
(when the Ivica Dačić-led government was formed together with a majority won by the SNS), to 
December 2018 (when the Brussels dialogue was put on hold for another two years, only to be 
reactivated in summer 2020). Additionally, for more context, I conducted four semi-structured 
interviews with subjects involved in the dialogue on Kosovo, namely the former directors of the 
Serbian team Borko Stefanović and Marko Đurić, as well as the head of the parliamentary group 
on Kosovo Milovan Drecun and one former representative of the Serbian community in Kosovo 
gathered around Srpska lista, Ljubomir Marić. In my researcher’s capacity, I also visited Northern 




The reason I chose media sources as my material instead of  conducting more thorough field work 
was motivated by the theoretical and analytical framework employed in this thesis. As Marttila 
(2015) mentions, “all social practices – including the practices of  scientific inquiry – are supported, 
motivated and rationalized against the background of  explicit/implicit and acknowledged 
discourses” (ibid., 110). What empirical research should mainly do, in Marttila’s view, is to “render 
visibility to the general discourse that determines subject roles’ general context of  appearance and 
the particular order of  discourse that conceptualizes a subject role” (Marttila 2015, 95). So called 
“public discourses” are particularly relevant. They emerge in mostly open social settings and 
circulate in public media, such as TV shows, newspapers, social media etc. These public discourses 
give a significant number of  subjects from a range of  fields the opportunity to perform practices 
of  articulation that are constitutive of  certain discourses (ibid., 179). They also convey generally 
accepted values and norms, that is, sedimented meanings, that different subjects might adhere to 
(ibid., 181). Hence, using media texts as a source allows the researcher to determine precisely the 
general discourses that are constitutive of  different subject positions and render visible the 
different sedimented and articulatory practices these subjects adhere to and perform. Of  course, 
the media are not just one of  many social spheres where discourses “circulate” but are also 
“[discursive] machineries that produce, reproduce and transform social phenomena” (Carpentier 
and De Cleen 2007, 274). As mentioned at the beginning, seeing institutions as part of  the 
discourse implies that media are also a part of  it. Consequently, using specific media outlets as a 
source necessarily implies a certain representation of  objectivity that might not be present in other 
media outlets. The media itself  attain certain subject positions within broader discourses and 
choose to represent ideological views aligned with those positions, but this does not imply that the 
media are defenseless against the influx of  such ideological views. As Carpentier (2008, 32-33) 
suggests, the specificity of  certain media should be considered, particularly those who position 
themselves as independent organizations. Thus, as I am conducting a discourse-theoretical analysis, 
studying representations is inevitable and the media outlets were chosen because of  their position 
in the wider field of  political contestation around Kosovo in Serbia. Namely, Dnevnik 2 can be 
deemed to represent the views of  the ruling parties and the Government particularly well. 
Additionally, it is also the most viewed information program in the Serbian media landscape 
(Živanović 2017, in Danas, 12 December), even though it has become the target of  criticism in 
more recent years for being extremely partial to representing the political messages of  the ruling 
SNS party. This makes an even stronger argument to use it as a source, due to the constant flow 
of  articulations on Kosovo by the SNS that Dnevnik 2 choses to transmit. On the other hand, Danas 
offers a counterweight to the Dnevnik outlet, since it represents the critical voices against the regime 
very well and views itself  as constitutive of  the opposition movement in Serbia. It is used also in 
case that Dnevnik 2 omits messages that would be critical of  the regime’s politics towards Kosovo. 
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Other outlets could have been chosen, but only Dnevnik 2 and Danas have consistently held their 
position as pro- and anti-regime outlets throughout the entire period of  analysis and have offered 
unobstructed access to their archives. 
As for my approach to data, I first collected and manually transcribed all parts of Dnevnik 2 shows 
available from their online archive which refer to Kosovo during the period mentioned, and all the 
news articles relating to Kosovo from the “Politics” section of the Danas archive, also for the 
relevant period, and saved them on the University of Helsinki online server in OneDrive. I also 
collected all relevant national and international documents pertaining to Kosovo and the Brussels 
dialogue and saved them in the same OneDrive folder. Subsequently, I uploaded my entire corpus 
into Atlas.ti, a program for qualitative data analysis that allows coding, and coded my data along a 
basic content analysis scheme. I coded for subjects, including specific ones which are frequently 
found in the material, such as “Subject RS: Vučić”, “Subject EU: Ashton”, “Subject KS: Thaçi” 
etc. I also maintained some general designations for subjects, such as “Subject: EU” or “Subject: 
UN”, when I deemed that they would be only used for contextual analysis. I also coded for 
particular performative moments and articulations, such as “Local elections” in Kosovo, when they 
were first held in 2013 and 2017 subsequently, or “A/CSM” whenever the 
Association/Community was mentioned in connection to other signifiers such as the “Judiciary”, 
or “Energy”, both of which are part of the Brussels agreement. All of these moments and 
articulations can be considered as being nodal points, the most frequent of which that I coded in 
my material were “EU integration”, which includes mentions on the Brussels dialogue (182 
mentions of the codes combined), “The People” (103 mentions) and the “A/CSM” (63 mentions), 
or codes related to territoriality, such as “Northern Kosovo” (91 mentions), “Territory” (42 
mentions), or “Compromise” (98 mentions) and “Partition” (70 mentions). I also coded for 
different articulations of Kosovo, for instance “Sharing Kosovo”, “Kosovo is Serbia” etc., 
emotions and affective articulations such as “Love for Kosovo”, “We will go to war over Kosovo” 
etc. Attention has also been paid to antagonistic and agonistic articulations of the Other, not only 
Serbian hegemonic actors and their articulation of Albanians and other Others, but also how 
Kosovo Albanians articulate the Serb community, which creates a reference point and 
counterweight for the Serbian actors’ articulations. Once I conducted the first round of coding, I 
moved on to writing up the analysis but I have frequently returned to the data in the process to 
expand the coding scheme in a second round, consolidating or expanding on some codes. The 
coding has allowed me to find data I was looking for quickly and given the fact that I also coded 
for the subjects who articulated them, relate the data to the subjects. This also allowed me to assess 
how dominant certain subjects were in the analysis, comparing both political moments of 2012-
2013 and 2017-2018. For instance, President Vučić was by far the most prominent articulatory 
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subject in 2018 (181 code mentions), and a transition can also be recognized from 2017 when 
Prime Minister Ana Brnabić or Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić were also proportionally heard more 
(since the 2017 dataset is smaller than the 2018). In 2017, Dačić was coded 16 times, and Brnabić 
6 times, in relation to Vučić being coded 55 times. By contrast, in 2018, Dačić was coded 27 times, 
and Brnabić 8 times, in relation to the 181 times Vučić was coded. In other words, in 2017, for 
every 3.43 mentions of Vučić, there was one mention of Dačić, while in 2018, for every 6.7 
mentions of Vučić, there was one mention of Dačić. Compared to 2013, a wider range of subjects 
could be identified, for instance Dačić and Vučić were mentioned, as well as former President 
Tomislav Nikolić or Director of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija Aleksandar Vulin, all on a 
similar footing in terms of frequency (Nikolić mentioned 35 times, Dačić 68 times, Vučić 39 times, 
and Vulin 21 times). When looking at the overall dataset, Vučić is by far the most dominant subject 
behind articulations of Kosovo, with 285 code mentions altogether. In 2012/2013, the Albanian 
Other was articulated agonistically more frequently, where a call for peace and co-existence was 
recognizable (9 mentions of agonism related to 25 mentions of antagonism), while in 2017/2018, 
this turned into an antagonistic articulation where a call for absolute separation, ethnic and 
territorial, was visible (8 mentions of agonism related to 55 mentions of antagonism). 
The fact that I coded for a range of articulations of Kosovo allowed me to portray exactly the way 
Serbian hegemonic subjects in the analysis referred to Kosovo: the term “Kosovo and Metohija” 
is exclusively used when referring to Kosovo and denotes its belonging to Serbia, since even under 
the Constitution, Kosovo is described as a province with the additional designation of Metohija. 
This term embodies Serbia’s hegemonic claim to this territory and designates a specific “reading” 
of the situation and Kosovo’s claim to independence, rendering it illegitimate. When Serbian 
hegemonic subjects do articulate the term “Kosovo” to designate the territory, it is almost 
exclusively with the prefix “takozvano” (which translates to “so-called”), reifying the illegitimacy 
of Kosovo’s independence and, so to speak, “casting out” this term to be part of the antagonistic 




4 The Kosovo Imaginary in Serbia and its Re-articulation within the 
Brussels Dialogue as a Political Contact Zone 
 
This chapter focuses on the context that my analysis is embedded in, while simultaneously bridging 
the theoretical and empirical parts of  the thesis through analytical insights from the material. That 
is, the re-articulation of  what Kosovo means for Serbian state political practice occurs against the 
background of  already sedimented discourses that are hegemonic, such as the mentioned “Kosovo 
is Serbia” discourse, which a significant portion of  Chapter 5 is devoted to. On the other hand, 
before I can portray the rest of  my analysis, I need to unpack the nodal points of  the Kosovo social 
imaginary in Serbia. After that I will move on to explain how it draws from other discourses with 
which it intersects, such as the discourse of  self-victimization in Serbia, especially its element of  
Kosovo being “stolen” from Serbia by international powers backing Kosovo’s claim for 
independence. Another discourse entangled in this web is the supposedly historic animosity 
between Serbs and Albanians, mainly over the claim to the territory of  Kosovo, as well as the 
dominant mnemonic discourse of  the wars of  the 1990s, in which the quest of  Kosovo Albanians 
for independence is articulated as illegitimate, with the year 1999 construed as a traumatic moment 
for Serbian nationhood when Kosovo was placed under UN protection and administration. I have 
recognized both of  those discourses in my material, which is why they are elaborated below. After 
that, I move on to explain what Serbia’s claim to and ownership of  Kosovo precisely entails within 
the context of  its EU integration process, finishing with an elaboration of  the Brussels dialogue 
through the lens of  a “contact zone”. As such, the Brussels dialogue brings together various actors 
with different hegemonic subject positions and constrains as well as enables their field of  action. 
4.1 The Nodal Points of the Kosovo Imaginary in Serbia and its Intersecting 
Discourses 
What I term the Kosovo imaginary in this thesis refers to a broad array of  discourses related to 
Kosovo that form the horizon of  meanings and political practice in Serbia. Generally, it is 
important to start the discussion on the importance of  Kosovo in Serbia with the introduction of  
the Kosovo myth mentioned in Chapter 1. Some scholars refer to the Kosovo myth as a specific 
historically situated narrative surrounding the Battle of  Kosovo from 1389, found in Church 
literature and vernacular poetry that has been transmitted via oral tales through generations (see 
e.g., Bakić-Hayden 2004; Čolović 2017; Pavlović 2019). In these tales, Kosovo is considered to be 
a place in which the faith of  the early Serbian nationhood and statehood was decided, in which the 
leader of  the Serb forces Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović gave up earthly control over Kosovo over 
securing an eternal place in Heaven for all Serbs and their ancestors (see Čolović 2017). These tales 
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surrounding the Battle have been used in several politically important moments in history to justify 
Serbia’s claim to the territory of  Kosovo, evident in the well-known speech by Slobodan Milošević 
commemorating the 600th anniversary of  the Battle of  Kosovo in 1989 – a moment which 
cemented Milošević’s grip on power and re-articulated Serbia’s claim to Kosovo in the wake of  
Yugoslav disintegration. The 1980s were especially instrumental in reviving a discourse on 
Kosovo’s importance for Serbian national identity, which is particularly evident in the famous 
Memorandum of  the Serbian Academy of  Sciences and Arts (SANU) from 1986. In the 
Memorandum, the intellectual elite of  Serbia called attention to the “persecution and expulsion” 
of  Serbs from Kosovo, which, together with other factors such as the discrimination of  Serbs and 
Serbia within the context of  Yugoslavia, was destabilizing the entire country (Serbian Academy of  
Arts and Sciences 1986). This was an implicit call for a nationalization policy about Kosovo, which 
came to be realized under Milošević and culminated in the Kosovo war of  1998-1999. Still today, 
following the wars of  Yugoslav succession from the 1990s, as well as Kosovo’s declaration of  
independence from 2008, the claim to Kosovo resonates strongly in Serbian political discourse, 
particularly its policy about Kosovo. 
Since the famous Serbian writer Matija Bećković characterized Kosovo as the “dearest” or “most 
precious” Serbian word (Kosovo je najskuplja srpska reč), this claim has become a sedimented 
repertoire of  Serbian nationalist politicians regarding Kosovo. Kosovo is regarded as the origin of  
the Serbian medieval state, the stuff  of  Serbian nationalism (Bieber 2002) and still today, it plays a 
significant role in conceptions of  self-identity of  the Serbian political collective (see Čolović 2017; 
Daskalovski 2003; Ejdus and Subotić 2014; Pavlović 2019, Vujačić 2015). Kosovo refers to a 
territory, a place, that is considered an integral part of  the Serbian state, not only today, but also 
throughout history; it is equally considered as an ontological, symbolic13 space onto which 
conceptions of  “Serbdom” and Serbian nationhood can be projected (Ejdus 2020). Hence, this 
thesis argues that the Kosovo social imaginary acts as a “foundation” or a horizon of  meaning that 
structures political practices in Serbia since Milošević – what can be officially articulated, practiced 
in terms of  policy, as well as questioned and felt. The nodal points of  the Kosovo imaginary 
mapped out as a discourse include: the notion of  the territory of  Kosovo being Serbian (and 
Serbia’s); a historic right to that territory; the Serbian people who live there, who have lived and 
died there, constituting the territory as eternally Serbian, even if  it is not under direct sovereign 
control of  Serbia; and the so-called Kosovo pledge, which Prince Lazar’s army took before going 
                                                          
13 It is important to point out that the use of the word “symbolic” in this chapter does not relate to the Lacanian order 
of the Symbolic, which would encompass all signifying practices (discourse as Symbolic order, elaborated in Chapter 
2). Rather, it relates to discursive practices which are detached from their material conditions of possibility, having no 
desire to translate them into material practices, or in Laclau’s (1990) words, into “objective spatiality”. It is a 
metaphoric use of Kosovo, to designate a metaphoric space or a metaphoric claim to it. 
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into battle against the Ottomans to give their lives defending Kosovo – a pledge that often gets re-
articulated in current political practice as a vow to never give up Kosovo, and fight for Kosovo 
with whatever means necessary and most importantly, united as a political and national collective. 
The pledge is also a story of  betrayal, in which, according to the legend, one of  Lazar’s allies, Vuk 
Branković, betrays him before the battle and never shows up, resulting in the Serb forces’ demise 
against the Ottomans. While traditionally the Kosovo myth is not about a place, but about a battle 
that occurred in a specific place, the Kosovo imaginary relies heavily on Serbia’s claims to the place, 
not only the symbolic space of  Kosovo. These nodal points are affectively invested with different 
emotions. The “structures of feeling” about Kosovo in Serbian political discourse have mainly been 
about love for the holy land as a site of the origin of Serbian nationhood and statehood since 
medieval times, as well as love for the remaining Serbian people there, who are often articulated as 
defenders of everything that is Serbia and Serbian in Kosovo. These affective structures are also 
about the honor of defending Serbia and Serbian ideals in this holy land and relate to the lesson 
about betrayal, anchoring a pledge not to give it up, because giving it up would mean giving up a 
part of the soul of the Serbian nation. Additionally, spite (inat) and defiance also anchor the same 
promise: in order to spite the hegemonic West, Serbs will never give up Kosovo, because the West 
has supported Kosovo’s independence even contrary to international law. Spite relates to a 
discourse on geopolitical self-victimization of Serbia (see Vranić 2019), which has suffered under 
the unjust practices of great powers in their alignment with the Kosovo Albanian politics of self-
determination. 
Discourses on Kosovo, it can be argued, are some of  those discourses with the most mobilizing 
potential to unify the different voices in the Serbian political landscape – as evident in Milošević’s 
re-articulation of  the Kosovo myth as the founding moment of  Serbian nationalist politics since 
the late 1980s and 1990s. Vranić (2019, 259) has characterized Kosovo as the Serbian “populist 
potato”, pointing out that the case of  Kosovo has been “[t]he strongest link between populism, 
territorial grievances and party mobilization strategies in Serbia over the past twenty-five years” 
(ibid., 262). Ejdus (2020, 40) has also argued that political elites in Serbia have made Kosovo “the 
epicenter of  the very idea of  Serbia” and have constructed it as Serbia’s ontic space. Even the 
“internal dialogue” on Kosovo from 2017 and 2018 (supposed to re-calibrate Serbia’s approach to 
Kosovo), has only served for further nationalist mobilization, as Ejdus argues (ibid., 143). Hence, 
even today, this mythical narrative has been re-articulated and embedded into different political 
practices of  the Serbian state – the claim over the physical place and ontological space of  Kosovo 
is inscribed into different institutions, the Constitution, parliamentary declarations, its reiteration 
in public discourse, all of  which is condensed in the articulation that “Kosovo is Serbia”. I will 
return to the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse which is structured by the Kosovo imaginary in Chapter 
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5, but for now, it suffices to illuminate the material effects of  the demand that Kosovo is Serbia. 
This is most evident in the institution with the highest legal authority in Serbia – its Constitution 
of  2006. The preamble to the Constitution (National Assembly of  the Republic of  Serbia 2006) 
states that citizens of  Serbia adopt it based on the following: 
Considering the state tradition of  the Serbian people and equality of  all citizens and ethnic 
communities in Serbia, Considering also that the Province of  Kosovo and Metohija is an 
integral part of  the territory of  Serbia, that it has the status of  a substantial autonomy within 
the sovereign state of  Serbia and that from such status of  the Province of  Kosovo and 
Metohija follow constitutional obligations of  all state bodies to uphold and protect the state 
interests of  Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija in all internal and foreign political relations. 
Not only is Kosovo and Metohija – a signifier that differs from the word “Kosovo” used to 
designate the political practice of  Kosovo Albanian authorities which Serbia does not recognize in 
the legal sense (see Chapter 3) – an integral Serbian territory, but the Constitution also obliges the 
entire institutional system of  Serbia to work towards upholding this assumption and defending 
such Serbian interests both in Kosovo and abroad.  
Given the strong mobilizing potential of  Kosovo discourses and their sedimentation in various 
discursive and material practices in the political arena, any attempt to re-articulate their elements 
must occur against the background of  their embeddedness and intersection with other related 
discourses, such as the discourse on a historic and timeless animosity between Serbs and Albanians 
(see Čolović 2002; Mertus 1999; Zdravković 2005). This has increasingly come into focus since the 
Kosovo war and Kosovo’s proclamation of  independence. The conflict between Serbs and 
Albanians in Kosovo has often been characterized as a conflict over territory, since both parties lay 
claim to it (see Bieber 2003; Daskalovski 2003; Guzina 2003; Stefanović 2005). This is also visible 
in empirical Chapters 5 and 6, in which the nodal point of  “territory” is articulated in connection 
to the “Serbian people” in Kosovo. This “struggle” over Kosovo has been evident in different 
interpretations of  the same events, or different “truths on Kosovo” (see Guzina 2003). For 
instance, there is the issue of  “who was there first”, by which Kosovo Albanians rely on an 
interpretation of  Illyrian origin which would precede the Serbs’ claim to having lived in the region 
since as early as the 7th century (Daskalovski 2003). The same logic applies to the end of  the Balkan 
wars and WWI in the second decade of  the 20h century, which Serbs frame as a rightful re-
integration of  Kosovo as part of  Serbia after centuries of  Ottoman rule, while Albanians see this 
move as an occupation and invasion of  historically predominantly populated Albanian lands. But 
most importantly, remembering the most recent Kosovo war of  1998-99 exacerbates the animosity 
paradigm even more, since for the most part, this event is a part of  lived history in which not only 
debates about the historic “truth” of  the events that took place, but also about who has the moral 
authority on the matter. In this context, it is important to mention the ethnic violence that occurred 
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on 17 March 2004, in which Kosovo Albanian rioters committed violence though large-scale 
attacks that quickly turned against Kosovo Serbs, their property and religious sites. As a result of  
the riots, the International Crisis Group (2004) reported that about 4,500 people were displaced, 
numerous private Kosovo Serb, Ashkali and Roma properties were destroyed and over 30 
Orthodox religious sites were damaged or destroyed. This has been termed the March pogrom in 
Serbia and is commemorated by a school class and a public minute of  silence. The re-articulation 
and commemoration of  the pogrom constitutes Albanians as violent and connects to the discourse 
on self-victimization in Serbia. At the same time, references to crimes committed by Albanians are 
used as a strategy of  comparative victimization (see Gordy 2013, 6), pointing out that the other 
side has also committed atrocities and functioning as a type of  denial or avoidance of  one’s own 
crimes. 
In this context, the Kosovo Albanians see their war of  liberation as morally justified, fought against 
a stronger and oppressive enemy with a guerilla army (the Kosovo Liberation Army – KLA), while 
the Serbs label the KLA as a terrorist organization and emphasize the legitimacy of  defending 
Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the Serbs in Kosovo. Both parties also 
overemphasize the number of  their victims and displaced persons, while pushing to the 
background the legitimate claims of  the other party – something which occurs both in vernacular 
and official discourse (see Zdravković 2005; Zdravković-Zonta 2009). The discourse of  self-
victimization in Serbia is not only evident in the different articulations of  the past, but it also relates 
to the notion of  unfair treatment by the international community, which has illegitimately occupied 
Kosovo in the aftermath of  the war (Spasojević 2016) and is sympathetic only to the suffering of  
the Kosovo Albanians, creating a context in which Serbs’ victimhood is potentially not legitimate 
(Zdravković-Zonta 2009). This will also be thematized in Chapter 6, alongside an articulation of  
the international community as siding with the Kosovo Albanians in their quest for international 
recognition by the UN. Here, of  course, the view of  the international community is nuanced to 
other and outcast Western European powers, while Russia and China are articulated as supporters 
of  Serbia’s politics of  de-recognition and vouch for Resolution 1244 to be upheld in the UN 
Security Council, guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of  Serbia. Serbia’s inability 
to accomplish anything substantial in their efforts to preserve Kosovo within Serbia is often 
attributed to this “conspiracy” by the Western powers.  
Apart from the intersecting discourses mentioned (discourse on self-victimization, and the historic 
animosity between Serbs and Albanians) it is important to emphasize that the “Kosovo is Serbia” 
discourse that entails Serbia’s territorial claim to Kosovo is also embedded in the European 
integration process of  Serbia. This is the case specifically because the Brussels dialogue has initiated 
a re-articulation of  Serbia’s claim to Kosovo, as I will explain in the sections below. Within this 
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process, a tendency to substitute one social imaginary with another can be recognized, namely the 
Kosovo imaginary being in specific moments substituted with an imaginary of  EU integration 
structuring the field of  intelligibility, when EU integration is articulated as taking precedence over 
“preserving” Kosovo. Consequently, one fantasy (that Kosovo is Serbia) underpinning the former 
imaginary is substituted with another one, namely the beatific fantasy that once Serbia solves its 
“Kosovo question”, an economically prosperous future awaits as part of  the European Union. I 
will deal with this in detail in Chapter 6, but for now, it suffices to explore the contextual importance 
of  Serbia’s European integration process and its connection to the Brussels dialogue. 
4.2 From a “Technical” to a “Political” Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina  
After Kosovo’s declaration of independence from February 2008, Serbia immediately reacted 
domestically and internationally. Domestic measures against the declaration, some of which were 
adopted a few months before the declaration, included resolutions and decisions of the Serbian 
Parliament from 2007 (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 2007a; 2007b), 2010 (National 
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 2010), and 2011 (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 
2011). These resolutions had a very strong focus on international law principles, such as the UN 
Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and Resolution 1244, taken as defense of the principles of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. International measures included a request to the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) to deliver an advisory opinion on whether Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence was contrary to international law. The ICJ reached a verdict on 22 July 2010 and 
delivered its opinion on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
In Respect of Kosovo, which stated that the declaration was not contrary to international law. This 
opinion raised some uncertainties within the international community, as the Court left unclear 
whether the declaration was an official act of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
(PISG) or not. Serbia’s main argument was that the Kosovo PISG declaring independence 
exceeded the authority given to them by the UNMIK Constitutional Framework. In fact, the Court 
determined it was issued by “representatives of the people of Kosovo” (International Court of 
Justice 2010, 406, 448) acting outside the established PISG, with no clear definition of whether 
Kosovo was a state or not. Even though the Court’s opinion provided some answers, it left 
unanswered the most important ones, such as the issue of statehood.14 
                                                          
14 For a detailed analysis of why Serbia chose to formulate its question the way it did and what the Serbian Government 
had to gain from this, see Ker-Lindsay, James. 2015. “Explaining Serbia’s decision to go to the ICJ.”  In The Law and 
Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, edited by Marko Milanović and Michael Wood, 9-20. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. The edited book provides additional insight into the whole process of reaching the opinion and the international 
and domestic political practices that preceded it and proceeded from it. 
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After the decision, Serbia submitted under EU pressure a draft resolution to the UN General 
Assembly (GA) in which they called for new negotiations on Kosovo and on 9 September 2010, 
the GA adopted Resolution 64/298 (United Nations General Assembly 2010) that welcomed “the 
readiness of the European Union to facilitate a process of dialogue between the parties [Serbia and 
Kosovo].” The dialogue was supposed to be “a factor for peace, security and stability in the region” 
and “promote cooperation, achieve progress on the path to the European Union and improve the 
lives of the people” (ibid.). With this broad scope in mind, the official EU-mediated talks began in 
March 2011 and came to be known as the Brussels dialogue, or, in official EU discourse, the 
Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue. They started with the negotiations on “technical issues”, aligned with 
the abovementioned principles of improving the lives of the people. This meant, as Visoka and 
Doyle (2016) explain, that technical or practical aspects of cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo 
were emphasized in the dialogue, instead of grand narratives of reconciliation or brotherhood. 
Larger political questions were broken down into “low-level” political and technical issues and 
these technical agreements ranged from the issues of freedom of movement, cadastral records, civil 
registry books, customs stamps and integrated border/boundary management, to regional 
representation and other agreements (Gashi, Musliu and Orbie 2017). However, as already 
recognized by many scholars (Bieber 2015; Gashi, Musliu and Orbie 2017; Visoka and Doyle 2016), 
the technical dialogue could only accomplish so much, since the negotiations often seemed to end 
up at a point at which the status question played a significant role. An issue that brought the dialogue 
to a halt was the crisis that started in July 2011 in North Kosovo and concerned the failed 
implementation of the integrated border/boundary management deal which resulted in the erection 
of roadblocks by local Kosovo Serbs. As noted by Bieber (2015), the implementation of the 
agreements reached in Brussels relied not only on high representatives of both Serbia and Kosovo, 
but also on Kosovo Serbs. Thus, after the dialogue came to a halt during the North Kosovo crisis 
and was prolonged by parliamentary elections in Serbia in 2012, the dialogue was resumed by the 
newly elected SNS-majority government in Serbia and discussions began on involving heads of 
states and later governments into the dialogue as well. The dialogue needed new impetus, as 
discussions on technical issues were not enough. Each technical issue was political as well, for 
instance whether, or to what extent, the crossing between Northern Kosovo and Serbia proper 
would be called or put to practice as a border. This also concerned the question whether or to what 
extent customs duty was levied on goods and whether this would mean that Serbia would recognize 
Kosovo as a separate customs entity, or a state.  
It is important to point out that the reading of “political dialogue” by the Serbian authorities is not 
the same as its reading by EU representatives, or Kosovo Albanian authorities. For instance, the 
EU has its mandate under UN Resolution 64/298, which clearly states what the scope of the 
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dialogue is (albeit very broadly), as mentioned above, and in this understanding, no negotiations 
on status were to take place, since Kosovo had already declared independence, which was deemed 
not to be contrary to international law. Kosovo authorities, on the other hand, interpret the political 
dialogue as a means to an end, which was achieving full independence and UN state recognition. 
For Serbia, the engagement in the “political dialogue” has always been about the status question, 
trying to settle on a shared meaning regarding the territoriality of Kosovo, preferably within Serbia. 
As Tomislav Nikolić, the former President of Serbia said in late 2012, when Serbia expressed 
interest to engage in the dialogue on the highest level: “We want to first and foremost talk about 
the status, because we do not recognize Kosovo’s independence. You [the EU and International 
organizations] do not recognize that there is any other status except independence, so we ask what 
kind of talks should we be engaging in [if not on status]?” (Dnevnik 2, 26.09.2012, 12:00). 
The issue of status, or the territoriality of Kosovo has played a big role in the context of Serbia’s 
EU integration process, specifically Serbia’s manifold representations of Kosovo in official 
discourse, for instance simultaneously as status-neutral within the framework of UN Resolution 
1244, as part of Serbia within the Constitutional framework, and occasionally as a separate entity 
with limited international subjectivity under Kosovo Albanian rule. This is not a surprise since the 
political contestation around Kosovo is still ongoing so there are inevitably going to be opposing 
meanings simultaneously present and “fighting” for hegemony. This will be further discussed in 
the next segment, specifically the relations between Serbia’s claim to and ownership of Kosovo 
and its EU integration process. 
4.3 The Brussels Dialogue and Serbia’s EU Integration Process  
The Brussels dialogue does more than follow the UN GA’s resolution after the ICJ’s opinion, in 
an effort to find a mode for the final settlement of the dispute between Serbia and Kosovo. The 
Brussels dialogue is also inscribed into the fabric of Serbia’s EU integration process, as evident in 
Chapter 35 of its acquis. Chapter 35, or the “Normalisation of relations between Serbia and 
Kosovo*”15 (European Commission 2015) postulates that 
the advancement of Serbia’s EU accession negotiations will be guided by Serbia’s progress 
in preparing for accession, which will be measured in particular against Serbia’s continued 
engagement towards a visible and sustainable improvement in relations with Kosovo, as well 
as the other requirements contained in point 23 of the Negotiating Framework. 
                                                          
15 The EU has adapted a way of referring to Kosovo from a “status-neutral” perspective by adding an asterisk whenever 
Kosovo is first mentioned in an EU document. The asterisk refers to the following: “This designation is without 
prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UN SC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of 
Independence.” However, in other discursive practice within the EU this can look quite different, since the majority 
of EU member states have recognized Kosovo as an independent state. 
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Chapter 35 acts as a link between the Brussels dialogue and Serbia’s EU accession process: whether 
Serbia will eventually join the EU will depend on, among other things, its full normalization of 
relations with Kosovo. This is why the role of the EU can be defined as hegemonic in these 
contestations on Kosovo, and not simply a neutral one. Neutrality in political practice hardly ever 
exists, since power is always at play between those seeking to join the EU and the EU itself. Even 
though membership is voluntary, non-membership is hardly a choice since Serbia is already very 
much dependent on EU economic cooperation, aid provided by the EU, as well as political 
cooperation and the role of the EU as a guarantor of stability in the Balkans, especially after the 
wars of Yugoslav succession. All these issues are important when we talk about Serbia’s 
engagement in the Brussels dialogue as a means of advancing into the EU. There is always a level 
of political pressure performed on Serbia to comply with the acquis, specifically Chapter 35 because 
it would have implications for the stability of and security in the Balkans, which the EU has an 
incentive to maintain. 
On the other hand, what the full “normalization of relations” means is an open question: it acts 
essentially as an empty signifier, driving further Serbia’s political project of joining the EU, but not 
having a stabilized point of reference. The full normalization of relations can be compared with 
the signifier “solution” which the Serbian Government often tends to use when speaking about 
this process. Thus, it is possible to fill these signifiers with various contents with sometimes entirely 
opposing meanings, depending on what discourse these meanings are part of. For instance, in 
Serbia the full normalization of relations (or a solution) can mean either the highest level of 
autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia, with Northern Kosovo as an autonomous region within an 
autonomous region, or it can mean the partition of Kosovo into a Serb-majority and Albanian-
majority populated part. It can also mean the formal non-recognition of Kosovo as a state, with 
full de jure separation of governance between Serbia and Kosovo, where the status question would 
not be problematized at all (the so-called model of “two Germanys”, which will be addressed in 
Chapter 6). In Kosovo, on the other hand, the normalization of relations can mean entirely 
different things, for instance attainment of full statehood as recognized by all UN states, including 
or excluding Serbia. Lastly, for the EU, it can mean a permanent and stable, mutual consensual, 
legally regulated relationship between Serbia and Kosovo, be it through formal recognition or not. 
This is why this signifier can also be conceived of as a floating signifier, since it acquires different 
meanings in different discourses. 
This only illustrates that the Brussels dialogue is a complex phenomenon that not only serves as a 
means of settling the dispute between Serbia and Kosovo on an international level, within the UN 
and amongst UN member states, where crucial international law principles are debated, such as 
sovereignty, or the right to self-determination. It also serves as a vehicle for bringing both Serbia 
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and Kosovo closer to the EU and improving the relations between them, which is not only an 
incentive for the two states, but also for the EU. 
4.4 Ownership of and Claim to Kosovo in Serbia’s Official Discourse 
All issues related to the Brussels dialogue as part of Serbia’s EU integration process raised in the 
previous subchapter are connected to the dominant discourses on the importance of Kosovo as a 
physical place and symbolic space for both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians.16 One area in which these 
two representations of importance meet is Northern Kosovo, as it is an arena where symbolic and 
physical space entangle. Symbolically, Northern Kosovo bears importance for the Serbian 
nationalist project because the claim to Kosovo is fully realized there, since the “Serbian people” 
live on “Serbian land”: Northern Kosovo is predominantly Serb-populated and still has Serbian 
state structures in place, where Serbia can exert some form of governance. Northern Kosovo is 
neither the only place in Kosovo where Serbs live, nor is it the place of the most important religious 
sites that are located in central and Southern Kosovo. However, due to its proximity to Serbia 
proper, adjacent to the border, and the fact that Serbia has some form of governance over this 
area, it becomes contested. Thus, the issue of territoriality, i.e., Northern Kosovo as a territory that 
Serbia can control, is essential. I have dealt with the issue in terms of Serbia performing statehood 
in Northern Kosovo elsewhere (see Vulović 2020). As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, 
two nodal points of the Kosovo imaginary are the claim to territory and the Serb people in that 
territory, which inevitably entangle in Northern Kosovo. Kosovo is considered as the origin of 
Serbian nationhood firstly because of the well-known Kosovo myth in which Prince Lazar has 
ensured an eternal place in the heavenly kingdom for the Serb people by losing the Battle of 
Kosovo. Secondly, Kosovo is constituted as Serbian because Serbia is where Serb victims lie buried, 
with so many Serb lives having been laid down for Kosovo throughout history. Ejdus (2020, 52) 
has referred to Kosovo as metaphorically being constructed as both Serbia’s cradle and its tomb. 
Kosovo is also where Serb people (still) live, not only lie buried. Since Serb people live in Kosovo 
today, and are particularly numerous and homogeneous in Northern Kosovo, Kosovo would still 
be considered Serbian. It is also considered as the origin of Serbian statehood because the Serbian 
medieval kingdom under the Nemanjić dynasty originated in the very place of today’s Kosovo, 
particularly the Metohija region (which is not in the North), where many medieval Serb monasteries 
are still located today. This means that the ownership over the symbolic space of Kosovo in the 
Serbian nationalist discourse (the claim of the origin of Serbian nationhood and statehood) 
                                                          
16 It is also symbolically important for the international community, or at least certain powers in the international 
community, because of the symbolic weight Kosovo has in breaking with previously dominant international legal 
principles, for instance, territorial integrity, self-determination, intervention. 
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coincides with the claim over physical place of today’s Kosovo (the claim that Kosovo is still Serbia 
or the “heart” of Serbia – what I have referred to as the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse). 
As Bieber (2002) elaborates, there are three important dimensions of the relationship between 
Serbian nationalism and the narrative of the Kosovo myth as a national “founding” myth. First, 
the myth became incorporated into the “commemorative calendar of the nation” (ibid., 96) by 
remembering the Kosovo battle once a year on St Vitus Day (Vidovdan), the 28 June, a 
commemoration marked by pilgrimage to the site of the battle and Christian Orthodox liturgies 
held either at the site of the battle, or in Serbian medieval monasteries in Kosovo. This 
commemoration ties the “historical record of the battle” with its “mythical representation” (ibid.). 
The second dimension, and most important for this study, is the claim to Kosovo, symbolic and 
physical. Through commemorative practices, past and present are woven together: the fact that 
Kosovo was important to the medieval Serbian kingdom “serves to ground a territorial claim 
irrespective of the fact of population distribution in the region and impervious to subsequent 
historical development” (ibid., 97). A third aspect of the myth follows from the second, in that the 
myth “establishes a historical continuity between the contemporary Serbian nation and the ‘Serbs’ 
of the Middle Ages, suggesting a perennial nation” (ibid.). This way, the claim to Kosovo, be it in 
a symbolic or physical sense, transcends constraints of time and space and informs the way it is re-
articulated within the framework of the Brussels dialogue. This symbolic and physical claim to 
Kosovo is exceptionally pronounced in Northern Kosovo and visible in the negotiations 
surrounding this area within the Brussels dialogue. This area in particular is what the majority of 
agreements within the dialogue are about. Because of its specific institutional setting, harboring 
both institutional frameworks of Kosovo and Serbia at the same time, it is even more so considered 
“Serbian” than the rest of Kosovo in the discourse I am analyzing.  
What is interesting about this interpretation is that most elements of the Kosovo national myth 
address Southern Kosovo, or the area of Metohija (Dukagjini in Albanian) where the Serbian 
medieval monasteries are located. The Kosovo battle also took place in Kosovo Polje, the Field of 
the Blackbirds, located in today’s central and Southern Kosovo. However, as the current structural 
conditions do not allow Serbia to exert any form of governance or sovereignty over this area, 
having only limited governance over the North, the claim to the “entire Kosovo”, in this discourse 
referring to the South, is symbolic. This means that even if Serbia claims sovereignty over entire 
Kosovo, it does not attempt to institute its sovereignty structurally. Hence, it remains metaphorical. 
One could argue that the claim to entire Kosovo is challenged by the “encounter with the Real” 
(see Laclau 1996b; Stavrakakis 2007), that is, the undeniable claim to independence of Kosovo and 
the material existence of Kosovo state institutions, which are the dominant governing authority in 
the rest of Kosovo, except the North. There are no Serbian institutions on a central level in 
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Kosovo, only marginally in the so-called Serb “enclaves” in the South and, of course, in the entire 
North. By contrast, the claim to Northern Kosovo is based on material state and national interests, 
anchored around the imaginarization that Serbia still has some maneuvering potential to not 
“share” this territory with the Kosovo Albanian institutional framework. In other words, even 
though Serbia claims that “Kosovo is Serbia” in its Constitution, different parliamentary 
resolutions, plans, government decisions, it does not attempt to “take back” Southern Kosovo, but 
it does so with Northern Kosovo, specifically within the partition discourse of 2017 and 2018. 
Thus, signifiers like “sovereignty” or “territorial integrity” can be perceived as floating between 
these two intersecting discourses in Serbia on community and partition. In the former, 
“sovereignty” and “territorial integrity” are not politicized and problematized, they refer to having 
power over the entire territory, North and South, which includes a physical “sharing” of space and 
only symbolic ownership of the entire territory. In the latter, they refer to maintaining power and 
abolishing the presence of the antagonistic, Albanian “other”, which includes exclusive ownership 
of the physical space of the North and (potentially) symbolic ownership of the rest of Kosovo in 
the South. 
This reading points to four articulations of ownership, or four claims to Kosovo in the Serbian 
political discourse since the Brussels dialogue began: 1) “our Kosovo” in a symbolic sense, which 
embodies the symbolic claim to entire Kosovo (space); 2) “our Kosovo” in a physical sense, which 
embodies the physical claim to Northern Kosovo (place); 3) “our Kosovo” in a physical and 
symbolic sense, which embodies sharing the space of Kosovo with Kosovo Albanians (space and 
place); and 4) “their Kosovo” which embodies the claim that Kosovo is an independent state, tied 
to the Kosovo Albanian nationalist project (place). Within the community discourse, the first and 
third readings are dominant, whereas the partition discourse revolves around the second and fourth 
reading, with elements of the first. The nodal point of “national” or “state interests” in the 
community discourse of 2012/2013 refers to symbolic ownership of the entire Kosovo, while in 
the partition discourse of 2017/2018, it refers to the physical ownership of the North while 
maintaining symbolic ownership of the South, since Kosovo will “always be Serbia” as an 
anchoring signifier of Serbian statehood and nationhood throughout history. 
It is particularly important to focus on the aspect of “sharing” Kosovo, since it denotes a claim to 
Kosovo that is not exclusive, meaning that it offers a platform for the re-articulation of political 
frontiers between Serbs and Albanians from antagonism into agonism, something that is important 
for cross-community understanding and political practice (see Carpentier 2018b). It is also 
important to dwell more on this because it helps us understand how the Brussels dialogue was 
initially conceived and practiced by the actors involved, and how a re-articulation of agonism into 
antagonism happened after 2017. Initially, namely, after the second high-level meeting between 
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Hashim Thaçi, Prime Minister (PM) of Kosovo and Ivica Dačić, PM of Serbia on 8 November 
2012 in Brussels, Dačić declared that the meeting was exceptionally fruitful and that “what has 
been inconceivable until now has become normal” (Dnevnik 2, 08.11.2012, 01:42). What has been 
inconceivable until that point is for the two parties to meet in person and even shake hands, not 
to mention constructively engage in a dialogue. The Brussels dialogue could have been considered 
as an attempt to re-articulate antagonistic relations between Serbs and Kosovo Albanian in this 
initial phase. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the notion of “sharing” Kosovo dominated the 
debates. For instance, when Dačić and Thaçi met for the first time in Brussels on 19 October 2012, 
Dačić claimed that he told Thaçi that “as much as Kosovo is yours, as much it is mine” (Dnevnik 
2, 19.10.2012, 05:54), reminding him that Kosovo Serbs have an equal right to exist in Kosovo and 
maintain their institutions as Kosovo Albanians had during Milošević’s rule, when they, too, 
maintained parallel structures (ibid.). Similarly, President Tomislav Nikolić, after his first meeting 
with his counterpart of Kosovo Atifete Jahjaga on 6 February 2013, recognized that the claim to 
Kosovo was not exclusively Serbia’s, but that Kosovo Albanians had a legitimate claim, too: 
I tried to express Serbia’s position that we are ready to talk, to find an agreement, to provide 
a better and more peaceful life [to Kosovo residents], […] but also to emphasize that Serbia 
cannot recognize the independence of Kosovo and Metohija; however, we can recognize the 
specific status of the territory and their Parliament, Government, their Presidency, while of 
course keeping in mind the specific position of not only the Serb, but also the Roma and 
Muslim communities in Kosovo and Metohija” (Dnevnik 2, 06.02.2013, 02:05). 
Sharing Kosovo does not involve Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo’s statehood, as evident on the 
Government’s Platform on the negotiations with Pristina (Government of the Republic of Serbia 
2013), but a recognition of the legitimacy of the Kosovo Albanian claim to this territory, something 
which in Dačić’s words, was indeed “inconceivable” in Serbia before (see Spasojević 2016). Sharing 
Kosovo also involves a degree of recognition of the specific position of Serbs in Kosovo (unlike 
other Serbs in Serbia proper), as Nikolić mentioned, because in this constellation, they acquire a 
degree of detachment from the rest of the national collective and are treated as a separate and 
“specific” category. In Vulin’s words: “The state [of Serbia] must not allow Serbs in Kosovo and 
Metohija to be left without the attention of their own state, to be left without their own system, 
and to allow anyone to push them into a system that attempts to create the state of Kosovo” 
(Dnevnik 2, 09.01.2013, 08:59). This particular statement illustrates the way this category is 
constructed, by which Serbia can be understood as an “external homeland” (see Brubaker 1996) to 
the Serbs in Kosovo and the Serbs in Kosovo as a specific (minority) community outside the reach 
of the “kin state”. This category is also homogenized to enhance the claim of their specificity, 
which is evident in Vulin’s statement that “Serbia does not distinguish between North and South 
Kosovo Serbs. Both Northern and Southern Serbs are exactly the same for us and, in our opinion, 
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they must have the same rights and receive the same degree of care from their own state” (Dnevnik 
2, 09.01.2013, 09:43).  
Even though the idea of sharing Kosovo dominated the debates, the playing field was never level 
to begin with. Given that Kosovo was at a clear disadvantage in the talks, having not attained full 
statehood and having limited maneuvering potential in talks with a fully recognized state it sought 
independence from. The Serbian “gaze” on Kosovo and its quest for independence is not only 
colored by the mentioned discourse of Serb-Albanian animosity, but also by fantasies of Serb 
superiority over Albanians, in which Albanians are articulated as the radical Other – inferior, 
primitive, undeserving (see Salecl 1994). To illustrate this point, after Dačić and Thaçi’s first 
meeting in Brussels on 19 October 2012, a meeting at which no state symbols of either Kosovo or 
Serbia were present, except for two small pins on their suit lapels, Dačić pointed out that his pin 
with the flag of Serbia was bigger than that of his counterpart from Kosovo (Dnevnik 2, 
19.10.2012, 09:54). 
Hence, all these opportunities created by the Brussels dialogue, such as the opportunity to re-
articulate the antagonism between Serbs and Albanians, have to be considered against the 
background of constraints that the Brussels dialogue also puts forward. The intersecting discourses 
of the two opposing political projects of Kosovo and Serbia, one fighting for independence, the 
other against it, and the fantasies that support them, all form the horizon of contestation of 
meanings within the Brussels dialogue. These contestations are not only constrained by the 
prejudices and historically repeated otherings of Albanians (and Serbs as oppressors in the Kosovo-
Albanian context), but also by the involvement of the international community and the view of 
particularly influential individual states on how the dialogue should play out. Hence, on the one 
hand, the Brussels dialogue should be able to offer a platform for the expansion of these horizons 
of meaning, enabling contestations that were not possible before, but on the other hand, it is 
constrained by different discourses and material structures, whether they are sustained by the two 
negotiating parties, by the EU, or specific members of the international community. To unpack 
this, in the following two segments, I will elaborate on my conception of the Brussels dialogue as 
a contact zone (with its own opportunities and constraints) and move on to discuss the hegemonic 
subjects and their positions in a wider context of the contact zone. This will be an analytical 
endeavor, but only used contextually in this thesis, since the main focus is on the re-articulation of 
Kosovo by the Serbian Government since 2012. 
4.5 The Brussels Dialogue as a Political Contact Zone 
The Brussels dialogue was set to resolve the conflicting claims over who has the ownership of the 
symbolic and physical space of Kosovo. Even though the status question was not supposed to be 
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discussed within the dialogue, the aim still was to find common ground on and shared 
understanding of different issues, such as the institutional setting, borders etc. The partition 
discourse has particularly shown that this common understanding (stabilization/fixation of 
meaning over different, conflicting discourses) is needed, since the EU’s approach of constructive 
ambiguity (Bieber 2015; Guzina and Marijan 2014) did not lead to the implementation of many 
crucial agreements. Taking the above into account, this thesis conceptualizes the Brussels dialogue 
as a contact zone (Pratt 2008) bringing together actors from various contexts and with conflicting 
claims about the same issue of Kosovo. This conception constitutes a novel reading of the Brussels 
dialogue, and particularly emphasizes spaces of encounter with the Other (Ahmed 2000) in which 
sedimented meanings attached to the Other can be transformed. So far, the Brussels dialogue has 
been discussed purely from the point of view of international relations and diplomacy, and Serbia’s 
or Kosovo EU integration process (see Beysoylu 2018; Bieber 2015; Economides and Ker‐Lindsay 
2015; Ejdus 2014; Gashi, Musliu, and Orbie 2017; Guzina and Marijan 2014; Troncota 2018), 
lacking a discourse-theoretical and cultural perspective. This perspective is needed because if any 
solution is to be found within the Brussels dialogue, its successful implementation will depend on 
re-articulating sedimented narratives of the Other, as well as those sedimentations that prevent the 
current implementation of agreements (such as constitutional obstacles towards recognizing 
Kosovo in Serbia or establishing the A/CSM in Kosovo). Another benefit of conceptualizing the 
Brussels dialogue as a contact zone is that it enables us to articulate it as an arena for 
accommodating dislocations, which helps us debate how actors politicize sedimentations by also 
paying attention to the power dynamics and changing articulations of the Other that are at play 
here. 
In Pratt’s words, contact zones are “social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple 
with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination like 
colonialism, slavery or their aftermaths” (Pratt 2008, 34). Even though we cannot speak of 
colonialism or slavery in the case of Kosovo and Serbia (although some discourses define Serbia’s 
politics towards Kosovo throughout history as colonizing), the fact remains that asymmetrical 
power relations are a key feature of the dialogue, as well as that the dialogue provides a space in 
which contestations can be carried out. Building on this, Yüksek and Carpentier’s (2018, 4) notion 
of the participatory contact zone is particularly useful here, claiming that “contact zones focus not 
specifically on the actors and their attitudes, but on the interactions between them, and act as a 
space for non-violent argumentation of conflicting narratives, beliefs, points of view, as well as for 
learning (about the others).” I would like to supplement this notion with a reading of the Brussels 
dialogue as a political (participatory) contact zone because at the heart of the dialogue lies the idea 
of contestation, not merely argumentation, where quite obviously asymmetrical power relations 
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between all parties involved come to the fore. These power relations are not only asymmetrical 
between Serbia and Kosovo, but also the EU’s mediation potential is embedded in sedimented 
notions of how to negotiate on Kosovo, allowing certain ideas (such as the Brussels agreement) 
and not others (such as discussions on territory and status). The dialogue is political in a post-
foundational sense, relying on Laclau and Mouffe’s notions of the political as the moment of 
institution and re-activation of a discourse – as I explained in Chapters 2 and 3. The contestation 
involves a struggle to define the meanings of crucial nodal points in such a way that that 
understanding is shared across conflicting discourses, inevitably expanding them to include 
previously non-viable options and meanings. Thus, a political contact zone is a space that provides 
for the expansion of the horizons of meaning of conflicting discourses, bringing them closer 
together and possibly, helping them accommodate dislocations. It offers them a possibility to 
intersect and interact, and in an idealized situation, create a common discourse out of the conflicting 
ones (which rarely happens in practice). These shared meanings would subsequently be “translated” 
into the various discourses of the negotiating parties, for the understanding of which the concept 
of cultural translation is important. According to Papastergiadis (2000, 131) cultural translation is 
“a dynamic interaction within which conceptual boundaries are expanded and residual differences 
respected”, a definition that resembles Carpentier’s (2018b) elaboration of agonism mentioned in 
Chapter 2. It is neither “the appropriation of a foreign culture according to the rule of one’s own 
culture”, nor is it “a reproduction which totally reflects the world-view of the other” (Papastergiadis 
2000, 131). Instead, it respects “residual differences” in an agonistic manner and does not 
necessarily require the de-structuration of any one of the conflicting discourses. Translation as a 
political practice is constitutive of the re-articulation of the Kosovo imaginary in Serbia, since each 
time an agreement is reached in the Brussels dialogue, it has to be accommodated by the hegemonic 
and institutionalized discourses in Serbia. However, this is not always done in an agonistic manner 
nor respecting residual differences, as the analysis in Chapter 5 and 6 will reveal. 
In a more practical situation, the political contact zone should offer a space for stabilizing the 
meaning of floating signifiers (Laclau and Mouffe 1985), signifiers that have a different meaning 
depending on the discourse they are embedded in. For example, such floating signifiers in the 
dialogue have been the “normalization of relations” as mentioned earlier. The A/CSM is another 
floating signifier, which for Serbia has full competence to decide on its matters and near-complete 
administrative independence from the central institutions in Pristina, while for Kosovo, it should 
only be a loose association between municipalities with an NGO-like status. It is here that a respect 
of residual differences in translating the shared meanings into the dominant context is imperative 
if the dialogue is going to succeed, since the respective translations of the concepts need to have 
as close as possible a meaning in both contexts, even if they are read slightly differently. 
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Even though the opportunities of a political contact zone are to create a shared understanding of 
the various issues (stabilization of meaning of floating signifiers, negotiating dislocations), and 
potentially re-articulate antagonisms into agonisms, it does not mean that this always translates into 
political practice. More often than not, the Brussels dialogue has demonstrated that antagonism 
prevails: the dialogue has been stopped or obstructed by the involved parties on multiple occasions, 
and the partition discourse dominating over the community discourse since 2017 demonstrates this 
clearly. When the tension over the fixation of meaning cannot be overcome, anchoring floating 
signifiers such as “normalization of relations” or “A/CSM” and filling them with meaning that is 
understood and shared by everyone in the dialogue in the same way, separation and antagonism 
increasingly become an option. This is why the EU’s notion of “constructive ambiguity” is highly 
problematic, especially in a situation in which conflicting discourses have such a visceral 
underpinning such as the nationalist discourse of Kosovo being Serbia, or the nationalist discourse 
of Kosovo being an independent state, both of which might have tangible implications for the lives 
of people living there. With constructive ambiguity, the issue of translating floating signifiers into 
local contexts that would have as close a meaning as possible becomes problematic, leaving greater 
room for individual interpretation of these contested signifiers, and thus not entirely bringing the 
two parties closer together. 
Contrary to opportunities offered by a political contact zone, there are also constraints, because 
not all options are viable options within the dialogue – the horizon of possible meanings is 
extended, but it is not unlimited. As Stengel and Nabers (2019) argue, and as I demonstrated in 
subchapter 2.2, any credible re-articulation of meaning inevitably occurs against the background of 
already sedimented and institutionalized political practices, which can act as constraints. This 
involves, for instance, the expectations and habitualized practices of the international community 
in regard to Kosovo, with UN Resolution 1244 granting it status-neutrality while at the same time 
transferring all its administrative and governance competencies to the recently formed institutions 
of the Republic of Kosovo in 2012. The Republic of Kosovo is obviously not a status-neutral entity 
but acts like a state and performs statehood in the international arena as well through its efforts at 
international recognition (see Visoka 2018). The Brussels dialogue was not supposed to discuss 
issues of status. Rather it should have focused on tangible issues and technically solvable challenges 
that people in Kosovo might experience on an everyday basis. To illustrate the constraints of the 
dialogue on a practical example: the fact that Serbia does not want to negotiate on UN membership 
of Kosovo also means that it is equally impossible for them to claim that Kosovo is part of Serbia, 
which might seem paradoxical at first. Since Kosovo is status neutral in the framework that Serbia 
refers to and relies on (UN Resolution 1244), which does not exist in practice (because the UN 
institutions transferred their competencies onto Kosovo institutions), Kosovo cannot at the same 
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time be not status-neutral, ergo a province of Serbia. Status-neutrality is an idealized principle that 
cannot be practiced, since it exists in the tension between Kosovo claiming statehood and Serbia 
claiming Kosovo as an autonomous province. On the other side of this spectrum are the 
recognizing states of Kosovo, which to date, amount to 9717, among which there are three 
permanent members of the UN Security Council (that is a guarantor of the UN Resolution 1244): 
United States, United Kingdom and France. The two remaining permanent members, China and 
the Russian Federation, do not recognize Kosovo. The EU is equally split on this matter: the 
economically and politically most influential states do recognize Kosovo (Germany, United 
Kingdom, France, Italy – 22 out of the 27 EU member states), while five states do not (Spain, 
Slovakia, Romania, Cyprus and Greece). Therefore, the Brussels dialogue can never be neutral, 
since there are always power imbalances at play, “tipping” the dialogue towards what suits the 
greatest number of EU member states. The non-recognizing states usually have a self-
determination or separation issue within their borders, and often argue for the principle of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity to be upheld in the international arena. All of this means that 
any solution to the Kosovo-Serbia dispute has to in some shape or form satisfy these different 
expectations by the international community, not to mention be accepted domestically in both 
Serbia and Kosovo. These are the constraints of the Brussels dialogue, in which not everything can 
be said or negotiated on, such as the issue of status or territoriality by many considered a done deal. 
The failed implementation of the idea of partition demonstrates this, since even though it floated 
around in 2013 when Dačić attempted to advocate for it and was a suppressed possibility during 
Zoran Đinđić’s rule in the early 2000s, it never actually came to be. Another issue that is “off limits” 
at least for the Serbian side is the recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign country, whereas de facto 
vs. de jure recognition could be an option (the model of “two Germanys”). 
It is important to stress the primacy of analyzing discourses in a setting of transnational 
entanglement that is evident in the case of the Brussels dialogue as a contact zone. Instead of 
focusing on international relations (IR) actors such as states (even though I often refer to individual 
states as subjects myself in this context chapter), it is more fruitful to focus on individual hegemonic 
subjects and map out their particular subject positions within a multitude of discourses they are 
embedded in and that they perform. When dealing with the Kosovo question, the usual approach 
is to view it in terms of one IR actor’s point of view, for instance as part of Serbia’s or Kosovo’s 
EU integration process (see Bieber 2015; Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015; Vachudova 2014); 
                                                          
17 There is considerable disagreement between the number of recognizing and non-recognizing states, because of the 
extensive de-recognition campaign of Serbia who lobbied many countries to withdraw their recognition of Kosovo. 
To date (December 2020), there are 15 such countries (Palickova 2019; World Population Review 2020), while the 
Government of Kosovo claims the number of UN states having recognized Kosovo to be 114 (Republic of Kosovo 
2018). In turn, Serbia claims this number to be 93 with 5 states that have a “fluid” understanding of Kosovo’s statehood 
(N1 Srbija 2020). 
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in terms of the Europeanization paradigm and/or the transformative power of Europe (see 
Anastasakis, Caplan and Economides 2013; Börzel 2011; Mladenov and Stahl 2015); or from a 
historical and cultural perspective embedded in the Kosovo myth related to the study of 
nationalism (Bieber 2002; Ejdus and Subotić 2014; Listhaug, Ramet and Dulić 2011). While these 
approaches all offer a valuable perspective, they put nation-states as actors to the fore and 
individual subjects to the back. This thesis is not disciplinarily embedded in an IR perspective. 
Rather, I would like to analyze how a particular set of subjects within the Serbian Government, 
such as high-ranking members of the Serbian Progressive Party, SNS, and their affiliates, such as 
individuals from the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), and Movement of Socialists (PS), came to 
define the Kosovo question when they came to power in 2012 and the SNS consolidated its power 
in 2017 with Aleksandar Vučić becoming President. All those actors are part of the Serbian 
Government and are hegemonic inasmuch as they take the place of representing a “universality”, 
be it the Serbian state or the Serbian nation. Castaldo (2020) has already paid attention to the 
authoritarian tendencies of the SNS-regime and democratic backsliding in Serbia, and Dragojlov 
(2020) has already analyzed SNS’s contradictory politics of EU integration and Kosovo non-
recognition. I would like to build on these recent analyses and investigate how specific discourses 
on Kosovo (the re-articulations) are performed by these hegemonic subjects and how seemingly 
contradictory politics are reconciled through practices of transgression and re-articulation of 
political frontiers. A discourse-theoretical and performative analysis, which does not neglect 
materiality and affectivity (as already elaborated in Chapter 3), can be an exceptionally fruitful tool 
in this endeavor. It can also illuminate the polarization of the political field around the empty 
signifier of a “strong leader”, which Vučić embodies, and increasing antagonization of the Other 
in the SNS’s shift towards a discourse of partition and separation from Albanians. Such an analysis 
can illuminate the process of change. 
4.6 Hegemonic Subjects in the Brussels Dialogue  
The Brussels dialogue understood as a contact zone involved not only representatives of the EU, 
Serbia and Kosovo, but also other interested and involved parties, such as representatives of the 
US State Department, the Russian Government, even China. This is because of the implications 
for the international community and practice of international law that any solution pertaining to 
Kosovo might have. Hence, negotiations were not just held in Brussels during the meetings of the 
technical teams or heads of governments and states of Serbia and Kosovo, but also “on the 
margins” of other events (such as the EU summit in Sofia in May 2018). This phrase was often 
used when the talks on partition started entering public debates more prominently in 2018 (Danas 
2018m, 18 May; Danas 2018q, 30 October; Danas 2018a, 31 October) and such “marginal” talks 
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were exceptionally practiced since the US administration said that they would support any solution 
that Serbia and Kosovo agree on, not excluding correction of borders (Dnevnik 2, 28.08.2018). 
Calls were also made for the US or Russia to be included in the dialogue officially, since 
consultations with them were always ongoing “on the margins”. In December 2017, Vučić claimed 
that Serbia would invite Russia to be part of the negotiations in Brussels should the Kosovo side 
decide to invite the US. Vučić said that “if you want to include another country, which has already 
recognized the independence of Kosovo, then Serbia will certainly request the presence of 
someone who has not recognized the independence of Kosovo, and that would be Russia who 
would accept such an invitation” (Dnevnik 2, 20.12.2017, 02:30). Even though no such moves to 
include other countries were officially made, consultations on Kosovo were always ongoing, 
evident in Vučić’s frequent talks with Russian officials and visits to Russia (Dnevnik 2, 18.12.2017; 
08.05.2018; 12.06.2018; 23.11.2018). Additionally, during the peak of negotiating on partition in 
the summer of 2018, the US ambassador to Serbia Michael Scot said that “I think that the entire 
international community has a role in this [negotiations in Brussels], because we want to support 
peace building and stability in this region, and when I say we, I mean the EU and the entire 
community of the UN” (Dnevnik 2, 09.06.2018, 04:26). 
However, the consultations with other countries were not only a practice that followed the partition 
negotiations of 2017 and 2018. It was practiced even before the conclusion of the Brussels 
agreement in April 2013, and some Western countries and their ambassadors were always brought 
in to consult on domestic legislation and platforms, such as the Serbian Government’s platform 
on the negotiations with Pristina from January 2013, stating the main principles and red tape of 
negotiating with Kosovo, such as non-recognition (Government of the Republic of Serbia 2013). 
Serbia often consulted with the so-called Quint states, a decision-making group consisting of the 
USA, UK, Germany, Italy and France (excluding Russia, all of which were part of the so-called 
Contact Group), who was also involved in the Ahtisaari-led UN-mediated talks in Vienna in 2006 
and 2007 (see Bergmann 2018).  
To illustrate this point, during the time of the drafting of the platform in late 2012, the President 
of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić met with the Ambassadors of Russia, China and the UK to consult on 
the platform. The Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Chepurin reassured Serbia that Russia would 
help Serbia’s views be represented in international institutions, while the Chinese Ambassador 
Zhang Wanxue thanked Serbia for its view on the question of Tibet and Taiwan and claimed to 
back Serbia in its preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty (Dnevnik 2, 17.12.2012). One 
day later, Nikolić met with all the Ambassadors of EU member states to discuss the platform, 
among other things, to which they could also give input. As the then Head of the EU delegation 
to Serbia Vincent Degert said after his meeting with Nikolić, the Ambassadors were brought to the 
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meeting to give their views and comments, since the platform was not yet a finalized document, 
and evaluate how the platform relates to Serbia’s EU integration process and the Belgrade-Pristina 
dialogue (Dnevnik 2, 18.12.2012, 03:55). Hence, all of these parties the Serbian Government 
consulted with had a degree of say in the matter, which is particularly important since the platform 
determined the framework of an agreement with Kosovo for Serbia. 
Similarly, a few months before the Brussels agreement was concluded on 19 April 2013, the Prime 
Minister of Serbia Ivica Dačić talked to the Ambassadors of the Quint states about the 
particularities of an agreement with Kosovo. While Dačić was meeting with the Quint states, 
Aleksandar Vulin, the then director of the Serbian Office for Kosovo and Metohija, was meeting 
with the ambassadors of non-European countries who did not recognize Kosovo on the same day, 
to re-affirm their commitment to non-recognition of Kosovo (Dnevnik 2, 25.02.2013, 08:40). This 
illustrates that the negotiations in Brussels were from the beginning followed by a campaign of 
non-recognition by Serbia, in a similar way as Kosovo was following a campaign of recognition, 
lobbying states to recognize it and increase its maneuvering potential in the Brussels talks with 
Serbia. These two dimensions were always intertwined. The statements made by members of the 
Serbian Government and the negotiating teams in the Brussels dialogue went so far as to not only 
claim that, in order to reach an agreement with Kosovo, Serbia would need to consult with the US 
as a “significant actor in the region” (Marko Đurić in Dnevnik 2, 07.03.2013, 03:55), next to the 
Quint countries and the EU Commission. They also went so far as to claim that a potential 
agreement would be made between Serbia and Western powers (Aleksandar Vučić in Dnevnik 2, 
03.04.2013, 15:08), articulating Kosovo rather as an object of the discussions, instead of a subject 
they are discussing with. Rather, Kosovo was a “proxy” for finding a solution to it with the great 
powers.   
Even though these entanglements between talks in the Brussels dialogue and talks on its “margins” 
with other actors who are not officially part of the dialogue itself are undeniable, they are not the 
focus of this thesis and are only brought in contextually. The focus of this study lies on how 
hegemonic actors in the Serbian Government re-articulated Serbia’s claim to Kosovo during the 
dialogue process and how they drew from these transnational entanglements in support of their 
discursive and material practices. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, the subjects I will 
focus on are the “protagonists” of a discourse (the SNS-dominated Serbian Government), while 
other subjects may act as “helpers” to achieving the ethical ideals of discourses the protagonists 
are performing, or as “opponents” obstructing them (Marttila 2015). Hence, Russia, China and the 
Quint countries as separate entities from the official ones that are part of the Brussels dialogue are 
only considered in light of their helping or opposing role and do not take the center stage. The 
subjects that do are members of the Serbian Government, who evidently can perform several 
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discourses simultaneously, for instance in 2018 claiming Kosovo to be Serbia while at the same 
time advocating for partition. Without opposing discourses existing simultaneously, there would 
be no room for contestation.  
Consequently, having defined the Brussels dialogue as a contact zone, I would like to elaborate on 
it as an arena for the opportunity to encounter the Other, which is one of the main aspects of a 
contact zone (Pratt 2008). Focusing on encounters, Ahmed (2000, 11) builds on the theory of the 
contact zone and states that “encounter involves both a temporal and spatial dislocation that 
transforms both the colonizing and colonized subjects: in other words, colonial encounters involve 
a necessarily unequal and asymmetrical dialogue between once distant cultures that transforms each 
one.” Even though Ahmed develops her theory with a post-colonial gaze and discusses it in such 
contexts, I see no problem in using the ideas developed there in any other context with unequal 
and asymmetrical power relations, in which the Other is perceived as distant and differing. This 
can be said for an encounter between Serbs and Albanians within the Brussels dialogue, basing this 
argument on the earlier elaborated discourse on enmity between the two groups. For this study, 
“distant” does not necessarily refer to spatially distant, or even “exotic”, but structurally and 
discursively “distant”, whereby the potential for accommodating opposing discourses of both sides 
on the same issue is very slim. As mentioned earlier, even the gesture of shaking hands with the 
other country’s prime minister was taken as a historic move, one that was both criticized by the 
opposition in Serbia and praised (Dnevnik 2, 19.10.2012). In Serbia, meeting with Kosovo officials 
was not seen as welcomed before, due to the frequently mentioned accusation of the leadership of 
Kosovo of being guilty of war crimes against the Serbs. Hence, “encounter” with the leadership of 
Kosovo Albanians was marked by past experiences of encountering them in the framework of war 
and battle. As Ahmed (2000, 8) argues, “each encounter reopens past encounters” whereby “prior 
histories of encounter” – which were most recently marked by violence between Serbs and 
Albanians – “violate and fix others in regimes of difference.” These regimes of difference that are 
constituting the Other through past experiences can also act as a constraint in the Brussels dialogue. 
Affective economies that stick to these experiences are inevitably part of these encounters, in which 
re-articulating or changing the way one “feels” about the Other is possible, albeit marginally. This 
option is opened up by the Brussels agreement and its re-articulation of the Serb-Albanian 
relationship as an agonistic one, but affective economies need time to change, and additional 
experience marked by positive emotions of and with the Other are necessary. However, this was 
not the case, since the Brussels agreement was only marginally implemented, thus resulting in 
agonism turning into antagonism again. Parts of Chapter 5 and 6 are devoted to specifically this 




However, the Brussels dialogue has fleshed out a conception of the Albanian Other as a legitimate 
subject, one with whom it is necessary to negotiate (something which was not a given before the 
Brussels dialogue), not simply an object of discussion. Such a conception can make a big difference 
in the encounter itself, as it can initiate a re-articulation of entire structures of meanings attached 
to and feelings about the Other. And although these encounters existed from 2012 to 2018 (which 
were only recently revived again in mid-2020), the analysis revealed that the affective structuration 
of the Other is quite rigid. Backed by a gaping lack of positive experiences, only a marginally 
possible re-articulation of the Other is provided, something that was evident in the early stages 
before and after the conclusion of the Brussels agreement from April 2013. The articulation of the 
Other was henceforth increasingly antagonistic as the lack of implementation of the key points of 
the Brussels agreement became more evident. This ultimately culminated in the discussion of 
partitioning Kosovo along ethnic lines in 2017 and 2018, which relies on absolute separation from 
the Other as a solution to the problem. In light of this, it came as no surprise that the Brussels 
dialogue was halted in November 2018, as the space for encountering and thus re-articulating the 




5 Community Discourse 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the “political dialogue” which essentially put a focus on 
negotiations between high-level political subjects from both Serbia and Kosovo opened up 
opportunities to renegotiate hegemonic structures and discourses embedded in both contexts. The 
analysis focuses on the claims-making process carried out by Serbian hegemonic subjects, with a 
specific focus on different elements of the Kosovo imaginary and their re-articulation. I have 
argued that the Kosovo imaginary as a horizon of intelligibility on what can be said and done in 
relation to Kosovo, is embedded in various state structures. Those are institutions (The Ministry 
for Kosovo and Metohija, The Government Office for Kosovo and Metohija) with their 
materiality, subjects (The Orthodox Church, the Minister for Kosovo and Metohija, the Head of 
the Government Office for Kosovo and Metohija etc.), as well as other cultural representations 
(popular culture, on the streets, in digital space etc.). Whenever somebody articulates the 
importance of Kosovo for Serbia, the meaning of that articulation is constituted through its 
referentiality to the narrative of the Kosovo myth (turned social imaginary) and its importance for 
the Serbian nationalist project. This is why the Serbian claim to Kosovo plays such a crucial role in 
this case study, since the claim itself embodies references to Kosovo’s historic importance for 
Serbia, as well as past, present and future physical and symbolic ownership of Kosovo by the 
Serbian nation and the Serbian state. In other words, the claim represents a specific political demand 
that forms the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse, which is also affectively invested with meanings and 
feelings. As I have argued, the claim to the territory of Kosovo is a central nodal point of the 
Kosovo imaginary, which in turn structures the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the analysis will start with mapping out the nodal points of the 
discourse in question, those elements and moments that stabilize meanings. I have identified two 
dominant discursive constellations in this case study at two different moments: the community 
discourse of 2012 and 2013, and the partition discourse of 2017 and 2018, both anchored by 
different myths: the former by the Brussels agreement and the latter by the idea of partition. This 
chapter will focus on the community discourse of 2012 and 2013 which can be understood as a 
larger context in which debates on the Brussels agreement are situated. Any re-constitution of its 
discursive elements must consider which elements were fixing the discourse in the first place. Thus, 
the first part of the analysis will map out the nodal points of the community discourse. As this 
study aims to demonstrate how discursive change has occurred, nodal points before the 
engagement in the political dialogue and the introduction of the idea of A/CSM are going to be 
mapped out (focusing on the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse), demonstrating subsequently the 
reconfiguration of these nodal points with the conclusion of the Brussels agreement. Secondly, I 
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will look at various practices of meaning-making, such as the re-constitution of elements resulting 
in new points of fixture and analyze which moves on the discursive field and performative acts led 
to this re-constitution. Here, a discussion on the creation of political frontiers will be provided 
which is affectively underpinned. Thirdly, I will analyze how the very subjects behind these shifts 
(re-)constitute themselves in this very process. Lastly, I will provide a brief summary of the analysis 
and create a bridge towards the next discursive constellation, the partition discourse. 
5.1 Nodal Points of the “Kosovo is Serbia” Discourse Prior to the Political 
Dialogue and Transition towards the Brussels Agreement 
The discourse on Kosovo in Serbia prior to the Serbian Government’s engagement in the high-
level “political” dialogue with the Kosovo Government was fixed around the articulation of 
Kosovo being an integral part of Serbia (as anchored in the Constitution as well). Hence, the nodal 
points of  the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse are a re-articulation of  the nodal points of  the 
Kosovo imaginary, supported by the same fantasy that Kosovo is part of  Serbia: the claim to the 
territory of  Kosovo; a legal and international right and obligation to defend Serbia’s right to that 
territory; the Serbian people living there that make Kosovo “still” Serbian even after Kosovo’s 
declaration of  independence and unfettered by the demographic composition of  Kosovo; and a 
pledge to be unified and unitary in getting around any obstacles that the current situation with 
Kosovo might pose for the Serbian state and nation – in line with the famous saying “Samo sloga 
Srbina spašava” (an alliteration which translates into “only unity will save the Serbs”). This call for 
unity resonates with Vuk Branković’s betrayal of  Lazar on the Field of  the Blackbirds and is 
supposed to be a reminder of  how discord and disunity can be the downfall of  Serbia when it 
comes to Kosovo. Thus, all these nodal points have an anchoring effect against the competing 
discourse generated by Kosovo’s declaration of independence, as well as the embeddedness of the 
“Kosovo is Serbia” discourse in the institutional framework of Serbia. This discourse is affectively 
underpinned with emotions such as love, pride, as well as spite and disdain for whomever tries to 
“take away” Kosovo from Serbia and the Serbs. Spite and disdain are not so pronounced in the 
community discourse as they are in the partition discourse, since the emphasis here is laid on an 
agonistic articulation of the Albanian Other as well as on “sharing” Kosovo with them. 
The competing discourse, which claims that Kosovo is not Serbia, but a separate entity, an 
independent state constitutes the limit of the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse. The high-level political 
dialogue is important as it allows subjects adhering to and constituting these discourses to interact 
and negotiate meanings situated “between” these two exclusionary poles, meanings that, ideally, 
will be shared across discourses, creating new nodal points. These are the opportunities of the 
Brussels dialogue as a contact zone that I have mentioned previously. 
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Even though the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse is hegemonic, the Brussels dialogue slightly 
dislocated its fixity: if everything is set in stone, if Kosovo is indeed Serbia, why does Serbia engage 
in negotiations at all and what are they negotiating? The EU has often mentioned that Serbia does 
not need to recognize18 Kosovo’s independence to join the EU through its engagement in the 
dialogue, something that has been verbally reaffirmed many times by Catherine Ashton, the former 
chief mediator in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, and is anchored in the EU negotiation framework 
of Serbia such as Chapter 35 of acquis (European Commission 2012b; 2015). This allowed the 
“Kosovo is Serbia” discourse to still be fixed around the above-mentioned nodal points even with 
Serbia pursuing EU integration. This fixity is mostly achieved through another nodal point 
dominant in the same discourse, namely status-neutrality that is related to territory. Status-neutrality 
of Kosovo, as guaranteed by Resolution 1244 which is still in force, is what allows Serbian political 
subjects to claim that Kosovo is Serbia and still engage in the Brussels dialogue: by calling the 
Brussels dialogue status-neutral, they simultaneously claim that engaging with the Kosovo issue as 
something that needs to be solved means accommodating the potential solution into a status-
neutral framework.  
This status neutrality has formed the cornerstone of Serbia’s willingness to participate in the high-
level dialogue and continue its engagement in it. An example of the EU’s commitment to status-
neutrality is the designation of Kosovo with an asterisk (Kosovo*) in all EU documents. The 
documents always refer to Kosovo in the footnote as “without prejudice to positions on status, 
and […] in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of 
Independence.” However, only the first mention of Kosovo in any given document is marked with 
an asterisk, any subsequent mention is without it. Additionally, even though the asterisk refers to 
Resolution 1244, it also refers to the ICJ opinion, which is “less” neutral since it states that 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not contrary to international law. For Serbia, the 
asterisk has played a big role in accommodating its engagement with members of the Kosovo 
Government as a separate entity with the dominant “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse: by claiming that 
Kosovo* designates a status-neutral entity, they are able to engage in negotiations with it. This has 
culminated in the agreement on regional representation in which both Serbia and Kosovo agree to 
engage in regional cooperation and in which “Kosovo* is the only denomination to be used within 
the framework of regional cooperation” (Kosovo Prime Minister Office 2012). 
The prospect of jeopardizing this principle of neutrality has often led to friction among the parties, 
such as the formulation found in the EU enlargement strategy from October 2012 (European 
                                                          
18 Even though recognition is not articulated as a condition of Serbia’s EU membership, doing something semantically 
similar would be expected (for example recognizing Kosovo de facto, instead of de jure), since the EU forecloses the 
possibility of Kosovo “returning” under the governance of Serbia. 
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Commission 2012a, 26), stating that an essential element of Serbia’s normalization process with 
Kosovo will be “[a]ddressing the problems in northern Kosovo, while respecting the territorial 
integrity of Kosovo and the particular needs of the local population.” Serbian officials considered 
the phrase “territorial integrity of Kosovo” to be highly problematic, since one of the central 
components of statehood is territorial integrity, thus claiming that the EU has implicitly put into 
question its status-neutral position towards Kosovo’s statehood. 
To this, Štefan Füle, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood 
Policy responded in an interview with RTS on 10 October 2012 that they did not “introduce any 
new concepts” and that the principle of “not changing the borders of Kosovo was stated by the 
Contact Group already in November 2005, in the guidelines for the negotiations on the status of 
Kosovo. The mention of territorial integrity has nothing to do with the status of Kosovo and the 
Commission made it clear in its report that it remains status neutral. Our request only means that 
we do not want the partition of Kosovo” (Dnevnik 2, 10.10.2012, 03:05). Indeed, the Contact 
Group’s guidelines state that “[t]here will be no changes in the current territory of Kosovo, i.e., no 
partition of Kosovo and no union of Kosovo with any country or part of any country. The 
territorial integrity and internal stability of regional neighbours will be fully respected” (United 
Nations Security Council 2005). This has prompted Prime Minister Dačić to react by claiming that 
Serbia can only continue on its EU path if there are no new conditions, such as accepting the 
statehood of Kosovo, and if the dialogue is status neutral. Comparing the phrase “territorial 
integrity of Kosovo” with a “milder alternative to recognizing Kosovo’s independence”, he claimed 
that it would be even “more honest” by the EU to make Serbia recognize the independence of 
Kosovo instead of making them recognize Kosovo’s territorial integrity, since there are no states 
with territorial integrity that do not have sovereignty (Dnevnik 2, 10.10.2012, 08:35). Already the 
next day, Füle visited Belgrade and tried not only to convince Serbia’s state leadership of the EU’s 
commitment to status neutrality, but spoke in the Serbian Parliament to the opposition as well, 
presenting the Enlargement strategy. After being asked by the opposition party DSS whether the 
EU will omit this controversial phrase, Füle stated that they will not do so because they “firmly 
believe that territory is one of the elements of statehood, but not the crucial one” (Dnevnik 2, 
11.10.2012, 06:10). In this sense, the EU implicitly acknowledges that Kosovo might exhibit 
features of statehood, which is related to my previous argument on how the Brussels dialogue is 
constrained by sedimented convictions held by the EU as a hegemonic actor. It is clear that “status-
neutrality” is a floating signifier that has two meanings. In the EU discourse, given that most EU 
member states have recognized Kosovo as an independent state, while five states have not, status-
neutrality is a term designating a gray area of political practice between full statehood and “traces” 
of it. In Serbia, it does not simply mean that Kosovo is status-neutral, since neutrality can hardly 
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exist in political practice – status-neutrality means that Kosovo is still Serbia, since its final status 
has not yet been determined by an alternative resolution to Resolution 1244. I have discussed the 
paradoxical nature of this claim in Chapter 4. 
Given the fact that Serbia is trying to join the EU, and recognizing the discrepancy between these 
two interpretations of status-neutrality which somehow need to be renegotiated during the EU 
integration process, Serbia is articulating Kosovo within the framework of the Brussels dialogue as 
a “question” or a “problem” that needs to be solved or somehow dealt with. For instance, after 
Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić’s speech at the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2012, 
officially declaring Serbia’s readiness to participate in the high-level political dialogue with Pristina, 
he mentioned in his interview with RTS that Kosovo and Metohija is currently a “problem” which 
all parties need to engage with in order to find a solution, for which time is slowly running out. If 
they do not engage, Kosovo will persist as a problem that future generations will need to deal with 
(Dnevnik 2, 26.09.2012, 10:20).  
Similarly, the Government platform for the negotiations with Pristina ratified by the Serbian 
Parliament on 13 January 2013 through a resolution, also frames Kosovo and Metohija as an issue 
that needs to be dealt with. Before its finalization and submission to the Parliament, Dačić said that 
this is the first document in which the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the 
President of the Republic of Serbia address such a difficult problem such as Kosovo and 
Metohija, and try to suggest something which would be a viable solution, not just something 
which would be our general goals, for which we know in advance cannot be realized” 
(Dnevnik 2, 22.12.2012, 02:50).  
The “general goals” Dačić has mentioned are a reference to the previous government and 
parliamentary resolutions and platforms that explicitly do not consider Kosovo as a problem or an 
issue that needs to be dealt with, but simply reify the dominant discourse that Kosovo is Serbia 
and ignore the existence of Kosovo Government structures as a possible negotiation party, or 
somebody the Serbian Government can or needs to engage with. For instance, the last resolution 
on Kosovo and Metohija prior to the adoption of the abovementioned one from 2013, dates back 
to July 2011 after the Brussels dialogue had begun. It was adopted during the North Kosovo crisis 
and was meant to reify Serbia’s commitment to preserving its territorial integrity and sovereignty 
against the “unilateral” acts of Pristina, a term mentioned five times in the resolution (National 
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 2011). The Kosovo Government is described as “temporary 
institutions of self-government in Pristina”, thus negating Kosovo’s prospects at becoming a fully 
independent state in the future. The resolution was anchored around temporality or interim, where 
the “compromise solution” the resolution calls for acts as an empty signifier, since the text does 
not articulate what this solution might be. The emphasis on temporariness allows for an 
imaginarization of Kosovo still being Serbian in the future. 
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This solution, alongside articulating Kosovo as a problem, is offered in the earlier mentioned 
Government platform from 2013, which acknowledges that Serbia has given PISG a “limited legal 
and international subjectivity and legitimacy” (Government of the Republic of Serbia 2013). By 
articulating the “temporary” institutions of Pristina as a legitimate party that needs to be engaged 
if Serbia is to solve the Kosovo problem, the Platform constitutes them as a separate entity that is 
here to stay, something that can no longer be ignored as merely interim, even though the 
designation stays the same. The Platform further speaks of “the Constitution of the province”, 
referring to the Kosovo constitution within the legal order of the Kosovo state, which is a 
contradiction in terms: all previous resolutions and this Platform as well have acknowledged that 
its province Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of Serbia under Serbia’s Constitution and that 
a compromise must be in accordance with that same Constitution. By acknowledging that the 
province has its own Constitution, the Platform acknowledges something that should not be there 
under the conditions of the Serbian state’s legal order. The platform further calls for the return of 
displaced persons and their offspring to be written down in the Constitution of Kosovo, as well as 
Serbian and other non-Albanian communities to be represented in central institutions, as foreseen 
by a mechanism (points G and D of the platform). These moves explicitly acknowledge the 
existence of institutions that are clearly part of the state and legal framework of Kosovo as an 
independent entity, and that Kosovo has some international subjectivity, both of which are hard 
to accommodate with the discourse that “Kosovo is Serbia”.  
Even though this might be the case, the platform states that the compromise solution resulting 
from the high-level political dialogue should be about “overcoming institutional parallelisms”, not 
touching upon the status question (that is, upon the question of international and state or legal 
status of PISG). Status-neutrality is still a key nodal point, which allows the Serbian state to claim 
the existence of Kosovo as something separate from Serbia, and something that is part of Serbia 
at the same time. This results in the four representations of Kosovo in the Serbian political 
discourse (Chapter 4). Status-neutrality is very accommodating to conflicting interpretations of 
statehood, since it can mean exactly the opposite in different discourses, as demonstrated above 
with the example of “territorial integrity of Kosovo”. However, what is new is the 
acknowledgement of the institutions in Pristina as a party that needs to be negotiated with, as a 
political subject with its own power and interests that cannot be ignored. President Nikolić, before 
meeting with the EU delegation in Brussels on 11 March 2013, representing the main points as 
established by the Platform, stated that for him the maximum he is willing to compromise about 
(the frequently mentioned red tape) is: 
that Serbia recognizes Kosovo as a territory that is specific in relation to other parts of Serbia, 
that it is willing to accept many things that Kosovo succeeded to become with the help of 
the UN and EU, that it knows that Kosovo as such has its own Constitution, its laws, a 
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president, a parliament, but that on that territory, which we will never recognize as an 
independent state, there is also a big Serbian community, which we want to preserve there 
entirely and enable its return (Dnevnik 2, 11.03.2013, 05:05). 
Even though Kosovo’s subjectivity is acknowledged, the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse still 
predominates, but the representation of Kosovo in Serbia is multi-layered, and so is the 
representation of Serbia in Kosovo. Here it is evident that the dislocation created by Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence is incorporated into the given dominant discursive structure through 
some compromises made, such as additional meanings acquired by the signifier Kosovo (the four 
articulations of Kosovo in Chapter 4). The platform introduces the idea of an “Autonomous 
community of Serbian municipalities” as a compromise solution (a myth representing the solution 
as an empty signifier) whose establishment is conditioned by direct ties with Serbia. The community 
should have the right to establish direct cooperation with Serbian authorities, as well as the right 
to additional financing as foreseen by the budget of Serbia. Hence, it is not only important to 
preserve Kosovo in Serbia (physically and symbolically), but also Serbia in Kosovo, as they are 
acknowledged as separate entities. 
5.2 Community Discourse: From Territory to People  
This shift of focus from Kosovo in Serbia to preserving Serbia in Kosovo is predominantly done 
through anchoring the discourse around the nodal point of the people, as evident in Nikolić’s 
statement above. I have called the 2012 and 2013 discourse a community discourse not only 
because the focus is on the Association/Community of Serb-majority Municipalities as an 
institution, but also because the people, i.e., the Serbian community in Kosovo – their status, 
position, power, opportunities, quality of life etc. – is what drives the negotiations in Brussels 
further. Making the people a contested signifier in the community discourse allows Serbian 
hegemonic subjects to renegotiate the “reach” of Serbian statehood within Kosovo as a separate 
entity and helps further fragment the meaning of Kosovo in the Serbian political discourse. As I 
mentioned earlier, the first and third articulation of Kosovo are dominant in the community 
discourse, meaning that the entire Kosovo is symbolically and physically part of Serbia (“our 
Kosovo”), and that the people constitute the boundaries of sharing that space with the Kosovo 
Albanians (“their Kosovo”). This is another reason I have called this discourse a community 
discourse, because the emphasis is on sharing this space between the Serbian and Albanian 
communities in Kosovo. Thus, the community discourse at times follows a logic of difference, by 
which antagonistic frontiers are weakened, instead a logic of equivalence (subchapter 5.7). It is 
about separation through integration into the Kosovo institutional framework. It is not about 
physical as well as symbolic separation, as we will see in Chapter 6 with the partition discourse. In 
summary, the dislocated “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse is “concealed” with the myth of the Brussels 
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agreement, which anchors the “community discourse” as a larger context in which these 
contestations of meaning occur. The main nodal point of the community discourse, apart from the 
Brussels agreement, is “the people”, which is also reflected in the Brussels agreement itself, as I 
will demonstrate in the next subchapter. 
The people are a “stretchy” category in many ways: firstly, the category can “extend” Serbia’s 
territorial claim over “their (Albanian) Kosovo”, in that the autonomous community creates a 
separate territorial entity within Kosovo under direct cooperation with Serbia. The platform even 
suggests that the autonomous community could be one of the many regions of Kosovo, something 
that the Serbian side would suggest in the negotiations. Secondly, it allows Serbia to be part of and 
have an influence on the state structures of Kosovo through the Serb community’s representation 
in central institutions in Pristina, as well as their involvement in the constitution of the court system 
as envisioned by the autonomous community’s responsibilities and powers. The representation of 
Serbs in central institutions is guaranteed by the Kosovo Constitution and by Serbia acknowledging 
these institutions it could perform control over them by exerting influence on the Kosovo Serbs 
in these institutions. Had it maintained its rejections of the institutions, it would have had less 
influence in Kosovo. Thirdly, it allows Serbia’s statehood to be present and above all visible in 
Kosovo through symbolic practices, such as the community’s independence in deciding on the 
appearance and use of their symbols (coat of arms, flag, anthem, etc.). Fourthly, through integration 
of the Serbian community in Kosovo state structures and their foreseen participation in Kosovo 
elections, Serbia extends its state influence by providing or omitting its support of different Serb-
led parties. I will return to the last point later in the analysis when I discuss Srpska lista (the Serbian 
list). 
Ultimately, “the people” becomes a political category, one which is not only debated among 
different parties in the Brussels dialogue, but one which embodies Serbia’s hegemonic claim over 
Kosovo, and in that manner represents a nodal point of stabilizing the “Kosovo is Serbia” 
discourse. Kosovo is still Serbia as long as the Serbian community is living there. If Kosovo is 
recognized as a separate entity, which would fragment the claim over Kosovo in terms of a unified 
territory, then the people signify a way for Serbian state and national interests to be represented in 
Kosovo. The people not only anchor the discourse of “Kosovo is Serbia”, but they also anchor 
the discourse that Kosovo is status-neutral and that Kosovo is an independent state. They do so 
because “the people” the parties in the dialogue are debating on do not have a legal international 
status or subjectivity. They are a seemingly apolitical category, which by virtue of being discussed 
and debated on within the dialogue, becomes a political category. 
117 
 
Why have the parties in the Brussels dialogue started debating on the position of the people in 
Kosovo, instead of something else? The answer primarily lies in the mandate given to the Belgrade-
Pristina dialogue by the UN, after the decision of the ICJ on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence from 2010. The UN GA has, by adopting Resolution 64/298, welcomed 
the readiness of the European Union to facilitate a process of dialogue between the parties 
[Serbia and Kosovo]; the process of dialogue in itself would be a factor for peace, security 
and stability in the region, and that dialogue would be to promote cooperation, achieve 
progress on the path to the European Union and improve the lives of the people (United 
Nations General Assembly 2010). 
As this resolution acknowledges the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the Accordance with International Law 
of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo, without providing a final verdict on the 
status of Kosovo, the EU is welcomed as a facilitator able to negotiate on the practical aspects of 
the dispute between the parties. Improving the lives of the people is one of the core imperatives 
of this facilitation. The people are defined here in “status-neutral” terms: there is no mention of 
which state or legal framework these people are part of, or whether status should be something to 
debate on. Leaving no room to debate anything else, the dialogue mainly concerns the position of 
the people in Kosovo, especially those whose lives need improvement through the difficulties 
created by institutional parallelisms. This was one of the main imperatives of the “technical” 
dialogue: solving conflicting issues on the grounds, apart from the agreements on regional 
representation and arrangements for official visits. 
Through metaphorically transposing Serbia’ entire hegemonic claim to Kosovo onto the people, 
the Serbian Government effectively abandoned earlier reiterations of “preserving the sovereignty/ 
territorial integrity of Serbia” in its resolutions. What is debated now is not the territory, or the 
efforts to preserve it, but to find a “compromise” with the Government in Pristina on how to 
improve the lives of the people: in other words, how to preserve Serbia in Kosovo through 
preserving the Serbian community in Kosovo. “The people” are operationalized in the service of 
Serbia’s claim to Kosovo, as a means to exert its hegemony without fully exerting territorial control. 
By hegemonizing the people (there can only be a Serb community that belongs to Serbia, not a 
Serb community that belongs to the Albanian Kosovo), Serbia can still be present in Kosovo and 
Kosovo in Serbia if the Serb community lives there. Through the people, there is an intrinsic link 
between these two claims: Kosovo will always be Serbia and Serbia will always be in Kosovo as 
long as there is the Serb community. 
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5.3 Accommodating the Dislocatory Moment of Kosovo’s Declaration of 
Independence through the Brussels Agreement 
The Brussels agreement reached on April 13, 2013 played a crucial role in allowing Serbian 
hegemonic actors to materialize the claim of Kosovo in Serbia and Serbia in Kosovo. This means 
accommodating the dislocation occurred by Kosovo’s declaration of independence, which clashed 
with the hegemonic discourse on “Kosovo is Serbia”. The Brussels agreement, with its 
“constructively ambiguous” language represents an attempt to incorporate the dislocation into the 
dislocated discourse and is thus considered a myth (one which ultimately failed the trial by space 
and was only marginally implemented). By claiming that the Brussels agreement is a way to preserve 
Serbia in Kosovo through preserving its people there, Kosovo can still remain a part of Serbia 
while simultaneously being separate from it. The ambiguity of language allows for a metaphorical 
“covering over” of the dislocation while simultaneously maintaining the unity of the Kosovo is 
Serbia discourse. If we look at the way different issues in the Brussels agreement were articulated, 
it becomes evident that ambiguity is its central characteristic, signified by the dash (“/”). The 
Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities already indicates a double-layered 
meaning: the term Association is supposed to signify its relation to other existing associations of 
municipalities in Kosovo under the Kosovo law, which do not have any executive powers 
(Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo 2008). By contrast, the term Community is supposed to 
signify an independent or autonomous body as part of the Kosovo institutional framework but 
comprising of the majority Serb community, where executive powers are the key (as was foreseen 
with the Government platform from January 2013). Even the way of writing it alternates within 
the text: sometimes Association comes before the dash followed by Community, and sometimes it 
is the opposite (Government of Kosovo 2013). This indicates that the meaning is not stabilized as 
a nodal point, around a singular signifier that would mean the same, or have as close a meaning as 
possible in both discourses of “Kosovo is Serbia” and “Kosovo is an independent state”. 
By extension, the extent to which this ambiguity has impaired the negotiation process becomes 
evident in the subsequent agreement on the general principles of how the A/CSM should be set 
up from August 2015 (European Union External Action 2015). In this text, the parties reached an 
agreement that the A/CSM should “exercise full overview […] to develop local economy, […] in 
the area of education, […] to improve local primary and secondary health and social care, […] to 
coordinate urban and rural planning” (ibid., emphasis added). The First agreement foresaw that the 
A/CSM “have full overview of the areas of economic development, education, health, urban and 
rural planning” (Government of Kosovo 2013, emphasis added). The verb “exercise” is transitive 
and refers to putting something into action, whereas “have” is intransitive and refers to being in 
possession of something, having a quality. This has allowed Serbian officials to claim that the 
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A/CSM will have executive powers, whereas the Kosovo officials have claimed that giving 
executive powers to the A/CSM would create a “second Bosnia” (Dnevnik 2, 20.04.2013, 12:20) 
or a second Republika Srpska in Kosovo (M. S. 2016, in Danas, 15 November) and have maintained 
that the A/CSM will be set up in the form of an NGO. This has resulted in the Kosovo 
Government referring this agreement to the Constitutional court that decided that the second 
agreement on A/CSM is contrary to the Kosovo constitution (Constitutional Court of Kosovo 
2015). This resulted in a blockage in the implementation of the A/CSM to date, since the Serbian 
side insisted on executive powers, whereas the Kosovo side insisted in following the 
recommendations of the Constitutional court.  
Returning to the Brussels agreement, at the time of its conclusion it was hailed as a “historic 
agreement” by EU officials specifically, such as Herman van Rompuy, Catherine Ashton and Štefan 
Füle (Dnevnik 2, 19.04.2013). This phrase has been re-iterated by the prime ministers of Kosovo 
and of Serbia, uplifting the moments of the agreement’s conclusion as historic, and something that 
will benefit the European future of both countries (ibid; Dnevnik 2, 16.06.2013). However, Dačić 
acknowledged that this agreement was not ideal, and Vučić and Nikolić insisted that with this 
agreement, Serbia lost as little as necessary by gaining as much as possible (Dnevnik 2, 20.04.2013). 
The report on the agreement was subsequently adopted by the Serbian Parliament, since adopting 
the agreement as such would mean recognizing Kosovo as a state (Serbia would have entered in a 
legal agreement with a separate state entity), hence only a report could be adopted as explained by 
Nebojša Stefanović, the Speaker of the National Assembly (Dnevnik 2, 22.04.2013, 08:22). Even 
though the discrepancy between the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse and the Brussels agreement was 
acknowledged by Serbian state officials, the dislocation was incorporated into the dominant 
structure of meaning not the least through the institutional acknowledgement and adoption of the 
report. Additionally, it was incorporated through relying on constructive ambiguity and the 
agreement being anchored by the nodal point of the people. In this manner, concealment of the 
dislocation could take place, by slightly re-structuring the dislocated discourse and incorporating 
additional nodal points. It was no longer about “preserving Kosovo and Metohija” or “defending 
Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” but about the position of the Serb community and 
Serbian state and national interests in Kosovo. Therefore, we can speak of the community discourse 
covering over the dislocated discourse, since the conversation is moved along debating the position 
of the people in Kosovo, instead of emphasizing the two discourses’ discrepancies. As Dačić stated 
in his speech before the Parliament when the mentioned report on the Brussels agreement was 
adopted, Serbia should “view this document as a charter of the rights and freedoms of Kosovo 
Serbs, a charter that is small for our [Serbia’s] wishes, but big for their [Kosovo Serbs’] future 
existence in Kosovo and Metohija” (Dnevnik 2, 26.04.2013, 02:22). He further added in his address: 
120 
 
This is now a chance for us to try to defend our state and national interests in a different 
manner. Not to celebrate our defeats after all that has happened. We cannot even defend 
Northern Kosovo today, not to mention defending Serbia! Defending it from poverty, lack 
of perspective for the future, and total failure. To refuse to acknowledge this would result in 
another Oluja19 in Kosovo” (ibid., 02:37, emphasis added). 
To accommodate the dislocation means to re-articulate different elements of the Kosovo is Serbia 
discourse, such as Serbia’s territorial claim to Kosovo. Dačić therefore further frames the Brussels 
agreement as a break with previous state politics towards Kosovo, especially the way Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence was handled in 2008, which resulted in popular riots and setting fire 
to several Western embassies in Belgrade. Dačić is re-articulating the political frontier between “us” 
and “them”, be it Kosovo Albanians or Western powers, and positioning the Brussels agreement 
as a break from isolationist practices on the international stage, as evident in the following 
statement: 
We could have banished the foreigners. We could have set fire to embassies and mosques. 
We could have directed our cannons towards Kosovo. We could have even become 
Europe’s North Korea. But what would happen then? Would we have won?! Would we have 
concurred Pristina?! There is no hiding anymore behind Kosovo. We are alone on this lonely 
island of ours! And it only depends on us what we will find on it tomorrow. Factories, 
schools, hospitals, apartments… or only vast cemeteries and tears. This is a question of to 
be or not to be! But not only for North Kosovo, but also for the rest of Serbia. This is why 
today we do not only talk about the negotiations on Kosovo in Brussels. We choose. Choose 
what kind of Serbia we want to have tomorrow. A humiliated one, a Serbia in soup kitchens, 
suffocated in tears, or a strong, economically developed Serbia in which everybody will have 
access to cures and in which Serbia will be the cure for everything” (ibid., 03:13). 
It is evident that continuing the “stubborn” and uncompromising politics around Kosovo is 
articulated in opposition to attaining economic and social prosperity in the future, as part of 
Europe. It is evident in these moments that one imaginary supported by one fantasy is being 
amended with a different imaginary of EU integration, supported by fantasies of prosperity and 
stability. Something similar occurs with the idea of partition, but the material and affective claim 
to Kosovo is re-articulated as well, which is not the case with the Brussels agreement. In fact, the 
only way Serbia can truly become part of Europe is by compromising around Kosovo, but not 
compromising on the territorial question, which is not debated here. Frequent articulations of 
“doomsday scenarios” (a horrific fantasy) on what would happen if the Parliament and the broader 
public did not accept the Brussels agreement is reinforcing the hegemonic narrative of this being 
the “best deal possible”. This constitutes concealment as well, in service of delegitimizing responses 
that would reveal the dislocation: if we have compromised only as much as to enable a better life 
for our people, but only as far as it would allow us to still keep Kosovo within the framework of 
                                                          
19 Operation Storm, or Oluja in Croatian was the name of the military intervention in 1995 when the majority Serb 
population of Krajina (approximately 150000) was expelled from Eastern Croatia. 
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Serbia, then nothing has essentially changed. The hegemonic discourse of “Kosovo is Serbia” can 
still be constitutive of Serbia’s political practice regarding Kosovo. 
This concealment is also evident in the decision of Serbia’s Constitutional court to define the 
Brussels agreement as a “political” instead of a “legal” one. Namely, the parliamentary caucus of 
the opposition party DSS (Demokratska Stranka Srbije), supported by other MPs outside the caucus, 
submitted a proposal to the Constitutional court for deciding on the constitutionality of the 
Brussels agreement on 8 May 2013. They claimed that the agreement is in violation of the law and 
Serbia’s Constitution and that it instead affirms the “Constitution and laws of the false state of 
Kosovo” (Dnevnik 2, 08.05.2013, 10:00). The public debate in the Parliament on this issue 
occurred a year after the submission and the Court’s decision was reached on 10 October 2014, 
although made public only four months after that, in February 2015. In the decision, the Court 
maintained that it could not reach a decision on the Brussels agreement because (1) it cannot be 
considered an international agreement, and (2) because the agreement and the subsequent 
conclusion of the Government on the acceptance of the Brussels agreement and the decision of 
the Parliament to ratify this conclusion cannot be defined as general legal acts (Constitutional Court 
of Serbia 2014; see also Đerić and Papić 2016).  
In saying that the Constitutional court had no capacity to decide on the legality of the agreement, 
it was not declared dislocatory to the constitutional and legal order of Serbia. Since the Government 
and the Parliament adopted reports on the agreement, not the agreement itself, as explained by 
Stefanović, it can only be deemed a political document instead of a legal one, only the latter of 
which would fall under the domain of the Constitutional court. The dislocatory potential of the 
Brussels agreement to the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse that even dominates the constitutional 
order of Serbia has been concealed by the Court’s decision. However, because the Constitution 
only forbids the recognition of Kosovo as a separate state, but it does not prescribe the modalities 
of the institutional infrastructure present within Kosovo, the plan of the Government since they 
began their engagement in the political dialogue has been to pass a law on Kosovo’s substantial 
autonomy, as Dačić explained immediately after the Brussels agreement was reached. He said that 
“The Community [A/CSM] will become a part of the constitutional-legal system of Serbia in that 
we need to pass a law on the substantial autonomy [of Kosovo and Metohija]. This law will be a 
constitutional law which will enable all the competences that the Community [A/CSM] will have, 
that Kosovo will have, to become legally valid under the Constitution” (Dnevnik 2, 20.04.2013, 
02:52). Even though the dislocation was noted at the beginning, the subsequent Constitutional 
court’s decision has concealed it, enabling the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse to be upheld. 
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On another level, discursive practices such as naming play a big role in accommodating and 
concealing the dislocation as well. For instance, Prime Minister Dačić has claimed that the Brussels 
agreement was “the most Serbia could gain in this moment” and represented the fact that “for the 
first time, we have an internationally recognized North [Kosovo], that is, a Community of Serbs 
that they have so far been calling ‘parallel structures’” (Dnevnik 2, 20.04.2013, 02:44). Naming the 
A/CSM the “internationally recognized North” or a “Community of Serbs” defies the logic of 
illegitimacy of Serbian state institutions in Kosovo and its breaking with the principles of 
Resolution 1244 since the beginning of the international supervision. It legitimizes the Serbian state 
in Kosovo and articulates the A/CSM as a whole that is separate, special and specific to the rest of 
Kosovo, a whole that is “ours” and not “theirs”. The “they” in the previous statement refers to 
both Kosovo Albanians and the international community, because both of those Others have 
identified Serbian state structures in Kosovo as parallel structures. Naming the A/CSM the way 
Dačić did is a subversive move, as it not only emphasizes the “separateness” of the A/CSM from 
the Kosovo framework, but also embeds it within the discourse of the international community on 
abolishing these parallel structures. By constituting it as separate, Dačić is claiming it as a double 
victory: it is through becoming a part of the international community’s discourse that the A/CSM 
can be named “Serbian”, after all it is a community of Serb municipalities that is recognized by all 
parties, not just by Serbia as was the case with parallel structures. 
At the same time, the dislocation is concealed by articulating the Serb community as a subject with 
agency and ability to tap into various resources offered by Belgrade, Pristina and the international 
community alike. Through the Brussels agreement, the Serb community would be able to resist 
something they do not support in an open-ended fight in which the fulfillment of their goals is 
possible – goals, that are inevitably aligned with the goals of the Serbian state. This is partially done 
through citationality, drawing parallels between Albanian “dissent” during the 1990s, as Rasim 
Ljajić, the Deputy Prime Minister, explained after the Brussels agreement was concluded: 
It is clear that the political fight does not end [with this agreement]. During the 1990s, 
Kosovo Albanians have fought for their rights, they did not accept the state of Serbia, but 
they have used all the resources Serbia offered them, starting with salaries, pensions, welfare, 
to investments in infrastructure that Belgrade financed. Practically everything. I think that 
now Kosovo Serbs should do the same, to fight for their goals by using all the mechanisms 
of the international community, Pristina and Belgrade. Nobody is forcing them to give up 
on their political goals (Milenković 2013, in Danas, 29 April).  
The previously discussed articulation of the Serb community in Kosovo as a nodal point in the 
community discourse is central to Serbia’s claim to Kosovo. Performing this claim to Kosovo 
within this discourse by Serbian hegemonic actors happens in a few ways. Firstly, the claim is 
performed through the institutional integration of the community in the Kosovo state framework, 
which is mainly done through the establishment of the A/CSM. Secondly, the claim is performed 
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through the institutional framework in Serbia as such: through the work of the Office for Kosovo 
and Metohija and by keeping the Serbia-run institutions in Kosovo still in place, after the adoption 
of the Brussels agreement. Thirdly, it is performed through various subjects of the Serbian 
community in Kosovo, mainly the newly elected mayors and the largest Serbia-backed political 
party Srpska lista (Serbian list), which was created as a result of the Brussels agreement and the 
necessity of Kosovo Serbs to participate in the first local elections in 2013. 
5.4 Performing the Claim to Kosovo through Institutional Integration: A/CSM  
Part of the logic of the contact zone is that it offers an opportunity for the production of empty 
signifiers which can bring conflicting political projects closer: particular meanings are debated 
across conflicting discourses until a specific nodal point takes the place of representing an 
unachieved universality that would stabilize conflicting discourses around it. That would imply that 
the meaning of a specific nodal point that has taken the place of universality is shared across 
conflicting discourses, that is all parties have to be in agreement on what it means. However, as I 
will demonstrate below, these nodal points remain simply floating signifiers, acquiring different 
meanings in these conflicting discourses. The Brussels agreement demonstrates the complexity of 
reaching such a shared understanding across conflicting discourses, and the main issue lies with the 
mentioned principle of “constructive ambiguity”. Ambiguity per se cannot be about a signifier 
having the same meaning across discourses. As I indicated earlier, the A/CSM is one of those 
floating signifiers the meaning of which is not stabilized across discourses. The empty signifier in 
this constellation would be a compromise, or a solution (that which is absent from the discourse, the 
“presence of an absence”) to the Kosovo-Serbia dispute, with the A/CSM taking the place of 
representing that solution. However, since the A/CSM does not have a stabilized meaning across 
discourses (it is read in an ambiguous manner, as I indicated earlier), the practice of contestation 
prevails over the practice of stabilization of meaning in the Brussels dialogue. 
A practice that serves the production of empty signifiers is naming, specifically “naming the 
unnamable” (Laclau 2005), when new terms emerging in the discursive field take the place of 
representing a whole, and which is usually the consequence of dislocation, as aptly explained by 
Palonen (2018b). This move would be a catachrestical one, as I indicted in Chapter 3. As explained 
by Howarth and Griggs (2006), the practice of naming, which they define as a “moment of 
catachresis par excellence”, constitutes the reference of the named object as such. Naming can tap 
into a variety of discourses that are prevalent and that several social subjects affectively subscribe 
to. By the practice of naming, the named object is constituted as a new object that can represent a 
multitude of demands and reconcile the achievement of contradicting elements (ibid., 41). 
Following this logic, naming the A/CSM as such, with a dash incarnating the ambiguity of such 
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naming, allows for this newly emerged object to represent a multitude of conflicting demands, all 
seemingly achievable at the same time (A/CSM representing the fantasy of social fullness, a solution 
to the dispute). However, it is the particularities of what lies on the other side of the dash that 
eventually fail to take the representation of fullness and accommodate these conflicting demands. 
This became especially evident in late 2015, after Kosovo’s Constitutional court found that the 
A/CSM could not be implemented as foreseen by the agreement on common principles concluded 
in August 2015. Hence, the main impetus of a contact zone as defined by this case study would be 
to foster the production of nodal points that would stabilize intersecting and conflicting discourses, 
instead of the production of floating signifiers. Although constructive ambiguity might be 
beneficial to bridge a gap between conflicting demands, at a certain moment, these conflicting 
demands need to be stabilized around a signifier whose meaning (content) is shared across 
discourses. This would ideally mean the emergence of a new discourse, unifying the previously 
conflicting ones, whose center of fixity is that specific nodal point, something that the Brussels 
dialogue has not been able to achieve yet.  
What this specifically entails is evident in the idea of “institutional integration” of Kosovo Serbs in 
the Kosovo institutional framework, specifically the establishment of the A/CSM. One of the 
reasons it was never implemented was the lack of a shared understanding on its setup, capacities 
and responsibilities, since both parties could continue to produce opposing demands. The Serbian 
representatives continued to articulate it as a way of preserving Serbia’s statehood in Kosovo, and 
the Kosovo representatives continued to articulate it as a triumph of consolidating Kosovo’s 
statehood (the logic of a floating signifier). This production of a new object has also been 
acknowledged by Dačić during the negotiations in Brussels, just prior to the conclusion of the 
Brussels agreement: “We will evidently need to figure out a non-standard solution [to the dispute] 
if we ever want to achieve an agreement, since the entire situation around Kosovo is non-standard” 
(Dnevnik 2, 05.03.2013, 02:00).  
This new object, as already mentioned, would become the A/CSM with a dash. For this object to 
be articulated, a few discursive elements needed to be re-constituted, so that performing the claim 
to Kosovo could occur through institutional integration as a proposed solution. First and foremost, 
it was about acknowledging the specificity of the situation around Kosovo, as evident in the above 
statement by Dačić. Secondly, it was about operationalizing the various representations of Kosovo 
in Serbia and Serbia in Kosovo, which would mean anchoring the claim to Kosovo around the 
nodal point of the people, i.e., the Serb community in Kosovo. 
Not only the specificity of the situation around the A/CSM was articulated, but the entire 
supposedly particular situation of Kosovo’s current status in the international legal order and its 
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particular position as part of Serbia’s demands to statehood in Kosovo. A few days before the 
conclusion of the Brussels agreement, Dačić acknowledged that 
On the one hand, Serbia has lost control over the majority of Kosovo after the NATO 
bombing of 1999. On the other, Pristina does not have sovereignty over parts of the 
province’s territory that is majority Serb-populated. We are ready to talk about the 
international status of Kosovo with Pristina, but they are not willing to do so. They view 
their independence as a done deal and believe that there is nothing more to talk about 
(Dnevnik 2, 15.04.2013, 06:13). 
These majority Serb-populated areas are used as an anchor of Serbia’s statehood in Kosovo. Since 
the representatives of Kosovo view the question of territory as finally set (meaning that Kosovo is 
an independent state with an unchangeable territory), the negotiations did not revolve around 
territorial issues. However, because the Serb community inevitably occupies a certain part of the 
territory, an equivalential relation is articulated between the Serb community and the parts of 
territory they live in. Hence, the claim to Kosovo does not refer to the entire territory of Kosovo 
here, but only to those parts where the Serb people live. This makes Northern Kosovo a very 
important bargaining chip for the Serb representatives, which is also evident in the Brussels 
agreement itself, in which about half of the agreement refers to this specific area. Establishing the 
A/CSM in Northern Kosovo is particularly vital, since this area is considered as the “last foothold” 
of Serbia’s statehood in Kosovo, both in terms of the population and territorial setup, given that 
the area borders Serbia proper. 
Since the specificity of Kosovo was recognized, it has also been recognized that the areas populated 
by Serbs, especially Northern Kosovo because of its territorial position, were specific as well. A 
compromise would need to address the issue of the Serb community as an umbrella term, under 
which the issue of territoriality in the North could be discussed. During the peak of negotiations 
in March and April 2013, these issues have been brought up by Prime Minister Dačić, claiming that 
no Serbs would ever offer more than his government had offered to Pristina (Dnevnik 2, 
08.03.2013). He claimed (ibid., 02:12): 
We have no maneuvering potential anymore. What we have suggested, we have suggested 
honestly, not because we wanted to bargain. No Serb will ever offer to Pristina more than 
we have offered. I said that openly to Thaçi: ‘Listen, you can come to Northern Kosovo 
only with guns. If you do not understand that, that it will cause regional instability, then we 
do not have enough room for an agreement.’ On the other hand, we are ready to solve the 
issue of parallel institutions. This solution proposed by our President Nikolić was very decent 
and just. If even that is not enough, then I do not know what else we can offer. 
In the above statement, Dačić articulates Northern Kosovo as Serbian, since it will defy any 
attempts at control by the authorities in Pristina. The representation of “their”, Kosovo Albanian 
Kosovo is anchored strongly here in opposition to what is “ours”. The political frontier is drawn 
between Serbian and Kosovo Albanian interests and the antagonistic relations between Serbs and 
Albanians as peoples is incarnated in the signifier “guns” which evokes the memories of past wars 
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and incites and affective response: the Kosovo Albanian Other is defined as an existential threat, 
not only to Serbian state interests, but more importantly to the local Serb community. It is because 
of this antagonism that the A/CSM has no alternative, since not having it in place would either 
mean the expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo, or another war if they try to defend themselves. 
The A/CSM comes to embody the performative claim to Serbia’s continued statehood in Kosovo. 
The fact that it would have “full overview” of essential areas of daily life, such as education, health 
care, urban planning etc. only serves to sediment this claim. Through the establishment of the 
A/CSM, as envisioned by the Serbian Government, having executive powers, Serbia would be able 
to uphold the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse as anchored in its Constitution, as well as maintain the 
emerging demands of “Serbia in Kosovo” in parallel.  
An event that very much amplified this performative claim to statehood was the first local elections 
as envisioned by the Brussels agreement, in which Kosovo Serbs would elect representatives to 
form mayoral offices in the majority Serb-populated municipalities. This step towards institutional 
integration, once the municipalities under the Kosovo system are stablished, would enable the 
formation of the A/CSM in Kosovo. If successful, it would also mean that the responsibilities of 
the Serbia-run institutions are transferred onto the A/CSM, so that there would no longer be 
“parallel institutions” in place. However, since the local municipalities under the Serbian system 
were run by members of the opposition party DSS and parties and groups associated with them, 
they have from the start opposed the implementation of the Brussels agreement and did not want 
to participate in the local elections. In fact, they have requested a referendum on the acceptance of 
the Brussels agreement once the Serbian Government has adopted the conclusions on the 
agreement on 22 April 2013. The DSS organized protests against the adoption of the agreement in 
both Belgrade and North Mitrovica. The leader of the local government of Mitrovica Krstimir 
Pantić called even for the establishment of a third system – the Parliament of the Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo and Metohija (Skupstina AP KiM) – that would not be obedient to either 
Belgrade or Pristina (Dnevnik 2, 22.04.2013, 10:29). Simultaneously, the leader of the DSS Vojislav 
Koštunica at the protest in Belgrade called for the resignation of the Government and the 
annulment of the Brussels agreement, since it adheres only to the Kosovo laws (ibid., 11:17). 
Because of the continuous boycott of the local Serb representatives from Kosovo and their 
unwillingness to participate in the upcoming Kosovo elections, the Government of Serbia decided 
to dissolve the four municipalities in Northern Kosovo (Kosovska Mitrovica, Leposavić, Zvečan 
and Zubin Potok) on 10 September 2013. In their place, the heads and members of the temporary 
institutions in these municipalities were named, representatives whose political views would be 
aligned with the Government’s. In response to this move, Aleksandar Vulin, the director of the 
Government’s Office for Kosovo and Metohija said: 
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These are historic times, truly faith-determining times, and in these times, nobody has the 
right not to be a part of the state of Serbia when the state of Serbia is fighting to remain on 
the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. The people who have left [the opposition substituted 
with government-aligned representatives] are not dishonorable people. The people who have 
left, they are not criminals, nor did we replace them because we think that they need to be 
incarcerated. But at the same time, the people who have taken their place are no less 
honorable, or lesser patriots, and no less capable than the others were (Dnevnik 2, 
10.09.2013, 07:59). 
The decision of the representatives of local governments that were replaced to boycott the local 
elections was equated to boycotting the entire state of Serbia and its interests. If there are no 
elections in Kosovo, then there cannot be “Serbia in Kosovo” as a solution to the dispute, or the 
re-articulation of the dislocated structure. The local elections constitute a practice of performing 
Serbia’s statehood in Kosovo, even though they are organized within the Kosovo system, largely 
because of the re-articulation of Serbia’s claim to Kosovo from “Kosovo is Serbia” to “Serbia in 
Kosovo”. On 17 October 2013, during the campaign for the local elections in Kosovo, the first 
ones to ever be held in the North, the Minister of Energy, Development and Environmental 
Protection Zorana Mihajlović and the head of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija Aleksandar 
Vulin articulated the participation of Serbs in the local elections as the beginning of the creation of 
a new system of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija, which will be reflected in the Community of Serb 
municipalities (Dnevnik 2, 17.10.2013, 08:04). Such a reconstitution of elements, in which “Serbia” 
becomes fragmented into systems, one in place in Serbia and one in Kosovo as separate entities, 
acknowledges that space in Kosovo is multi-layered (our Serbian and their Kosovo Albanian) and 
that these two representations need to meet at the intersection of institutional integration through 
performing elections and establishing the A/CSM. In short, that space needs to be shared. 
Another practice of performing Serbia’s claim to statehood in Kosovo is material, infrastructural 
to be more precise. Namely, when the energy and telecommunications agreement was reached 
between Belgrade and Pristina in Brussels on 9 September 2013, Vulin identified it as crucial for 
Serbia, especially in terms of its claim to Northern Kosovo as a specifically important area: 
The essence of Northern Kosovo is energy, it is Trepča. Energy has remained in the same 
position as it had before, the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija will continue to be supplied 
with electricity from our system, electricity will be charged via our companies […] We keep 
an eye on this, we continue to fight for every detail of life for Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija 
and I will add one more thing: not a single project we have started in the municipalities in 
Northern Kosovo will stop, all of them will be finished, and we will start new ones. We are 
replacing people [the local municipal representatives], but our politics of North Kosovo’s 
development, the preservation of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija will not change (Dnevnik 
2, 10.09.2013, 11:25).  
Energy and infrastructure financed by the Serbian state is articulated as “Serbia in Kosovo” and 
through this move, in part at least, Northern Kosovo is articulated as “Serbia in Kosovo”. By 
putting it in the locus of negotiations, using the fact that Northern Kosovo is not integrated within 
Kosovo state structures as a bargaining chip, to establish the A/CSM in the first place (recalling 
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Dačić’s statement that the Albanians can only come to the North by using guns), this area becomes 
a material incarnation of Serbia’s claim to Kosovo. As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, 
Northern Kosovo will embody Serbia’s claim to Kosovo fully when the idea of partition is 
introduced in late 2017 and 2018, when the rest of Kosovo ceases to play a significant role for the 
fulfillment of “Serbian state and national interests”. In a nutshell, the people are made political in 
the community discourse in order for territory to be left un-politicized. In the partition discourse, 
territory is made political through the previous articulation of equivalence between the people as 
Serb community and the places where they live in Kosovo. Only those parts of territory in which 
Serb people live are part of the claim to Kosovo, meaning that both territory and the people acquire 
additional meanings, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 6.  
5.5 Performing the Claim to Kosovo through the Serbian Institutional Framework 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the community discourse is characterized by the dominant two 
representations of Kosovo: sharing Kosovo with Kosovo Albanians and the symbolic claim to 
entire Kosovo, meaning that the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse can be upheld while simultaneously 
claiming that Kosovo is a separate subject. In maintaining that Kosovo is Serbia, this claim is 
performed through Serbia’s institutional framework as well, not only in the practices of institutional 
integration of Serbia-run institutions into the Kosovo framework. Even though institutional 
integration happened in some areas, Serbia still maintained all its crucial institutions in place in 
Kosovo, specifically in the areas populated by the Serb community. Their abolition should have 
happened with the establishment of the A/CSM but during that transition period, they were upheld 
and are still in place (since the A/CSM was never realized). Because of this, Serbia was still able to 
maintain its claim to statehood in Kosovo, both symbolically and materially. 
Firstly, this claim was performed through the general institutional framework of Serbia, such as the 
Constitution, whose preamble claims that “the Province of Kosovo and Metohija is an indivisible 
part of the territory of Serbia” (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 2006). This has been 
reified in many declarations and resolutions of the Parliament, specifically those concluded prior 
to and in 2011, which emphasize the “preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity”. A 
resolution that complicates this picture is the one from 13 January 2013, even though this 
resolution also confirms the principles set out in all the previous resolutions on the fact that “the 
Republic of Serbia, in accordance with international law, the Constitution and the will of the people 
does not and will never recognize the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo” (National 
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 2013). Initiated by members of the ruling parties SNS and SPS, 
the adoption of the resolution was supported by an overwhelming majority of the Parliament, 
namely 175 MPs, while 19 voted against it (MPs of the Democratic Party of Serbia – DSS, the 
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Liberal Democratic Party – LDP and the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina – LSV), and 
two abstained. The resolution is a perfect illustration of how upholding both the claim to Kosovo 
in Serbia and recognizing Kosovo as a separate subject can be maintained, and it is primarily by 
making certain issues political, and not touching on others at all. In this case, territory and its status 
are left undebated, while the position of the people, the Serbs community is politicized. 
The resolution opens with the statement that Kosovo and Metohija occupies a central spot in the 
political, economic, cultural, spiritual and social life of Serbia, and continues to define what the 
main state and national goals are: “maintaining territorial integrity and sovereignty, economic 
development, the protection of political, economic and security interests of the Republic of Serbia 
in the area of Kosovo and Metohija, enabling a better life for all citizens through EU integration, 
demographic recovery” (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 2013). The resolution affirms 
that any solution pertaining to Kosovo (be it its final territorial status, the position of the Serbian 
people in the province or the position of Serbia’s religious and cultural heritage) must be in 
accordance with the Constitution and valid international resolutions. This excludes the recognition 
of Kosovo’s independence (since it is prohibited by the Constitution) and the quest for an 
alternative solution to the Kosovo question is left revolving around the latter two aspects 
mentioned above. The resolution thus calls for the following: 
The aim of the negotiations [in Brussels] is to create conditions for the Serbian community 
and all other national communities in Kosovo and Metohija that would guarantee security 
and full protection of human rights. The Government of the Republic of Serbia will demand 
the protection of all guaranteed rights for Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, the right of return 
and property rights. The Government of the Republic of Serbia is committed to continue to 
shed light onto the fates of missing persons and to follow the trials of people accused of 
perpetrating ethnic violence against the Serbs (ibid., emphasis added). 
The specific conditions that would need to be provided must also be in line with the 
abovementioned legal principles, which affirms again that territory cannot be politicized, ergo: 
everything must follow from the Constitution and affirm the state and national interests mentioned 
in the resolution. As the resolution further explains: “The Republic of Serbia is ready to make 
additional concessions in order to overcome the current state of affairs between the Serbian and 
Albanian people. At the same time, the Republic of Serbia is not ready to make additional 
concessions that could jeopardize its state and national interests.” It is quite evident how the 
resolution articulates the main issue: as an issue between the two communities, not two countries, 
and by politicizing the people, “state and national interests” in terms of territory are left outside of 
the frame of debate. 
Another institutional constellation that embodies the performative claim to Kosovo is the 
Government Office for Kosovo and Metohija, established in 2012. There is a long history of 
specific ministries and offices in Serbia that deal explicitly with affairs pertaining to Kosovo, 
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starting from the Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, via the Minister without Portfolio in charge 
of Kosovo and Metohija, to the Government Office for Kosovo and Metohija (KiM) today. It can 
be argued that this institutional transformation also reflects the re-constitution of Serbia’s claim to 
Kosovo and the attempts at changing its hegemonic status. Basing this argument on the fact that 
ministries have the highest institutional status in a government, changing it into an institution 
represented by a Minister without Portfolio and subsequently to an Office of the Government 
testifies to the attempt at re-constituting the meaning of such institutions. It also testifies to the 
attempt to change the subjects behind affairs pertaining to Kosovo and the institutional procedures 
that follow it. For instance, prior to the introduction of the Office for KiM in mid-2012, with the 
constitution of the new, SNS-majority government led by Ivica Dačić from SPS, the procedure of 
adopting any agreement (or the standard procedure of a report on the agreement) made in Brussels 
had to go to the Parliament where it would face a majority vote (Borko Stefanović, personal 
correspondence 2017). However, with the adoption of the Government platform which was 
ratified by the resolution from January 2013, the procedure was changed so that the Government 
could simply adopt the (report on) agreements during government sessions and let the Parliament 
subsequently ratify it. This gave much more independence to the Government instead of the 
Parliament in deciding on the implementability of agreements reached in Brussels. This was evident 
during the peak of negotiations to reach the Brussels agreement in April 2013 and Vučić’s statement 
on the draft paper of the agreement. He said that “we need to look at the real facts, we do not need 
a priori attitudes from the Parliament” (Dnevnik 2, 03.04.2013, 23:00). This is an indication of why 
the Government has taken on a bigger role in the negotiations, since this move enables quicker 
decision-making, fewer people involved in the decision process and most importantly, enables the 
marginalization of opposition voices from the Parliament. The Government can decide on the 
negotiation direction and the specific contents of the agreement, and the Parliament is left with a 
“take it or leave it” choice, which is no choice at all if the government parties have a parliamentary 
majority. Hence, the opposition is marginalized from input to the content of the agreements, 
something that was not the case in the previous procedures prior to 2013. One of the reasons why 
the idea of partition gained traction, as will be elaborated in the following chapter, is because 
alternative political demands were institutionally marginalized from the process of producing a 
solution, enabling political actors to institute an idea hegemonically that otherwise might not have 
passed the debates in Parliament. Another reason is of course the failed implementation of the 
A/CSM, and the recognition that an alternative solution was needed, all of which will be addressed 
in detail later. 
When Aleksandar Vulin became head of this Office, he maintained that: 
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The main goal of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija is to preserve the existing number of 
Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija and to increase this number. Of course, it is about ensuring 
a better, more just life for them, and when I say this, I do not only mean this in legal terms 
but also in economic terms. The misery of our people is not commensurate with the amount 
of money that Serbia allocates for its southern province (Dnevnik 2, 23.07.2012, 07:42). 
Vulin ties the main reason the Office was put in place to the position of the people, the Serb 
community in Kosovo. He also articulates his position as “the hardest and most honorable task in 
the new government” (ibid., 07:25). The responsibilities of the Office are tied partially to the 
previous responsibilities of the Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, as indicated on their website, 
and are also evident in the special Regulation that brought this institution about. The regulation 
(Office for Kosovo and Metohija 2012) claims that 
The Office performs professional tasks for the needs of the Government and responsible 
Ministries related to the: functioning of the institutions of the Republic of Serbia on the 
territory of Kosovo and Metohija; education, health, social policy, culture, infrastructure, 
local government and telecommunications in the Serb areas of Kosovo and Metohija; 
functioning of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija; 
restoration and protection of spiritual and cultural heritage; financial, legal, technical and 
personnel assistance in all areas relevant to Serbs and other non-Albanian communities in 
the territory of Kosovo and Metohija; cooperation with the Commissariat for Refugees in 
terms of internally displaced persons from Kosovo and Metohija; cooperation with the 
United Nations civilian and military mission in Kosovo and Metohija (UNMIK and KFOR) 
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1244. 
The Office also performs “professional and operational tasks in the negotiation process with the 
provisional institutions of self-government in Pristina”, specifically those relating to the negotiation 
process and the implementation of agreements (a provision that was added in 2013). Hence, the 
main task of the Office is to preserve “Serbia in Kosovo” in all its forms, be it Serbia-run 
institutions, the Serb community itself or the religious heritage in Kosovo. Since the Serb 
community came to embody Serbia’s performative claim to statehood in Kosovo, preserving the 
Serb community (or even increasing it, as Vulin mentioned) would entail the realization of this 
hegemonic project. The bigger the Serb community in Kosovo, the bigger Serbia’s claim to 
Kosovo. As also indicated in the Resolution from 2013, all institutions should act together in order 
to achieve the main state and national goals it defines, and that would be “the protection of political, 
economic and security interests of the Republic of Serbia in the area of Kosovo and Metohija, 
enabling a better life for all citizens through EU integration, [and] demographic recovery” (National 
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 2013). The focus on preserving “Serbia in Kosovo” mainly 
through the Serb community is quite clear in the entire institutional framework. In sum, even 
though Serbia’s claim to Kosovo is performed through the Office for KiM, its very existence 
reaffirms the paradoxical notion that Kosovo is part of Serbia, albeit being recognized as something 
different from the rest of Serbia. However, due to the re-articulation of the claim to Kosovo into 
“Serbia in Kosovo”, its specificity and difference is re-affirmed as necessary, because it is articulated 
as the only way Serbia can preserve its statehood there, as Vulin mentioned. 
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Apart from the Office for KiM, Serbia is performing its claim to Kosovo through the institutional 
framework by keeping the Serbia-run institutional bodies in place in Kosovo, even though Kosovo 
has been recognized as a separate subject. It is not only about the performative potential of the 
institutional framework in Serbia as such, but also about its parallel existence to the already 
Kosovo-integrated institutions. These integrated institutions are local municipalities formed after 
the first local elections in November 2013, as well as the judiciary integrated in 2017, the police 
force, and the telecommunications company Telekom. Serbia thus dissolved their state-run 
structures in the field of telecommunications, police and judiciary, but kept financing local 
governments, as well as other institutions pertaining to social issues, such as hospitals, clinics, 
schools, cultural centers etc. Another institution that remained in limbo was energy, for which an 
agreement was reached, but had not been implemented to date. The initial idea was to keep these 
parallel institutions in place until they could be transformed into the institutions of the A/CSM, 
which would mean a full institutional integration with no parallelisms. 
The main objective with the A/CSM, as explained earlier by Serbian Government representatives, 
was to keep “Serbia in Kosovo”, and even strengthen it, because the so-called “parallel structures” 
would then be recognized by all parties as the structures of A/CSM. During the negotiation process 
for reaching the First agreement, Vulin said in January 2013 that “the institutions will remain, […] 
life will continue as it did before” (Dnevnik 2, 18.01.2013, 07:25). What was generally emphasized 
by Serbian representatives was that these new institutions (what would crystallize into the idea of 
A/CSM) would be “the institutions of the Serbian people”. At the same time, “these institutions 
that some would consider today to be institutions of Serbia, would be recognized by Pristina as 
well” (ibid., 06:40). The Serbian people metaphorically take on the representation of the integrated 
institutions, in order to accommodate the dislocation created by Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence: in effect, the integration of institutions means that they would fall under the Kosovo 
state framework, but by articulating them as the institutions of the Serbian people, they can remain 
part of the Serbian state framework, since the Serb community has been re-iterated as the 
embodiment of Serbia in Kosovo. The fact that the new institutions would continue to be financed 
from Serbia only reinforces this claim, since the Serbian state representatives can argue that nothing 
has changed, as evident in the abovementioned statement by Vulin. 
5.6 Performing the Claim to Kosovo through Members of the Serb Community 
I discussed in Chapter 4 the different representations or articulations of Kosovo in Serbia. At the 
same time, as the community discourse has been anchored around the nodal point of the people, 
this signifier also acquires several meanings. In 2013, and primarily with the adoption of the 
Brussels agreement, there are two representations of Serbs based on political affiliation: 1) the ones 
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supporting Serbian state and national interests in Kosovo (members and supporters of Srpska lista), 
and 2) the ones who do not support these interests (labeled with an array of expressions, such as 
traitors, dissidents, but also “fine people” as expressed earlier by Vulin when DSS municipality 
representatives in Northern Kosovo were replaced by government-aligned). In the community 
discourse, the Serbian Government representatives tend to articulate the Serb community in 
Kosovo as a unified whole, without much distinction between Serbs from North Kosovo and those 
living in the South. This was primarily because of the setup of the A/CSM, since it was supposed 
to be comprised of municipalities with a Serbian majority from all over Kosovo. However, this 
changed within the partition discourse, since separating Northern Kosovo from the rest was at the 
top of the agenda, which has resulted in a divided view of the Serb community itself: 3) Serbs from 
Northern Kosovo and 4) Serbs from South of the Ibar River. Serbs from Northern Kosovo 
became a political category since they were the locus of negotiations with Pristina, particularly 
because of their ties to the specific territory of Northern Kosovo. This will be elaborated in the 
following chapter, but the focus of this one is how Serbia’s claim to statehood in Kosovo was 
performed through the Serb community as such, however, politically divided. 
Serbia’s claim to statehood is mainly performed through the Srpska lista (Serbian list). When the 
Srpska lista was registered for the local elections on 4 September 2013 under the name of Građanska 
inicijativa Srbija (Citizens’ initiative Serbia), Dačić claimed that with the formation of this party, the 
Government wanted to “show that there is a list which Serbia stands behind, that is the state 
authorities of Serbia” (Dnevnik 2, 04.09.2013, 00:30). This was also confirmed by one of the high-
level members of the Srpska lista, claiming that the party was an “extension of the Serbian 
Government” (Ljubomir Marić, personal correspondence, July 2017). In this sense, the unitary 
Serbian list that would later become Srpska lista performatively embodies the state of Serbia in 
Kosovo, since its members are selected in direct contact with Belgrade and the ruling parties. 
Even on the formation of this list, Dačić made it clear that “they” (referring to the Kosovo 
Albanian representatives) 
only verbally want Serbs to participate in the elections in the right manner, but they obviously 
have some other favorite Serbian lists that they think should take part. That is why we have 
agreed, regardless of all the problems, that it would be in the Serbian interest to have a single, 
unified list. When I say unified, I mean that it should be composed of the most important 
Serbian political factors in Kosovo and Metohija, where this is possible (ibid., 02:32). 
Serbian interest here can refer to both Serbian state interest and the interest of the Serb community 
in Kosovo. A unified list is important for performing the state of Serbia in Kosovo because it 
allows for a very focused influence on the political landscape of Kosovo. This way, opposition 
voices from the Serb community that might not agree with the Serbian state’s hegemonic project 
in Kosovo are immediately disqualified as illegitimate. Dačić is also articulating a division between 
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those Serbs who would be representing the Serbian state interests on the one hand, and those Serbs 
“favored” by Albanians that would represent theirs on the other. These “other” Serbs Dačić has 
called “Thaçi’s Serbs” (Tasić 2013d, in Danas, 23 May) to warn the Serbs from Kosovo not to 
boycott the local elections in November 2013, because the future A/CSM will be run by the said 
“Thaçi’s Serbs”. Accordingly, those Serbs who are not part of this list cannot be deemed as 
legitimate representatives of Serbs and Serbia. 
As explained in the methodology chapter, naming is an important aspect of performativity, since 
it enables the institution and re-articulation of hegemonic discourses. Hence, another aspect of 
performing Serbia’s claim to statehood is the very name of this Serbian list. When it registered for 
the elections as the “Citizens’ initiative Serbia”, the central election commission of Kosovo 
remarked that the name was unacceptable, since it contained the name of a foreign country in its 
title. Two lists by Kosovo Serbs were deemed inappropriate: the “Građanska inicijativa Srbija”, 
backed up by the Serbian Government, and the list “Srbija, demokratija, pravda” (Serbia, 
democracy, justice). After a meeting in Brussels on 7 September 2013, Vulin as a member of the 
Serbian delegation remarked that the “Albanian side” had issues with the name, but that any change 
to it has to be agreed with [the members of the Serb community]” (Dnevnik 2, 07.09.2013, 02:37). 
Vulin further ironically remarked that “you cannot expect of Serbs to name their list ‘the spirit of 
reconciliation’, or to name it something entirely neutral. These are elections where one nation 
[nacija] is gathering and where one nation takes responsibility for its own future. This is why its 
name has to be Serbian [srpska]” (Dnevnik 2, 09.09.2013, 06:50). By claiming that the upcoming 
elections would gather an entire nation, meaning the Serbian nation, irrespective of the territory 
they inhabit, Srpska lista comes to represent an extension of Serbia’s statehood and metonymically 
stands in place of Serbian state and national interests. The suggestion to call the list Serbian (srpska) 
instead of Serbia (Srbija) was eventually accepted by the central elections commission, a move that 
enabled the focus to be shifted away from claiming that Kosovo is a part of the Serbian state in 
territorial terms, to Kosovo as a part of the Serbian nation in terms of the Serb community there.  
The Građanska inicijativa Srpska (later renamed Srpska lista) began their election campaign on 4 
October 2013 with a rally in Štrpce, a Serb-majority municipality in South Kosovo. At the rally, the 
representatives of Srpska lista said that their victory means preserving both (Serbia-funded) salaries 
and the state institutions of Serbia, as well as preventing the “Albanianization” of Serb communities 
in Kosovo and Metohija (Dnevnik 2, 04.10.2013). The Serbian list is re-articulating what has been 
previously mentioned by the Serbian Government representatives: they are metaphorically 
substituting the integration of institutions as foreseen by the Brussels agreement with the 
preservation of Serbia-run institutions, but they are also antagonistically articulating the Kosovo 
Albanian threat, supposedly endangering the “Serbdom” of the Serbian-majority municipalities. In 
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this manner, they are supporting the Serbian Government’s view of the Serb community being a 
part of the Serbian nation, and, by extension, of the Serbian state, embodying Serbia’s claim to 
statehood in Kosovo. With this move, they are concealing the dislocation in terms of the existence 
of Kosovo state structures and the institutional integration into these structures that the very 
existence of Srpska lista represents. Being part of the Kosovo electoral framework, Srpska lista is 
dis-articulating their involvement in this framework and articulating instead how their victory will 
help to protect the institutions of Serbia in Kosovo. 
Prime Minister Dačić was also supposed to participate in this rally, but was denied entry by the 
Kosovo authorities, with the justification that it is unheard of that a representative of a foreign 
government helps campaign for and potentially interfere in political elections of another (Dnevnik 
2, 04.10.2013). Finally, after much deliberation mediated by Brussels Dačić was granted entry on 
religious grounds, with the justification that he wanted to visit the Serbian Orthodox medieval 
monasteries in Kosovo. He participated in a rally in front of the monastery Gračanica and called 
Serbs to participate in the upcoming local elections. Dačić said that Serbs should vote for those 
political representatives that would lead a unified policy with Belgrade and through this protect 
Serbian state and national interests in the province (Dnevnik 2, 19.10.2013, 03:52). In his address 
to the gathered crowd of reportedly several thousand people, Dačić drew on the well-known 
discourse on Kosovo as a cradle of the Serbian nation and the Serbian medieval state: 
Wherever we come [referring to him only being allowed to visit the monastery, instead of 
participating in the rally] you know that it is a message that Serbia is here [applause, cheering]. 
Wherever we come [applause], Kosovo is a sacred place for every Serb! And that is why every 
visit to Kosovo is religious in nature, that is, a pilgrimage [applause]. It is a great honor for 
me to come here to convey to you the message of Serbia that Serbia is there for you, that it 
will always be there for you, but that we must be together and united if we are to win this 
fight! For starters, winning the local election – cheers! [applause, cheering] (ibid., 05:30) 
This re-iteration of the established discourse of Kosovo as the heart of Serbia, which Serbian 
Orthodox Monasteries embody, represents a symbiosis of Serbia’s symbolic claim to Kosovo 
through the presence of religious and cultural heritage and the hegemonic claim to statehood 
politically performed through the election rally in front of the monastery. The crowd, affectively 
supporting and being subjectivated into this discourse gives the claim to Kosovo an appearance of 
legitimacy on the ground. Additionally, articulating the Serb community’s participation in the 
upcoming elections as something that the Kosovo Albanians are against can serve two, 
interconnected goals: firstly, it frames an entire group as the adversary of fulfilling Serbs’ legitimate 
rights, and subsequently, serves as a way to justify the participation in elections of another state 
that Serbia does not formally recognize. By articulating the Kosovo Albanian opposition to Serbs’ 
participation in the election, the only logical choice, if they are articulated as the adversary, is to do 
the exact opposite, and that is to participate, even though that might help the institution of Kosovo 
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state structures in Serb-majority communities as well. After all, Dačić claimed in the same speech 
that “it does not suit them [Pristina, or Kosovo Albanians] that Serbs can exercise their right! We 
have to do something that does not suit them! And that is, if we are offered the possibility to take 
power, to do it and use it for the benefit of the Serbian people in Kosovo!” (Dnevnik 2, 19.10.2013, 
04:53). The drawing of political frontiers between “their” and “our” interests is quite evident, but 
what is important is the concealment of the fact that the very participation of Serbs in the local 
elections helps the institution of the opposing hegemonic project of the state of Kosovo in Serb-
majority municipalities. 
Creating the Srpska lista was not an easy task for the Serbian Government in the sense that the 
local governments in North Kosovo, for instance, were held by members of the opposition party 
DSS, but also members of the ruling SNS that had a different opinion than the Government. They 
vigorously protested against the implementation of the Brussels agreement and after meeting with 
the Serbian Government in Belgrade on 30 April 2013 to discuss the implementation, they called 
for an assessment of the constitutionality of the agreement. Their continuous unwillingness to 
follow the political agenda of Serbia has resulted in a hostile articulation of the relationship between 
these Kosovo Serb representatives and the Serbian Government, particularly those representatives 
from Northern Kosovo. For instance, after the 30 April meeting, Dačić claimed that the opposition 
to implement the Brussels agreement came mainly from the DSS members in the North, saying 
that he  
has not noticed that the Serbs from the South are against this [the agreement]. They have 
been living there [in the South] for 14 years now, so how could they be against something 
that they have lived in for 14 years? This is a political campaign. They are not considering 
the interests of all Serbs [in Kosovo]. We will not participate in a political campaign. Does 
anyone think that they are stronger than the Government of the Republic of Serbia? They 
are not (Dnevnik 2, 30.04.2013, 04:33). 
Dačić is claiming that the views of the representatives from the North are aligned with their political 
party in Serbia proper and not with the interests of all Serbs, which in this case would be the highest 
priority of the Serbian Government. In essence, Dačić is emphasizing divisions within the Serb 
community in Kosovo, on the one hand those who are supporting the Government’s political 
goals, and those opposing it, and on the other hand, those who are aligned with the opposition 
narrative of resistance in Northern Kosovo and those who are more or less already integrated into 
the Kosovo state structures living in the South. The only way to unify these complex relations 
among the Serbs in Kosovo, who are not articulated as a homogeneous whole, is to homogenize 
them by politically aligning them with Serbian state and national interests. Hence, the formation of 
a unified political list comprised of Kosovo Serbs who would follow and support the Serbian 
Government’s political agenda becomes the only solution to the heterogeneity of the Kosovo Serb 
community. Simultaneously, those Serbs that do not follow the agenda of homogenization, such 
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as the Independent Liberal Party (Samostalna liberalna stranka – SLS) whose leader Slobodan 
Petrović was the Deputy PM of Kosovo, and the Minister for Local Self-Government (a Kosovo 
institution) are cast aside and not constituted as part of the community, but are called “Thaçi’s 
Serbs.” Ultimately, the intention was for the Srpska lista to win the election, help form the new 
Kosovo Government and substitute these Kosovo-aligned Serbs with Serbs aligned with the 
Serbian agenda. This can only happen through the use of power and coercion, as evident in Dačić’s 
question about whether anybody thinks they are stronger than the Government of Serbia. 
This demonstration of power happened at various times. Firstly, after the Government and the 
local representatives of the Serb community living in South Kosovo reached an agreement on the 
participation in the upcoming local elections (Dnevnik 2, 20.08.2013), the leaders of the local 
governments from Northern Kosovo still objected to participating in these elections. Subsequently, 
the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry determined numerous abuses in spending budget funds 
in Kosovo and Metohija over the past 12 years, as confirmed by the Committee Chairman Momir 
Stojanović (Dnevnik 2, 29.08.2013, 07:20). He confirmed that the draft report, which found that 
in some cases a significant amount of money was embezzled by the local governments, would soon 
be presented in the Committee and then the Parliament, after which a criminal investigation would 
be initiated. The main criminal offences concerned the way different infrastructure projects were 
financed and allocated, with some infrastructure objects even existing on paper but not on the 
ground (ibid., 07:46). 
This investigation was only initiated once the local governments hampered the implementation of 
the Brussels agreement, after the Serbian Government had ignored it for the previous 12 years. 
The investigation could be seen as a practice that supported the ongoing de-legitimization of the 
local government representatives who are members of the opposition party DSS and as a move 
that would enable the installation of alternative political subjects supportive of Serbia’s policies. 
Secondly, this demonstration of power against parts of the Serb community culminated on 10 
September 2013 in the earlier mentioned substitution of these local government leaders in 
Northern Kosovo with interim governments gathering people who the Serbian Government 
trusted would closely follow its political agenda. This happened only a few days after Srpska lista’s 
(then called Građanska inicijativa Srbija) submission of registration for local elections. On the day 
the Government announced the replacement of leadership of the local municipalities, Dragiša 
Milović, then local government leader of the municipality of Zvečan, claimed that “it is clear that 
the Brussels agreement must be implemented, and the municipalities in the North will not do that. 
I fear that the current situation may lead to destabilization in Northern Kosovo” (Dnevnik 2, 
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10.09.2013, 08:07). The DSS, Milović’s party, criticized the Government for forcibly trying to get 
people to participate in the local elections (ibid., 08:25). 
Vulin, on the other hand, justified the Government’s decision claiming that Milović knew that 
Serbia would do everything in its power not to let the destabilization of Northern Kosovo happen 
and that Milović would also do everything in his power to help defuse the situation. Vulin claimed 
that “the will of the state of Serbia is holy in Kosovo and Metohija” and that it must be respected 
(ibid., 09:35). Articulating the will of Serbia as the highest moral authority in this decision-making 
process makes it infallible and, subsequently, constructs everybody who questions that authority as 
the enemy of Serbia’s “holy” intentions. This way, Kosovo Serb political subjects are divided into 
two opposing camps, those who are “with us” and those who are “against us”. Members of the 
DSS were not the only “against us” subject articulated in this process (apart from the SLS, who are 
constituted as subjects of the Kosovo Albanian discourse on independence), but everybody who 
was against the implementation of the agreement. Some leadership that was replaced were 
members of the leading SNS, and Vulin claimed that “there is no political discrimination here” and 
that Serbia was making “a list comprising all Serbs, not a list comprising of this or that political 
party” (ibid., 07:30). Loyalty was the central signifier that determined who would be “with us” and 
who “against us”, and this loyalty should be indisputable, since the sanctity of Serbia’s will should 
remain unquestioned. 
Substituting the local leadership in the North and supporting Srpska lista was only one way of 
performing the claim to Kosovo through the implementation of the Brussels agreement. Another 
way was economic conditioning with an undertone of emotional blackmail by virtue of 
personalizing the relationship between the Serbian Government and the local Serb community. 
For instance, during the local election campaign in Northern Kosovo, Vulin visited a construction 
site of apartments that Serbia was building for Kosovo Serb families, and said: 
If you accept that the state of Serbia builds apartments for you, and if you accept that it gives 
you employment even when it is not able to employ you, and if you accept that it provides 
conditions for you to live here, then listen when it tells you something! Then listen when it 
tells you to vote, when it tells you ‘I need this, it is important to me.’ Well, it is important for 
the Government of Serbia that you vote (Dnevnik 2, 09.10.2013, 07:57). 
Vulin articulates the state of Serbia as something that is not strong enough to prevail in Kosovo 
without the support of its people there. By personalizing this relationship and by giving agency to 
the local Serb community to “do something for their country”, loyalty and allegiance are forged 
between the Government and the local leadership and the entire community. This loyalty and 
allegiance are then sustained through continuing the Government’s economic support of the local 
community, something that might be put into question if the community does not choose to “do 
something for their country”. This statement also helps forge affective attachments of the 
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community to the Government through guilt, since they would feel obliged to help the 
Government as it sustains their livelihoods. 
As mentioned before, establishing mayoral offices and letting hand-picked candidates be elected in 
the local elections on 3 November 2013 was another way of performing Serbia’s continued claim 
to Kosovo. For instance, during the campaign for local elections, Krstimir Pantić who was a 
member of the SNS and representative of the Serbian list, claimed that Serbs would have to go out 
and vote, because: 
Those will not only be local elections, nor will the Serbs recognize Kosovo’s independence 
[by participating in them]. On the contrary. They will finally get institutions recognized by 
the international community, but also institutions that Albanians will have to respect. These 
institutions have either way been the only legitimate and legal institutions for us, but not for 
the international community and the Albanians. Albanians do not want Serbs to participate 
in the elections and then to form the Community of Serb Municipalities, because about ten 
municipalities would be controlled by parties close to Belgrade and not Pristina, which would 
create a strong Serb identity. That is why Pristina did its best to discourage Serbs from voting 
(M. S. and S. Č. 2013, in Danas, 30 October). 
It is essential for Serbia to have local government leaders who would “act in its stead” in conditions 
in which the Serbian Government is not able to exert governance over this territory. Mayors have 
also been essential in concealing the dislocatory effects of political practices and institutional 
transformations that followed from the Brussels agreement, as evident in Pantić’s statement above. 
A few voices that were not part of the Srpska lista but that still supported Serbia’s policies in 
Kosovo were the people around Oliver Ivanović. As mentioned earlier, two lists registered 
containing “Serbia” as part of their name: one was Građanska Inicijativa Srbija (later renamed 
Srpska lista) and the other one was “Srbija, demokratija, pravda” led by Oliver Ivanović (later 
renamed Sloboda, demokratija, pravda). Ivanović supported Serbia’s political agenda in terms of 
implementing the Brussels agreement from the start, and claimed that “we will either stand with 
our own country or against it, but I believe it is logical for everybody that we can work with our 
own country more easily, better and more successfully, and that we can deal with our problems 
with greater certainty” (Dnevnik 2, 27.05.2013, 03:30). He maintained that “deep down, in [the 
heart of] every Serb, there is one certainty: only Belgrade is our center, only the Government of 
Serbia is our government and only in that Government we trust” (Dnevnik 2, 07.05.2013, 09:30).  
He even criticized the former North Kosovo local government leadership’s decision to form the 
“Provisional Assembly of the Autonomous Province Kosovo and Metohija” which they 
announced after the Brussels agreement and formed on 4 July 2013. The Assembly gathered local 
representatives from a variety of political parties: the majority SNS, Dačić’s SPS, and the opposition 
parties DSS and Radikalna Stranka (the Radical Party) – RS. This only supports the earlier 
elaborated argument that party-orientation was not important in the decision to replace this 
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leadership, but their loyalty to and support of Serbia’s national and state interests. Hence, Ivanović 
supporting these interests is not articulated as a hostile political subject (such as the SLS), but 
frequently spoke in public in support of Serbia’s interests. Regarding the Assembly formed on 4 
July, Ivanović said that it only brings in confusion among the local Serb community and deepens 
the rift between the Government of Serbia and the Serb community in the North, something which 
he considers “absolutely wrong” (Dnevnik 2, 04.07.2013, 18:08). 
Even when his party’s headquarters were set on fire in April 2013, he claimed that Serbs from the 
North should respect Serbia’s political goals, since worsening these relations would endanger the 
survival of the Serb community there (J. T. 2013b, in Danas, 2 April). He maintained that 
participating in the elections was the only way to ensure that the community stays there and that 
casting a vote means thinking about the future, criticizing attempts of the replaced former leaders 
of local governments to intimidate people to participate in the elections (Dnevnik 2, 04.09.2013). 
On election day, Ivanović claimed that “the main goal of my list is to cooperate with the 
Government of Serbia, with participation in the Community of Serb municipalities as its priority” 
(J. T. 2013a, in Danas, 3 November). Even though the Government of Serbia officially only 
endorsed Srpska lista, Ivanović was not excluded from the “legitimate” membership of the Serb 
community in Kosovo. This slightly changed after the irregularities during the local elections in 
North Mitrovica on 3 November 2013, after which they were repeated mid-November and the 
elections went on to a second round between Krstimir Pantić, representative of the Srpska lista, 
and Oliver Ivanović. During the campaign for the second round of elections, Ivanović claimed that 
he “expects of Belgrade to be fair and to create conditions for fair elections”, as well as that he 
hopes Belgrade will no longer “threaten people with losing their jobs or social insurance”. He did 
not specify who claimed that he was a candidate of Pristina and the West, but emphasized that 
these attacks were aimed at discrediting him and giving political credibility to Krstimir Pantić (Tasić 
2013e, in Danas, 20 November). Even though Vulin maintained that the Government of Serbia 
“supports all Serbian lists in Kosovo and Metohija, it has the closest ties with Lista srpska and its 
candidates” (Stojanović 2013, in Danas, 21 November). 
In summary, Serbia’s claim to Kosovo is performed through and embodied in the presence of 
Srpska lista, through the establishment of mayors in the four municipalities in Northern Kosovo, 
as well as in other political subjects who are aligned with Serbia’s state and national interests in 
Kosovo, which is preserving its institutional presence and preserving the Serb community there. 
Given the fact that they supported the implementation of the Brussels agreement, Serbs from 
Southern Kosovo are generally articulated as part of Serbia’s performative claim to statehood, 
except the SLS which is not even considered “Serbian”, but “Thaçi’s”. However, subjects are not 
mere puppets that can be manipulated without further effort and loyalty and allegiance is not a 
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constant fact. It has to be continuously articulated and performed, which enables spaces and 
opportunities for the re-constitution of these allegiances. This was the case with Ivanović, who at 
one point was described as supporting the Government, and at another as supporting Pristina’s 
and the West’s interests. This complex relationship between the Government of Serbia and the 
Serb community, particularly in the North, will be further elaborated in the next chapter. 
In the following segment, I will give a portrayal of the institution of antagonistic and agonistic 
frontiers and how they shifted over time and with the conclusion of the Brussels agreement. 
Affective articulations and politics of emotion play a big role in the institution of these frontiers, 
as they also do for the constitution of the political “us”. This is where familiar narratives of Kosovo 
as the heart of Serbia, and other elements of the Kosovo imaginary, play a decisive role, such as 
commemoration and reiteration of historical motives. One of the driving subjects behind these 
articulations is not only the Government of Serbia, but also other hegemonic subjects such as the 
Serbian Orthodox Church. Thus, in the following subchapter I am going to introduce these familiar 
narratives that enable their performative embodiment by different subjects and in various material 
forms. Subsequently, I am going to look at how these narratives are re-constituted with the 
adoption of the Brussels agreement and how agonistic and antagonistic frontiers are drawn 
between the Serb and Kosovo Albanian communities, but also within the Serb community as a 
whole. Finally, I am going to elaborate on how this (re-)drawing of various frontiers helps Serbia’s 
performative claim to Kosovo be materialized and/or instituted on the ground. 
5.7 Drawing Political Frontiers through Affective Articulations 
In the community discourse, Kosovo has been articulated as an “emotional issue” for the entire 
Serb people by an array of hegemonic subjects, be it the Government of Serbia, the Serbian 
Orthodox Church (SOC), or local governments in Northern Kosovo. The adoption of the Brussels 
agreement, being that many recognized its potential for decentering the “Kosovo is Serbia” 
discourse, something that has been re-iterated and performed in many shapes and forms so far, 
has spurred a wave of counter-articulations demanding it not be implemented. The main signifier 
around which these articulatory chains are formed is the narrative of Kosovo being a holy land for 
the entire Serb people and something which Serbia should never recognize as anything other than 
part of its territory. This iteration of sanctity of the land is performed in the territorial claim to 
Kosovo. It is also embodied in the very existence of Serbian medieval monasteries in Kosovo, 
which makes the Serbian Orthodox Church a central subject to the sustainment of these narratives 
of sanctity and unity of the Serb land with Serb people. The SOC gives legitimacy to the territorial 
claim as such, as it acts as a reminder of the historical right to this land and brings about the 
symbolic claim to entire Kosovo. Therefore, the SOC is intrinsically tied with the narrative 
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produced by the Serbian Government, who are dependent on the Church’s re-production and 
sustainment of these narratives, and their ability to generate affective ties within the community 
and help sway public opinion. Through their authority, if the Church claims that a new agreement 
does not violate the holy principle of Kosovo as part of Serbia, then it might just be enough for 
some people to believe it. 
As indicated above, these narratives were re-constituted with the myth of the Brussels agreement, 
since some recognized the decentering effect it might have on the earlier mentioned narratives. For 
instance, on 22 April 2013 the local Serb leadership from Northern Kosovo (before they were 
replaced) organized a rally in North Mitrovica which reportedly attracted 10,000 people. At that 
rally, they issued a declaration by the “Convocation of the Serb people” (Sabor srpskog naroda), 
which said: 
By signing this [Brussels] agreement, Serbia renounces not only its institutions in Northern 
Kosovo but also its right to its Southern province. Those who have done so deserve every 
condemnation because they have not been mandated by anyone to hand over the holy 
Serbian land and the Serbian people, material goods and spiritual sanctities for their own 
political interests (P. D. 2013b, in Danas, 22 April). 
At that moment they performatively took on the role of speaking for the entire Serb people, in 
Kosovo and beyond, and sedimented their claims in the affective attachment of the crowd to these 
claims. They used familiar discourses that many people can relate to. Recognizing this, Snežana 
Grubješić, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, mentioned in an interview 
with RTS that the Government needs to have a “serious word” with them, even though they 
understand why North Kosovo Serbs are against the agreement, since for them “partition” would 
be ideal. “Every agreement would be unacceptable to them now, but let us wait for passions to be 
calmed”, after which they will see what benefits they get with this agreement, she said (Dnevnik 2, 
22.04.2013, 06:05). Grubješić also articulated the emotional effects and resonance of the familiar 
discourse around Kosovo which articulates it as a holy place and an indivisible part of Serbia, 
anchored by love for the holy land. The Brussels agreement, given that it partially decenters this 
discourse (it recognizes the institutional authority of the state of Kosovo in a territory Serbia 
considers its own), also acts as a way of accommodating a larger dislocation, which is recognizing 
that Kosovo is an entirely independent state. For this to be a viable political practice that would 
sustain already familiar discursive structures, concealment and metaphorical moves on the 
discursive field would need to be practiced. First and foremost, this was done through re-drawing 
political frontiers between the Serb and Albanian communities in Kosovo and their right to inhabit 
the physical place and symbolic space of Kosovo. The emphasis was on articulating agonistic 
frontiers: this meant recognizing the different interests of the communities, but also their equal 
right as neighbors to live in that same space. A re-drawing of these frontiers between the 
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communities from agonistic to antagonistic relations happened primarily as part of the logics of 
the partition discourse, something that will be elaborated on in the next chapter. 
By recognizing Kosovo as a separate subject and Kosovo Albanian leadership as somebody they 
needed to engage with in the dialogue, the Government constituted them as a political subject in 
their eyes, which opened up ways to discuss their relationship to one another. As Nikolić 
mentioned in January 2013 when meeting with the President of Slovakia, Serbia seeks to “reach an 
agreement with the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija, and [by doing that] defend what every 
other state in this world would defend – its sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Dnevnik 2, 
22.01.2013, 03:10). Even though Kosovo is articulated as part of Serbia in territorial terms (Nikolić 
never speaks of an agreement with Kosovo, but of an agreement with the Albanians), Kosovo 
Albanians are constituted as an agonistic political subject with whom Serbs need to reach a durable 
agreement. This is related to the earlier mentioned shift of talking about the people and with 
peoples, instead of the dialogue being about territories, which would imply a breach in the principle 
of status-neutrality of Kosovo in Serbia’s view. 
During the period of “harmonizing” the Serbian Government’s approach to dealing with Kosovo 
once they engaged in the political dialogue, a significant parallel was drawn between Kosovo 
Albanians the Serbian leadership engaged with in Brussels, and Albanians living in the South of 
Serbia, mainly around Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac. Namely, in early January 2013, a 
monument was erected in Preševo dedicated to KLA fighters (more precisely the LAPMB, a faction 
of the KLA for Medveđa, Bujanovac and Preševo), which the Serbian Government immediately 
requested to be taken down, since the KLA is considered to be a terrorist organization under 
Serbian law. When the Government platform was adopted on 13 January 2013, Vučić visited the 
Serbian army base in Bujanovac and claimed: “we want peace, we want respect. We will always 
have to live next to our neighbors Albanians, like they will always have to live next to their 
neighbors Serbs” (Dnevnik 2, 13.01.2013, 06:58). It is important to draw attention to the words 
used here: Vučić is speaking about living “next to” each other, not “with” each other, constituting 
the already familiar discourse of eternal animosity and ethic separation between the groups. The 
place where this statement was issued is also important, since the army base in Bujanovac is an 
embodiment of Serbian military might and potential threat to Albanian nationalist interest, recalling 
the conflict of 1998 and 1999. Dačić also brought to the fore these underlying power relations and 
conflicting discourses about the past between the groups in his claim that “[the state of Serbia] will 
certainly not allow to be provoked in this manner in its own territory. Just as I think that in New 
York you can never have a monument erected for al-Qaeda members, I think that a monument 
like this can never be erected in Serbia” (Dnevnik 2, 15.01.2013, 02:44). After the local leadership 
of Medveđa, Bujanovac and Preševo met with Kosovo’s PM Hashim Thaçi to discuss the 
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monument and decided not to take it down within the given deadline set out by the Serbian 
authorities, the monument was eventually brought down by force a few days later. 
Whereas Albanians from the Preševo valley are presented here as a threat to Serbian national and 
state interests, Kosovo Albanians are articulated as a political subject with a legitimate claim to live 
in the territory of Kosovo. When the Parliament was in the process of adopting the Government 
platform on Kosovo and Metohija, Dačić stated in his address that “it is true that we do not 
recognize the independence of Kosovo and Metohija, but somebody else rules over the majority 
of Kosovo, and we have to find a solution with them. That solution should satisfy both Serbs and 
Albanians, and needs to be just, because only a just solution can be permanent” (Dnevnik 2, 
12.01.2013). During the peak of the negotiations in Brussels to reach the First agreement, Vučić 
also claimed that it is “essential that we reach an agreement. We will have to live with these people 
[Kosovo Albanians] and next to them for the next 10, 100 and 200 years” (Cvejić 2013, in Danas, 
8 April, emphasis added). It is clear that Vučić’s statement here entails the idea of living with and 
next to Kosovo Albanians, not merely the latter, which institutes the relationship between these 
two communities as agonistic, as equal parties that need to reach a common understanding of how 
to live together and find a durable compromise. As Dačić stated: “we need to finalize this issue 
[finding a compromise]. We need to return to a state of normalcy and regularity. In a nutshell, we 
need to enable both Serbs and Albanians to live there” (Tomić 2013, in Danas, 12 April). 
Finding a compromise can only be done through re-articulating what Kosovo means semantically 
and emotionally to the Serb community as a whole, a meaning that relates to the mythical 
conception of Kosovo as the cradle of Serbdom. As Vučić mentioned just prior to the Serbian 
delegation leaving for negotiations in Brussels on 1 April 2013, traditionally, Serbs accept two 
versions of Kosovo, Prince Lazar’s and Vuk Branković’s: “Many centuries later, we are searching 
today for a third solution. Does it exist? […] We have to reach an agreement in the upcoming period, 
be it 2 April or 2 September, I just think that Serbia does not have any more time to waste” 
(Dnevnik 2, 30.03.2013, 02:17). Prince Lazar’s conception understands Kosovo as the place and 
space where Serbs were ensured an eternal place in the heavenly Kingdom, which is why many 
consider the territory itself to be sacred. Vuk Branković’s conception refers to his betrayal of 
Lazar’s forces in the Battle of Kosovo, which forms the basis for a historical lesson that Serbs 
should never betray Kosovo again, which would constitute anybody who “gives up” Kosovo as a 
“traitor”. Transposed to the current situation, Vučić’s potential third solution would be finding a 
middle ground between entirely preserving Kosovo within Serbia and entirely giving it up (i.e., 
recognizing Kosovo’s independence), which would turn out to be the myth of the Brussels 
agreement, that conceals the earlier mentioned dislocatory effects of this independence. 
Articulating the Brussels agreement as the only way Serbia can “gain” something in terms of 
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Kosovo constitutes it as an experience of partial enjoyment (jouissance of the body), hailing it as a 
historic agreement, one that could change the way the Serbian national collective experiences its 
emotional ties to Kosovo. Here, it is also evident how discursivity, materiality, and the affectivity 
of myths work together to help institute a “new objectivity”, a “third solution” that promises the 
fantasy of a full closure of identity. This is a temporal endeavor bridging past, present, and future, 
but also a spatial endeavor, since this new objectivity is always anchored by specific signifiers. The 
A/CSM is one of those signifiers, never actually realized, but anchoring an imaginarized discourse, 
a new objectivity. 
As framed by members of the Serbian Government, re-articulating what Kosovo means for the 
Serb community should only be done on the basis of love: love for the land and for the people living 
there. As Nikolić mentioned in an interview for the Jerusalem Post (referenced by Dnevnik 2, 
03.05.2013, 10:50), after the Brussels agreement was reached: “We cannot [recognize the 
independence of Kosovo]. It is not about nationalism, it is not about hatred, but about love – love 
for our own people and for our country.” Similarly, when Vučić went to Kosovo after the 
agreement was signed to convey its details to the Serb community there and reassure them about 
the continued support from Serbia, he mentioned: 
I do not want to convince the people here that this is a very good agreement, because I 
myself am not convinced about that, but this is the only possible agreement offering the 
most in this moment in which we find ourselves. But I also do not want to convince them 
of lies and untruths that some others might convince them of, others who do not love 
Kosovo, who do not love Metohija, but only love their pockets. (Dnevnik 2, 12.05.2013, 
07:42). 
Betraying the Serbian people in Kosovo, which would be aligned with Vuk Branković’s conception, 
would be to convince them that the Brussels agreement is bad, or that it implies giving up on 
Kosovo entirely. Thus, through articulating himself and the Serbian Government as somebody 
who loves Kosovo and is devoted to fighting for it, others who might not support the 
Government’s politics would be traitors of the Serbian people and the representation of Kosovo 
as Serbian land. This move marginalizes opposing voices and institutes the Government’s 
hegemony over shaping Kosovo’s meaning and affective attachment to it for the Serb community 
as a whole in the current historical moment. 
The Brussels agreement is also important because it shifts the attention from discussing Kosovo 
in terms of territory (physical as in place, and symbolic as in space), to discussing it in terms of 
people. As this focus gained traction, the relationship between the Serb and Albanian communities 
inevitably became the locus of meaning-making, with shifting political frontiers that would 
constitute these communities as separate wholes. An agonistic institution of the relationship 
between the communities relies on the idea of sharing the space of Kosovo, while an antagonistic 
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institution of it would rely on total separation between the communities. The former is 
characteristic of the community discourse discussed here, while the latter is characteristic of the 
partition discourse discussed in the next chapter. 
Apart from the Government, a central subject instituting an agonistic relationship between the 
communities with the emphasis on sharing the place of Kosovo with Kosovo Albanians, is the 
SOC. This is quite evident in the following statement by the Patriarch of the Serbian Church Irinej, 
issued as part of the bishop’s holy liturgy in Prizren, the seat of the Eparchy of Raška and Prizren: 
“I am praying, my Lord, that the time returns in which both Serbs and Albanians live together like 
brothers in these holy lands. You must know that everything you experience here, we experience 
as well, and we live through it as a common misfortune, but also as a common hope that this 
situation might end soon” (Dnevnik 2, 07.02.2013, 16:20). Serbs and Albanians are articulated as 
brotherly people sharing the right to inhabit the same land and co-habit in it, in which the past is 
underpinned by the fantasy of a golden age that supports a future vision of Albanian-Serb relations. 
Even after the Brussels agreement was signed, the Synod of the Church issued a statement saying 
that even though the Church believes that the agreement indirectly and tacitly, but nevertheless 
actually recognizes the existence of a state system in Kosovo and Metohija independent of the state 
structures of Serbia, the Church still urges the Serb people as a whole to forever consider Kosovo 
and Metohija as their land, without disputing in any way the fact that it is also the land of those 
Albanians who have lived there together with the Serbs for centuries (Dnevnik 2, 22.04.2013, 
09:51). The logic of difference can be recognized here, since the very idea of sharing the place 
involves an acknowledgment of views different from the Serbian one and the weakening of 
antagonistic frontiers between the two communities. This is also a political statement since it 
defines the land as Serbian, even though the emphasis is on sharing Kosovo with Albanians – 
something that can be understood as undermining the Kosovo Albanian claim to statehood in this 
territory. However, because the statement also recognizes the destabilizing effect of the Brussels 
agreement on the representation of Kosovo as Serbia, it speaks of Kosovo as part of Serbia more 
in terms of Serbia’s symbolic ownership of the space of Kosovo, instead of Serbia’s physical 
ownership of the place of Kosovo (i.e., in terms of statehood or governance). This way, the Church 
also helps conceal the dislocation of the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse by the material existence of 
Kosovo state structures, since it transposes Serbian ownership of Kosovo to the symbolic realm – 
in it, Kosovo will eternally remain Serbian, no matter if this is the case in the material world. The 
Church mainly does so by rearticulating a central trope of the dominant conceptions of Kosovo 
for the Serb community as a whole, and that is unity. Following the very well-known phrase re-
iterated many times in the Serbian nationalist discourse, “samo sloga Srbina spašava” (Only unity 
will save the Serbs), which draws inspiration from the legend of disunity and betrayal of Prince 
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Lazar by Vuk Branković before the Kosovo Battle, it is a citation that resonates throughout 
centuries and carries a lesson that only united, the Serb people can concur all trials. As Bishop 
Teodosije of Vlaška and Prizren stated during Vučić’s visit to Kosovo after the conclusion of the 
Brussels agreement: 
It is not necessary to be low-spirited about this agreement, not all is over with it. If we are 
unanimous, if we build unity, love, and harmony here, and by doing that affirm that we are 
the people of St. Sava, the evangelical people of Christ, then no one can really do anything 
to us. It is precisely this that I am telling people, and I encourage them to stay in this area, 
and I urge the representatives of our country to always be with this people, to give more and 
to provide for them more than they did before, in order to confirm this in practice (Dnevnik 
2, 12.05.2013, 07:05).  
Like the well-known Christian principle that love conquers all, unity built by love is what will enable 
the Serb community to endure in this political moment that potentially disunites it. Here, the 
Kosovo myth is re-articulated as a historic lesson, a way to define future political action, and ensure 
that Kosovo remains Serbian also in the material world through the presence of the Serb 
community in that territory. At the center of this articulation lies the unity of the Serb people with 
the Serb land, constituting the territory as Serbian as long as the Serb people live there. It also 
addresses the potential fear of uncertainty in the local Serb community, uncertainty and fear that 
such institutional integration might bring. The message is: if we love others and one another, and 
if we build unity, then we can exist and remain here as part of a framework that might not be the 
one of the state of Serbia. This clearly underlies the agonistic construction of Serb-Albanian 
relations in Kosovo, even though not explicitly mentioned. The emotion of love can thus forge 
affective attachments not only among the Serb community and their investment in Government 
politics, but also among previously antagonistic groups. 
As one might expect, the Brussels dialogue as a contact zone not only enables the re-drawing of 
political frontiers from antagonistic into agonistic relations, but also the other way around. Since 
political contestation is at the center of the dialogue, these frontiers are mobile and never fully 
stabilized. It is important to note that in this case study, agonistic relations were articulated when 
agreements needed to be reached (i.e., agreeing on a common understanding of conflicting issues), 
while antagonistic relations were articulated when one party failed to hold up its end of an 
agreement in the view of the other party (i.e., the same issue practiced in different ways). For 
instance, once the Brussels agreement was reached, re-drawing political frontiers became important 
again, because of differing political practices in terms of implementing the agreement. The 
discursive field became split between subjects articulating agonistic relations as well as antagonistic 
relations between the groups, as the line between those is thin and concerns an ongoing political 
process of meaning-making. 
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For instance, the first Belgrade-backed local elections in Kosovo as foreseen by the Brussels 
agreement in late 2013 are a good example of the re-drawing of political frontiers between the 
communities. Since the elections were organized under the administrative authority of Kosovo 
institutions, local Serb leadership in Northern Kosovo particularly objected to participating in them 
and called people to boycott them. As mentioned before, frontiers were drawn within the Serb 
community itself between those who supported Serbia’s implementation of the principles foreseen 
by the Brussels agreement, and those who did not, independently from the fact which party they 
belonged to, the ruling ones or one of the opposition parties. On 31 October 2013, just four days 
prior to the local elections in North Mitrovica, the chairman of the municipal board and another 
member of the municipal assembly in Mitrovica were excluded from membership in the SNS party 
because they called on people in that municipality to boycott the local elections. The SNS’s 
statement read (R. D. 2013, in Danas, 31 October) that the two former members, by calling people 
to boycott, “unequivocally showed that they advocate that, after the elections, local institutions 
should be led by Albanians, not Serbs, which is directly against the interests of all Serbs living in 
Kosovo and Metohija and against the interests of Serbia.” Similarly, after a very low turnout in 
Mitrovica in the local elections on 3 November and several irregularities, a decision was made to 
repeat them, after which Prime Minister Dačić on multiple occasions (Tasić 2013c, in Danas, 6 
November; Tasić 2013a, in Danas, 7 November; P. D. 2013a, in Danas, 10 November) called the 
local Serb community to participate in the elections, because “if Serbs from North Mitrovica do 
not turn out in sufficient numbers, the mayor will be Albanian, which could cause armed conflicts, 
and in such a situation, Serbia could not help much” (Tasić 2013c, in Danas, 6 November). He also 
mentioned that the Community of Serb Municipalities could never be established if an Albanian 
were to be mayor of North Mitrovica, which was supposed to be the political center of that 
institution (P. D. 2013a, in Danas, 10 November). Evidently, having an Albanian mayor in North 
Mitrovica was articulated as a threat and an obstacle to the realization of the collective political 
goals of Kosovo Serbs and Serbia as a state alike. Evoking an imaginarization of potential armed 
conflicts if an Albanian were to lead the local government institutes the relationship between the 
two communities as antagonistic. The emphasis is laid not on cooperation and “shared” ownership 
of Kosovo with Kosovo Albanians, but on familiar narratives of exclusion and animosity between 
the communities. At that political moment, Kosovo Albanians were articulated as the enemy, since 
they “do not want Serbs to participate in the elections and the Community of Serb municipalities 
to be formed […] because it would mean the creation of a strong Serb identity,” as mentioned by 
Krstimir Pantić just prior to the election (M. S. and S. Č. 2013, in Danas, 30 October). Kosovo 
Albanians are framed as the very obstacle to the constitution of a “full Serb identity”, a fantasy 
whose enjoyment they obstruct and aim to steal, which means that they are entirely excluded from 
this process of identity-building and constitute its very limits.  
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Another example of re-drawing political frontiers happened right after the Brussels agreement, 
namely when the parties discussed the practicalities of its implementation in May 2013. After the 
Kosovo delegation left the negotiations after the parties failed to agree on the proper sequence of 
events – whether Serbia-run parallel institutions should be dismantled before or after the A/CSM 
is established – antagonistic articulations of the Albanian side started to re-surface. One of these 
events concerned the integration of the police in Kosovo state structures. For instance, Vučić 
mentioned that the Brussels agreement ensured that “there will never be Albanian boots on the 
ground in Northern Kosovo, which the people there are most afraid of. You can put the police 
force there in whichever boots you want, but they will always be 98 percent Serbs and 2 percent 
Albanians. NATO guarantees that these will be the only armed formations in the North” (Dnevnik 
2, 08.05.2013, 08:00). The politics of fear subjectivates Kosovo Albanians into a discourse of 
animosity, articulating them as a threat to the existence of the Serb community in the North. The 
Serbs are constituted as the majority in the North (in contrast to the Albanian majority in Kosovo 
generally) as a means of instituting their legitimate political (and security) control of this area. 
Similarly, Nikolić mentioned a few weeks later that the Brussels agreement “legalizes the fact that 
Pristina will never be able to rule not only in Northern Kosovo, but also the remaining four [Serb-
majority] municipalities in the South” (Dnevnik 2, 31.05.2013, 04:40), which extends this claim to 
parts of Southern Kosovo as well. At the same time, Nikolić constitutes Pristina as a hegemonic 
force that unrightfully wants to rule Serb-majority areas, which is an antagonistic articulation of the 
Other.  
This only goes to show that in an ongoing process of politically contested meaning-making, the 
boundaries of agonistic and antagonistic articulations of groups are very fluid and heavily depend 
on the shifting hegemonic status of dominant discourses. Sometimes, the discourse of joint EU 
integration in the spirit of normalizing relations between Belgrade and Pristina takes over, whereas 
at other moments, the well-known discourse on animosity between Serbs and Albanians is at the 
core of these political contestations. Additionally, as we have seen with Dačić for instance, the 
same subjects can articulate both of these relations in connected political moments. However, 
subjects do not only constitute the discursive and material reality around them, but they also 
constitute themselves in all of these discursive processes, by subjectivating into a number of 
different discourses which can sometimes also be conflicting. The next segment will address this 
process, namely how these hegemonic subjects constitute themselves and are constituted by others 
as part of different political projects, be it EU integration on the one hand, or performing the claim 
to Kosovo on the other. 
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5.8 Positionalities of Hegemonic Subjects 
The various subjects I have discussed throughout this chapter subjectivate into and constitute an 
array of discourses and articulate themselves anew in this meaning-making process. Additionally, 
certain subjects are mainly re-articulating a few types of discourses and one could say that in this 
manner they bring different political projects further through their re-constitution. Therefore, the 
following segment will address two main figures of the Serbian Government that have stood 
behind the re-constitution of the discursive field: Prime Minister Ivica Dačić and Deputy Prime 
Minister Aleksandar Vučić. For instance, Prime Minister Dačić primarily constitutes (and is 
constituted by) the discourse on EU integration and so-called normalization of relations between 
Belgrade and Pristina: with his role as PM and leader of the Serbian delegation in the Brussels 
dialogue he is in a position to accommodate the dislocatory effects of external events I have 
mentioned throughout this chapter. Constituted by his role as PM and through the conclusion of 
the Brussels agreement, Dačić also embodies the past conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. 
Namely, Dačić was a prominent member of Milošević’s SPS party and was engaged in the 
information and propaganda division of the party during the 1990s. When Milošević was arrested 
and sent to The Hague, Dačić took over the party and transformed it partially away from 
Milošević’s convictions, incorporating a more moderate stance. By following an EU integration 
path as PM of Serbia and his willingness to engage with the Kosovo Albanian side in the Brussels 
dialogue, he acts as a figure able to overcome his past. He becomes a figure onto which people can 
project their hopes for a better, conflict-free future and affectively invest in him as a leader. 
Similarly, Deputy Prime Minister Vučić also constitutes the same discourse on EU integration, but 
he is the driving political subject behind connecting this discourse with the discourse on economic 
progress. For Vučić, under the umbrella of EU integration, finding a “solution” to the “problem 
of Kosovo” means economic progress and a renaissance for the entire country and its people. In 
this process, he positions himself and is being positioned by others as a “reasonable”, “responsible” 
and “realistic/pessimistic” leader who will always put “tangible” results, such as economic benefit, 
over clinging to past wrongdoings or entrenched myths (even though he was the Minister of 
Information and propaganda during Milošević’s regime – a fact that is often sidelined). 
Dačić rarely self-articulates and is constituted mainly by other figures. This has primarily occurred 
since the conclusion of the Brussels agreement, when representatives of the EU started articulating 
both Dačić and Thaçi as “great leaders”, leaders with “courage”, who are “breaking with the past” 
etc. For instance, when the First agreement was initialed on 19 April 2013, Catherine Ashton said 
that she “want[ed] to congratulate them [Dačić and Thaçi] for their determination over these 
months and for the courage they have. It is very important that now we see it as a step away from 
the past and, for both of them, a step closer to Europe” (Dnevnik 2, 19.04.2013, 05:32). Ashton 
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articulated Dačić as courageous, determined and a leader, stepping away from the past towards a 
joint European future with its neighbors. A common European future is a strong imaginary that 
grips subjects affectively. It coexists with the Kosovo imaginary and particularly in 2012 and 2013, 
this horizon of intelligibility revolved around simultaneously preserving Kosovo as Serbian and 
joining the EU, which Dačić also described as not mutually exclusionary processes (Dnevnik 2, 
04.09.2012, 08:10). In fact, it was underpinned by a fantasy of EU membership that would allow 
Serbia to have it all. A common European future was often repeated by all parties involved. For 
instance, on the night before the conclusion of the Brussels agreement, Štefan Füle, said that “it is 
time for Serbia and Kosovo to step away from their past and look ahead, into their common 
European future” (Dnevnik 2, 18.04.2013, 11:21), an imaginary that was also reaffirmed later, with 
the adoption of the EU Credible enlargement perspective from February 2018 (European 
Commission 2018). To realize this imaginary, strong leadership was required, making bold and 
sometimes unpopular decisions, and EU representatives constituted Dačić as one of such leaders. 
For instance, Eamon Gilmore, the then head of the FAC (Foreign Affairs Council) of the EU 
“praise[d] the two Prime Ministers, both Dačić and Thaçi, for the political courage they have 
demonstrated while leading their people towards this [Brussels] agreement” (Dnevnik 2, 
22.04.2013, 02:50). 
On the other hand, Aleksandar Vučić is not only constituted by others, but also frequently self-
articulates as someone who is realistic and who honestly fights for preserving Kosovo within 
Serbia. In terms of Vučić being articulated by others, primarily EU representatives such as 
Catherine Ashton and representatives of Germany speak about him. For instance, just a few days 
after the EU decided to open EU accession talks with Serbia on 28 June 2013, Catherine Ashton 
flew to Belgrade and meet with the Serbian Government to discuss the implementation of the 
Brussels agreement as part of these talks. At the press conference after the meeting, Ashton said 
that the EU Council’s decision was historic and  
a signal of the great achievements of the leadership of Serbia and I want to commend anew 
the Prime Minister [Dačić], the Deputy Prime Minister [Vučić], the Ministers and the team 
who have worked so hard all these last few months. All of that work has been acknowledged 
by every member state of the EU, and they proved it when they took the unanimous decision 
to open negotiations on the accession of Serbia to the EU. […] In my meeting just now with 
Mr. President [Nikolić], the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, I wanted to express 
my great respect for your vision, your courage, and how I’ve seen you take what were often 
painful decisions. (Dnevnik 2, 09.07.2013, 36:50). 
Ashton, in her role as the mediator in the Brussels dialogue, articulates the entire Serbian leadership 
as “hard-working”, “respect-worthy”, “visionary”, “courageous”, making “painful decisions” and 
dealing with “difficult political challenges”. By doing so, Ashton is constituting the Serbian 
leadership as figures that can accommodate a range of diverse political demands in the best interest 
of the people they lead, with full trust that they will do the best they can for them, no matter the 
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meanings that people may attribute to them. Ashton not only congratulated the Serbian leadership, 
but also “the people of Serbia, for the inspiration that [they] have given not just to the region, but 
all over the world.”  
Apart from Ashton, German leadership and German media have put a focus on Vučić from the 
moment of the conclusion of the First agreement. RTS reported that the German agency DPA has 
described Vučić as the “strongest Serbian leader” and “father of the agreement” (quoted in 
Dnevnik 2, 20.04.2013, 18:26), claiming that by playing high-stakes poker he eventually won. 
Additionally, a few days before the EU’s decision to start accession talks with Serbia, RTS reported 
that the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) termed him a “responsible” and “realist politician”, 
who not only drew declarative lessons from the past, but instead succeeded to convince members 
of the Bundestag that he abandoned the ideas of Greater Serbian chauvinism (Dnevnik 2, 
24.06.2013, 08:46). Of course, the selective reporting by RTS also articulates Vučić in this manner. 
Similarly, then Germany’s ambassador to Serbia, Heinz Wilhelm said that if Vučić is an optimist 
that the Bundestag might give its consent to begin accession talks with Serbia, he is an optimist as 
well (Dnevnik 2, 14.06.2013). Vučić was articulated as a rational political subject, who could 
overcome past narratives, which is particularly important when dealing with Serbia’s position 
towards Kosovo. His leadership skills and negotiation ability have been underlined by domestic 
actors in Serbia as well, such as Vulin, who praised Vučić as someone who “coped with [the 
pressure of negotiations with Pristina] like a real man, who knew how to respond and to defend 
his and our principles, and not to listen to the others’ tirades” (Dnevnik 2, 02.04.2013, 04:25). In 
this context, Vulin also emphasizes Vučić’s masculinity, his masculine leadership style that helps 
him defend Serbia’s interests. 
On the other hand, Vučić articulated himself as a rational and compromise-oriented politician, 
“one of the few [at the table] who did not have a priori attitudes but wanted to hear what the 
arguments of the others were, to hear what they are offering us and see whether or not we can 
implement it” (Dnevnik 2, 03.04.2013, 19:00). He also self-articulated as a selfless, honest politician, 
who only had the best interests of the state and its people at heart, not his personal and political 
interests. After his visit to Northern Kosovo in May 2013 to convey the Brussels agreement to the 
local community, he said: 
Yesterday’s meeting showed that they [the Serb community in Kosovo] trust their country. 
Being aware that I was maybe going to commit political suicide, I came in front of these 
people to tell them that Serbia is behind them. I was only telling them the truth no matter 
how painful it was. This honest approach has clearly influenced a change in their thinking. 
Most of them now understand that with differences amongst us, we cannot go into the 
future. That is why I am convinced that we will make and implement all decisions together 
(Dnevnik 2, 13.05.2013, 05:07). 
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In summary, if Dačić and Vučić are taken as the main figures behind the community discourse, 
their positionalities were altered with a change in their political role. Soon after the events described 
in this chapter, Serbia held its early parliamentary elections in 2014, after which Vučić took on the 
role of Prime Minister and Dačić became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This resulted in a changed 
approach towards the Brussels dialogue, especially considering other structural factors, such as the 
continuously failed implementation of the A/CSM. Vučić became the leading figure of a “de-
mythological” approach to Kosovo in Serbia in 2017, with his call for an internal dialogue on 
Kosovo in which the entire Serbian society should be engaged. Emphasis was put on defining 
Kosovo as a problem and on finding a tangible solution that could take the place of representing 
a “final compromise”, instead of the A/CSM. The next chapter addresses precisely this shift in 
meaning-making – an increased emphasis on “myth” and “narratives of the past” as an obstacle to 
Serbia’s realization of its full potential: economic progress and EU membership, substituting the 
Kosovo imaginary with an imaginary of EU integration and economic prosperity. In this “partition 
discourse”, the mythology around Kosovo that supposedly steers Serbian politics is articulated as 
an obstacle to the fantasy of full closure of identity of the Serbian political collective and requires 




6 Partition Discourse  
 
The partition discourse came about not as something entirely new. As we have seen, making issues 
political again entails a certain degree of re-activation of meaning. In Laclau’s words, “reactivation 
does not […] consist of returning to the original situation, but merely of rediscovering, through 
the emergence of new antagonisms, the contingent nature of so-called ‘objectivity’” (Laclau 1990, 
34-35), that is, rediscovering a specific historical alternative that was available at one point but got 
pushed aside and deemed illegitimate. This concrete historical alternative that was re-activated in 
2017 and 2018 was the idea of partition. Even the late Prime Minister of Serbia Zoran Đinđić 
advocated partition in the early 2000s, although it was not a favorable option at the time (Danas 
2018c, 7 August; Dnevnik 2, 31.07.2017). This was also the case in the 1990s, with the former 
President of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia advocating partition (which he later elaborated on in 
his books Kosovo from 2004 and Kosovo 1966-2013 from 2013). And even in 2013, during the height 
of negotiations in Brussels, Dačić claimed that by engaging in the political dialogue, “Serbia has 
made a compromise, so they [the EU/international community] do not let me talk about partition 
or delineation anymore, even though I am convinced that this is the only possible solution” 
(Dnevnik 2, 28.02.2013, 09:00). Below, I will introduce the main points from the previous chapter 
in which I discussed the community discourse and relate them to the partition discourse as a re-
articulation of the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse due to the Brussels agreement’s inability to act as 
a solution. 
In the previous chapter I elaborated on the efforts made by the Serbian Government to re-
constitute elements of the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse into “Serbia in Kosovo” through 
acknowledging a subjectivity of Kosovo state institutions and anchoring its hegemonic claim to 
Kosovo through a focus on the Serbian community there. In the community discourse, territory is 
left relatively un-politicized (except the acknowledgement of Kosovo as a separate subject in terms 
of both institutional framework and its Kosovo Albanian representatives with legitimate interests) 
due to the still dominating articulation that Kosovo is Serbia, ensured through positioning the 
Brussels dialogue as status neutral. This discourse is characterized by a metaphoric move I have 
termed concealment, in which the dislocatory effects of Kosovo’s declaration of independence 
(and the existence of Kosovo state structures) on the claim that Kosovo is Serbia have been 
concealed and not presented as a threat to the unity of that claim. The dislocation has been 
“sutured” by the myth of the Brussels agreement. However, even though the dislocation has been 
concealed, other dislocatory events have emerged since the conclusion of the Brussels agreement, 
the most important of which was the lack of implementation of the A/CSM. If an agreement that 
was supposed to conceal the dislocation and let the dislocatory events be incorporated into the 
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given structure is never fully implemented, if its most crucial part for suturing the dislocation – the 
A/CSM – is not realized, then the given structure – the “Kosovo is Serbia discourse” – can no 
longer incorporate it. The discourse gets de-centered again and, inevitably, its elements need to be 
re-constituted again.  
This focus on the Serb community as embodying Serbia’s hegemonic claim to Kosovo got de-
centered with the lack of A/CSM’s implementation since the Serb community could not exert 
power and act as an extension of the Serbian state in Kosovo without it. However, specifically 
because the people have become a political category, the claim to Kosovo in the absence of 
A/CSM’s implementation has been put into question and an alternative demand has been 
positioned at the center of Serbia’s hegemonic claim to Kosovo: parts of Kosovo’s territory, namely 
those parts majority-inhabited by the Serb community. This hegemonic claim aimed to 
incorporating these parts of territory into the Serbian state framework to the fullest degree. If now 
Serbia cannot exert governance over major parts of Kosovo and has acknowledged a certain 
political subjectivity of the Kosovo state framework, incorporating parts of Kosovo territory that 
is majority-populated by Serbs would mean a consolidation of Serbia’s statehood in these areas. It 
would mean that Serbia would have governance in and control of these parts that would 
consequently be incorporated fully into the Serbian state framework. However, since control 
cannot be exerted in the so-called “enclaves” in Southern Kosovo, Serbia’s hegemonic claim to 
Kosovo is limited to the North. Thus, the relation between the nodal points of the people and the 
territory is articulated as equivalential as far as North Kosovo is concerned, since the Serbian 
Government put physical ownership over symbolic ownership and sharing of territory at the center 
of contestation in 2017/2018. 
The contestation in the partition discourse of 2017 and 2018 does not revolve around de-
politicizing the territorial question (leaving the question of status uncontested) in favor of 
politicizing the people, as it was the case in the community discourse. It is the other way around: 
once the people have become political, their tie to territory became political as well. Hence, what 
becomes part of political contestation are only those parts of territory where Serbs live, and 
specifically Northern Kosovo since it enables consolidation of Serbia’s statehood there. This way, 
what has been termed “Serbian state and national interests” is filled with alternative content as well: 
while in 2013, the interests were to preserve the Serb community in Kosovo (and claim Kosovo as 
Serbian through this practice), in 2017 and 2018, Serbian state and national interests are to “gain 
something” in terms of territory. As Vučić has expressed, “if we could gain even one meter [of 
land] there, it would be a win, because we [Serbia] have nothing there [in Kosovo] now” (Dnevnik 
2, 30.06.2018, 00:44). The fantasy of “restoring” Kosovo that is acknowledged as a lost object-
cause of desire underpins political contestations incarnated in the myth of partition. Hence, the 
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fantasy of Kosovo (as a whole) being Serbia is substituted with a different one, namely that of 
finally “solving” the Kosovo issue through partition, upon which a future of economic prosperity 
and stability awaits as part of the EU. I will illuminate these fantasies more in the upcoming 
segments. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Firstly, I will examine the main elements of re-articulating 
Serbia’s claim to Kosovo in the partition discourse, after which I will illuminate the transition 
towards articulating Serb-Albanian relations as antagonistic (between the two peoples across 
territories and throughout history) and the politicization of Northern Kosovo. Secondly, to shed 
light on how this transformation happened, I examined how the conflict itself is articulated, how 
the many antagonistic Others are articulated, and how the political “us” is articulated. All of these 
articulations are underpinned by different fantasies: the fantasy of “restoring” the loss of Kosovo 
through “gaining” the territory of North Kosovo; and the fantasy of EU integration that would 
solve all issues that Serbia has, including the Kosovo issue. Finally, I will demonstrate how the 
internal dialogue on Kosovo that started in 2017 aimed to re-articulate not only the meanings 
attached to Kosovo, but also the structures of feeling about Kosovo. 
6.1 Main Elements of Re-constituting Serbia’s Claim to Kosovo 
There are two practices that enable the Serbian Government led by SNS to carry out a re-
constitution of the claim to Kosovo: 1) transforming Serbian-Albanian relations from agonism 
(which was characteristic of the community discourse) to antagonism and articulating them as 
relations between two peoples across territories, not just between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, 2) 
abandoning the claim to symbolic ownership of entire Kosovo as a means of holding the “Kosovo 
is Serbia” discourse together and instead focusing on claims to physical ownership, actual 
ownership of a territory through the possibility of exerting control and governance. Hence, Serbia’s 
hegemonic claim to Kosovo is re-articulated from “Serbia in Kosovo” within the wider discourse 
of “Kosovo is Serbia”, to claiming the right to “consolidated” statehood in parts of territory 
populated by Serbs, by abandoning the “Kosovo is Serbia” claim through drawing a border 
between Serbia and Kosovo and mutual recognition as the possible result. 
The antagonistic institution of Serbian-Albanian relations as a whole, not just between Albanians 
in Kosovo, and Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia drives the idea of total separation further as a means 
to finally solve the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. To this end, the conflict is articulated as a 
historical conflict between the two peoples in their entirety, living across nation-state borders. I 
will elaborate on this issue specifically when I address the dominant articulation of conflicting 
Serbian and Albanian ideological projects, such as the creation of Greater Albania and Greater 
Serbia. In this context, subjects from countries in the region, such as Milorad Dodik, President of 
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Republika Srpska and Edi Rama, Prime Minister of Albania also constitute hegemonic subjects 
(acting as supporters or opponents of ethical ideals), due to their shaping of the discourse on 
antagonistic relations between the two peoples. 
The antagonistic institution of Serbian-Albanian relations enables an antagonistic institution of 
space in terms of territory, since both sides begin to claim different territories inhabited by “their” 
people as theirs. For instance, the Presevo valley is articulated as “Eastern Kosovo” by the PM of 
Kosovo Ramush Haradinaj, and Northern Kosovo as “Serbia” by Vučić. This political boundary-
drawing between the peoples and territories leaves the previously dominant articulation of 
“sharing” of space between the communities aside, in favor of almost total separation, something 
that culminated in the idea of swapping territories as a means of solving the dispute: Serbia would 
get Northern Kosovo while Kosovo would get the Presevo valley (even though the land swap idea 
was one among many that circulated at the time). In the partition discourse, the symbolic 
representation of Kosovo as a whole does not dominate anymore: the “Kosovo is Serbia” 
discourse, which is carried by the symbolic claim to all of Kosovo, is abandoned in favor of “parts 
of Kosovo are Serbia”, specifically those parts inhabited by Serbs and exclusively Northern 
Kosovo, as will be demonstrated later in the chapter. The claim to Kosovo is transposed from a 
symbolic realm into a physical, material realm, which constituted a larger shift in the way the 
Serbian Government was articulating Kosovo as of 2017. Thus, it is not about metaphoric claims 
anymore aiming to conceal dislocations, but about drawing metonymic articulations, establishing 
counter-hegemonies and paradigmatically substituting one hegemonic project for another. 
It is also important to emphasize once more here, as I have already indicated above with Dačić’s 
statement from February 2013, that the idea of partition is not something entirely new in the 
political dialogue and does not necessarily constitute the naming of an “unnamable object”. The 
claim for partition remained outside the realm of what was constituted as possible in that specific 
political moment. As I have mentioned in Chapter 5, the people, or the Serb community in Kosovo, 
was the only issue that could be discussed in the Brussels dialogue as outline in the UN Resolution 
64/298. Since political contestation centered on the people, territory was left outside of the realm 
of contestation, due to the prevalent articulations of status-neutrality of Kosovo as a nodal point 
centering the Kosovo is Serbia discourse. Without this emphasis on the people, embodied in the 
demand for A/CSM, the entire discourse on “Kosovo is Serbia” would fall apart, that is, it would 
become de-centered. This is precisely what happened with the failed implementation of the 
A/CSM, specifically after Kosovo’s Constitutional Court reached the verdict that it cannot be 
implemented fully according to the agreement from August 2015, which gave it substantial 
oversight over different areas of political and social life. 
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Since the implementation was postponed multiple times, when Vučić was elected President of 
Serbia in early 2017, he started his political presidency with the announcement that an internal 
dialogue on Kosovo in Serbia was needed, one that would engage all segments of society in dealing 
with the issue of Kosovo and coming up with solutions to the problem. Immediately after the 
internal dialogue commenced, Dačić made a statement that 
under the agreement between Serbs and Albanians, this [partition] is one possible lasting 
compromise solution, with a special status for our churches and monasteries and with the 
Community of Serb municipalities in Southern Kosovo. Kosovo is our value, but only to 
the extent to which we regard it as such. We are the ones who determine its value and 
importance, with only one condition, the condition of all conditions for our future: that the 
future must not be bloody, and this must be our red line (Dnevnik 2, 31.07.2017, 02:17). 
This illustrates quite well the contingent nature of the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse, since even 
with the most sedimented demands, there is still room for politicization. The importance which 
Kosovo has in Serbia as a social value is contingent on the articulations various subjects make 
about it, and it is precisely the discursive nature of Kosovo in Serbian politics that enables it to be 
re-constituted time and again. Dačić, for instance, identified the internal dialogue as a suitable 
political moment to re-surface the idea of partition as a viable political option in the dialogue, 
something that gained momentum through its appropriation by other political subjects, such as 
Vučić, the PM of Serbia Ana Brnabić, Minister of Defense Aleksandar Vulin and many more, even 
outside of the Serbian political discursive constellation. It seemed that many subjects from EU 
institutions and EU-member states have expressed their support for this idea, such as the High 
Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, who also 
mediated the Brussels dialogue after Catherine Ashton left office, the EU Commissioner for 
European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Johannes Hahn, and Austria’s Chancellor 
Sebastian Kurz, just to name a few. While not explicitly claiming to support partition, they claimed 
that they would not oppose any solution that Serbia and Kosovo might reach between themselves. 
Outside the EU framework, John Bolton, the United States National Security Advisor has openly 
claimed that the USA does not foreclose territorial corrections as a solution to the Belgrade-Pristina 
dispute and that the Trump administration would support it (Dnevnik 2, 05.09.2018). The horizon 
of possible meanings attached to partition, that is, what would constitute the limits of the partition 
discourse, would be war, or events that would result in bloodshed, as identified by Dačić above. 
This is something that resonated with the idea of correction of borders, exchange of territories, 
demarcation etc. which would all adhere to the basic principle of a peaceful solution and one which 
would exclude the creation of “ethnically homogeneous” states as a result of such a compromise. 
Another dimension that must be considered in the quest for a final compromise within the Brussels 
dialogue is a temporal one. Finding a durable solution is constitutive of the imaginary of a European 
future for Serbia, one which entails economic prosperity above all. Maintaining the status quo, that 
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is choosing to leave things un-politicized, imaginarizes Serbia as being stuck in the past, a past that 
is characterized by wars, bloodshed and economic stagnation. Thus, the myth of partition as a 
possible solution to the dislocations Serbia experiences around claiming Kosovo as Serbian 
constitutes a deeply affective discourse, a discourse that is able to grip the Serbian political 
collective in the most personal ways possible, as it touches upon their very livelihood: if Serbia 
chooses not to engage, if it chooses to put “emotion” over “rational” politics, it could find itself in 
another war left economically devastated. If it chooses to pursue a compromise solution through 
partition, Serbia could flourish economically, politically and demographically. Partition is 
articulated as a stepping-stone to re-capturing the lost jouissance, a fantasy of social “fullness” that 
was “castrated” from Serbia in the form of losing Kosovo due to violent events from the recent 
past. The temporality of myths is reflected in the workings of fantasy, in imaginarizing a future 
state of affairs in which all problems are solved by adopting the myth. 
A compromise solution because of the dialogue would tie the past and future together for the 
political collective in Serbia – in other words, “we” need to give up a piece of the past (our old 
views on Kosovo) in order to gain a piece of the future (the European Union). In this context, the 
temporality of the Brussels dialogue is evident in its articulation as something that inevitably has 
an expiration date. For instance, after Vučić became president in 2017, the EU has frequently 
announced a “new phase of the EU facilitated dialogue” (EU Stabilisation and Association Council 
2017), which would result in a durable solution inscribed in a “legally binding normalisation 
agreement” (European Commission 2018). This further means that maintaining a status quo is not 
an option within the Brussels dialogue, leaving only some sort of a solution, possibly in terms of a 
compromise through partition, as a viable political option.  
In sum, while the Brussels agreement was an attempt to sediment/institute an agonistic articulation 
of the people (in terms of the relation between the Serb and Albanian community in Kosovo) and 
territory (in terms of sharing the claim to inhabit the physical space of Kosovo), the internal 
dialogue and partition as a viable solution are an attempt to politicize a different sedimentation: the 
Kosovo imaginary structuring the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse, which is sedimented in the 
structural logics of institutions in Serbia, and the political collective’s affective attachment to this 
discourse. This politicization is achieved by re-articulating the meaning of Kosovo in the internal 
dialogue and subsequently through the idea of partition, resulting in a re-constitution of previously 
fixed discursive elements. The most visible re-constitution is the changed position of the signifiers 
“territory” and “the people” in the partition discourse, which once stabilized the “Kosovo is 
Serbia” discourse, but now anchor the emerging hegemonizing (in Brubaker’s (1996) words, 
“nationalizing”) project of the Serbian state to incorporate Northern Kosovo into its framework, 
leaving the Serb community in Southern Kosovo outside the realm of political contestation. In 
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contrast with the community discourse, the main political category of the partition discourse is 
territory, but now referring to specific parts of Kosovo, as mentioned earlier. The people refer only 
to the Serb community in the North since they are part of the political contestation. A relation of 
exclusion (or contrariety) is articulated between the Serb community (in Northern Kosovo and 
elsewhere alike) and the Albanian community in general, two categories that are antagonistically 
opposed. Hence, the discursive limit of the emerging project to hegemonize Northern Kosovo is 
constituted by what lies beyond its political frontier, namely the constitution of “Greater Albania” 
as a counter ideological project. When the relation between Serbs and Albanians in the Balkans 
overall, not just in Kosovo, is antagonistically articulated, very often “Greater Albania” is presented 
as an obstacle to achieving the “full” constitution of the Serbian political collective as such. The 
hegemonic consolidation of Serbdom across nation-state boundaries acts as an umbrella-ideology 
that breathes life into the political project of Serbia’s consolidation of statehood across the 
boundaries of Kosovo and Serbia. This will be unpacked later. What will follow now is the 
antagonization of Serb-Albanian relations in various discursive moments, all of which politicized 
Northern Kosovo. 
6.2 Destabilizing Political Moments: On the Train Tracks of Antagonism 
Antagonistic relations between Serbs and Albanians in general are based on two moves on the 
discursive field: on the one hand, articulating Albanians as a threat to the very existence of Serbs 
in Kosovo, that is their lives and livelihood, and on the other, articulating the supposedly intended 
creation of “Greater Albania” as an ideological threat to whatever is considered “Serbian” in the 
region, be it people or territory. A central signifier in this debate is Northern Kosovo, as it is framed 
to represent “the last fortress” of Serbia (in terms of both people and territory) in an environment 
in which the Other is threatening to abolish one’s own existence. It is also articulated as standing 
in the way of the creation of “Greater Albania”, which makes it even more important territorially. 
This way, Serbian hegemonic subjects are politicizing Northern Kosovo, i.e., making it a political 
problem to be discussed within the Brussels dialogue. All of this is achieved through gradual 
political moments of destabilization that would put Northern Kosovo at the center of contestation 
and re-frame Serbian-Albanian relations as antagonistic. Those moments are Ramush Haradinaj’s 
arrest in early January 2017, the sending of the so-called “Kosovo is Serbia” train from Belgrade to 
Mitrovica only a few days later and the erection of the separation wall in North Mitrovica to 
barricade off the main bridge leading to the South.  
On 4 January 2017, Haradinaj was arrested in France based on a warrant issued by Serbia in 2006 
for war crimes against civilians during the Kosovo conflict of 1998 and 1999 (Danas 2017g, 5 
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January; Danas 2017h, 10 January).20 The arrest became a showcase of boundary-drawing practices 
between the two communities, since representatives of Albania became involved in the debate as 
well. After his arrest, Haradinaj was detained facing possible extradition to Serbia and during this 
time, many protests of Albanians not only in Kosovo, but also in the Albanian diaspora were 
organized against detaining Haradinaj. For instance, on 9 January 2017, the Albanian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Ditmir Bushati asked the EU to exert pressure on Serbia for jeopardizing the 
process of normalization of relations with Pristina through this arrest warrant. As reported in 
Dnevnik 2, Albanian politicians in Kosovo and Albania called the Albanian diaspora to demonstrate 
against the arrest in front of Serbian and French diplomatic representations abroad, as they did in 
New York on 9 January. To this, the Serbian head of diplomacy Dačić claimed that he possessed 
security information that parts of the Albanian diaspora were planning to occupy certain Serbian 
diplomatic and consular representations in the USA and Europe in order to pressure Serbia to give 
up on prosecuting Haradinaj, accusing Albanian politicians of being prepared for terrorism 
(Dnevnik 2, 09.01.2017, 01:31). By naming Albanian politicians as terrorists, Dačić, through 
citation, constitutes the antagonistic discourse in Serbia on Albanians as terrorists, as they were 
framed during the conflict of 1998-1999. This is a powerful affective articulation, too. It establishes 
equivalence between Kosovo’s political demands for independence through arguably democratic 
means of deliberation within the Brussels dialogue, and the historic fight for that independence 
through means of violence during the Kosovo conflict. It insinuates that Albanians have not 
changed their means of fighting for political goals and forecloses their possibility for change in the 
future, which makes them a legitimate threat to Serbian state and national interests. Moreover, 
Dačić established “Albanian politicians” in general as terrorists due to Albania’s involvement in the 
debate, not only Kosovo Albanian politicians, which re-iterates the antagonistic relation between 
Serbs and Albanians as peoples. 
Serbian authorities officially requested extradition on 10 January (Danas 2017h, 10 January), 
elaborating that “Serbia does not accept justice that involves the unpunished hunting and 
unpunished killing of innocent Serb civilians or civilians of any other nationality, such as those 
crimes perpetrated by Ramush Haradinaj and his criminal group according to our indictment”, as 
Marko Đurić, the Director of the Office for KiM claimed (Dnevnik 2, 13.01.2017, 02:10). The 
phrase of “killing civilians”, specifically Serb civilians, has been repeated often after that, and 
particularly in connection with the “Kosovo is Serbia” train sent from Belgrade one day later. If 
                                                          
20 Ramush Haradinaj was not only indicted by Serbian courts, but also by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2011, among other things for the “abduction, murder, detention, and other forms of 
mistreatment of Serb, Kosovar Albanian and Kosovar Roma/Egyptian civilians, and other civilians who collaborated 
with, or were perceived to have collaborated with, the Serbian Forces or otherwise not to have supported the KLA” 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2011). 
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Albanians are “killing Serb civilians”, they represent a threat to the very existence of the Serb 
community in Kosovo and embody their very antithesis. The politics of fear incites a visceral 
response and can be felt as a bodily threat to the livelihood of the Serbian people. Here, it is also 
evident how the “stickiness” of emotions works: through the historical re-articulation of Albanians 
as a threat, as the enemy, they are subjectivated into this role to which fear is attached. Articulated 
in this manner, in which Albanians are threatening the annihilation of Serbs in Kosovo, one 
additional articulation forms a chain of equivalence against the Albanian presence in areas where 
Serbs live: war. If “they” are killing Serbs, then “they” must want war, and “we” must respond with 
war. 
This logic was heightened with the sending of the so-called “Kosovo is Serbia” train from Belgrade 
to North Mitrovica on 14 January 2017, on the celebration day of the Serbian New Year according 
to the Julian calendar. The Serbian authorities claimed that the promotional train line should 
announce the revival of the regular train line operating between these two cities prior to 1999 and 
is anchored in promoting the idea of freedom of movement. The train came from Russia, its 
exterior was colored in the colors of the Serbian flag (red, blue, white) and contained the inscription 
“Kosovo is Serbia” and/or “Kosovo is Serbian” in above 20 world languages. The interior of the 
train was plastered with posters and photographs containing images of the Serbian cultural and 
religious heritage in Kosovo, such as frescos from the four Serbian medieval monasteries 
(Gračanica, Our Lady of Ljeviš, Patriarchate of Peć and Visoki Dečani) which are under the 
protection of UNESCO (Danas 2017k, 13 January; P. D. 2017, in Danas, 14 January). The train 
was eventually stopped in Raška near the crossing to Kosovo, since allegedly and according to 
Dnevnik 2, Kosovo authorities have announced that they would “blow up” the railway tracks if the 
train intends to proceed to Mitrovica (Dnevnik 2, 14.01.2017). During the wait in Raška, the 
cultural-artistic society “Kopaonik” from Leposavić in North Kosovo joined the passengers on the 
train, wearing traditional folk costumes and Serbian flags, singing several well-known songs about 
Kosovo, such as “Oj Kosovo, Kosovo” (Danas 2017l, 15 January). The text of the song translates 
into: “The dawn rises from Kosovo, A new day dawns, Gračanica, all in splendor, Awaits 
Vidovdan; Oh Kosovo, Kosovo, My beloved land, Land of the famous knights, Lazar and Miloš; 
All heroes from Serbia, Every proud heart, Love their land, Gazimestan, Kosovo; All Serbs shout 
together: We are not giving you away Kosovo! It has always been ours, Through ages it has stayed 
ours.”21 
The train essentially embodied Serbia’s hegemonic claim to Kosovo as a material constitution of 
the claim. The exterior of the train is characterized by symbols of the Serbian state and nation, such 
                                                          
21 Author’s own translation. 
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as the colors of the flag, as well as the inscription that “Kosovo is Serbia/Serbian”, which makes 
the claim not only anchored in the idea of consolidating statehood there (“Serbia”), but also in the 
idea that Kosovo is crucial for the Serbian nation as such (“Serbian”). The interior features the 
Serbian cultural heritage in Kosovo, which anchors Serbia’s historic claim to statehood there and 
Kosovo’s eternal belonging to the Serbian nation as a symbolic space. Metaphorically, the train 
carries the claim to statehood in Kosovo, which envelops the cultural heritage claim, making the 
former primary and the latter subordinate. The latter is the content that fills, or fuels, the primary 
claim to statehood in Kosovo. Since the destination of the train is North Mitrovica, the claim to 
statehood refers to Northern Kosovo, but is justified by Serbia’s historic claim to Kosovo as 
evident in its cultural heritage there. This example illustrates very well how different discourses 
intersect to form and be constitutive of hegemonic projects, such as the claim of Serbia to Northern 
Kosovo. It is also a citation of the Kosovo myth. The discourse on Serbia’s historic right to this 
territory, which is embodied by these monasteries, constitutes the current claim of Serbia to parts 
of that territory, since Serbian political subjects that are part of this analysis are not considering to 
simply “give up” on statehood in Kosovo. The claim to Northern Kosovo is hegemonic in that it 
refers to attempts to consolidate statehood in this area and envelop it into Serbia’s state framework, 
instead of focusing on the betterment of people’s lives without politicizing territory, as was the 
case with the community discourse. It aims to “suture” the dislocation resulting from the existence 
of Kosovo state structures in this territory by means of drawing political (which translates into 
territorial) frontiers between these two opposing projects. The result of this hegemonic project 
would be total separation and acknowledgement of the dislocation as such, instead of incorporating 
the dislocation into the given discursive structure and concealing it, as was the case in 2013. In this 
sense, the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse as we know it would be de-structured and paradigmatically 
substituted with a counter-hegemonic discourse of partition. 
On 14 January, when the train was stopped in Raška, Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 14.01.2017, 05:05) made 
it clear in an interview with RTS that the train was “harmless”, articulating it as a symbol of 
European and democratic values such as freedom of movement. In turn, the Kosovo authorities’ 
response was “dangerous”, articulating their sending of armed security forces (termed “long 
barrels”) to the North as an act of war: 
This morning at 8:30 a train set off for Kosovska Mitrovica from Belgrade, I repeat – a train, 
not a tank or armored vehicle or anything like that – a passenger train, to be precise, which 
was to connect people, cities, in accordance with the principles of public law, the laws of all 
countries of the world, in accordance with the highest values and standards of the EU, 
namely freedom of movement, movement of people, goods, capital and services. […] Then 
almost incredible things began to happen. I want to inform you that we found out tonight 
that Albanians, their special forces, were trying to blow up a part of the rail tracks, but they 
were not quite capable of doing it properly either. But what they did was send their forces, 
only comprised of Albanians, […] [forces] most loyal to them in which there were no Serbs. 
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They were sent with long barrels to Jarinje, where they had to wait for the train […] to arrest 
the passengers; […] at first, we though they were aiming at a political victory, but then we 
realized that they wanted to cause major conflicts and for what? […]  The Serbs gathered 
and surrounded an Albanian unit from Lužane – these are Serbs living in the area [of 
Northern Kosovo], since there are no Albanians living there. Only Serbs live in Leposavić 
municipality, less than 1% Albanians. They surrounded the Albanians, the Albanians then 
called for backup, without the approval of NATO or anybody else, and sent 17 Cobra 
armored vehicles, with special forces ROSU onboard, to Northern Kosovo, wishing to incite 
a conflict, to start a conflict of wider proportions tonight in a part of territory we consider 
our own. […] My decision was at that moment […] to stop our train in Raška, in order to 
preserve the freedom and lives of our people, to avoid conflicts and to show everyone that 
we want peace. 
There was no mention of the provocative contents of the train, nor of the implications that such a 
move might have had for the dialogue in Brussels. The actions by Serbian authorities are 
downplayed in terms of provoking this conflict, while the response of the Kosovo authorities is 
exacerbated. There is a clear boundary-drawing between the Serb and Albanian community in 
Kosovo, in that the latter is vilified and presented as a threat to the livelihoods of the Serb 
community there. In turn, the Serbs are articulated as having a right to defend themselves in a 
territory in which the only legitimate forces can be Serbian forces. Northern Kosovo is thus defined 
by its absence of “Albanianness”, grounded in the re-iteration that Albanians represent a threat to 
the Serb community embodied by their security forces, their “long barrels” and their “Cobra 
armored vehicles”. Albanians are also re-iterated as infringing on human rights, specifically 
freedom of movement which is articulated as a nodal point of the discourse on European values – 
a community that “they” cannot belong to in the same manner as “we” can. While “our” train 
fosters the promotion of these values, constituting “us” as part of the European family, “their” 
acts of war do not, excluding them from membership in this family. 
In the same interview, Vučić articulated the “Albanian threat” as their attempt to actually “kill 
Serbs”:  
We only have a problem if someone thinks they can kill Serbs. We will not allow anyone to 
kill Serbs unpunished. That is all I have to say to them. We ask them to act responsibly. We 
ask them to understand that peace is in everyone’s interest. They should not play around and 
ruin what we have been building for a long time, which is peace and security for all citizens. 
A train with ordinary passengers is not a threat to anyone. […] We have over 50 buses [from 
Kosovo] passing through central Serbia every day and we never made any problems, they 
carry black eagles and green eagles, and I don’t care what kind of eagles, but we never made 
any problems. […] I just beg them not to kill Serbs. […] It is my plea that they do not kill 
Serbs, we will protect our people (ibid., 11:05). 
Very much related to Haradinaj and his troops articulated as having killed Serbs, Vučić’s statement 
establishes equivalence between the past killing of Serb civilians during the conflict and the present 
moment of Kosovo authorities trying to hinder an “aggressive meddling into state sovereignty of 
Kosovo”, as claimed by Edita Tahiri (Danas 2017k, 13 January). The current claim borrows its 
legitimacy from the re-iterated discourse of Serbs being the actual victims of the Kosovo conflict, 
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having greatly suffered by the hand of Albanian forces, who have never been punished for their 
crimes. The fact that former KLA members are Kosovo’s leaders in that particular moment only 
reinforces this discourse of Serb suffering. The phrase “killing Serbs” represents the historic threat 
Serbs have had to face and are still facing as victims of “Albanian intrusion”, particularly in 
territories that are not constituted as “Albanian”. More importantly, if the issue at hand is about 
“killing Serbs”, and if the train is articulated as merely a “passenger train” and it is juxtaposed with 
the countless busses with Albanian passengers displaying their national symbols (red eagle 
symbolizing “Albanianness” and green eagle symbolizing the predominantly Islamic faith of 
Kosovo Albanians), then the conflict is construed as being between the people, not between 
hegemonic attempts to consolidate statehood in a territory that is considered indisputably their 
own by Kosovo authorities. Similar to claims made by political subjects of Serbia about the threat 
of the local population faced by Albanian special forces’ intrusion, the Kosovo authorities’ reaction 
to the train can be seen in the framework of yet another attempt of Serbia to undermine Kosovo’s 
statehood. Since Serbia is not giving up on its hegemonic claim to Kosovo, this practice can be 
seen as an attack on the Albanian people as such, bringing about memories of the conflict of 1998 
and 1999. In the eyes of Kosovo authorities, the train would embody a continuation of previous 
Serbian hegemonic policy towards Kosovo and be in violation of the principles of normalization 
of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, as foreseen by the Brussels dialogue, with Thaçi even 
calling it an “intrusion” and “extremist project” (Dnevnik 2, 15.01.2017, 07:05). Additionally, it was 
a train sent to their country without their consent, and thus less about the provocative decoration 
and more about the unilateral introduction of the train, which underlined the competing claims to 
sovereignty. 
Since the phrase of Albanians “killing Serbs” stands in place of an entire discourse of Albanian-
Serb historical animosity, it is a very emotionally powerful signifier. It was re-iterated by Nikolić in 
a similar manner to Đurić and Vučić, the power of which manifested itself in Nikolić’s willingness 
to send Serbian armed forces to Northern Kosovo to “defend the Serbs” if “they [Albanians] start 
to kill them”. He even added that, not only will Serbia send its army, but he would also go to fight 
in Kosovo (Dnevnik 2, 15.01.2017, 04:18). He claimed that Serbia now faces two choices: either to 
accept everything that Kosovo authorities are demanding, or to go to war, to which he added that 
as long as he is president, Serbia will not accept everything that they demand (ibid., 10:04). This 
iteration resonated even over a year into the future, when Pristina announced that they would form 
the Kosovo army out of ROSU special forces. In connection with the Kosovo Parliament’s 
decision to form the army, Vučić said that “we will not allow anyone to expel, persecute or kill the 
Serb population” (Dnevnik 2, 30.10.2018, 03:01). He added: “I am not an enemy of the Albanians, 
on the contrary: I am an enemy to anyone who would persecute the Serbian people, who would 
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kill innocent people” (Dnevnik 2, 01.11.2018, 00:41). Any moment in which the Kosovo special 
forces ROSU would enter the North, or in which the Kosovo army would come about as an 
organization, is articulated as a threat to the lives of the Serb community, which inevitably must 
result in war between the peoples. As Nikolić said after the train incident (Dnevnik 2, 15.01.2017, 
02:15): “Yesterday was on the verge of a conflict with temporary institutions in Pristina. The 
appearance of the ROSU special forces [in Northern Kosovo] was a sign that the Albanians wanted 
war.” 
A nodal point already mentioned above constituting Kosovo Albanians as an antagonistic force (as 
well as politicizing Northern Kosovo) was “freedom of movement”, which was a right they have 
denied the Serb community specifically in the North. On the one hand, it was part of the 
contestation regarding the train, for instance when protests against the decision to avert the train 
were organized in North Mitrovica. At the protest, Đurić’s deputy Petar Petković said that “Priština 
should know that, by trying to prevent freedom of movement of the Serbian people, they will not 
succeed in making the Serb-majority areas into ghettoes, in which they would apparently like to see 
only those notorious trains that go in one direction” (ibid., 06:00). By equating the current situation 
in Northern Kosovo with the situation of Jewish ghettos during WWII, Albanians are affectively 
articulated as the ultimate incarnation of evil. This articulation also accentuates the Serbian 
necessity for this part of territory to be out of Pristina’s control, since Kosovo authorities cannot 
have the best interest of the Serb community at heart. 
On the other hand, “freedom of movement” was part of the contestation regarding the main bridge 
in Mitrovica, in which it was articulated as a commodity that only pertains to Pristina, but not to 
the Serb community. A relation of equivalence was established between the train and the wall on 
the main bridge. The Serbian political subjects claimed that if freedom of movement for the 
Albanian side should be guaranteed by the demolition of the wall on the bridge, then it should also 
be guaranteed for the Serb community by enabling them to use the train and move freely towards 
Serbia. Even Milorad Dodik of Republika Srpska commented on the “hypocrisy of Pristina” asking 
how it was possible that freedom of movement only pertains to one community and not to the 
other (ibid., 08:40). The issue of the wall north of the main bridge in Mitrovica was not only 
compared to the train and the question of freedom of movement, but also to the question of 
A/CSM as an empty signifier able to fulfill all the desires and political needs of both the Serb 
community in Kosovo and Serbia alike. Being constituted as an “impossible object” throughout 
the course of the dialogue in Brussels, the A/CSM represents the belief that it can bring about the 
“closure” of the Serb community’s identity and through that closure, release the dialogue of any 
social tensions, thus solving the conflict between the two parties. After the events with the train 
and in order to discuss the wall on the North side of the bridge in Mitrovica, the Belgrade and 
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Pristina delegations met in Brussels on 1 February 2017, after which Vučić said that Serbia was 
experiencing pressures from Pristina and the EU to bring down the wall urgently, to which the 
local Serb mayor agreed. Vučić asked why such a rush and whether it was fair that the “Community 
of Serb municipalities has not been established for four years, but the wall needs to be brought 
down immediately” (Danas 2017m, 2 February). Since the A/CSM is constituted as the main 
political objective to be fulfilled, it lends itself easily to comparisons with other issues that have not 
been fulfilled or issues acting as a barrier to their fulfillment. The A/CSM is a demand that can 
bring together various other demands (such as the bridge, the agreement on energy as we will see 
later in the chapter) into a chain of equivalence in order to strengthen Serbia’s performative claim 
to statehood in Kosovo. However, since the A/CSM was never realized, alternative demands 
started to take precedence, such as a division of Northern Kosovo from the rest of Kosovo, and 
its incorporation into the state system of Serbia. 
All these moments of destabilization contribute to performing Northern Kosovo as a “special 
area”. On the one hand, it is performed as special because of its majority-Serb population that 
denounces the legitimacy of Kosovo institutions; on the other hand, because it is constituted as a 
place that has an uninterrupted, continuous connection with the Serbian state framework, that is a 
place where Serbia can exert governance, as discussed earlier. Both of these elements institute 
Northern Kosovo as “Serbia” or “Serbian”, as has been demonstrated with the train sent from 
Belgrade or barricading North Mitrovica off from the South with the wall erected on the main 
bridge. The materiality of Northern Kosovo also “invites” meanings of independence and 
detachment from the rest of the territory to be attributed to it. It has historically resisted integration 
into Kosovo institutions, and the existence of the Serbia-run framework there supports such 
claims. Through barricades and walls, its leadership has continuously demonstrated this ability for 
detachment, especially because of the natural barrier of the Ibar River separating the North and 
the South. Throughout this subchapter, I have also suggested that Haradinaj’s arrest and Serbia’s 
extradition request have enabled an antagonistic articulation of Albanians as a people, which was 
accentuated by the train incident and the debate regarding the wall. In order to unpack the 
antagonistic articulation of the Other by Serbian hegemonic actors, all aiming to politicize the 
question of territory in Northern Kosovo, the next segment is going to address, firstly, how the 
conflict itself is being articulated, secondly, how the many antagonistic Others are being articulated, 
followed by, thirdly, how the political “us” is being articulated. 
6.3 Articulations of the Conflict 
First and foremost, during early 2017, even before the internal dialogue in Serbia started, there had 
already been a noticeable shift in the way Serbian political actors were framing their relations with 
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Pristina. Instead of the need for an agreement, which characterized the 2013 discourse on agonism 
and community, there are increasing articulations of a conflict between Serbia and Kosovo (mainly 
as a result of the non-implementation of A/CSM) and of the need for an alternative solution. This 
was elaborated above in the examples of the train and Haradinaj’s arrest, in which Albanians were 
constituted as a threat to Serbs. Because the political events discussed above generated the 
momentum for finding an alternative solution to the A/CSM in the Brussels dialogue, Vučić 
initiated the internal dialogue on Kosovo immediately after he came to office as President of Serbia. 
Within this internal dialogue, which was aimed both at the Serbian public and at the EU, a meaning-
making process began which re-articulated two different sedimented meanings: on the one hand, 
it tried to re-articulate the so-called “mythical approach to Kosovo” that characterized Serbian 
politics towards it, and on the other, the question of borders between Serbia and Kosovo, but also 
in the region more broadly. 
This entire meaning-making process inevitably intersected with the meaning-making in the Brussels 
dialogue, since the internal dialogue was also incorporated by the EU into reports on Serbia’s 
progress towards EU-integration (EU Stabilisation and Association Council 2017). The internal 
dialogue was praised, announcing a “new phase” of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. In connection 
to the new phase, the EU introduced the term “legally-binding agreement”, a floating signifier that 
did not have a fixed point of reference but suggested that it can be reached in the “final phase of 
dialogue”, indicating that the Brussels dialogue is not an open-ended process but that it has a clearly 
intended result. While the EU has substituted one agreement (the Brussels agreement) with another 
(the legally-binding agreement), a shift can be noticed in the discourse of the Brussels dialogue on 
the part of the Serbian Government, namely from reaching an “agreement”, most notably the 
Brussels agreement, to reaching a “compromise”, most notably the idea of partition (razgraničenje 
in Serbian). This will be addressed in detail in the second thematic segment of the chapter, namely 
how Serbia’s hegemonic claim to Kosovo changed from symbolic ownership to physical 
ownership. However, this entire shift would not have been possible without Serbia’s disarticulation 
from an agonistic construction of Albanians and the Brussels agreement embodied by its most 
important aspect for Serbia – the A/CSM. Instead, increasingly antagonistic articulations of the 
conflict between Belgrade and Pristina were practiced, and the conflict was mainly articulated in 
three different forms. Firstly, as a historical conflict between the two peoples, Albanians and Serbs 
not just confined within the borders of Kosovo or Serbia. Secondly, as a conflict of these peoples 
over territory, in which not only Northern Kosovo was politicized, but also the Presevo valley. 
Thirdly, as a conflict between two competing ideological projects, namely the creation of “Greater 
Albania” and the nationalist project of Serbia to consolidate its statehood in Serb-populated 
territories in the Balkans, which characterized the Milošević-era. The conflict between the peoples 
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is anchored around nodal points of ethnicity, the conflict over territory around nodal points of 
“Northern Kosovo”, “Presevo valley” and “Republika Srpska”, whereas the ideological conflict is 
anchored around the nodal points of “Greater Albania”, “The green transversal” (so-called zelena 
transverzala) and “Milošević”. 
In articulating the conflict as a conflict between two peoples, Vučić has been the most prominent 
subject behind generating this type of antagonism between Serbs and Albanians. On numerous 
occasions, he has emphasized that he wanted to solve the “conflict between Serbs and Albanians.” 
In this articulation, history is used as its central component. The conflict between Serbs and 
Albanians is articulated as timeless: it has been there for ages and will be there for ages to come, if 
we do not solve it now. For instance, when the Western Balkans Summit was held in Sofia in March 
2018, Vučić said that he would attempt to “solve this historical conflict between Serbs and 
Albanians” through his engagement in the Brussels dialogue and his idea of a compromise 
(Dnevnik 2, 01.03.2018, 03:16). Additionally, when the prominent local Kosovo Serb politician 
Oliver Ivanović (who was also addressed in Chapter 5) was murdered in January 2018, Vučić visited 
Northern Kosovo and at the monastery Banjska near Zvečan said: “I came here to let the Albanians 
know that, even though […] we often have opposite interests, that Serbia not only wants peace, 
but that we will do everything in our power to preserve that peace, and […] to solve our quarrels 
that have lasted for many decades, even many centuries” (Dnevnik 2, 20.01.2018, 04:28). With this 
claim, Vučić is constituting the discourse on Albanian-Serb eternal animosity. The conflict is 
articulated as one that knows no boundaries of time and that has been going on “for centuries”. 
By claiming that the conflict is between “Serbs” and “Albanians” throughout “history”, these 
groups are constituted as spanning across current nation-state borders, as well as suggesting 
perennial nations. In other words, this conflict is not between Serbs in Serbia and Kosovo, and 
Albanians in Kosovo, but between the two peoples in general. Similarly, the historic right of both 
communities to live in Kosovo is articulated at the core of the problem, when Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 
17.05.2018, 10:16) says that “the conflict between Serbs and Albanians – not to go into whose fault 
it is and for what – has lasted long before the formation of the Prizren league. That was 140 years 
ago, and people should know that this conflict is not one that has lasted for 140 days.” Central to 
articulating the conflict as between two peoples is its connection to history. On the one hand, 
conflict has been a central signifier of Serb-Albanian relations throughout history (“we have always 
had opposing interests”), and on the other, Serb-Albanian relations, being constituted by eternal 
conflict, cannot improve if we do not address this history as part of the solution, bearing in mind 
that the solution as well must be a long-term process. This form of groups-making forecloses the 
possibility for alternative meanings to emerge, that is, alternative solutions to the conflict, since 
these groups are articulated as homogeneous, with each of them having opposing interests without 
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the option of intersection. This move has implications for why partition has become an option in 
the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue: if the relation between the groups is characterized by eternal 
conflict, and if their interests are always diametrically opposed, then it invites the possibility for 
solving the conflict between them in terms of separation instead of community. 
A crucial aspect of performing the conflict as one between the two peoples is commemoration. By 
commemorating particular historic moments that incarnate the antagonistic relation between them, 
such as the “pogrom” on 17 March 2004, political frontiers between the communities are re-drawn 
time and again. This has been the case with commemorating the 17 March during the entire period 
of analysis (2012-2018), with hegemonic actors perpetuating the antagonism between Serbs and 
Albanians structurally in the Serbian political collective. The commemoration practices are 
materialized in festivities, such as solemn academies, Church memorial services, school classes etc. 
usually in Belgrade, Pristina and North Mitrovica, which are instituted as the main three sites of 
remembrance. Through commemoration, experiences of the discussed (partial) enjoyment of the 
body are generated, which grip the subjects performing commemoration affectively and help 
reinforce the dominant discourses of Serb-Albanian animosity. However, the memory of the 17 
March is articulated with whatever political project is most dominant at a specific point in time. In 
2013, for instance, Dačić (Dnevnik 2, 17.03.2013, 05:10) said at the solemn academy gathering 
representatives of academia and the Church in Belgrade, that “we are living in a situation in which 
that territory [Kosovo and Metohija] is in some way under occupation. […] The Government of 
Serbia will never betray its people, it will never betray the Serbian idea of Kosovo and Metohija, 
but at the same time, its actions will be guided by immediate vital interests of the [Serb] people 
who live there.” Similarly, during his visit to Kosovo and after the Church memorial service in 
Pristina, Vulin asked whether the international community, in the face of what has happened on 
17 March 2004, considers the Serbs as the only people in Europe who are not supposed to decide 
on their own fate, elect their own police and judicial institutions (ibid, 03:14). These statements are 
constitutive of the community discourse anchored around the nodal point of the people, and, as 
evident in Vulin’s statement, bringing it together with the political project of establishing the 
A/CSM (which was still under negotiation at that time, the Brussels agreement having been reached 
a month later). However, with the failed implementation of A/CSM, increasingly antagonistic and 
divisive articulations of the Other are produced, and sedimented in collective practices such as the 
school class on 17 March introduced in 2016. Across schools in Serbia, the first class on that date 
was dedicated to revisiting the violence of the “pogrom”, with Vulin, then Minister for Social 
Affairs, being present at one and talking to pupils (Dnevnik 2, 17.03.2016). The same practice of 
dedicating a school class to the “pogrom” was continued on 17 March 2017 (Dnevnik 2, 
17.03.2017) and came at a moment when the Government in Pristina ratified the decision to 
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register all immovable property, currently registered under the SFRY (Socialist Federative Republic 
of Yugoslavia), Republic of Serbia and AP Kosovo (Autonomous Province Kosovo) in the name 
of the Republic of Kosovo as the owner (Danas 2017e, 15 March). In connection to this political 
decision, the director of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija Marko Đurić said that the situation 
now is similar to the situation on 17 March 2004 (when the “pogrom” happened), and that it was 
worrying that the political climate among Kosovo Albanians has not fundamentally changed since 
then (Danas 2017c, 17 March). Similarly, on 17 March 2018, in a press conference dedicated to this 
symbolic date, Vučić claimed that “Albanians” have no obligation to establish the Community of 
Serb municipalities as part of their EU integration process and that this is one reason why he trusts 
neither Albanians nor the international community and the reason why he would seek a 
compromise (instead of the A/CSM). “If they do not want a compromise solution, there will be 
no solution at all – and that is final”, Vučić said (Dnevnik 2, 17.03.2018, 03:55). In a similar manner 
to Dačić tying the 17 March to the establishment of A/CSM, Vučić articulates the “pogrom” as a 
reason Albanians cannot be trusted. Like Đurić, who establishes a relation of continuity between 
the incidents of 17 March 2004 and the current political practice of Pristina authorities, Vučić 
anchors antagonism of Albanians towards the Serbs (as manifested in a continuous row of practices 
by Pristina against Serbia and the local Serb community in Kosovo) as the main characteristic of 
the group. Because Albanians could not be trusted then, they cannot be trusted now, meaning that 
Albanians as a collective, not just their political representatives, are articulated as hostile towards 
Serbs and Serbia. Commemorating 17 March acts as a way to establish a relation of continuity 
between the actions against Serbs then and those against Serbs in the current political moment – 
thus affectively re-instituting political frontiers between the two peoples. 
By establishing the conflict at hand as a conflict between the peoples living across territories, the 
second articulation of the conflict becomes possible, namely as a conflict between peoples over 
territory. This territory specifically is articulated as either Northern Kosovo or the Presevo valley, 
something that later became known as the idea of exchange of territories. Vučić termed the conflict 
as a “war over territory [between Serbs and Albanians], a conflict over territory which has lasted in 
an intense manner since the year 1750” (Dnevnik 2, 01.09.2017, 15:17). With 1750, Vučić is 
probably referring to the second great migration of the Serbs from the Raška and Kosovo regions 
towards what is today Northern Serbia (and back then the Habsburg Monarchy), which altered the 
ethnic composition of these regions, decreasing the number of Serbs there and increasing the 
number of Albanians (see Ćirković 2004). The argument is that Albanians “flooded” into the lands 
that were emptied by Serbs migrating to the North. Thus, the conflict over territory has been going 
on for centuries, establishing a relation of continuity between these territories and peoples from 
1750s and the territories of the respective nation-states and its peoples. 
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In his first visit to the UN after Vučić came to occupy the office of the President, he mentioned in 
his address to the General Assembly (Dnevnik 2, 21.09.2017, 04:12) that “Serbia has not recognized 
the independence of its Southern province, but it is searching for a political solution, which is 
currently Serbia’s national priority.” By addressing the issue of territoriality in his speech, Vučić is 
acknowledging that the solution has to be about the territorial status of Kosovo, something that 
has not been articulated in this manner within the community discourse. The community discourse 
was anchored around the notion of status-neutrality, which stabilized Serbia’s claim that Kosovo 
is Serbia. However, after Vučić came to power as President, this slowly began to change, which is 
especially evident in the discourse of the internal dialogue, which I will address later. However, it 
is not only the territoriality of Kosovo that is debated, but also that of Serbia, since Kosovo 
increasingly articulated its territorial claim to the Presevo valley (which is also a relatively established 
discourse), following the same type of articulation by Serbia and its claim to Northern Kosovo. 
For instance, when Isa Mustafa, during the crisis of Haradinaj’s arrest and just a day before the 
train incident, received the representatives of the three municipalities of the Presevo valley and 
called them the “three municipalities of Eastern Kosovo” (Dnevnik 2, 13.01.2017, 05:14), he 
politicized the issue of territory. Dačić termed this a clear sign of wanting to establish “Greater 
Albania” and an attempt to destabilize the region (ibid.). Hence, the conflict between Serbs and 
Albanians is framed as one over territory, specifically territory that is populated by the two 
antagonistically articulated communities. Once the conflict is framed as a conflict over a territory, 
partition becomes more plausible a solution, than if the conflict was framed as being between two 
states over the same territory. It introduces ethnicity as the main dividing principle, linking it to 
territorial separation more easily since the contestation is broadened to include peoples (who live 
across states) and not states themselves. 
As mentioned earlier, history is an element that is constitutive of the antagonistic institution of the 
relation between Serbs and Albanians, but it is also constitutive of the relation between two 
antagonistically framed ideological projects of these peoples, namely “Greater Serbia” and “Greater 
Albania”. This is the third form of articulating the conflict, namely between ideological projects 
“of the past” that find their way and creep into the political projects “of the present”. “Greater 
Albania” is a frequently used signifier incarnating the entire Albanian “threat” to everything that is 
Serbian throughout history. It is not only a threat to the Serb people across the region, but primarily 
to the territorial integrity of Serbia and regional neighbors. For instance, articulations of Greater 
Albania were used to antagonize Albanians after the train incident in January 2017, claiming that 
the excessive force used in the form of armed vehicles and long barrels was constitutive of 
Kosovo’s aim to “take over” Northern Kosovo. The use of symbols of these competing hegemonic 
projects was thematized, such as Serbia’s use of flags, pictures of monasteries and the phrase 
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“Kosovo is Serbia/Serbian” being compared to a previous incident at a football match in Belgrade 
in October 2014. During a match between Serbia and Albania, a drone was flown over the stadium 
in Belgrade carrying a flag with symbols of Greater Albania, after which some fans stormed the 
court and caused incidents. This was termed a “diplomatic-football scandal” and it was even 
debated whether the Albanian President Edi Rama would visit Serbia during his planned visit with 
Vučić a week later (Živanović and Nonin 2014, in Danas, 15 October; Čongradin 2014, in Danas, 
15 October). Vučić drew parallels between Serbia’s reaction to this incident, which did not escalate 
and was handled without significant physical clashes by Serbia’s security forces, and the actions of 
Pristina in sending their security forces to Northern Kosovo in the expectation of the train possibly 
entering Northern Kosovo. Vučić even asked what would be a greater insult: Greater Albania or 
Serbia, “regular Serbia, not even Greater Serbia?” (Dnevnik 2, 18.01.2017, 03:55). By establishing 
a relation of equivalence between these two incidents, Albanians are framed as “hostile” and 
“overreacting”, whereas the Serbs as “calm” and “responsibly” reacting to provocations, similar to 
the train incident. Albanians are also articulated as still pursuing “dreams” of Greater Albania, 
whereas Serbia is just “regular” Serbia, without pretenses to other territories. Vučić claimed that 
the train could not be a reason for war, and that Serbs had never threatened anybody with tanks 
and armored vehicles when Albanians have promoted the independence of Kosovo and the idea 
of Greater Albania (Dnevnik 2, 24.01.2017, 07:00).  
Greater Albania is also articulated as the main threat to regional stability. For instance, during 
Mogherini’s visit to the Western Balkans in March 2017, Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 03.03.2017, 05:10) 
expressed his  
concerns about the fact that everyone was silent on the horrific statements […] by Thaçi 
[who] told the Albanians to take matters into their own hands in Macedonia. […] If one was 
to read a few more sentences after this statement it would be clear what he is talking about. 
If any of us had said that, they [the international community] would have officially imposed 
sanctions on Serbia. 
The project of Greater Albania is equated with Albanian pretenses on other territories of the region, 
primarily Serbian, but also Macedonian territories. In this light, Greater Albania is articulated as a 
territorial threat, among other things. Another issue that represents a territorial threat and a threat 
to regional stability is the formation of the Kosovo army, something that had already been set in 
motion in March 2017, when Thaçi handed over a draft legislation to the President of the Kosovo 
Parliament on the transformation of the special forces ROSU into an army. In response to this 
action, Đurić said that “it is evident that the Greater Albanian project today is the main threat to 
stability in the region and the creation of an Albanian para-military in Kosovo would fan the flames 
and pose a grave and serious threat to a fragile peace” (Dnevnik 2, 07.03.2017, 02:15). When Thaçi’s 
draft legislation passed the parliamentary vote, and together with later statements about unification 
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between Albania and Kosovo, Đurić claimed that “as long as they are playing with claims about 
changing the borders and creating the fascist Greater Albania in the territory of our country”, the 
Brussels dialogue will be in danger, as well as regional stability (Danas 2017d, 20 April). The 
transformation of the Kosovo special forces into an army is equated with the project of Greater 
Albania and would constitute one step towards consolidating that project in the region. The army 
is also not recognized as legitimate, but only as a para-military organization, one that would pose a 
physical threat to the security structures of Serbia. A major aspect of articulating Greater Albania 
as a threat is based on politics of emotion, specifically the politics of fear. By characterizing 
practices by Pristina as threatening, on the one hand to regional stability, on the other to Serbia 
and Serbdom itself, Serbian hegemonic actors are producing an antagonistic image of Kosovo 
Albanians who drive the said project of Greater Albania forward. The creation of Greater Albania 
is articulated as something that would “consolidate” the full identity of the Albanian nationalist 
project in the region, and should be therefore counteracted, since this consolidation would equally 
jeopardize the identity of the Serbian state and Serbian people in the region (as well as potentially 
do bodily harm due to war). 
The project of Greater Albania is dependent on the regional element, since the very idea of creating 
Greater Albania is articulated as the consolidation of those territories across different states in the 
region where Albanians constitute the majority in terms of population. This is why any form of 
deepened cooperation between Albania and Kosovo is met with suspicion by Serbian political 
actors. For instance, when Edi Rama said in an interview with Politico that a union between Kosovo 
and Albania is possible if EU membership prospects of Western Balkan states fade (quoted in 
Stojanović 2017, in Danas, 19 April), Serbia reacted harshly. Dačić accused the EU and 
international community for the lack of appropriate reaction to and condemnation of the 
statements, drawing parallels between these statements by Rama and hypothetical statements of 
Serbian officials in regard to a potential unification between Serbia and Republika Srpska. He also 
articulated Rama’s statement as “jeopardizing Serbia” as a whole (Danas 2017b, 18 April). Referring 
to the same statement, Đurić said that “Enver Hoxha is dead” (Dnevnik 2, 18.04.2017, 01:30), 
constituting Hoxha as an embodiment of “old” ideas such as the creation of Greater Albania, 
whereas Vučić claimed that he “would be hanged on a pole like one of those flags in Brussels” if 
he had proclaimed the unification of the entire Serbian people in the Western Balkans (Dnevnik 2, 
20.04.2017, 00:38). Whereas the idea of “Greater Serbia” (the unification of all Serbian people in 
the Balkans into one state) is juxtaposed with the idea of “Greater Albania”, articulating them as 
comparable, they are not comparable inasmuch as Serbia guarantees the territorial integrity of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Dayton agreement. This is not the case with Albania and 
Kosovo, where one or the other would guarantee that they would not unify, but the principle of 
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not seeking a union with any state is inscribed into the Kosovo Constitution. Additionally, the 
principle of regional stability and good neighborly relations promoted by the EU in the EU 
integration process of both Kosovo and Albania is something that might foreclose a unification 
between them. 
After Rama’s statement, there was a chain of reactions to unification between Albania and Kosovo 
on the part of leaders from the Presevo valley, too. When Jonuz Musliu, the Mayor of Bujanovac, 
and the leader of the Albanian National Council in Serbia claimed that a hypothetically unified 
Albania with Kosovo should include the Presevo valley as well, Vulin interpreted his statement as 
a “call for a third Balkan war for the creation of Greater Albania” (Danas 2017f, 21 April). Dačić 
drew a relation of equivalence between Musliu’s statement and the territorial pretenses of Albanians 
in the region, and claimed that such statements are “a reflection of a clear platform of all Albanians 
on the creation of Greater Albania. Yesterday, it was Kosovo, today, it is Niš, and tomorrow it will 
be Skopje and so on” (Danas 2017a, 21 April). Making Greater Albania responsible for the 
territorial fragmentation of not only Serbia, but also its neighboring countries, constitutes all 
Albanians living across different Balkan borders as antagonistic subjects. After all, Dačić and Vulin 
are not only speaking of Albanians in Kosovo, but all Albanians as a people, who constitute a 
physical threat because they are prepared to go to war in order to fulfill their old dream. This is an 
example par excellence of how politics of fear can constitute an entire group as homogeneous and as 
the absolute antithesis to the closure of identity of the political “us”.  
The discourse of Greater Albania proved to be quite a useful one in that it accommodated a range 
of demands for the constitution of the political “us” by the Serbian Government against the 
Albanian Other. Serbian political subjects kept re-articulating it even during the internal dialogue 
on Kosovo in Serbia, specifically when the meeting gathered representatives of the Ministry of 
defense and security agencies. Being primarily presented as a security threat to Serbia and the 
region, Vulin kept re-iterating Greater Albania as almost a conspiracy project of all Albanians in 
the Balkans (Dnevnik 2, 06.02.2018, 15:40): 
It is indisputable that the politics of Pristina is formulated in Tirana, it is not formulated in 
Pristina. This is often demonstrated at the symbolic level, but it is likewise often shown at 
the practical and political level. Yes, the real address is essentially Tirana, because we are 
talking about Greater Albania here, we are not talking about solving the problem of Kosmet 
[Kosovo and Metohija abbreviated] alone in terms of dealing with this or that part of our 
territory. We are talking here about the conflict with Greater Albania, Greater Albania that 
is politically and geographically trying to establish its borders. 
Vulin essentially articulates the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo as a conflict between Serbia 
and Greater Albania, claiming that the potential solution cannot only pertain to Kosovo itself, but 
needs to take into account Albania and possibly other territories. Politics and geography are 
determining factors of the potential success of such a Greater Albanian project, something that 
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Serbia needs to consider when trying to find a compromise. Similarly, when Edi Rama visited 
Kosovo and suggested in the Kosovo Parliament a unitary foreign policy of Albania and Kosovo, 
Vulin claimed that this is a move by Greater Albania and that it would make it difficult to explain 
to all the Serbs in the region that they cannot have one president as well (Dnevnik 2, 19.02.2018, 
04:00). Again, the project of Greater Albania also represents an opportunity for Serbian hegemonic 
subjects to claim an equally destabilizing project of unification of all Serbs in the region, for instance 
through incorporating Northern Kosovo or Republika Srpska, constituting the element of Greater 
Albania as both supportive and obstructive of Serbia’s hegemonic project in the region. 
Another ideological project that is juxtaposed with the Serbian hegemonic project in Kosovo is the 
so-called zelena transverzala (the green transversal), which as the name might suggest, constitutes 
Albanians as a Muslim threat, since the idea is said to represent the unification of Kosovo with 
Sandzak (which is a largely Muslim-populated, Slavic-speaking region of Southern Serbia), in the 
path of which lies Northern Kosovo. This idea dates back to the nationalist discourses of the 1990s, 
as will be explained below. This ideological constellation is embedded in different discourses of 
Albanian-Serb animosity, the Muslim unity and its threat to Serbia, as well as on the vital 
significance of the natural and man-made treasures and potentials of Northern Kosovo for the rest 
of Serbia. The discourse of zelena transverzala illustrates very well how materiality and discourse 
work together to bring about and obstruct the institution of different ideological projects. On one 
hand, Serbia is trying to institute statehood in Kosovo in terms of territorial gain, meaning the 
possibility to practice governance and exert control over Northern Kosovo, which comes to 
embody the hegemonic claim as such. This includes a control over natural resources and energy 
production as well. On the other, Kosovo is also trying to consolidate its statehood in Northern 
Kosovo in terms of sovereignty, which would include the governance over natural resources and 
infrastructure such as the lake Gazivode, the mine Trepča and the main bridge in Mitrovica. 
The idea of zelena transverzala (green transversal) emerged only in June 2018, when messages came 
from politicians in Pristina that there will be no partition of Kosovo, but that Kosovo should get 
Sandzak and part of Southern Serbia (referring to the Presevo valley). The green transversal 
generally refers to an alleged Islamic plan or conspiracy to establish power in the Balkans, from 
Bihać in Croatia all the way to Albania, “cut[ting] the Christian world in half,” as Cohen (1992, NY 
Times) describes. It was prevalent during the wars of Yugoslav succession of the 1990s and was re-
articulated in the context of territorial contestations of 2018. Namely, the Vice-President of 
Kosovo’s ruling Democratic Party Rexhep Hoti claimed that no partition of Kosovo would be 
possible, except if Kosovo would take Sandzak, the Presevo valley and a part of Montenegro 
(Dnevnik 2, 18.06.2018, 5:30). The Office for KiM immediately issued an official statement saying 
that realizing the “fascist” ideas of “Greater Albania” and “green transversal” will only remain a 
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dream (Danas 2018h, 18 June). Drecun claimed that Albanians, because they have not abandoned 
the “Greater Albanian concept”, have been planning to destabilize the region, by claiming Sandzak 
“where no Albanians live” and the Presevo valley “where also Serbs and Roma live” (Dnevnik 2, 
18.06.2018, 00:48 and 06:00). This all happened a few days before Vučić and Thaçi were supposed 
to meet in Brussels, where the energy agreement would have been discussed. Referring to energy, 
Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 19.06.2018, 02:30) said that  
[t]here is a need on the one part of Albanians to form the so-called green transversal and in 
its way stands Northern Kosovo. The North is exactly between Southern Kosovska 
Mitrovica, Vučitrn, Srbica, or Skenderaj as they call it, and Ribariće and Novi Pazar, that 
central part of Serbia, or the area of Raška. That is why they are bothered by the territory of 
Northern Kosovo. And when I talk about their hunger for occupying Northern Kosovo, I 
have always portrayed all these arguments: both Gazivode and Valač, and their need to 
maintain this kind of green line they always insisted on. As you can see, one of their 
politicians cannot hide it anymore. 
On the one hand, the said “green line” Muslim Albanians have “always” insisted on is used to paint 
them as subjects that have throughout history been against the fulfillment of Serbian interests. 
Their current actions testify to a historic continuity of this type of politics. Additionally, in 
articulating the green transversal as Muslim, Vučić is constituting Muslim Albanians as an 
antagonistic element and a threat to Serbian interests (explicitly) and their Christian faith 
(implicitly). The territorial contestation around Northern Kosovo incarnates an articulation of the 
conflict as one between opposing ideological projects rooted in material gain. This material gain is 
manifested in the natural and man-made potentials of Northern Kosovo, namely its energy 
potential (the Valač energy station) and natural resources (Lake Gazivode and its hydropower 
plant). Thus, the question of energy is also politicized through its tie to the territory of Northern 
Kosovo. 
The example of zelena transverzala illustrates perfectly how the politics of fear operates in discourse: 
Kosovo Albanians are articulated as a force that has a “hunger” or an “appetite” for Northern 
Kosovo and wants to “consume” all the riches that North Kosovo has to offer, which are 
constituted as Serbian and belonging to Serbia. They are essentially articulated as the Other that is 
responsible for the “theft” of our enjoyment, and their hunger does not only stop with them taking 
Southern Kosovo – they want “our” Northern Kosovo, too. The resistance that Serbs and Serbia 
pose in Northern Kosovo is the only thing that stands between them being consumed by the 
ideological project of zelena transverzala, which would allow Kosovo to satisfy its “thirst” for energy. 
What is left outside of the field of contestation is the possibility of sharing the ownership of these 
resources. Additionally, politics of fear is evident in Vučić’s articulation of razgraničenje (partition) 
as the only possible option for solving the “historical” conflict between Serbs and Albanians. In 
response to an open letter by the Bishop of Raška-Prizren Teodosije, who called on the 
Government to rethink the idea of partition since it would leave most Serbs South of Ibar with the 
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choice to emigrate and leave their ancestral homes and the holy monasteries in an ethnically 
homogeneous state of Kosovo, Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 25.07.2018, 02:52) responded with asking: 
On the one hand, we do not want ethnic borders, but on the other, we want the Albanian 
state of Kosovo, that non-existing state, to pay us 650,000 euros for our church! Is that what 
we want? Do you not want people to live normally? Do you instead want to lie to them? If 
you do not want ethnic borders, if you do not want partition [razgraničenje], then well, no 
problem: tell the people that we should get ready to defend Vranje [in Southeastern Serbia], 
in 40 or 50 years. 
Kosovo Albanians are constituted as a threat to the territorial integrity of Serbia, a threat that would 
find a way to creep into the future because of the insatiable desire to take more and more parts of 
the Serbian territory. To prevent this threat, Vučić is offering partition as a way to contain it within 
its newly established borders. Similarly, Vulin (Dnevnik 2, 30.08.2018, 09:07) has said that “it is 
time for a delimitation [da se razgraničimo] with Greater Albania and that we say, ‘enough is enough, 
this is how far you have come’. As long as we don’t do that, the Albanians will have a tactical 
advantage to determine when they want to cause conflict and when they want to cause instability 
that would suit them and their allies.” Not only is Vulin suggesting a delimitation with Greater 
Albania instead of the request of Kosovo Albanians for consolidated statehood, he is also 
suggesting that things might get worse in Serbia if we do not act fast and establish clear borders 
between these two peoples with diametrically opposed ideologies. Fear is incited once more when 
Vulin claims that “if Greater Albania is created by force, the Balkans will be set on fire once again, 
and this fire will not only burn in the Balkans” (Dnevnik 2, 25.10.2018, 00:35), pointing to the 
previously established image of Albanians as “warmongers”, thirsty for territory, and wanting war 
with Serbia. All of these articulations institute Albanians from the region as an antagonistic force 
to be reckoned with, as the “thieves” of “our” enjoyment. 
A third nodal point anchoring the ideological conflict between Serbs and Albanians is the signifier 
“Milošević”, as mentioned earlier. Milošević as an ideological construct that embodies the Serbian 
hegemonic pretenses towards Kosovo, a fierce discrimination against Kosovo Albanians and a 
disregard for human rights, is articulated in relation to Vučić and his current politics towards 
Kosovo. This is explicitly evident in Vučić’s speech in North Mitrovica on 9 September 2018, 
which the media even termed “Vučić’s Gazimestan”, referencing Milošević’s speech at Gazimestan 
in 1989 (Dnevnik 2, 09.09.2018). This speech acted as a “founding moment” of the Serbian 
hegemonic claim to Kosovo in the wake of the Yugoslav break-up, consolidating the link between 
Serbian nationalism and the myth of Kosovo as always having belonged to Serbia and that it always 
will remain Serbian (see also Bieber 2002; Čolović 2002; 2017).  
In terms of comparisons between Vučić and Milošević, citationality and mimicry can be used as 
analytical categories: Vučić’s speech in North Mitrovica is a performative re-articulation of 
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Milošević’s speech from 1989. Through this performative aspect, it is also a contemporary 
reinvention of a wider politics of Serbia towards Kosovo, issued by “great leaders” (in Vučić’s 
words) in each respective moment in time. Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 09.09.2018, 06:15; Danas 2018s, 9 
September) even cited Milošević’s politics towards Kosovo during the 1990s and his Gazimestan 
speech from 1989 in his own speech from September 2018, claiming that:  
Milošević was a great Serbian leader, his intentions were certainly the best, but our results 
were much worse. Not because he, or anyone else, wanted it so, but because our wishes were 
not realistic, and we neglected and underestimated the interests and aspirations of other 
peoples [drugih naroda], which is why we paid the highest and most serious price. 
Vučić is dis-articulating his own politics towards Kosovo from that of Milošević, although not 
entirely distancing himself from the figure of Milošević. By claiming that Milošević’s intentions 
were best, even though the result was not as successful, he articulates a wish to build upon 
Milošević’s politics with other means, i.e., reinvent Serbia’s political practice towards Kosovo in a 
more “realistic” light, keeping in mind the “interests and aspirations of other peoples”, such as 
Kosovo Albanians, or even Western nations that support Kosovo’s independence. This turn 
towards “realism”, “pragmatism” and “rationality” is constitutive of a greater shift of Vučić’s vision 
for Serbia’s future in terms of structural change. With the internal dialogue on Kosovo and his idea 
of razgraničenje, repeated and performed in various instances, such as his speech in North Mitrovica, 
Vučić is also trying to re-frame the structures of feeling related to the question of Kosovo in Serbia. 
This is primarily done through articulating Kosovo as an emotional issue (which is “bad” for the 
future of Serbia) that should be viewed rationally (which is “good” for the future of Serbia). In 
Vučić’s conception, Milošević had grand ideas, but they were not rational and realistic. Vučić’s task 
is, consequently, to face the Serbian public with the “inconvenient truth” about how “we have lost 
Kosovo” (Dnevnik 2, 27.12.2018, 15:31) and should therefore abandon the “emotional approach” 
towards dealing with this issue. This is also in line with the earlier analyzed self-articulation of Vučić 
as a reasonable, responsible and honest leader (subchapter 5.8). 
Apart from articulating Milošević as a reference to distance his own politics around Kosovo from 
past practices, Vučić is referencing Milošević’s “leadership” as another issue he can build on 
through his own reframed approach towards Kosovo. However, Milošević’s leadership is also 
something that frequently resurfaces in the discourse on the legitimacy of Kosovo’s independence 
and the Kosovo Albanian suffering under Serbian rule, constituting a floating signifier. For 
instance, after Vučić’s visit to Northern Kosovo and his speech in Mitrovica, Kadri Veseli, the 
Chairman of the Kosovo Assembly, accused Vučić of using the same rhetoric as Slobodan 
Milošević, while the opposition parties have criticized the Kosovo Government for allowing Vučić 
to mark the territory of Northern Kosovo as under his control (Dnevnik 2, 09.09.2018, 15:10). 
Similarly, before Vučić’s visit to Gazivode on 8 September, Enver Hoxhaj, the Deputy Prime 
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Minister of Kosovo, said on his Twitter account that Vučić is following in the same footsteps as 
Milošević, because he wants to visit Gazivode to spread hatred “like his ideological father did at 
Gazimestan 30 years ago” (Danas 2018g, 08 September). On the day of Vučić’s visit to the lake, he 
reiterated his claim about parallels between Vučić and Milošević and added that the EEAS is 
promoting anti-European politics in the Balkans (ibid.). These references to the past were taken up 
by Serbian Prime Minister Brnabić, who accused the Kosovo political representatives of “not 
having peace in their interest, [that] war equals stability to them, and that they do not see a different 
future [for Serbia and Kosovo] from what has been our joint past” (Dnevnik 2, 09.09.2018, 16:22).  
6.4 Articulations of the Antagonistic “Others” 
Having discussed the way the conflict has been re-articulated (as a conflict between Serbs and 
Albanians as peoples, as a conflict of these peoples over territory, and as a conflict between 
competing ideological projects), it is now useful to look into how the antagonistic Others have 
been articulated. Shifting from an articulation of Albanians as a heterogeneous group in 2013, 
whereby they are presented as a viable political subject to negotiate with, Serbian hegemonic actors 
articulate the Albanian Other within the partition discourse as a homogeneous group. Whereas in 
2013, Kosovo Albanians were largely differentiated from Albanians outside Kosovo (be it in Serbia 
or the neighboring countries), in 2017 and primarily 2018, the differences between these political 
subjects were disarticulated and a chain of equivalence established between the demands of Kosovo 
Albanians, Albanians and Muslims inhabiting the South of Serbia proper (Sandžak and the Presevo 
valley), as well as Albanians living in the neighboring countries of the region. More importantly, 
this homogeneous group has been articulated as both strong and powerful and weak and powerless 
at the same time. 
In addition, Albanians in Kosovo are not articulated as legitimate citizens of Serbia, even though 
Serbia still claimed Kosovo as part of its territory. Only Serbs in Kosovo are articulated as citizens. 
For instance, in early 2017, in connection to the train incident and the unrests in Northern Kosovo, 
Thaçi claimed that Serbia intended to annex Northern Kosovo in the same manner as Russia did 
Crimea, by using the same tactics of sending weapons and undercover military to the North (Danas 
2017j, 25 January). To this, Vučić replied that the Kosovo Albanians were “spreading stupidity” 
about how Serbia wants to annex the North the same way Russia did, and that this analogy testifies 
to the fact “that they were poor pupils or have never even gone to school” (Dnevnik 2, 02.02.2017, 
05:20). By calling Kosovo Albanians stupid or uneducated, Vučić is presenting them as inferior, or 
“lesser than” Serbs. This is constitutive of the earlier mentioned fantasy of Serb superiority over 
Albanians (subchapter 4.4.), in which Albanians are articulated as the radical Other – inferior, 
primitive, undeserving (see Salecl 1994). At the same time, when Nikolić was informing the 
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ambassadors of China, Russia and USA about the actions taken by Pristina against the Serbs in 
Northern Kosovo, he said that “endangering the security of the citizens of Kosovo and Metohija 
in any form should be prevented” (Dnevnik 2, 02.02.2017, 11:00). By referring to Kosovo Serbs as 
citizens who are threatened by the actions of Pristina, Kosovo Albanians are not treated as citizens 
but as an antagonistic subject who is endangering the security of the proper citizens of Kosovo 
and Metohija, that is Serbs. Kosovo Albanians are excluded from the discourse on Serbian 
citizenship, which is constitutive of the conception of Serbia as a nationalizing state with one core 
nation (see Brubaker 1996). On the other hand, Kosovo Serbs are explicitly articulated as citizens 
by the Kosovo Government. For instance, during the train incident, when Nikolić said that Serbia 
would go to war in order to protect the Serbs in Northern Kosovo, the Prime Minister of Kosovo 
Isa Mustafa (M. R. M. 2017, in Danas, 15 January) said that 
Kosovo Serbs are equal citizens of our Republic. There is no need for Belgrade to protect 
them and to separate them from other citizens by erecting walls, because they are not in any 
danger and will not be in any danger. We all have a need to always communicate and work 
together on building a common European perspective.  
Mustafa is referring to the concrete wall that the local government of North Mitrovica started 
building on their side of the main bridge in December 2016, which I mentioned earlier (subchapter 
6.2.). The wall was justified as a necessary support wall because the bridge was being “revitalized” 
as part of the bridge revitalization agreement between Belgrade and Pristina concluded in August 
2015 (Office for Kosovo and Metohija 2015). When the local Serbs protested about the announced 
demolition of the wall by Kosovo authorities and gathered in front of it, Thaçi told the local Serbs 
that they have nothing to fear from Kosovo authorities (Dnevnik 2, 02.02.2017, 11:25), and that 
“the Kosovo security forces will not do them any harm, because they are there to protect the lives 
of all citizens of Kosovo, regardless of their ethnicity” (Danas 2017i, 2 February).  
Articulating Serbs as equal citizens of Kosovo has also been part of Haradinaj’s political practice 
when he took office as Prime Minister, often speaking in Serbian instead of Albanian when 
addressing them directly. As part of this agonistic articulation of Serbs, the A/CSM is constituted 
as a body that Kosovo Serbs do not necessarily need to have full and equal rights in Kosovo. This 
left room for the A/CSM to be articulated as a hegemonic project of Serbia, not of Kosovo Serbs. 
In commenting on the decision of the Kosovo Constitutional Court to halt the implementation of 
the August 2015 agreement on the principles and elements of the A/CSM setup, Haradinaj 
(Dnevnik 2, 20.12.2017, 17:55) said that: 
We all understand that this is not an easy situation, because the Constitutional Court is, after 
all, the Constitutional Court. But there is still room in our Constitution to do this [implement 
the A/CSM]. And I believe it will be appropriate for the needs of Kosovo Serbs who live 
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here. Otherwise, Kosovo Serbs are not only dependent on the Association, they are also part 
of Kosovo institutions: the Assembly and the Government. 
By articulating Kosovo Serbs agonistically, as part of the state of Kosovo, both in terms of 
citizenship and institutional participation, Serbs are heterogenized: on the one hand, Serbs who 
want to be part of the Kosovo framework can be constituted as equal citizens, and on the other, 
those who do not are “Serbia’s Serbs”, constituting Serbia’s hegemonic project in Kosovo, which 
is in this context the A/CSM. 
The A/CSM is a nodal point both in the discourse on Albanians being weak/powerless and 
Albanians being strong/powerful, constituting a floating signifier. In the former, the A/CSM is 
related to the Albanians’ “inability” to implement it properly and their patronage by “great powers” 
and inability to do anything without their approval. It is also about Albanians failing to join 
international organizations such as UNESCO or Interpol, which Serbia has successfully blocked 
on a few occasions. In a nutshell, local Serb resistance in Northern Kosovo and Serbia’s resistance 
to Kosovo joining international organizations are the main practices that constitute Albanians as 
weak/powerless, since this is juxtaposed with Serbia’s power. In the latter discourse on Albanians 
being strong/powerful, they are constituted as a threat to the lives and livelihood of Kosovo Serbs, 
something that has been operationalized, for instance, during the train incident, and the demolition 
of the bridge wall in Mitrovica. Frequently, Kosovo Albanians are articulated as wanting to “take 
over” Northern Kosovo. Additionally, specifically regarding the lack of implementation of A/CSM 
since 2013, Kosovo Albanians are articulated as powerful in their backing and support by the 
international community to “do whatever they want” and disrespect agreements such as the 
establishment of the A/CSM. This way, various members of the international community are 
sometimes articulated as the Other (opponents) and sometimes as supporters of Serbia. The 
Albanians being backed by the most powerful nations of the world is what makes them powerful 
as well and puts Serbia in a weakened position. Somewhat paradoxically, their support by the 
international community is what makes them both weak and strong at the same time. 
This is evident in the incident surrounding the arrest of Marko Đurić on 26 March 2018 by ROSU 
in North Mitrovica and his release later the same day. Namely, Đurić was in North Mitrovica as 
part of the internal dialogue on Kosovo but entered the territory without the proper approval of 
the central authorities in Pristina. Given that Pristina saw his entry into Kosovo as illegal, the special 
forces ROSU were sent to Northern Kosovo to arrest him. The incident was accompanied by 
ROSU’s excessive use of force against the local Serb leaders who were trying to protest about 
Đurić’s arrest, whereby several of them were injured and ended up in hospital (Danas 2018i, 26 
March; Dnevnik 2, 26.03.2018). After the incident, Srpska Lista announced that they would boycott 
their participation in the Kosovo Government and that they would form the A/CSM unilaterally, 
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as it had been several years since the Kosovo Government took on the obligation to establish it 
and failed (Danas 2018e, 29 March). In regard to this, the Office for Kosovo and Metohija issued 
an announcement that 
Serbs did not recoil even when Haradinaj and Thaçi’s terrorists tried to march into Northern 
Kosovo and Metohija in NATO tanks and transporters [referring to Đurić’s arrest], and we 
hope that after beating up defenseless people they do not start to believe that they are very 
strong and that they can forcibly occupy the four municipalities North of Ibar” (Dnevnik 2, 
29.03.2018, 05:46).  
Clearly, the special forces that arrested Đurić are articulated as terrorists, something that has been 
constitutive of the discourse on Serbian-Albanian animosity since the Kosovo conflict of 1998 and 
1999. In this respect, “terrorist” actions are directed towards the remaining Serb community in 
Kosovo, whereas other details such as Đurić breaking Kosovo law by entering the territory without 
permission is either omitted or negated. Đurić and other Serbian officials have claimed that he sent 
his request to enter Kosovo 72 hours prior, according to previously established agreements 
between Serbia and Kosovo, but since his request was denied (for whatever reason), he was in 
breach of the law. Some commentators from both Kosovo and Serbia even speculated that Đurić 
was deliberately sent to Mitrovica to be arrested, knowing that his entry might cause legal action 
by the Kosovo authorities (Tasić and Čongradin 2018, in Danas, 28 March). Additionally, these 
“terrorist actions” by Pristina are not only directed towards the Serb community, but also towards 
the territory of Northern Kosovo, constituting the Kosovo authorities as a hostile force and a 
threat. As such, they are portrayed as having a certain ability to exert power over the Serb 
community and North Kosovo, while at the same time, they are “weak” because they are “playing 
dirty” in using force against “defenseless people”. 
Apart from the A/CSM, what constitutes Kosovo Albanians as simultaneously powerful and 
powerless is their support by the “international community”. For instance, after the 
abovementioned incident, Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 29.03.2018, 00:29) claimed that “neither Thaçi nor 
Haradinaj are important here, nor do they play any games here or have any significance. All of our 
relations and all of our negotiations are with those who sponsor them.” Those who sponsor them 
and “who are on Pristina’s side” are members of the international community, specifically “those 
who have created that country [Kosovo]. It is clear that we negotiate about Kosovo and Metohija 
with USA, UK and a few more EU countries, and not with the Pristina authorities” (Dnevnik 2, 
17.04.2018, 11:37). “When we say ‘the international community’, it is a euphemism for us, as we 
think of the Western world, who is on Pristina’s side”, Vučić claimed (Dnevnik 2, 16.08.2018, 
03:50). In an “appeal to the international community”, Vučić asked them to “not only hear but also 
to listen to everything the Albanians are saying, to understand well their messages and to prevent 
their potential attempt to invade the North and continue to attack the Serbian people” (Dnevnik 
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2, 01.06.2018, 02:37). Albanians are presented as a hostile force, but also as an entirely dependent 
force on their support by the international community, the latter of which is articulated as blindly 
supporting all actions of Pristina, even when they are violent and hostile. In this regard, the 
international community is constituted as an opponent of Serbia, seemingly always taking the 
Albanians’ side. 
Because of Serbia not only “fighting” against Pristina but also against great Western powers, in this 
same discourse Serbia is constituted as “weakened”, precisely because of this supposedly unfair 
treatment. International law and the many agreements signed thus far between Serbia and Kosovo 
are the nodal points that anchor Serbia’s argument about unfair treatment, since even when 
everything is on paper, “black on white”, the international community does not seem to care about 
it, but simply takes Pristina’s side. For instance, Vučić claimed that “our [Serbia’s] problem is that 
we have many papers, and all these papers are on our side. But the problem is that ‘might’ [sila, 
power] is not on our side. The people in Serbia should understand this, that we are weaker. Not 
weaker that the Albanians, but weaker than the USA” (Dnevnik 2, 24.04.2018, 14:20). The signifier 
“papers” stands in place of international law, which is one of the central nodal points of the 
“Kosovo is Serbia” discourse as mentioned in Chapter 5. The many resolutions adopted by the 
Serbian Parliament, government decrees, the references to UN Resolution 1244, the Helsinki Final 
Act, as well as the discursive practice of Serbian political subjects in the international arena 
(particularly before the UN Security Council) testify to the centrality of “international law” as an 
anchoring signifier of this discourse. This signifier is juxtaposed with the “might” of great powers 
as its antithesis, which constitutes Serbia as weakened, but also just and righteous. Even if Serbia 
is “losing” in the fight for Kosovo because of the might of great powers, it will always remain the 
moral “winner” in its defense of international legal principles and its defense of its people. By 
referring to Serbia’s negotiations with these great powers, Vučić claimed that 
In that case, your hands are tied, you are much smaller, you are much weaker, but you fight 
as courageously, nobly and proudly as you can for your country and for the interests of your 
people, for the Serb people in Kosovo and Metohija, so that they can live, so that they can 
survive in their heartland, and maintain their safety. That is our goal and our interest 
(Dnevnik 2, 18.04.2018, 04:52).  
This moral victory is also evident in the claim that Serbia is only interested in peace, only defending 
itself if being attacked, while Kosovo is only interested in threats and conflict. For instance, when 
Thaçi attended the commemoration of the Battle of Košare on 9 April 2018, honoring the fallen 
KLA fighters in this battle, he mentioned that in the wake of Serbia’s recent threats to Kosovo and 
its sovereignty, “Kosovo would respond in the same manner as it did 19 years ago – with guns” 
(Dnevnik 2, 09.04.2018, 10:00; Danas 2018l, 9 April). To this, Đurić responded that Thaçi “is not 
even hiding the fact that the main goal of his political activities, both former and present, is the 
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creation of a Greater Albania” (Danas 2018l, 9 April), while Vučić claimed that “it was not his 
[Thaçi’s] guns that have devastated Serbia, but someone else’s planes [referring to NATO]. It is 
our obligation to respond with peace” (Dnevnik 2, 09.04.2018, 11:08). The discourse of self-
victimization in Serbia, particularly the NATO bombing of 1999, is still very prevalent, but its nodal 
point is the moral victory of Serbia in the wake of unfair treatment, by defending international law, 
primarily the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
It is not only the USA or NATO that are articulated as blindly taking Pristina’s side, but also the 
EU in broader terms. When there were talks of unification between Albania and Kosovo in spring 
2017, Vučić claimed, as mentioned previously, that “he would be hanged on a pole in Brussels like 
one of those flags there” had he called for a unification of all Serbs in the region (Dnevnik 2, 
20.04.2017, 00:38). Similarly, the EU is blamed for not applying the same standards to Serbia and 
Kosovo in terms of fulfilling the agreements concluded within the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. For 
instance, Dačić claimed that “the representatives of the EU Commission are deaf-mute when it 
comes to Pristina [and their non-fulfillment of the obligations from the Brussels Agreement]. I am 
not sure if this illness is curable. When they have to say something against Pristina, it is as if the 
Tibetan council of the wise is presiding” (Dnevnik 2, 25.04.2018, 12:11). Additionally, when 
Nataliya Apostolova, the EU Ambassador to Kosovo mentioned that Kosovo should use the 
momentum of the new EU strategy towards the Western Balkans (adopted in February 2018) to 
lobby with non-recognizing countries for recognition, since the strategy puts Kosovo as an equal 
partner to the EU, Đurić mentioned that “[with this statement] she has put herself on the side of 
Pristina and directly delimited what could have been achieved in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue” 
(Dnevnik 2, 26.04.2018, 04:45). This is to the detriment of the Serbian position. One of the main 
sources of leverage of Serbia in the dialogue has been the fact that Kosovo is not treated like a fully 
recognized state, as evident in the five EU non-recognizing countries and the EU’s use of the 
“asterisk” when referring to Kosovo (without prejudice to its status, as stipulated by UN Resolution 
1244 and the ICJ decision from 2010). However, it has to be emphasized that the asterisk is a 
product of the Brussels dialogue (as part of the agreement on regional representation, see Chapter 
5) and used in the first mention of Kosovo in any document, after which it is omitted. 
The fact that Pristina has not established the A/CSM since 2013, Serbia sees as something that has 
happened because of the EU’s non-willingness to enforce it upon Kosovo. Vučić claimed that even 
though Pristina “openly admits” that it will not establish the A/CSM, “the EU and the world just 
keep silent […] Is there any justice in this? No there is not!” (Dnevnik 2, 25.04.2018, 11:43). Still, 
the EU continues to apply pressure on Serbia in the form of a “legally-binding agreement” as a 
precondition for membership, asking “between the lines” for Serbia to recognize the independence 
of Kosovo, Vučić claims (Dnevnik 2, 16.11.2017, 06:00). The fact that Serbia is voluntarily pursuing 
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EU membership is omitted and Serbia is presented as a victim in this process, since the means the 
EU is using are unjust. 
The power relation between Serbia and the EU, as well as “the international community” is only 
re-articulated in light of the proposed “compromise” solution that defined the scope of the Brussels 
dialogue primarily as of August 2018. The compromise agreement allows Serbia to be constituted 
as powerful both in international terms and towards the Pristina authorities, since it puts Serbia “in 
the good grace” of the West and subjectivates the West in the role of a supporter, instead of 
opponent. For instance, after Vučić and Thaçi met in Vienna with Austrian Prime Minister 
Sebastian Kurz and the EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Johannes 
Hahn, the idea of a compromise solution started to circulate in the media. The President of Austria 
even claimed to have witnessed “a historic moment” because of the constructive tone of Vučić and 
Thaçi during the talks (Dnevnik 2, 26.08.2018, 03:52), with Thaçi referring to it as a “peace 
agreement”. Because of this, Dačić claimed that Serbia “succeeded to change the West’s attitude, 
we have moved them away from their entrenched position. Simultaneously, we have remained 
good friends with Russia and China. Hence, on the part of the international community, there is 
no obstacle for an agreement between Belgrade and Pristina to be reached” (Dnevnik 2, 28.08.2018, 
03:10). In the wake of the formation of the Kosovo military, which was opposed by the 
international community without the proper constitutional changes by Kosovo, Dačić even claimed 
that “they [Kosovo] are not the West’s child anymore, they are a problem” (Dnevnik 2, 14.10.2018, 
00:46). “They are an obstacle to a peaceful solution regarding Kosovo and Metohija, which is why 
the position of Serbia is getting stronger and stronger and the [international community] has more 
understanding for our arguments” (ibid., 13:19). The very fact that the international community, 
primarily USA, “is prepared to listen to the Serbian side” and not pose ultimatums in terms of 
recognizing Kosovo is in Vučić’s eyes a sign that the power-relations between these parties have 
been re-constituted (Dnevnik 2, 26.10.2018, 02:33). Discussing the possible format of talks 
between Belgrade and Pristina to reach such a compromise solution, Vučić claimed that “without 
the participation of Serbia, nobody can solve any problem” and that “great powers cannot simply 
decide on their own” (Dnevnik 2, 29.10.2018, 03:13). 
The suggestion for a compromise in terms of partition has re-constituted Serbia as a “powerful 
player” in the international arena, and the unfair treatment by the international community was re-
articulated into support for Serbia’s arguments in the wake of the negotiations on the scope of the 
compromise agreement. Additionally, after Pristina introduced a 10 percent tax on all imports from 
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina early November 2018, Serbian hegemonic actors determined 
that the EU’s response was appropriate and that there was no more talk of the responsibilities “of 
both sides” as previously (Dnevnik 2, 07.11.2018). After the tax was raised to 100 percent on 21 
187 
 
November 2018, Vulin, in connection with the tax being against CEFTA and Kosovo’s SAA 
agreement, said that “we have proven ourselves to the EU enough times, it is time for Europe to 
prove themselves to us” (Dnevnik 2, 25.11.2018, 07:45). However, after several talks between the 
EU High Representative Mogherini and the representatives of Serbia and Kosovo, the EU failed 
to convince Kosovo to withdraw the 100 percent tax measure. Even the USA got involved in the 
debate, claiming that the momentum should be used to reach an agreement between the parties 
and even invited Vučić and Thaçi to the White House. However, they have not tried to lobby for 
the withdrawal of the tax measure without Serbia stopping its campaign against the international 
recognition of Kosovo and their membership of international institutions such as Interpol, which 
triggered the tax in the first place. All of this in turn led to a standstill in the Brussels dialogue 
altogether. In response, Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 07.12.2018, 07:03) said that 
no matter how many times they [Kosovo Albanians] violate public international law, 
Americans will always be on their side. And it is high time for us to come to terms with that 
and to understand that this is the final fact on the matter. They have recognized an 
independent Kosovo – that is the end of the story for them. Serbia cannot force them to 
change their minds, it is not realistic. […] I admit, both the Albanians in Kosovo and the 
Americans and everyone else are very strong, and we are small, weak, but we have nothing 
else to do, we are cornered. We have to protect ourselves as much as we can, given our 
position. 
In the end, given the failed attempt of the EU and USA to re-constitute the power-relations 
between them and Serbia, they are articulated as actors with a fixed position, one that will never 
change no matter what happens. They will always remain on the side of Pristina, which keeps 
feeding the discourse of self-victimization in Serbia in terms of its international positioning, which 
is determined by Kosovo. Given this situation, Serbia re-constitutes itself as “powerful” in terms 
of its refusal to participate in the “unfair game,” even at the cost of stopping the Brussels dialogue 
altogether. This lets Serbia keep a morally superior discursive position, since Kosovo is clearly 
articulated as the actor that is in the wrong and one that has caused the halt in the negotiations in 
Brussels with their 100 percent customs tax. 
6.5 Articulations of the Political “Us” 
In comparison to 2013, the logic of drawing political frontiers between “us” and “them” becomes 
populist and increasingly polarizing. It is populist in the Laclaudian sense, as a “logic of 
articulation” (Laclau 2005) that draws affective political frontiers between an “us” and a “them” 
(Palonen 2020). While previously, emphasis was laid on transforming antagonistic relations into 
agonistic, in 2017 and 2018 there is an increased focus on re-drawing political frontiers between 
Serbs and Albanians as antagonistic. In this context, the political “us” is built on the one hand in 
relation to the Albanian Other (articulated in ethnic terms) and foreign powers aligned with 
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Kosovo Albanians, and on the other hand in relation to political “dissidents” within the Serbian 
political collective as such, be it in Serbia (the opposition, NGOs) or in Kosovo (Kosovo Serbs 
who are not seen as representatives of Serbia’s official policy, such as opponents of the Srpska 
lista). What makes these articulations populist in terms of a post-foundational understanding is that 
the people, the political us, is entirely defined by what and who it excludes, making polarization 
more visible than previously, especially within the Serb community in Kosovo. They come to be 
entirely defined by affiliation to and membership of Srpska lista, who embodies the Serbian 
hegemonic project in Kosovo and the politics of SNS. To unpack this, I will first focus on the 
articulations of Serbs as “defending” or protecting Serbia in Kosovo (subject role of supporters), 
after which I will address how the divisions among them are created and accelerated as the partition 
idea gains traction as a viable compromise solution to the Belgrade-Pristina dispute (subject role of 
opponents). 
One issue that has always incited the opposition’s critique of Serbia’s policy regarding Kosovo as 
hypocritical is Srpska lista’s participation in the Kosovo Government, especially after Haradinaj 
became Prime Minister. In response to this, the Prime Minister of Serbia Ana Brnabić (Dnevnik 2, 
13.09.2017, 05:02) said that  
despite the entirely unfounded criticism by some parties in Serbia, the Serbs [in Kosovo and 
Metohija] are those people who keep Serbia in Kosovo in place, those people who have 
remained there and are responsibly and unitarily, without any internal divisions – which is 
very important –defending our interests in Kosovo and Metohija. 
Brnabić is articulating Kosovo Serbs as a homogeneous group, one that is the embodiment of 
Serbia in Kosovo. Primarily, legitimate members of this group are those who are part of or are 
supporting Srpska lista, which is part of the Kosovo Government, acting as an extension of Serbia 
in Kosovo. Within this, it represents Serbia in Kosovo, but it also represents the idea(l) of political 
unity before the common enemy. Presenting Serbs as defending Serbia in Kosovo without any 
internal divisions marginalizes those moderate voices that might not be entirely in support of 
Serbia’s policy in Kosovo. Through homogenizing Kosovo Serbs around Srpska lista in this 
manner, divisions among Kosovo Serbs are created along the lines of who supports Serbia’s 
hegemonic project in Kosovo (and by extension SNS’s) and who opposes it. Those who oppose it 
are not constituted as legitimate representatives of the Kosovo Serbs community and because of 
the polarized discourse, are thus aligned with the project of the state of Kosovo. The logic follows 
the familiar principle “if you are not with us, you are certainly against us”. 
Similarly, when the local Serb politician Oliver Ivanović was murdered in January 2018 – whose 
murder is still not solved at the time of writing (December 2020) – it was articulated as an attack 
on Serbia in Kosovo. Even though a campaign by Srpska lista was led against Ivanović and his 
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candidacy for mayor of North Mitrovica in 2017, when he was murdered, Ivanović was aligned 
with the state of Serbia in Kosovo, as the embodiment of local Serb resistance against the state 
project of Kosovo. This is in line with the earlier perception of Ivanović elaborated in Chapter 5. 
For instance, in connection to Ivanović’s murder, Đurić (Dnevnik 2, 16.01.2018, 14:41) said that 
“this is an attempt to push the Serb people in Kosovo and Metohija into chaos, to push Serbia into 
chaos – this is an attack on the entire Serbian people, and it is a criminal act of terrorism that must 
be and will be punished.” As Ivanović is presented as one of the main pillars of local Serb resistance 
to Pristina, his murder is articulated as an attack on the entire Serbian people, not just those living 
in Kosovo, and is termed an act of terrorism, something that resonates with the ongoing discourse 
on Albanians being terrorists. 
However, it was known that Ivanović publicly stood against Srpska lista and especially their 
connection to the criminal elements in Kosovo and Serbia. To the accusations of the opposition 
in Serbia that the Serbian Government was killing political opponents, Vučić responded (ibid., 
07:55): 
Shame on you for the most brutal and worst lies. At least somebody must stand up against 
your lies. And ‘shame on you’ is not harsh enough in comparison to what kind of damage 
you are inflicting upon your country. We will not allow them to use this to strengthen 
Kosovo security forces, and to finally put an end to the robbery of Kosovo and Metohija 
from Serbia, because they think it should have happened much earlier, so they use this as an 
ideal opportunity, an ideal impetus to do so. And I will not allow the various liars in Belgrade 
to accuse the state, to accuse any of us in any way of killing Oliver Ivanović. 
Vučić draws political frontiers in two directions: one against the Pristina authorities, who aim to 
control and take away Northern Kosovo from Serbia with their security forces (steal our 
enjoyment), and the other against domestic political opponents who do not subjectivate into the 
polarization of the political field along ethnic lines, in which all acts against the Serb people in 
Kosovo are committed by Pristina and Kosovo Albanians. This way, Vučić is articulating a political 
“us” that is entirely constituted by these two antagonistic camps (Kosovo authorities and the 
opposition in Serbia), an “us” that must support the hegemonic project of Serbia in Kosovo, since 
everything else would be articulated as a direct support of the opposing project of Kosovo – as 
evident in the above statement. 
The Serbian Orthodox Church also helps polarize the field and interprets the attack on Ivanović 
as an attack by the Other on “us”, the Serbian collective and the Serbian state. Bishop Teodosije, 
for instance, claimed that (ibid., 12:15) “[Oliver], through his perseverance and determination to 
remain in Kosovo and Metohija, gave hope to the survival of all Serbs in these areas.” Ivanović in 
these statements comes to embody the fantasy of resistance of Serbs to different challenges in 
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Kosovo both through history and in current times, challenges that aim to banish “Serbdom” from 
this area, be it in the form of statehood, or in the form of people. 
On the other hand, those subjects who do not support Serbia’s hegemonic project in Kosovo in 
its current form, such as Rada Trajković, have articulated Ivanović as the embodiment of the 
“Kosovo is Serbia” discourse, somebody who opposes the partition of territory. Trajković, one of 
the prominent Kosovo Serb politicians who has frequently spoken out against Srpska lista, claimed 
that “Oliver was one of the most powerful, authentic voices of Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija, 
who clearly and without any hesitation defended our interests and who very strongly advocated 
against the partition of Kosovo” (ibid., 11:40). Hence, Ivanović is not only used to foster fear and 
animosity between Serbs and Albanians, as is evident in Đurić’s and Vučić’s statement, but also to 
criticize the idea of potentially partitioning Kosovo that emerged as part of the internal dialogue 
on Kosovo at that time. In the former statement, Ivanović’s murder is used to articulate unity of 
Kosovo Serbs and all Serbs outside of Kosovo against the common enemies, be it domestic (the 
opposition) or foreign (Kosovo Albanians, foreign powers). In the latter, Ivanović’s murder 
emphasizes the heterogeneity of Kosovo Serb voices and the hegemonic project of Serbia working 
against its own people in Kosovo. At the same time, the latter statement builds a political “us” that 
is comprised of Kosovo Serbs as separate from Serbs from the rest of Serbia, those Kosovo Serbs 
who do not support current Serbian policies towards Kosovo. To summarize, the political “us” 
comes to include Vučić and his Government (and by extension his party SNS), everybody who 
supports the policies of this Government, and Kosovo Serbs from Srpska lista and supporting 
Srpska lista. The political “them” comes to include the opposition to these policies of Vučić’s 
Government, and Kosovo Serbs who do not support Srpska lista and said policies. Later, when the 
partition discourse gains traction towards the middle of 2018, Kosovo Serbs are also divided along 
geographic lines, in terms of North and South (those in the North are politically favored, since they 
back up the idea of partition). 
In order to respond to the crisis as a result of Ivanović’s murder, and to consolidate the 
homogenization of the political “us” in Kosovo and Serbia, Vučić visited Kosovo, starting with 
the North, four days after the murder. Regarding his visit, Bishop Teodosije (Dnevnik 2, 
20.01.2018, 05:22) said that  
Today’s visit […] of Vučić is very significant for all of us in Kosovo and Metohija. […] All 
of us who currently live in difficult conditions in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija know 
that we cannot survive without our state. Above all, we need to have the courage, strength 
and endurance to survive and stay in these areas, but as I said, only with the universal help 
of our country, as it has been so far. 
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Teodosije is articulating Serbia as “our state”, not Kosovo. “We” are also the embodiment and 
protectors of that state in Kosovo and Metohija, an articulation that is constitutive of the “Kosovo 
is Serbia” discourse, in which as long as there are Serb people living in this area, it will be considered 
part of Serbia. Homogenizing the Serbian political collective occurs on two levels: on the one hand, 
Kosovo Serbs are homogenized with reoccurring calls for unity among them; and on the other, 
Kosovo Serbs are homogenized with Serbs from Serbia, constitutive of the larger narrative of the 
unity of all Serbian people no matter where they live (under the signifier of Serbdom). 
Homogenizing Serbs in Kosovo is primarily done through calls for unity, above all political unity 
in supporting Srpska lista, which substitutes Serbia in Kosovo politically. In the wake of the local 
elections in Kosovo in October 2017, Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 18.10.2017, 02:22) claimed that  
There is a great deal of outside pressure from some Western embassies to break up the 
Serbian List and to reduce the Serbian influence in Kosovo and Metohija. Not all embassies, 
but some of them with great influence and who apply great pressure. They do this through 
individual Serbs, together with the Albanians, because they do not want the Serbs to have 
that key influence, that golden ticket in the [Kosovo] Government, but want to make it 
difficult for them by taking away the local governments from them. 
The above statement illustrates perfectly Vučić’s populist meaning-making in terms of polarizing 
the political field around Srpska lista into “us” and “them”. Those who support Srpska lista also 
support legitimate state interests of Serbia and the interests of Kosovo Serbs to govern themselves 
against the threatening forces coming from Kosovo Albanian ranks and foreign embassies, who 
do not have the best interests of Serbs at heart. Only through unity of Kosovo Serbs can a victory 
for them be achieved, as evident in Đurić’s claim that “there should be no divisions among Serbs 
in Kosovo and Metohija, since the matter is about their collective relationship with Pristina 
institutions (Dnevnik 2, 22.10.2017, 03:38). When Srpska lista won, Vučić claimed that “this is one 
of the greatest victories of the state of Serbia, and I am not ashamed to emphasize this – the state 
of Serbia and its idea of creating a unified Serbian list” (Dnevnik 2, 29.10.2017, 04:17). Here, Srpska 
lista is equated with the state of Serbia, since the project of creating it had as its final goal the 
unification of all Kosovo Serbs around a common goal – supporting Serbian state and national 
interests. This quest for unity was emphasized once more directly after the list won the local 
elections, with Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 23.10.2017, 03:12) claiming that 
Serbs are more unified than ever, and for the first time, the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija 
are, I would say, less quarrelsome than even Albanians among themselves. This brings us 
another advantage, because many outside forces and Albanians as well wanted different 
political options to exist for the Serbs to choose from [in the elections], so that they can 
work with these different options and say: these people want the Community of Serb 
Municipalities to have these competencies, and these people want others, so that the Serbs 




This hegemonic collectivization of Kosovo Serbs is part of Serbia’s nationalizing project in 
Kosovo, part of which is the establishment of the A/CSM with executive powers, as has been 
explained in Chapter 5. For this project to be realized, Kosovo Serbs must collectively embody this 
project, hence there is a need to homogenize them as a group and not let heterogeneity among 
them become visible. Heterogeneity in representing Kosovo Serbs politically is articulated as 
antagonistic to the project of fighting for the realization of their collective rights and interests 
through establishing the A/CSM. These interests can hence only be achieved if Serbs act as a 
unified whole, not a pluralistic collective. 
The second aspect of homogenizing Serbs is through drawing equivalence between Kosovo Serbs 
and Serbs from Serbia, constitutive of a larger discourse on Serbdom, i.e., all Serbs belonging to 
the same nationhood no matter where they live. Vučić’s earlier mentioned visit to Kosovo after 
Ivanović’s murder performatively homogenizes both Serbs in Kosovo (disarticulating political and 
geographic divisions among them) and Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia alike (articulating political, 
historical and emotional links between them). For instance, in Laplje Selo, a Serbian-majority village 
next to Gračanica South of the Ibar River, Vučić held a public meeting with the townspeople to 
answer all their questions and help facilitate financial assistance to the residents. He “thank[ed] the 
people for coming out [to meet him] during the snowstorm, and for preserving their homeland and 
their Serbian name and surname” (Dnevnik 2, 20.01.2018, 11:25). The homogenizing signifier in 
his statement is “Serbian name and surname”, pointing to the fact that everybody who “calls” 
themselves Serbian constitutes a Serb, someone that Serbia will inevitably protect and see as a 
member of the Serbian political and national collective. They are, in turn seen as “protectors of 
Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija” (ibid., 12:00), which constitutes the people as Serbian in terms of 
both statehood and nationhood. 
After the visit and having reportedly attempted to solve the problems of local residents for six 
hours, Vučić said that he considered his visit to be “very significant for the unification of all Serbian 
people and the position of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija” (Dnevnik 2, 21.01.2018, 02:31), whereas 
Đurić claimed that (ibid., 09:50) 
As a consequence of this visit, Serbia is in my opinion uniting in its efforts to help our people 
in Kosovo and Metohija. The Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija are also uniting in their desire 
to fight for them staying and surviving in Kosovo together, with the support of their state. 
And I think with this kind of gatherings we are defeating the ideas and goals of those who 
wanted to divide us with their acts of terror and cause us the greatest possible harm. 
It is evident that Serbs in Kosovo as well as in Serbia are homogenized and unified against the 
“common enemy”, which is in this case the “terrorists” who have murdered Ivanović and who 
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want to cause us harm. It is only through unification that the Serbs can resists these attempts to 
split them up and deny them their right to live and remain in Kosovo. 
Additionally, Kosovo Serbs are interwoven with the Serbia-run institutional framework in Kosovo, 
embodying it as “part of Serbia” as well. For instance, within the internal dialogue on Kosovo on 
1 February 2018, when Kosovo was discussed with representatives of the healthcare sector, Đurić 
claimed that “Serbia should know that the white coats, along with the education sector, and all 
other institutions of ours, are the first line of defense of the survival of our people in Kosovo and 
Metohija” (Dnevnik 2, 01.02.2018, 17:20). This statement indicates that first and foremost, the 
people are important, in order to maintain Serbia’s hegemonic claim to Kosovo: Đurić does not 
say that the institutions are the first line of defense of the Serbian state in Kosovo, but that they 
are the first line of defense of the survival of Serbian people in Kosovo. The people come to center 
the entire claim to Kosovo, so much so that they are interwoven into the institutional framework 
and territory as such, as argued in this chapter. 
A subject that is primarily important for this is Srpska lista, members of which through their 
participation in the Kosovo Government have been able to exert at least limited power over this 
framework. This is due to the political and institutional setup of the Kosovo framework, in which 
members of the minority communities (such as Serbs) are guaranteed a number of places in the 
Parliament and the Government. Srpska lista, being part of this institutional framework, has been 
able to boycott the Kosovo Government and freeze their participation in it on numerous occasions, 
which makes them a vital instrument of maintaining Serbia’s claim to Kosovo and why it is so 
important for the Serbian Government that every Kosovo Serb support their politics. Through 
homogenizing Kosovo Serbs as a political subject around Srpska lista, Serbia maintains its role as 
a hegemonic actor able to have a say in internal issues of the Kosovo Government, all the while 
negating Kosovo’s independence. In this sense, the authorities in Pristina are not considered as a 
legitimate political subject, but Srpska lista is since it is “Serbian” through and through: it is directly 
supported and politically backed by the governing SNS in Serbia, while at the same time being 
exclusively comprised of Kosovo Serbs who claim to represent legitimate Kosovo Serb and Serbian 
interests.  
For instance, Srpska lista, with the support of Belgrade, has managed to politicize the question of 
the North in territorial terms, based on the failed implementation of A/CSM by Pristina. In March 
2018, Goran Rakić, the mayor of North Mitrovica, announced that the mayors of the 10 Serb-
majority led municipalities from the ranks of Srpska lista would form the A/CSM on their own 
terms, independent of Pristina: “we, as legitimate representatives of the Serb people in Kosovo and 
Metohija, cannot be silent and will no longer be a decoration” (Dnevnik 2, 27.03.2018, 03:20). The 
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leaders of the local governments announced that they would form the Community independently 
on 19 April 2018, on the fifth anniversary of the Brussels agreement, adding that the A/CSM was 
one of the preconditions for the Kosovo Serbs to participate in the Kosovo Government. The idea 
of forming the A/CSM was put on hold when the Kosovo Government was given a deadline of 
four months by the EU to form the statute, but it managed to politicize the territorial situation in 
the North as a “special” case. This is evident in Rakić’s statement from 25 July 2018, criticizing 
opposition and civil society voices against a possible partition of Northern Kosovo, in which he 
claimed that the options of partition and demarcation should not be criticized by those who “either 
way hold Kosovo identity cards” or even identity cards of countries that have “sponsored Kosovo’s 
independence” (Dnevnik 2, 25.07.2018, 06:00). In this manner, Rakić is helping institute a political 
“us” that is comprised of “real” Serbs around Srpska lista, claiming that “80 percent of Serbs [from 
Kosovo] have given their vote of confidence in precisely this Government and President Vučić.” 
These Serbs do not legitimize Kosovo’s independence, and should be left alone to solve this issue 
with their “own country and with President Vučić” (ibid.). 
Being Serbia-run, Srpska lista is additionally articulated as an institution of the Serbian people, 
according to the same logic of articulation of other Serbia-run institutions. On the anniversary of 
forming Srpska lista (which has previously only differed in name, see Chapter 5), a solemn session 
was organized in North Mitrovica to commemorate its founding moment. Đurić was present at 
the session and said that Srpska lista was not simply a political party, but an institution that protects 
the interests of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija (Dnevnik 2, 08.06.2018, 09:07), adding that Srpska 
lista has become the bulwark of defense of the Serbian people in Kosovo and Metohija, calling for 
unity and perseverance (ibid., 09:43). Given that the number of Serbia-run institutions has been 
decreasing since the signing of the Brussels agreement, other bodies come to take their place, such 
as Srpska lista. By helping entrench and sediment Srpska lista as the only viable political option for 
Kosovo Serbs, Serbia is simultaneously instituting its foothold in Kosovo through this party. After 
all, sedimented institutions are much harder to remove and negotiate over, than are fleeting 
articulations and materialities. Through this move, Srpska lista is articulated to embody the political 
“us” as the last bulwark of resistance against the threatening Others, be it from the ranks of Serbs 
from both Kosovo and Serbia, or from the ranks of Kosovo Albanians. 
Once the question of Northern Kosovo has become politicized with the idea of partition around 
the end of July and beginning of August 2018, an increasing number of Kosovo Serbs started to 
voice their concern about this idea. Apart from the Orthodox Church and the open letter of Bishop 
Teodosije voicing his concerns about partition and drawing of ethnic border, a number of local 
non-governmental organizations (with some NGOs from Serbia) have also come together and 
compiled a letter they sent to Federica Mogherini, the EU mediator in the Brussels dialogue, to 
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rethink the EU’s support of re-drawing the borders of Kosovo. They warned about the “dangerous 
principle of ethnic ownership of territory” which could create a chain reaction in the region and an 
exodus of people from the “wrong ethnicity” into the newly created ethnically claimed territories 
(Radio Slobodna Evropa 2018, in Danas, 11 August). Apart from them, around 3 and 4 August 
2018, when the deadline given to Pristina by the EU to compile a statute of the A/CSM has passed, 
there were increasing warnings from various hegemonic actors from Serbia and Kosovo alike about 
the possibility of incidents in Northern Kosovo, that would allow for partitioning the North, or 
for Pristina to take lake Gazivode by force (Tasić 2018, in Danas, 2 August). For instance, the 
Serbian Orthodox Church warned about an “incident, either in the form of the proclamation of 
the alleged autonomy of the North or the takeover of Lake Gazivode by the Kosovo police” which 
would “directly serve to create a situation on the ground that would cement the territorial division 
and permanently endanger the civilian population” (Danas 2018o, 3 August). The opposition in 
Serbia has also issued several statements about the necessity to prevent heightened tensions 
between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo and causing constructed conflict situations among them 
(Danas 2018j, 3 August). Additionally, in an open letter addressed to the Serb-led local 
governments and generally Serbs in Kosovo, Vučić (RTS 2018, in Danas, 3 August) stated that  
While I am in charge, Serbia will not allow organized violence against Serbs and their 
sanctities, nor their persecution. […] Apart from us, who are genuinely dedicated to 
maintaining peace in our Southern province, this is also the primary task of the KFOR and 
NATO missions, of which I particularly expect and demand to protect the peace by 
preventing any possible attempts, by anyone, and under any pretext, to seize and hijack the 
Gazivode hydroelectric power plant, the Valač substation or any other key infrastructure 
object on which your survival depends. For your sake and the future of the whole of Serbia, 
we will continue to strive for reaching a compromise and comprehensive solution. 
Clearly, by naming Gazovode and Valač as two potential sites of “attack” by the Pristina authorities, 
Vučić is politicizing Northern Kosovo as particularly endangered and a place that needs Serbia’s, 
as well as NATO’s protection. The fact that KFOR was present at Gazivode from the early hours 
in the morning on 4 August only heightened the tensions and increased anticipations that 
something might happen. After the situation remained calm in terms of a potential conflict 
occurring, Vučić held a meeting with local Serb leaders from Kosovo to discuss next steps. In 
response to this, the local representatives of Srpska lista responded with unequivocal support for 
Vučić’s politics towards a potential solution for the Belgrade-Pristina conflict, stating that no 
solution can ever be reached without first consulting the Kosovo Serb representatives. In an open 
letter to Vučić, they wrote (Dnevnik 2, 15.08.2018 04:28; Danas 2018f, 15 August): 
Dear President Vučić, in the name of the Serbian people in Kosovo, who see in your politics 
the only hope for continuing their existence in our centuries-old heartland, please do not 
give up the fight for a just, sustainable and compromise solution, which will mean a better 
future for not only Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, but for the entire Serbian people. […] 
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We urge you not to give up on your mission of rescuing Northern Kosovo and everything 
else that can be rescued from the clutches of Pristina. 
By articulating Pristina authorities as a threat, particularly as a threat to Northern Kosovo, which 
is always explicitly mentioned as a special case, Srpska lista is producing the political “us” around 
Kosovo Serb affiliation with Serbia, particularly the Government led by Vučić. They primarily 
subjectivate into any solution suggested by Vučić, be it partition, delineation, or any other form of 
compromise, stating that “we do not know what the compromise solution is, but we conveyed a 
message to President Aleksandar Vučić that he has our absolute support” (Danas 2018k, 25 July). 
In this manner, Vučić acts as an empty signifier embodying the possible compromise solution, 
which in the end might mean many different things. However, the one issue in common to these 
various solutions is that they come from or are supported by Vučić, which for Srpska lista is 
enough. I will return to this point in the subchapter 6.6. 
It has to be re-iterated that the entire meaning-making around a compromise solution in mid-2018 
has become increasingly populist, since frontiers are drawn between everybody who supports Vučić 
and his Government’s solution for Kosovo and those who oppose it. Even within the Serb 
community in Kosovo, which was previously articulated as one whole with the same interests, there 
are divisions created in 2018 because of the suggested compromise of razgraničenje. The same logic 
has followed articulations of the Serbian Orthodox Church, some members of which have also 
voiced their opposition to the idea. On the other hand, as also elaborated previously, Kosovo 
Albanians are increasingly articulated as antagonistic, primarily because of the idea of partitioning 
Kosovo along ethnic lines. The partition discourse is thus polarizing the entire political field in 
Serbia and Kosovo alike. 
Having extensively dealt with the shifting articulations of Albanians from agonism to antagonism 
by scrutinizing how the conflict has been articulated, how the antagonistic Albanian Other has 
been constructed in terms of power relations, and how that was constitutive of a political “us” 
building guided by a populist logic, the next subchapter addresses the second thematic part of this 
chapter, namely the re-articulation of the “Kosovo is Serbia” claim. The claim to entire Kosovo 
has been constitutive of Serbia’s hegemonic project there ever since the question of Kosovo 
Albanian independence became political during the 1990s. This claim has been sedimented in 
several social forms, be it the institutional and legal framework of Serbia, or the widespread 
affective investment of the Serbian political collective in this demand. However, with the initiation 
of the internal dialogue on Kosovo in 2017 and later the introduction of the idea of razgraničenje 
into the Serbian public discourse in 2018, this totalizing claim has been re-articulated in 
“downscaled” terms, and its focus shifted from the metaphysical, symbolic realm (entire Kosovo 
is Serbian, even though Serbia cannot perform sovereignty in the majority of this territory) to the 
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physical, material realm (only North Kosovo is Serbia, since only there can we perform our claim 
to sovereignty). Thus, synecdoche, i.e., substituting the claim to entire Kosovo for only one of its 
parts, Northern Kosovo, can be recognized. Additionally, in terms of a macro-level, paradigmatic 
substitution of one hegemonic project (the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse) with another (the 
partition discourse) can be recognized. The fantasies underpinning and imaginaries delimiting these 
projects are also substituted. These shifts in meaning are going to be the focus of the next 
subchapter. 
6.6 Re-articulating Serbia’s Hegemonic Claim to Kosovo: From Symbolic to 
Physical Ownership 
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the internal dialogue initiated a meaning-making 
process which aimed to re-articulate two sedimented discourses: on the one hand, the so-called 
“mythical approach to Kosovo” that characterized Serbian politics towards it, and on the other, 
the question of borders between Serbia and Kosovo, but also in the region more broadly. The 
former is tied to the symbolic ownership of Kosovo, in which the entire Kosovo is 
“Serbia/Serbian” independent of the fact whether Serbia can perform sovereignty in that territory. 
The latter politicizes the question of sovereignty and prioritizes the exercise of hegemony in at least 
a part of physical territory over the symbolic ownership of the entire space. The partition discourse 
renders this synecdochic substitution visible, since exercise of physical ownership in terms of 
controlling and nationalizing borders – which would enable Serbia to perform sovereignty in 
Northern Kosovo through exerting control – trumps the exercise of symbolic ownership, which 
in material terms does not contribute much to consolidating the nationalizing project of the Serbian 
state in Kosovo. 
The following subchapter is divided in two parts: the first will address the internal dialogue as a 
destabilizing moment aiming to politicize previously sedimented meanings, that is, “de-
mythologize” and “de-emotionalize/rationalize” Serbian politics towards Kosovo. The second part 
will address how this de-mythologization and rationalization of the Kosovo question was tied to a 
new fantasy of Serbia’s future, a future in which Serbia is imagined as economically prosperous and 
part of the EU, for the realization of which the “mythological approach” to Kosovo posed an 
obstacle. This vision is guided by the generation of a new myth – a “compromise” solution that 
would ensure that both Serbia and Kosovo are equally satisfied and dissatisfied, that would lift all 
the obstacles in Serbia’s path towards joining the EU, and that would ensure an economically viable 
future for Serbia and the coming generations. Within the Brussels dialogue, various signifiers 
articulated by many hegemonic subjects take the place of representing this mythical compromise, 
but most importantly for Serbia, this is razgraničenje. In the Albanian political discourse, this signifier 
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is predominantly “correction of borders” or “exchange of territories, and the EU’s discourse and 
their subject role as a mediator, it is the “legally-binding agreement” (although the EU also 
articulates the signifiers of “partition”, “exchange of territories” and the like). Razgraničenje 
transposes Serbia’s claim to Kosovo, as mentioned above, from a symbolic into a physical realm, 
and part of this transposition is temporal. The claim to Kosovo is transposed from a historical 
moment into a contemporary one, with increasing articulations of substituting “our past” with “our 
future”: the “mythological” approach to Kosovo is part of the conflict-ridden past, whereas EU 
membership is part of the prosperous future. This is related to my initial argument on myths as 
having a distinctly temporal function, grounding communities and political projects in different 
moments in time, anchoring imaginarized alternatives to the ones already available in the social 
world. 
The meaning-making process within the Brussels dialogue in 2017 and 2018 differs from the one 
in 2012 and 2013 because the horizon of possible meanings associated with such a compromise 
solution is broadened by the majority of hegemonic actors that are constituting this process. While 
in 2013 the idea of partition and razgraničenje, even though Dačić introduced it in the dialogue with 
Pristina, was immediately dismissed (Dnevnik 2, 28.02.2013, 08:53), this was not the case with 2017 
and 2018. Given that the most vital agreement for the Serbian side, the A/CSM, has not been 
implemented during the five years of the dialogue at that time, alternative suggestions were 
explored and enabled by the EU as a mediator. Apart from the EU, other notable subjects got 
involved in the negotiations, expressing their support (USA, Austria, Russia) or disabling further 
talks on changing the borders (Germany). Even within the given countries, the views were 
polarized from one individual hegemonic subject to the next, the best example of which is the 
Kosovo Government, in which some subjects supported border talks (Thaçi) while others opposed 
them (Haradinaj, opposition parties such as Vetëvendosje). However, the expanded horizon of 
possible solutions to take the representation of a final compromise between Belgrade and Pristina 
shrank soon after, with the introduction of a 100 percent import tax on Serbian goods stopping 
the negotiations in Brussels altogether. At the end of 2018, the Brussels dialogue did not succeed 
in what it initially showed promise of: the transformation of antagonistic relations into agonistic, 
anchored around a mutual understanding, or reading, of the signed agreements between Belgrade 
and Pristina. 
Internal Dialogue: De-mythologizing and Rationalizing Serbia’s Approach to Kosovo 
When Vučić initiated the internal dialogue, it was envisioned as a debate that should engage the 
Government with all the representative segments of Serbian society, such as the civil sector, 
businesses, academia, media, health sector, sports and culture, legal community, religious 
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community and so forth. In doing this, the internal dialogue has aimed to politicize, or scrutinize, 
previously sedimented practices of the Serbian political collective towards Kosovo, which is evident 
in Vučić’s opening call in the daily newspaper Blic, analyzed below. Since it was about politicization 
of sedimented meanings, the internal dialogue aimed to find a solution that might lie beyond the 
horizon of meanings up until that point (beyond the Kosovo imaginary) and was a practice of 
“naming the unnamable” in terms of a potential solution for Kosovo, specifically by engaging all 
aspects of Serbian society. In the end, it turned out to be merely a re-activation of an old, unpopular 
idea of partition, but initially, this potential solution constituted an empty signifier, which later came 
to be embodied by Vučić as a leader who is blindly to be trusted to find a suitable solution. His 
idea of razgraničenje first articulated in August 2018 took on the role of representing that “social 
fullness” that was absent because of the entrenched practices of Serbia towards Kosovo, practices 
that needed to be changed. What the de-mythologization discourse presented as an obstacle to 
achieving our “full” enjoyment was not only the radical Other, as discussed above, but also the 
“us”. In other words, the structures of feeling about Kosovo and the sedimented political practices 
regarding Kosovo as they have been constitutive of the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse needed to 
change. Ergo, razgraničenje can also be read as a counter-hegemonic project, a proposal for 
substituting the hegemonic “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse, even though (or precisely because) it is 
articulated by hegemonic actors who have the discursive power to change things. 
When Vučić took office on 31 May 2017, he commenced his presidential term traditionally with 
an oath before the Parliament in which he stated that he would uphold the Constitution, its laws, 
and ensure Serbia’s territorial integrity “with Kosovo and Metohija as its inherent part” (Dnevnik 
2, 31.05.2017, 02:50). However, only two days later, he announced that during his presidency, he 
wanted to “open up a social dialogue about the Constitution, our attitude towards Kosovo and 
Metohija and the region”, emphasizing that Serbia should renounce a mythical approach towards 
Kosovo and explaining what renouncing the “mythical approach” entailed (Dnevnik 2, 02.06.2017, 
02:19): 
Our attitude should be harmonized with the problems of daily life, with issues our people 
from Kosovo and Metohija are facing, with what we consider to be factual interests of our 
state. But let us forget that we are the only ones who can make these decisions. Let us 
remember what the role of the Albanians is. Let us put things into a rational perspective, on 
a national level, and talk about it that way. 
He also explicitly brings the mythical approach to Kosovo in connection with the Serbian 
Orthodox Church, who has continuously maintained that Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo should 
be directed to include Kosovo as a whole, maintaining symbolic ownership of the entire territory, 
as is anchored in Serbia’s Constitution. Vučić claimed that he “respects the religious community, 
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but our [the Government’s/ the state’s] job is to worry about the earthly life, not about the heavenly 
one” (ibid., 02:50), alluding to the idea of “heavenly Serbia” as part of the Kosovo myth. 
A second aspect of the internal dialogue’s initiation is the intended constitutional change, 
specifically relating to its preamble stating that Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of Serbia. 
In connection to this, Vučić called for wider societal talks with the aim to reach an “agreement” 
that would testify to “our effort to do something for our country”: “if it fails, then it means that 
we have once again prioritized the country of our forebears, instead of the country of our children” 
(ibid., 03:07). The juxtaposition between past and future, in which the Kosovo myth is articulated 
as part of the past, whereas renouncing it is articulated as part of the future, is a re-occurring theme 
in Vučić’s statements as of him taking office as president. For instance, during the celebration of 
St Vitus Day (Vidovdan), a day that has great symbolic significance for the re-articulation of the 
Kosovo myth in the Serbian political discourse, Vučić claimed that Vidovdan should not remain a 
myth, but become “our clear history which will give us the material from which we can build up a 
better future” (Dnevnik 2, 28.06.2017, 08:45). By distinguishing between “myth” and “history”, 
clearly prioritizing history over myth, Vučić attempts to commit the reading of Vidovdan entirely 
to a “factual, historic” domain, and take it as a historic lesson that can help Serbia be guided towards 
its future. As commemorating Vidovdan is also part of the affective calendar of the nation, it is a 
call to transpose the nation’s feelings anchored by the myth into the realm of “history”, fact, and 
consequently, leave them in the past. He continues by saying that: 
We will never give up our fight for Serbian honor, the Serbian honorable name, Serbian 
history. Building up on that history, [we will continue to fight] above all for the Serbian 
future. We will preserve the Serbian land and the Serbian saints; we will be able to preserve 
our people wherever they are. The fight for freedom lasted for centuries, but Serbia has won 
its freedom. I deliberately say ‘won’ instead of ‘got’. 
The fight for Kosovo here is primarily not about a fight for every inch of the territory as indicated 
in the Constitution; it is instead a fight for the Serbian people (their honor, their name, their history, 
their future), and those lands where Serbs live, including the monasteries. The Serbian people are, 
hence, affectively constituted: whoever feels as and is named as Serb, is a Serb, and this category 
should not be solely defined by historically changing territories. Similarly, Đurić has also stated 
during Vidovdan that “the fight [for Kosovo and Metohija] is not simply a fight for territory and 
square kilometers, but a fight for preserving our identity” (ibid., 11:25). With the idea of partition, 
it becomes clear that the fight is actually about territory, basing this claim on the majority-Serb 
population and the materiality of Northern Kosovo. The fight for Kosovo has to continue in an 
active voice, instead of waiting for an impossible scenario in which Serbia would get something 
handed to it. Additionally, Vučić stated that he believes “even Prince Lazar would want us to fight 
for an earthly Serbia and not a heavenly one”, an earthly Serbia that is characterized by “labor, the 
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number of meters we build in highways and railroads both in Serbia and Kosovo, new jobs, and 
especially new people we give birth to” (ibid., 10:22). This juxtaposition of “myth” on the one 
hand, and “reality” on the other, is part of the logic of “de-mythologizing” Serbian politics, 
specifically its approach to Kosovo. It is also about a transposition from the symbolic into a 
physical and material realm (that structures the new claim to Kosovo), in which the earthly is 
equated with materiality and economic progress (highways, roads, jobs, a larger national collective), 
and the heavenly with “overcome” ideas that should be left in the past. As mentioned earlier, part 
of this de-mythological approach is a temporal transposition from the past into the future, in which 
various articulations of the future form the fantasy of a new, economically prosperous Serbia under 
Vučić’s guidance, which will be elaborated later. 
By using Vidovdan as a symbolic moment to initiate the politicization of the Kosovo myth in the 
Serbian public discourse, Vučić published an open letter to the Serbian public in the daily 
newspaper Blic (Vučić, Blic, 24.07.2017). Publishing this letter constituted a performative moment 
of initiating the internal dialogue on Kosovo in Serbia, in which Vučić calls all citizens of Serbia to 
reconsider their attitudes towards Kosovo. The letter states: 
It is time for us as a nation to stop putting our heads in the sand, and try to be realistic, not 
to allow ourselves to lose, or hand over to somebody what we already have, but also not to 
wait to regain something that we have already lost long ago. […] Ever since 1878, since the 
creation of the so-called Prizren league, we Serbs did not want to be responsible enough to 
understand the strength and desires of Albanians; and I consider it a big mistake of the 
Albanians – and thank them for that – that they misunderstood and underestimated Serbian 
state and national interests. […] Serbia should not be underestimated, despite the fact that 
Albanians have significant support from most Western countries in implementing their 
national ideas. […] The solution does not lie in our myths and conflicts, nor does it lie in 
denying and negating all our national and state interests. 
Temporally, Vučić is situating “our myths” and “conflicts” into the realm of the past, whereas a 
possible solution would be part of a future in which Serbia at least maintains what it “already has” 
in Kosovo. This is in line with my earlier argument, that it is the collective “us” that obstructs 
Serbia’s progress towards the future, an “us” that needs to rethink the entrenched structures it is 
performing and re-articulating. Although Northern Kosovo is not explicitly mentioned, it is 
considered to be the only area where Serbia can perform some sort of control through its 
institutional framework which is still in place. Additionally, given that Northern Kosovo is directly 
adjacent to the Serbian border and has a history of resisting integration into the Kosovo state 
framework, it can be argued that he is referring to this area, specifically because “what we already 
have” and “what we have lost long ago” are brought in connection to Serbian and Albanian national 
and state interests. He might also be referring to the Serbian medieval monasteries as part of the 
cultural heritage in Kosovo. 
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Vučić is also calling for a “realistic” approach to solving the Kosovo question, which is part of the 
previously named attempt to “rationalize” Serbian politics towards Kosovo. As evident in the 
statement above, one of his main tasks as new head of state is to confront the Serbian nation with 
the inconvenient truth: a truth which they have chosen to ignore for a long time (by “burying their 
heads in the sand”), namely that the Albanians have their legitimate national and state interest in 
the same manner as Serbs do. This is evident historically in their quest to seek national 
independence and self-determination, a trend that is continuing in the present moment as well. 
This “truth” is what cannot be ignored by simply relying on “myths” or the conflict-ridden past: 
Vučić is explicitly acknowledging the dislocatory moment of Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence, an issue that Serbia as a country and as a nation has to deal with in order to progress. 
In acknowledging this dislocation, Vučić is constituting himself as a truth-teller, a leader who is not 
afraid to make unpopular choices and one who is realistically and cool-headedly considering the 
situation Serbia finds itself in by choosing to be ignorant. For instance, when the SOC issued a 
declaration opposing a partition of Kosovo, Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 11.05.2018, 04:57) asked: 
I have seen everything, and I respect all opinions. But the only thing I have not seen is what 
would be the solution. Is the solution to negate everything, to be against everything? Is the 
solution to have a frozen conflict, to wait for better times? What better times? When we are 
only five million people left, when we are three million left? When all people leave abroad 
and we lose all our citizens? 
This is also evident in the effects of the internal dialogue, which spurred a process of public-
opinion-making and -questioning in terms of the Serbian political collective’s stand towards dealing 
with Kosovo. To a survey claiming that 80 percent of people would prefer a “frozen conflict” in 
Kosovo instead of a solution, Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 24.05.2018, 15:54) said: “I will do everything I 
can, without regard for my political career, to change the minds of the 80 percent of people who 
think that frozen conflict is the best solution. […] I will certainly not make any decisions against 
our people, but I will try to convince the majority […] that peace [and stability are] more important 
to us than anything else.” 
By constituting himself as a political subject in the proper sense of the word (as a result of 
accommodating a dislocation), Vučić’s body as a leader, in its materiality, becomes part of these 
contestations about accommodating the dislocation. Vučić becomes an empty signifier able to 
accommodate different political demands and fantasies by offering his idea of a historic 
“compromise” between Serbs and Albanians, something that forms the bedrock of his vision for 
a better future of Serbia. This vision is a counter-hegemonic project against what he sees as the 
current Serbian political practice towards Kosovo, as being stuck in the past. Specifically, his 
counter-hegemonic project is opposed to the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse. As a way forward to 
realize his vision, Serbia needs to confront these ignorant assumptions about Kosovo (de-
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mythologize its approach to it) and change the way it approaches this question (rationally instead 
of emotionally). If Serbia succeeds to change these structurally sedimented constraints, then a 
future of economic progress and EU-membership awaits, a fantasy that promises to restore the 
“lost” enjoyment of the nation due to the current situation around Kosovo. It can only be restored 
if “we” as a nation recognize the errors of our ways and entrust in Vučić to come up with a solution 
that would restore our full identity – through his project of razgraničenje. 
When it comes to the so-called de-mythologization of Serbian politics, other hegemonic subjects 
are constitutive of the debate as well, such as Brnabić and Dačić, all trying to politicize the meaning 
of Kosovo for the Serbian political collective. For instance, Brnabić claimed in an authored piece 
for BIZ Life magazine that her “wish is that the Serbian society accepts a different reality and 
changed circumstances, and turn towards the future, while leaving the past and the myths of the 
1990s in the previous century” (Dnevnik 2, 22.12.2017, 03:40). Similar to Vučić, Dačić also 
maintained that while it will “surely be difficult to secure the support of the citizens and the world”, 
he is “sure that the Serbian people will not miss this opportunity [to find a compromise], because 
we have to keep an eye out for a national program for the next 100 years” (Dnevnik 2, 28.08.2018, 
03:51).  
This politicization of Kosovo in Serbia is part of the internal dialogue’s logic of articulation, because 
there is an attempt to reconstitute sedimented meanings of the signifier Kosovo for the Serbian 
political collective. On the one hand, history and its connection to the “mythologized” view of 
Kosovo is problematized, while on the other, integral elements of the Kosovo myth, such as the 
sanctity of the territory of Kosovo, are rearticulated. The former is evident, for instance, in Vučić’s 
explicit distinction between the myth-laden tales of Kosovo and the “factual” historical record of 
Kosovo, asking (Dnevnik 2, 07.08.2018, 02:28): “We Serbs tell ourselves that for 600 years now, 
we keep the entire Kosovo and Metohija under our control, but my question is: how come our 
consul was murdered in 1890; how come Nušić, and Vojislav Ilić, and Rakić were our consuls 
there? Were they consuls in their own country, in their own territory?” Vučić is here referring to 
the Consulate of the Kingdom of Serbia in Pristina formed 1889, while the Kosovo Vilayet was 
under Ottoman rule, which was later integrated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
following the First and Second Balkan Wars and WWI. Vučić is establishing a historical equivalence 
between the Serbian and Kosovar states now and these territories in the wake of the 20th century, 
and by doing so, questioning the assumption that Kosovo has always been Serbian, through arguing 




The latter, i.e., problematizing the sanctity of Kosovo as part of the sedimented mythical narrative, 
is evident in Vučić’s increasing conflict with the Serbian Orthodox Church as the main subject 
behind constituting Kosovo as a holy land. Of course, the conflict is not with the entire Church, 
but only those representatives who oppose a possible “compromise” as envisioned by Vučić. For 
instance, as also mentioned above, when the Church issued a declaration opposing a partition of 
Kosovo, Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 11.05.2018, 05:31) said: “Everyone talks about the holy land, but no 
one wants to live in the holy land. I am sure they [the Church] have a better vision of Serbia’s future 
than I do. The people will certainly speak their word, and everyone will have their own cross to 
bear, as our Church would say – some of us today and some in the future.” It is evident that the 
symbolic ownership of entire Kosovo loses its appeal in Vučić’s attempt to institute his counter-
hegemonic project. Instead, as part of the de-mythologization effort, the sanctity of the land 
(heavenly Serbia) is juxtaposed with the reality of life (earthly Serbia). If Serbia is fighting for a 
piece of land that no Serb wants to live in, then how justified is that fight for ensuring a better 
future for Serbia?  
In terms of de-emotionalizing or rationalizing Serbia’s political approach towards Kosovo, many 
subjects, such as members of the Serbian leadership, EU representatives, as well as participants in 
the internal dialogue, articulate Kosovo as being an “emotional” issue in Serbia, frequently 
juxtaposing it with a “rational” or “realistic” approach that is needed instead. For instance, this was 
the case with the fourth internal dialogue session in the form of a roundtable gathering prominent 
academics, former diplomats, political analysts to discuss possible solutions for Kosovo, whereby 
some of them put into question whether emotions should prevail when trying to find a durable 
solution for Kosovo (Dnevnik 2, 28.11.2017, 06:50). 
The Serbian Orthodox Church has, perhaps most prominently, articulated Kosovo as an emotional 
issue of the entire Serbian nation, a feeling that needed to be respected and upheld by the state 
apparatus as well. For instance, Vladika Porfirije (Dnevnik 2, 31.08.2018, 07:24) said that the 
question of Kosovo and Metohija was so important and painful, that we cannot allow it to be 
misused for individual or political party interests, calling Kosovo the “most costly [precious] 
Serbian word”, a saying that has resonated many times in the past in the Serbian public discourse 
on Kosovo. Because Kosovo is constituted as the most precious issue for Serbs, losing or giving it 
up would cause great pain to the entire nation. 
Similarly, when Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council visited Serbia in late April 




I know that you hate it when someone tells you what you should do. It is you – and you 
alone – who decide about your destiny. […] Today it is clear to the whole world that neither 
Moscow, Washington, Ankara, nor Brussels will decide about the future of Serbia. Only 
Belgrade will decide about it. […] Aleksandar Vučić is living proof that you can be at the 
same time a strong patriot and a rational pragmatist. I am not sure if you know that it is in 
fact he who initiated the ambitious vision of the economic integration of this region. […] I 
want to thank President Vučić for his personal engagement in the dialogue with Pristina. I 
know this is a difficult and emotionally charged issue. But it is also a strategic choice that 
will pay off in the long run. 
The articulation of Kosovo as an emotional issue of Serbia is evidently not only perpetuated by 
Serbian hegemonic actors, but it is constituted as an issue of the entire dialogue between Belgrade 
and Pristina by other actors involved. To this statement by Tusk, Vučić replied that Serbia would 
accept “every compromise, but cannot accept the humiliation of Serbia” (ibid., 09:20). Recognizing 
Kosovo is articulated as a humiliation, implying that pride and shame both form a constitutive part 
of these political contestations around Kosovo. Another constitutive emotion, one that was already 
mentioned earlier, is spite, or inat. When Johannes Hahn, the EU Commissioner for 
Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement, stated that “if Serbia wants to become a member of the 
EU, then that country needs to find a legally-binding form of normalization with Kosovo” 
(Dnevnik 2, 24.02.2018, 02:43), Dačić replied that if the EU “thinks that by offering us a lollipop 
in the form of EU membership in return for forgetting about Kosovo, they do not know the 
Serbian people – we will not recognize Kosovo out of spite!” (ibid., 02:54). 
These sedimented affects, or structures of feeling that are constitutive of the meaning-making 
process around Kosovo in the Brussels dialogue, are part of upholding the “Kosovo is Serbia” 
discourse explained in the previous chapter. As mentioned earlier, what Vučić is attempting to do 
is to dis-articulate the meaning of Kosovo in Serbia from these structures of feeling in his attempt 
to institute an alternative discourse, a vision of Serbia’s future that is marked by economic progress 
and EU membership. For instance, he is doing that based on “rationalizing” the Kosovo question 
in Serbia, i.e., articulating it as something that needs to be looked at realistically and rationally, 
detached from emotions. For Serbia to progress into a European future, fear about a possible 
solution that would clash with the established “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse and the structures of 
feeling constituting it, needs to be concurred. This can only be done through a rational approach 
to the question of Kosovo in Serbia. For instance, Vučić expressed his concern “that the decisions 
we make [regarding Kosovo] are too emotional instead of rational and that we are prouder of our 
past instead of thinking of our future” (Danas 2018r, 17 March). In seeking to formulate a 
compromise solution, Vučić has always maintained that the people would decide in a referendum, 
constituting the solution as an issue that is of and for the Serbian political collective – an idea that is 
also reflected in the internal dialogue as a widespread collective endeavor that needs to involve all 
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segments of the Serbian society. In connection to a solution and a referendum, Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 
08.07.2018, 04:00) stated: 
In order for the people to decide on something, we have to offer something to the people. 
I do not know at the moment what I would suggest. If we ever have an offer, then we will 
call for a referendum […] Will my party accept this offer? Hardly. Will the public in Serbia 
accept it as well? Responsible people will! How many responsible people? Well, emotions 
have always prevailed with us instead of responsibility and a serious attitude [ozbiljnost]. 
The clear boundary-drawing between those who support Vučić’s ideas and suggestions, whatever 
they may be, is evident in the statement above, and constitutes a populist logic of articulation in 
which those who are rational and responsible are part of the political “us”, while those who are 
emotional and irresponsible are part of the political “them”. A rational approach to Kosovo is 
articulated as something good for the future of Serbia, while an emotional approach is the complete 
opposite. What prevents the subjects constituting “them” to recognize and subjectivate into 
Vučić’s rational and responsible proposal is fear, an emotion that needs to be concurred. In April 
2018, Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 28.04.2018, 00:34) stated that “we have to act responsibly and not simply 
say ‘we will not accept anything [on the table]’. No, we have to participate in the negotiations, and 
we have to fight and try to find a solution. And we need not fear a solution.” 
New Vision of Serbia’s Future: Kosovo as an Obstacle to EU Membership and 
Economization:  
To politicize the meaning of Kosovo in Serbia, apart from de-mythologization and de-
emotionalization, articulating Kosovo as an obstacle to EU integration and the realization of the 
envisioned future of Serbia is integral to this process as well. First and foremost, when discussing 
EU integration, other obligations following from the acquis are subjugated to Chapter 35, which 
regulates the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. Such is the case with 
Chapters 23 and 24, which are otherwise two of the most important chapters in any country’s 
accession process. These parallels between fulfilling obligations from Chapter 35 and other 
chapters are frequently drawn by Dačić, Vučić, Jadranka Joksimović (the Minister of EU 
Integration) and others, such as some EU member states PMs like Sebastian Kurz. 
When Vučić met with Alexis Tsipras, the Prime Minister of Greece, in Thessaloniki in mid-2017, 
he commented on Serbia being as prepared for EU accession as Romania and Bulgaria were by 
claiming that “behind the various remarks regarding [Chapters] 23 and 24 – to be completely honest 
with the citizens of Serbia – […] lies Kosovo. Hence, if everything were all right with regard to 
Kosovo, we would be champions in human rights, so at least be frank about it with us” (Dnevnik 
2, 13.07.2017, 03:29). Similarly, Dačić has illustrated: “You all know how that song goes, ‘wherever 
I go, I return to you, Kosovo!’? Whichever path we take, that [Kosovo] is the subject. That subject 
207 
 
needs to be resolved” (Dnevnik 2, 25.07.2017, 12:05), alluding to the popular folk song called 
“Vidovdan”, which thematizes the Battle of Kosovo and how Kosovo can never be taken out of 
the Serbian soul. 
Additionally, when David McAllister, the European Parliament’s rapporteur on Serbia, visited 
Belgrade, Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 12.08.2017, 00:46) claimed after the meeting that “the key question 
[in Euro-integration] is Kosovo. The second key question is our relationship with Russia. So, if you 
ask me whether human right are the reason my head hurts the most, [no] it hurts the most because 
of Belgrade-Pristina relations,” referring to Chapter 35. He added (ibid., 04:00) that this chapter, 
permeates several other chapters. It is not just one chapter, because you cannot even talk 
about traffic without talking about Chapter 35. This is what people in Serbia need to know. 
That is why the internal dialogue [on Kosovo] is important to us, and that is why people 
should know full well that unless we make progress on this [Kosovo], there is no progress 
[towards the EU]. […] The essential reason for this is Kosovo. 
By articulating the current political practice about Kosovo, i.e., denial of the inconvenient truth by 
the nation as a whole and the previous Government, as the biggest, and perhaps only obstacle to 
Serbia’s progression on its EU path, the representatives of the Serbian Government are offering a 
discursive substitution: Kosovo for EU membership. One social imaginary is substituted for 
another, namely Kosovo for membership of the EU. As a way of instituting this counter-
hegemonic project, based on economic progress that comes with progress on Serbia’s EU path, 
Kosovo is portrayed as an obstacle, something that needs to be overcome for the betterment of 
Serbia. Other issues that the country might be facing on this same path are dismissed, specifically 
because this dismissal is beneficial for the process of politicization of Kosovo in the Serbian public 
discourse. By articulating it as an urgent matter, without the solution of which any dreams of ever 
becoming a member of the EU will not be realized, Serbian hegemonic actors are inciting its 
deliberation, putting it in the focus of public discourse in the form of the internal dialogue.  
However, by “dealing with Kosovo” as an obstacle on Serbia’s EU integration path, simply 
recognizing Kosovo in its current form is outside of the realm of possibilities. If something like 
that would be done, then only in a situation in which Serbia would “gain something”, be it EU 
membership or Northern Kosovo. Since instituting a counter-hegemonic project is a difficult 
endeavor, which would entirely de-structure the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse, it has to be 
mentioned that this discourse is still present. Both of these discourses are performed by the 
Government simultaneously (the mentioned issue of self-transgression), which facilitates their 
contestation in the first place. In the search for a signifier that would represent a possible solution, 
other signifiers except Northern Kosovo or recognition are articulated, for instance “normalization 
of relations” (related to the signifier “legally-binding agreement”). It is often used by the Serbian 
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Government to refer to one solution on how to overcome the obstacle that Kosovo poses for 
Serbia. In the Serbian public discourse, this would primarily entail that Serbia does not recognize 
Kosovo formally (de jure) but recognizes its subjectivity in international terms (de facto). For instance, 
when the Serbian Minister for European Integration Jadranka Joksimović was asked in an RTS 
interview whether Serbia could ever join the EU without recognizing Kosovo, Joksimović 
(Dnevnik 2, 17.11.2017, 04:48) said: 
Of course we can, precisely because the essence of our normalization agreements [with 
Pristina] is to regulate certain frameworks of normalization that will not lead us to recognize 
the independence of Kosovo. They do, however, mean a range of concessions we have made 
throughout these agreements, with the condition that Pristina fulfills their primary 
obligation, and that is the Community of Serb Municipalities. 
The concessions refer to Serbia already having recognized with the Brussels agreement that Kosovo 
has a certain kind of international subjectivity – after all, the institutional integration of Serbs in 
Kosovo must occur under Kosovo law, and the establishment of the A/CSM has to be compatible 
with its legal framework. One only needs to look at the decision of the Kosovo Constitutional 
Court concerning the August 2015 agreement (regulating the basic principles of the A/CSM’s set-
up) to recognize that Kosovo as a viable political subject in Serbia’s eyes does play a decisive role 
in how and if the agreements are implemented. 
In connection to this, that is, recognizing Kosovo as a subject in international terms but not 
recognizing its statehood, the Serbian Government has sought ways to put this principle into 
practice within the Brussels dialogue. In this context, the so-called idea or model of “two 
Germanys” has been articulated as a possible way to bypass the recognition of Kosovo’s statehood, 
although not a popular one. Namely, the model of two Germanys involves an agreement in which 
Serbia would regulate its relations with Kosovo legally, but not recognize it as an independent state 
– which would enable Kosovo to join the UN and receive more widespread international 
recognition as a state. This was also the case with the Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) after WWII, in which case both 
Eastern and Western Germany became full UN member states in 1973, without Western Germany 
ever de jure recognizing Eastern Germany.  
The model of two Germanys was already circulating in the media in 2012, 2013 and 2015 as a 
possible way to solve the dispute between Serbia and Kosovo. For instance, in October 2012 Danas 
has received the information from “diplomatic sources” in Berlin that the “[German] authorities 
would not have anything against the application of the model of two Germany’s” as the basis for 
the final agreement between Belgrade and Pristina (Diković 2012, in Danas, 25 October). Similarly, 
Enver Hoxhaj, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo, claimed that the model of two 
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Germanys would be “interesting” for the regulation of Kosovo-Serbia relations: “If Serbia cannot 
recognize [Kosovo’s] independence, it should bracket it and find a way to deal with Kosovo based 
on the reality on the ground. Kosovo’s advantage in this model is not only in regulating relations 
of normalization, but also in the fact that both Germanys were members of the UN” (P. D. 2012, 
in Danas, 5 November).  
During the intensified negotiations in early 2013 before reaching the Brussels agreement, Blerim 
Shala, the coordinator of the Pristina team in the dialogue with Belgrade, said that Catherine Ashton 
suggested that a final agreement between Belgrade and Pristina could have the likes of the 
agreement between the two Germanys. He added that such a peace agreement could be reached 
by April 2013, which in fact turned out to be the case (Tasić 2013b, in Danas, 24 January), only not 
in that form. Before Angela Merkel’s official visit to Serbia in July 2015, the former President of 
Serbia Boris Tadić claimed that she might arrive with a proposal for Serbia in terms of “formalizing 
relations between two states, Serbia and Kosovo. It is a model of two Germanys, where mutual 
recognition never took place, but both countries had the right to be members of the UN. Such a 
model could lead to an independent Kosovo from the standpoint of international relations, 
whether Serbia recognizes it or not” (Milenković 2015, in Danas, 3 July). 
Even later, during the 2017-2018 negotiations in Brussels, Tadić claimed that this particular model 
was suggested to him during his term, and even to his predecessor Vojislav Koštunica as part of 
the DSS-Government (Danas 2018n, 1 February). This was also confirmed by the head of DSS 
Miloš Jovanović in mid-2018, when he claimed that the Serbian Government, which was then led 
by his party, rejected the proposal by Wolfgang Ischinger (the EU representative in the Kosovo 
talks) in 2007, which had envisioned a similar agreement for Serbia and Kosovo to the one between 
the two Germanys (Danas 2018d, 11 June). It is evident that this model on how finally to solve the 
dispute between Serbia and Kosovo has been in use for quite some time, primarily to motivate the 
claim that EU officials have often made: Serbia does not have to recognize Kosovo in order to 
become a member of the EU, but it needs to comprehensively normalize its relations with Kosovo 
through a legally-binding agreement. Particularly in 2018, when the idea of reaching a 
“compromise” came into focus both in Serbia and Kosovo, many mentions of the model of two 
Germany’s have been made in the media (see e.g., Dnevnik 2, 01.02.2018; Dnevnik 2, 18.02.2018; 
Danas 2018b, 22 January; Danas 2018n, 1 February; Čongradin and Stojanović 2018, in Danas, 27 
February; Stojanović 2018a, in Danas, 10 May; Danas 2018d, 11 June; Stojanović 2018b, in Danas, 
20 December). 
However, this model has been articulated as not very beneficial for Serbia, as indicated earlier. For 
instance, Dačić claimed that, 
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those who propagate this idea do not speak of a potential re-unification of Kosovo and 
Serbia [which was the case with the two Germanys], but about Serbia recognizing [Kosovo’s] 
unilateral declaration of independence. They are only interested in us recognizing Kosovo’s 
international subjectivity, in giving them a chair at the UN, but we want a permanent 
solution, not to be guessing around what could happen after our recognition. That is 
absolutely unacceptable to us (Danas 2018b, 22 January). 
He added that there are also international constraints when assessing the adoption of this model, 
since “it would not only be a fairytale, but a mirage, for us to suggest to Russia to let Kosovo join 
the UN and for them to vote for it” (ibid.). This only illustrates how complex the international 
recognition of Kosovo is, since the discourse is not only (re)produced by Serbia and Kosovo, but 
many other subjects such as the EU, individual member states, the UN Security Council, the so-
called Troika group (EU, USA and Russia), and the so-called Quint states (USA, UK, France, Italy 
and Germany). The latter two were part of the former Contact Group mediating the UN talks on 
the status of Kosovo in Vienna, prior to Kosovo’s declaration of independence (see Weller 2008), 
which only illustrates the legacies of power of certain countries over these discourses of 
international and mutual recognition, and why they are still involved in the negotiation process on 
the margins of the official Brussels dialogue. In this context, Danas has frequently reported that 
“diplomatic circles” advocate the model of two Germanys as the best and most realistic model 
upon which a final agreement between Belgrade and Pristina could be based (Stojanović 2018a, in 
Danas 10 May; Stojanović 2018b, in Danas, 20 December). 
However, as mentioned above, for Serbia, the model of two Germanys essentially means something 
else: if Serbia recognized Kosovo de facto, but not de jure, and granted Kosovo a seat at the UN, it 
would practically mean the same thing as recognition. Additionally, it would eliminate any 
advantage that Serbia might have in the Brussels dialogue to pursue its interests: be it in the full 
establishment of the A/CSM or gaining something in territorial terms. It is because of this that 
Serbian hegemonic actors dislike this model, as evident in Vučić’s statement (Dnevnik 2, 
18.02.2018, 04:29): “Be it formal or informal, be it the model of two Germanys or not, in which 
they [Kosovo] could join all international institutions and leave us as the only ones who would not 
recognize them formally – well, it all ends up being the same [as recognizing Kosovo’s 
independence].”  
Instead of “conforming” to the internationally advocated model mentioned above, within the 
discourse of the Serbian Government, and primarily Vučić, the signifier “compromise” takes the 
role of stabilizing the entire discourse on negotiations with Pristina. Only through compromise 
could Serbia end up in a situation in which it does not simply (formally or informally) recognize 
Kosovo, but actually gets something in return for this “sacrifice”. What this would entail in practice 
is manifold: sometimes it is “razgraničenje”, sometimes “partition”, and sometimes “exchange of 
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territories”. Whatever it may be, it is something different than what “many in the world would want 
to see, [namely] their own will and their own decisions [being implemented]”, as Vučić claimed 
(Dnevnik 2, 04.05.2018, 00:30). In connection to this, Vučić (Dnevnik 2, 18.02.2018, 04:00) stated: 
In order for [a final] agreement to be reached, we have to come to a compromise solution, 
and not a solution where you would say ‘Serbia must recognize Kosovo’s independence 
because we like it so’, and in return ‘we will guarantee Serbia the safety of their monks and 
nuns in the Serbian monasteries [in Kosovo].’ And otherwise, you would do what? Burn the 
Serbian monasteries down, like you did in 2004? […] If we do not understand […] that we 
have to make compromises, that we have to deal with certain things – and I tell you this at 
a moment when I should not and when I will lose political points – I know that [Kosovo] is 
the most important question that awaits Serbia, this year, next year and all years to come. If 
we do not do anything, we will drown ourselves in our own past. 
By articulating Serbia’s dealing with the Kosovo issue, primarily as an issue “of the past”, Vučić is 
constituting his compromise solution as part of a progression towards a (more prosperous) future. 
A compromise also constitutes Serbia as a powerful actor, one that would not only accept 
everything offered by international actors or the Kosovo authorities, but one that takes its destiny 
into its own hands. To do this, to reach the compromise, Serbia must renounce its past approach 
to dealing with the Kosovo issue, which will metaphorically drown her if she does not act. 
Similarly, when Vučić visited the Government in Vienna in February 2018, he was asked about the 
legally-binding agreement and what it would entail, to which he responded that many ideas were 
on the table, such as the model of two Germanys, which some countries propagate, while other 
countries propagate the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina even before 
reaching a final agreement. He added (Dnevnik 2, 01.02.2018, 04:00): 
I am always in favor of not running away from solutions. I am always in favor of not 
maintaining a frozen conflict. I am in favor of not having problems and not leaving those 
problems to our children to solve in the coming 100 years. I know this is something no one 
likes to hear, but it is a perspective towards the future, and it is the responsible thing to do. 
Whether we succeed in this depends not only on us. It takes two to tango, and others need 
to understand that they have to compromise as well, not just Serbia. 
In parallel to articulating the conflict between Serbs and Albanians as historical, which was analyzed 
earlier in the chapter, Vučić also articulates the solution to this conflict as a future prospect, under 
the condition that a compromise is reached within and outside of the Serbian political collective. 
A compromise that is not about maintaining a frozen conflict, but about finding solutions, actively 
dealing with the Kosovo question and coming up with concrete examples on how to achieve that. 
Additionally, by claiming that a compromise might be achieved before a potential legally-binding 
agreement based on the model of two Germanys, Vučić is suggesting that other solutions might 
take its place (such as the previously mentioned razgraničenje, partition, or exchange of territories). 
All these particular solutions concern territory. While in 2013, the central nodal point of the 
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community discourse was the people, in 2018 primarily, it was territory. Territorial contestation is 
what underpins the idea of a final compromise, precisely because these issues are being contested 
in the debates – the establishment of the A/CSM as a way of finally solving the conflict is 
articulated as impossible and thus lies beyond the horizon of meanings. Often, Kosovo politicians 
as well as parts of the “international community” are held responsible for this situation and are 
blamed for not even considering implementing it the way it was agreed upon in 2013 and primarily 
2015. This was evident when the local governments in Kosovo led by Srpska lista announced that 
they would leave the Kosovo Government and form the Community under their own terms, since 
Pristina has not fulfilled their obligation to form the Community for five years (Dnevnik 2, 
27.03.2018). Previously, both Vučić and Dačić have expressed their skepticism regarding Pristina’s 
willingness to implement the A/CSM, with Vučić claiming that he is “certain that this [the 
establishment of the A/CSM] is a lost cause” (Dnevnik 2, 14.03.2018, 04:20), and Dačić claiming 
that Serbia is “being lied to by the international community” and that they are “faking” their 
pressure on Kosovo to establish the A/CSM (Dnevnik 2, 09.03.2018, 03:28). 
Having been declared a “lost cause” and something that might never be realized (an impossible 
object) – at least not in the manner the Serbian Government envisioned it, namely with executive 
powers – the A/CSM becomes disarticulated as an empty signifier in the partition discourse of 
2017 and 2018 and is instead replaced by “compromise” as mentioned above, which is underpinned 
by territorial contestation. Why a compromise would be more desirable than a frozen conflict, 
Vučić explained through economy and demography: in a few years, there will be fewer than five 
million Serbs left, which will also mean uncertainty and the inability to attract investments (Dnevnik 
2, 20.07.2018, 03:00). By shifting the focus away from the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse, which is 
incarnated in the signifier “frozen conflict” (or keeping the status-quo), to a compromise, Vučić is 
in a counter-hegemonic move trying to institute a different political project than the one of the 
previous few years: one which would be characterized by economic progress and demographic 
recovery through said progress. Similarly, Ana Brnabić, the Prime Minister of Serbia, has claimed 
that the crucial question for Serbia will be (Dnevnik 2, 16.08.2018, 02:10)  
whether we will promote outdated ideas that have been overcome by Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence – which the most powerful countries in the world consider to 
be a done deal – or whether we will show maturity and seek a compromise within the realm 
of what is possible. This [question] will directly influence what our future will be and how 
young generations will grow up: nurtured by myths of the past or by creating a future tailored 
to each citizen. 
This vision of the future, which is based on renouncing the past and the myths that underpin it, as 
well as “outdated” claims that the entire Kosovo is Serbia/Serbian, is argued to be the responsible 
choice, since it will ensure that future generations grow up in prosperity. Drawing such lines 
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between discourses “of the past”, among which is the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse, and 
imaginarized futures in which all obstacles are overcome for the betterment of society rely on the 
production of myths. This utopian vision of the future is entirely based on the generation of a new 
myth – reaching a final compromise through partition which will enable the Serbian nation to move 
forward and reinvent itself. This is also evident in the priorities articulated by the Government in 
2018, compared to 2013. While the priority in 2013 (in terms of Kosovo) was to protect the people, 
that is the Serb community in Kosovo, and to enable them a secure life, to uphold the constitutional 
order, and maintain the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia (as it was discussed in the 
analysis of the resolutions and platforms of the Government in Chapter 5), in 2018, Vučić 
articulates new priorities (Dnevnik 2, 16.08.2018, 05:28): 
Our first goal is to preserve peace and stability, and that means the future for our children. 
[…] Goal number two is to protect our state interests, both territorial and property rights, 
and all other interests of the state of Serbia. […] And number three is to protect the rights 
of our people, our people in Kosovo, their safety, security, to guarantee and ensure this to 
them, and that their children, the children of our people, our Serbs [in Kosovo], can attend 
school undisturbed, to go to the cinemas, to go out for walks. 
With these new priorities, the order has changed: the vision of a peaceful and stable future 
envisioned by Vučić (if Serbia manages to solve the Kosovo question) takes priority, followed by 
Serbian state and national interests. The latter is not articulated as preserving “territorial integrity” 
or “sovereignty” of Serbia, which was the cornerstone of the 2013 politics towards Kosovo, but as 
“protecting territorial interests” and “property rights”. Preserving integrity and protecting 
territorial interests are two different things: while the former presupposes the protection of the 
status quo, the latter might point to the (future) fulfillment of territorial interests regardless of 
preserving territorial integrity. It is anchored around property rights, which can be the rights of the 
Serbian state to claim the medieval Orthodox heritage in Kosovo as Serbian, but it can also refer 
to the natural resources and state-owned and state-run enterprises in Kosovo, which are located in 
the North, Trepča and Gazivode to name a few. That is, the hegemonic nationalizing project of 
the Serbian state, which aims to consolidate its borders and incorporate certain territories into its 
“core” state is what characterizes the Serbian politics about Kosovo in 2018. It is about material 
gain. Only named as a third priority is the protection and preservation of the Serb community in 
Kosovo, which was the first priority in the community discourse of 2013, acting as its nodal point. 
In a nutshell, territory and all that goes with “protecting” or “preserving” it acts as a nodal point 
of the partition discourse, decentering the dominant “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse that has been 
constitutive of the politics of the Brussels agreement from 2013. 




Can we always keep telling ourselves that everything is ours, albeit knowing very well that 
we are not telling ourselves the truth? Because, you know, the definition of a state is that it 
has three basic elements: territory, population and a monopoly on violence, that is, police and 
military. And which of these three elements do we have in our hands in Kosovo and 
Metohija? Except in some parts of Kosovo and Metohija, in which we have population on 
our side – we have nothing else on our side. […] Only in the North, where we have 98 
percent of the population, we have something. In the South, we have three to four percent of 
the total population (Dnevnik 2, 16.08.2018, 06:41, emphasis added). 
Firstly, this statement puts into question the entire “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse, since Vučić claims 
that saying that Kosovo is Serbia is actually a lie. The only area where this claim might be true is 
Northern Kosovo, which comes to embody the entire claim. Northern Kosovo thus represents an 
area to which all nationalizing measures of the Serbian state should be directed. Secondly, by 
naming the three elements that make up a state in the classic Westphalian sense, Vučić is articulating 
these elements as the nodal points of Serbian statehood in Kosovo, of which only one is realized 
in the North, while the rest was lost long ago. By attributing the North such great importance in 
terms of possibly preserving Serbian statehood in Kosovo, this area becomes a politically contested 
category, one over which is negotiated within the Brussels dialogue as a wider contact zone. 
Although a special status for Northern Kosovo or potentially an exchange of territories between 
Northern Kosovo and the Presevo valley was never officially discussed in Brussels, a “bilateral” 
agreement between Serbia and Kosovo was, which was not supposed to be used as a precedent for 
other cases in the world (Dnevnik 2, 27.08.2018, 03:48). Several actors from EU institutions and 
EU member states have been discussing the issue of borders, with many saying that if the two 
parties reach an agreement (including borders), they would not object to it. This compromise 
agreement obviously differs from the mere implementation of the Brussels agreement and its most 
important provision for Serbia – the establishment of the A/CSM. By mid-2018, the 
implementation of the A/CSM was almost entirely substituted by the pursuit of a compromise 
solution, as I mentioned earlier in Vučić’s and Dačić’s statement that it was a lost cause. In terms 
of the international and EU support for a compromise solution, in July 2018, Serbia reportedly 
received its support from the PM of France Macron to pursue it (Dnevnik 2, 17.07.2018, 05:44), 
although it was never mentioned what “it” entailed until Vučić’s articulation of razgraničenje on 9 
August 2018 (Danas 2018t, 9 August). By claiming that he advocates razgraničenje “with the 
Albanians” because of “having a territory of which nobody knows whom it belongs to is always a 
source of potential conflicts and many problems” (ibid.; Dnevnik 2, 09.08.2018, 01:58), Vučić 
defines his idea only vaguely. However, it implies some kind of “re-bordering” of the region in 
order to determine what is whose, based on ethnic affiliation by tying territory to its population. 
Therefore, both partition of Northern Kosovo and exchange of territories/land-swap between 
Northern Kosovo and Presevo valley came to represent the idea of razgraničenje, because they both 
imply a territorial division between Serbs and Albanians. 
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Something similar happened during the Alpbach Forum in the end of August 2018, when Vučić 
and Thaçi met with Johannes Hahn, the EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, 
and the Austrian PM, Sebastian Kurz, to discuss, what Vučić later called, “the common 
denominator of a compromise solution” (Dnevnik 2, 18.07.2018, 00:37; see also Dnevnik 2, 
10.09.2018) and Thaçi called a “peace agreement” (Dnevnik 2, 26.08.2018, 03:24). Namely, after 
the meeting mediated by Kurz and Hahn, the Austrian president Alexander Van der Bellen said he 
witnessed a historic moment due to the constructive tone of Vučič and Thaçi (ibid., 03:52), and 
the EU Commission issued a statement that Belgrade and Pristina should be given room to reach 
an agreement (Dnevnik 2, 27.08.2018). The spokesperson of Mogherini, the chief mediator of the 
dialogue, claimed that “we are currently working on a sustainable and realistic solution in line with 
international law. The parties are currently defining common ground for a mutual agreement. They 
have already said publicly what they see as the main elements, but the EU as a mediator will not 
comment on how we see some elements of a potential agreement” (Dnevnik 2, 27.08.2018, 03:10). 
What was said publicly up to that point were the ideas of partition, razgraničenje, exchange of 
territories/land-swap and demarcation, all of which might have been on the table at some point on 
the margins of the negotiations in Brussels. What they all have in common is some kind of re-
bordering of the territories of Serbia and/or Kosovo, primarily centered on Northern Kosovo and 
the Presevo valley. 
To the question why Northern Kosovo is the most important issue for Serbia in this entire process, 
Vučić added the following statement, which I will give in full, due to its explanatory potential (ibid., 
13:12, italics added): 
I cannot say that it is the most important, the most important are the lives and the safety of 
our people, wherever they may live in Kosovo and Metohija, but in terms of territory, 
Northern Kosovo – and this is no secret whatsoever – of course it is important. We are 
talking about 1000 square kilometers. But it is not a question of kilometers or square meters, 
it is also a question of the strategic importance of the territory, it is also a question of the people 
who live there, 43-44,000 people live there. However, you also have Kopaonik, which today 
belongs half to us, and the other half does not, which people do not know about. There you 
have Gazivode, which is of strategic importance, both for Serbia and for Kosovo and 
Metohija as a whole. You also have Valač, which is also in the North, you have Banjska and 
Sokolica [monasteries] of course, but you also have ore, you have Trepča, and you have a 
very significant geostrategic position of Northern Kosovo, which I would not discuss 
further. But this does not mean that it [Northern Kosovo] is more important to us than 
Kosovo-Pomoravlje, or Gračanica, or any other part. For each of our people we will fight 
and win if we can. Everything else would be a disaster, a disaster for us. 
This statement illustrates perfectly how and why Northern Kosovo becomes so politically 
contested, as mentioned previously. Even though it might seem that the people still play a central 
role in the discourse of preserving Kosovo in 2018, they only play a central role because they can 
anchor Serbia’s territorial claim to Kosovo in terms of the North and its geo-strategic position and 
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various economic and natural resources. Northern Kosovo is also economized, its material 
importance overemphasized. It not only comes to be articulated as the only area where Serbia has 
a majority Serb population in place (first element of statehood as articulated by Vučić), but also as 
an area where territorial consolidation (or its incorporation into the core state) might still be 
possible, partly due to its proximity with Kopaonik and the Serbian border, the territory’s 
importance in terms of harboring valuable natural resources and key infrastructure. This means 
that the claim to having Serb people live in this territory serves to consolidate the claim to this very 
territory – making the people a subordinate category to the category of territory, at least in terms 
of Northern Kosovo. While in the South, the people still may seem to play a valuable role in 
anchoring Serbia’s symbolic claim to entire Kosovo (Kosovo as a space), the hegemonic claim to 
Kosovo as a physical place is now downscaled (through synecdoche, pars pro toto) to include only 
Northern Kosovo. In terms of nationalizing Serbia’s claim to Kosovo, that is expanding the 
hegemonic order, only Northern Kosovo is a political category, not Southern Kosovo. The South 
is mainly attached to the previously dominant discourse on community, which lost its momentum 
in 2018 and with the lack of the A/CSM’s implementation. The transposition of Serbia’s claim to 
Kosovo occurs from a symbolic realm (“our Kosovo” in its entirety) to the physical, material realm 
(“our Kosovo” as Northern Kosovo), since also the materiality of Kosovo, its specific makeup, 
lends itself to be articulated as such. 
As previously mentioned, the economization of the Kosovo question is a steppingstone towards 
realizing Vučić’s counter-hegemonic project. By articulating Kosovo as an obstacle towards 
economic prosperity, the current political practice towards Kosovo becomes something to be 
overcome or dealt with. Crucial for this is reaching a compromise solution. For instance, Vučić 
explicitly articulates reaching a compromise and the betterment of economy as two interdependent 
issues, by saying (Dnevnik 2, 28.02.2018, 03:13): 
I am sure that, if we reached some kind of a compromise with the Albanians, one which we 
would be equally satisfied with, or equally dissatisfied with, our trade exchange with 
Germany would reach seven or eight billion. That would mean that we would lower 
unemployment by five percent in a year, a year and a half. That would mean that our salaries 
would be much higher. I am talking about net salaries; they would reach 500 EUR by the 
beginning of next year without any problems.  
Part of this vision of a better future for Serbia is substituting “old” narratives around Kosovo with 
economic prosperity, primarily as part of Serbia’s EU integration process within which it could 
reach a compromise with the Albanians. In a nutshell, the central elements of the fantasy (new 
vision) of Serbia’s future anchored around the myth of a final compromise are: downscaling 
Serbia’s hegemonic territorial claim to only Northern Kosovo, substituting the Brussels agreement 
with a compromise solution, articulating Kosovo (or the previous political practice towards it) as 
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an obstacle to realizing an economically prosperous future for Serbia, an obstacle that can be 
overcome by de-mythologizing and de-emotionalizing the Kosovo question. 
What forms the bedrock of this new project’s logic of articulation is the re-drawing of political 
frontiers between us and them, whereby “us” is comprised of everyone who supports Vučić’s 
vision, and “them” of everyone who opposes it. This is illustrated by Vučić’s claim that “there is 
no difference” between “those who are in favor of an independent Kosovo as a whole, and those 
who think that we should still propagate tales from the time of Dušan’s Tsardom” (Dnevnik 2, 
16.08.2018, 12:13). By creating a chain of equivalence between anyone who might be opposing 
Vučić’s proposal for a compromise (which is a heterogeneous group, comprised of opposition 
parties, intellectuals, even members of Vučić’s own party, but also some members of the so-called 
international community and Kosovo’s political spectrum), and anyone who is supporting Kosovo 
as an independent state in its current borders (articulated as Albanians as a people as well as 
powerful Western nations sponsoring Kosovo’s independence), Vučić is articulating a political “us” 
around himself as a political leader and the project he represents. As part of this self-articulation, 
Vučić acts as an empty signifier that drives this entire counter-hegemonic project further, able to 
unify and accommodate a range of demands: a solution for the Kosovo question, a better future 
for Serbia and its offspring, economic prosperity, and a better position for Serbia in terms of 
international relations with great powers etc. Illustrative of this argument that Vučić is constituted 
in this discourse as an empty signifier is the promise of the North Kosovo leaders that they would 
support any solution offered by Vučić. Hence, Rakić, the Mayor of North Mitrovica, claimed that 
“we do not know what the compromise solution is, but we conveyed a message to President 
Aleksandar Vučić that he has our absolute support”, claiming that they would back any solution 
offered by him (Danas 2018k, 25 July). The trust is not articulated as being in the Serbian 
Government, but in Vučić as a leader. Even though no specific solution is articulated (as 
mentioned, razgraničenje can mean a variety of things), the range of possible signifiers that could 
take the place of representing a solution (the hailed “final compromise”) is bound by one common 
thing, and that is Vučić as a political figure who will find the best possible solution. The demand 
that Vučić places on its political subjects is not to trust in an actual plan, but to trust in him and his 
ability to solve the issue in the best possible manner. 
I argue that the “founding moment” of Vučić’s new vision of Serbia’s future, (re-)constituting him 
as the empty signifier of this entire political project, is Vučić’s speech in North Mitrovica, which 
the media has called “Vučić’s Gazimestan”, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. This speech 
illustrates perfectly the main elements of his new counter-hegemonic project in terms of Kosovo: 
the de-mythologization of Serbian politics concerning Kosovo, de-
emotionalization/rationalization of the Kosovo question, economization of Serbia’s practice about 
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Kosovo, all of which are anchored around the nodal point of “final compromise” as a myth 
representing the unattainable social “fullness” of the Serbian political collective. In this speech, 
Vučić claimed that “myths, dreams and premonitions are not my job, nor is my job a lunatic vision 
of Kosovo without Albanians, or even worse – without Serbs. Reality is my job” (Predsednik 
Republike Srbije 2018), which re-constituted him and his political vision as rational, realistic and 
responsible, in a sharp break with previous political practice which was anchored around myths, 
dreams and premonitions. As an embodiment of this previous political practice, Vučić names 
Milošević as “a great leader”, but one whose politics failed because “our wishes were not realistic, 
and we neglected and underestimated the interests and aspirations of other peoples [drugih naroda], 
which is why we paid the highest and most serious price” (ibid.). In this moment, Vučić is 
articulating himself as another great leader who is able to accommodate realistic expectations and 
take into account the aspirations of Albanians as well in seeking a final compromise. His vision 
might even be able to transform what he has articulated as a “historical” conflict between Serbs 
and Albanians as peoples, into a utopian vision in which Serbs and Albanians respect each other 
and maintain peace: 
I want ideas for a better future, how to protect our own country, our institutions, how to 
protect peace and build bridges of trust between us and the Albanians, so that we can strive 
towards an agreement even if we know that it might be impossible to have – after centuries 
of wars and conflicts – centuries of decent, rational and, why not, friendly relations with the 
Albanians (ibid.). 
While peace and friendship between Serbs and Albanians have not yet been reached, they will be 
reached as part of his vision of Serbia’s future. All issues that are articulated as currently 
unattainable will be reached once a compromise solution is realized as part of his new vision, 
allowing for a fantasy of full constitution of Serb identity. To be able to build bridges of trust, 
Serbia needs to get “big” again, but not in the sense of the idea of Greater Serbia dominant during 
the 1990s: 
Today, without spilling a drop of blood, we are getting bigger, because today, after many 
years, Serbia is working hard, not fighting with anyone, because it invests in life, and does 
not throw resources around – because our children are growing up, we are not burying them 
like we did after the bombing [of 1999], because we are relying on knowledge, work, not on 
guns. […] My intention is for Serbia to be big, but not to conquer the Balkans and the world, 
but to conquer the future (ibid.). 
By re-appropriating a common conception from the 1990s (that of Greater Serbia), one that 
characterized Milošević’s rule and its politics about Kosovo which resulted in war and Kosovo’s 
unilateral declaration of independence, Vučić is re-articulating his politics as part of his new vision 
as a break with previous practices. Instead of pursuing the physical ownership of entire Kosovo, 
which he calls mythical and unrealistic, Vučić is pursuing physical ownership of Northern Kosovo 
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as its most important part. The place he chose to give his speech in testifies to the performance of 
Northern Kosovo as an important and symbolically significant site. Through his speech in North 
Mitrovica and his visit to Northern Kosovo in September 2018, Northern Kosovo is performed as 
the most important part of Kosovo for Serbia, one which comes to embody Serbia’s entire claim 
to it. In this performative move, Serbia’s hegemonic claim is once again transposed from a symbolic 
into a physical realm, and from a historic into the present moment, when certain things can be 
achieved, such as reaching a final compromise. Through these moves on the discursive field Vučić 
as a leader and his vision are able to accommodate a range of different, sometimes conflicting 
demands, such as claiming that South Kosovo is equally important as North Kosovo (two demands 
that are practiced entirely differently). Even though the partition project promises to deliver almost 
a utopian vision of Serbia’s future and is presented as a progressive project in terms of transforming 
Serb-Albanian relations and delivering economic betterment, it is deeply antagonistic. Partition 
managed to polarize the political field in Serbia around affiliations with the leader and his party 
politics, but also managed to antagonize Serb-Albanian relations further, as explained in 
subchapters 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. 
And while Vučić’s vision has not been instituted to date (December 2020), at the time of exploring 
and contesting different options on how to solve the Belgrade-Pristina dispute, it gained significant 
traction not only within Serbia, but also abroad – gaining US support as one if its more visible 
traits. The realization of this project failed primarily due to Serbia’s successful blocking of Kosovo 
from becoming a member of Interpol in November 2018, upon which Kosovo imposed a 100 
percent import tariff on all goods from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This ultimately put a 
stop to the entire Brussels dialogue, which did not resume until the summer of 2020. Ultimately, 
the idea of razgraničenje is not vanished from the public discourse in Serbia yet, partly because Vučić 
as a political leader embodies it and, consequently, propagates it, even though not as vocally as in 
2018. Due to current developments in Serbia in terms of a shrinkage of space for expressing 
alternatively voiced political messages to those propagated by the Serbian Government, a potential 
solution that might be reached sometime in the near future will likely be a solution monopolized 
by Vučić. As the polarization of the political discourse in Serbia continues, any solution might also 
be articulated following a populist logic as seen in 2018, that is, sharply polarizing the political field 
along the lines of who supports Vučić’s visions and who opposes it. However, the concrete 
signifiers taking up the space of representing the possible final agreement (be it legally-binding 
agreement based on the model of two Germanys, be it the final implementation of the A/CSM, be 






Having discussed the Serbian Government’s attempt to find common ground with Kosovo 
Albanians as part of the Brussels agreement and the idea of sharing Kosovo, as well as their attempt 
to re-articulate old animosities between Serbs and Albanians through re-introducing the partition 
idea, it is necessary to conclude with how such a shift was possible and answer why it occurred. 
Perhaps one of the more important reasons why the boarder-changing discourse gained such 
traction is the stagnant implementation of the Brussels agreement and generally a lack of tangible 
results from Serbia’s EU integration process. EU membership also became increasingly 
unattractive due to the EU experiencing a few crises, such as Brexit. The above not only concerns 
the lack of implementation of the A/CSM (although this is a major reason), but also the ever more 
visible authoritarian-style rule in Serbia since Vučić consolidated his power, which in turn halted 
EU-related reform, such as ensuring a more impartial judiciary, media freedom etc. As explained, 
partition was constitutive of a political community-building process around support for Vučić’s 
ideas of a compromise, which came to be articulated as razgraničenje. 
Secondly, perhaps partition was the ultimate goal of the dialogue for the Serbian side from the 
beginning, as we have seen in Dačić’s attempt to re-introduce it in 2013, and all the previous 
prominent supporters of that idea in Serbia, such as Zoran Đinđić or Dobrica Ćosić. It was not a 
new idea and since it was previously part of the public discourse on possible solutions to the 
Kosovo question, it was a readily available option, perhaps more easily susceptible to gaining public 
support. Additionally, since the technical aspects of the dialogue proved always to be entangled 
with the political aspects, an all-in-one solution that would encompass both was favored. The 
guiding reasoning was that if Kosovo had been partitioned, Serbia would most likely have 
recognized Kosovo as an independent state and thus, the dialogue would no longer be necessary. 
Thirdly, there is also a transnational aspect to seeking solutions, as we have seen in the way different 
local and transnational actors’ claims entangle in the contact zone. Since Donald Trump assumed 
office, there was a visible distancing from the foreign policies of the EU and EU-member states, 
not the least in terms of how to solve the Belgrade-Pristina dispute. As mentioned before, the 
Trump administration’s National Security Adviser John Bolton openly supported the correction of 
borders between Serbia and Kosovo, and with the increasing support of the international 
community (with Russia and China joining), the idea increasingly gained momentum. 
What this thesis has argued is the importance of discourse for politics, in which an understanding 
of politics was put forward that does not advocate for a separation between “talking” and “acting” 
or understands speech as merely one of many social practices. On the contrary – the social is 
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primarily discursive, and this lens guides the understanding of materiality and affectivity in my 
thesis. By taking a holistic approach to analysis that looks at all three elements – language, 
materiality and affectivity – as discursive, I was able to focus on a narrow research question and 
look at it from three angles.  
This thesis has primarily asked how the Serbian Government under the leadership of the SNS has 
re-articulated its symbolic, physical, and affective claim to Kosovo within the Brussels dialogue 
mainly by paying attention to the politicization of already sedimented meanings, such as the 
Kosovo imaginary that structures the Government’s political practice towards Kosovo. I attempted 
to answer my initial question by pointing to the shift in meaning-making around Kosovo in relation 
to the Brussels agreement that has occurred in 2018, whereby Vučić comes to embody an entire 
counter-hegemonic project of partitioning Kosovo. This project’s main elements are about de-
mythologizing, rationalizing and economizing the Kosovo issue, by seeking a compromise instead 
of readily available solutions such as the “two Germanys”. I argued that to understand how 
sedimented practices change, we need to pay attention to the notion of myth, understood both as 
an ontological concept and an analytical/empirical one. Ontologically, I have argued for a 
conception of myth based on structure/spatialization (“new objectivity”) and change/temporality 
(“empty signifier”). I have also argued for an analytical division between the Kosovo imaginary, 
that structures the hegemonic “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse, and the Vučić-driven counter-
hegemonic project in which Kosovo is articulated as an obstacle towards Serbia’s future progress 
towards EU membership. Thus, I have operationalized in my analysis the theoretical categories 
that are necessary for understanding myths, such as fantasy, enjoyment (jouissance), empty signifiers, 
as well as structurally illuminated the form of myths and how they are embedded in larger 
discursive-material-affective structures. 
I have demonstrated that the Brussels dialogue understood as a contact zone can help us flesh out 
the particular opportunities and constraints for action that the SNS might have had in re-
articulating their claim to Kosovo. These opportunities and constraints have a transnational 
underpinning, since any solution to the Kosovo-Serbia dispute would need to be addressed and 
accepted in the international arena, having implications for the practice of legal principles such as 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and self-determination. In my analysis, I have also demonstrated 
how these transnational underpinnings work, such as the various compromise solutions offered by 
the international community. I have also demonstrated how the same solutions can be subverted 
by the SNS (such as the model of “two Germanys”) in their quest to find what they would deem 
the best possible solution, such as razgraničenje. 
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Having firstly explained why myths’ temporal understanding is important for post-foundational 
theory on myth in general (as being necessary for meaning-making), and my case study in particular, 
I have conducted my analysis in two steps. The first step was to illuminate how the first myth, the 
Brussels dialogue, has managed to suture the dislocated “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse by concealing 
the dislocation, with the Serbian Government performing the dislocated structure as not dislocated 
at all (which I have recognized as a metaphor). This was achieved through re-articulating Serbia’s 
claim from “Kosovo in Serbia” to “Serbia in Kosovo” and performing this claim through 
institutional integration in Kosovo (such as the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities), 
through the institutional framework in Serbia (such as the Constitution) and through the Serb 
community in Kosovo (such as the Srpska lista). These practices are part of the community 
discourse as a larger context of contesting meanings, which emphasized the sharing of the territory 
(place) of Kosovo with Kosovo Albanians and perpetuated at times an agonistic constitution of 
Kosovo Albanians as a community that has a right to live and stay in Kosovo, while also 
acknowledging that Kosovo has a certain international subjectivity. It is highlighted here that the 
Brussels dialogue had a transformative potential. 
The second step was to illuminate why the Brussels agreement’s main component for the Serbian 
side, the A/CSM, was never implemented and how that prompted a re-articulation of the claim to 
Kosovo again, this time from community to partition. While the myth of the Brussels agreement 
anchored the community discourse, the myth of partition anchored a counter-hegemonic project 
of transposing the claim to Kosovo from a symbolic/metaphysical realm into a physical/material 
realm, territorializing the Kosovo issue. Partition encompassed a re-articulation of the claim to 
Kosovo as a whole to the claim to only one of its parts, namely Northern Kosovo (which I have 
recognized as a synecdoche). This had a de-structuring effect on the “Kosovo is Serbia” discourse, 
by which partition did not aim to conceal the dislocation but displace the dislocated discourse with 
an alternative one altogether (which I have recognized as a paradigmatic substitution). This 
counter-hegemonic project was underpinned by a different fantasy than the “Kosovo is Serbia” 
discourse, namely that of economic progress and stability as part of the EU, which could only be 
achieved if Serbia solved the Kosovo issue. This chapter has demonstrated how the temporality of 
myth works to bridge past articulations of the Kosovo myth, the Kosovo social imaginary and the 
idea of partition through territoriality. It has also demonstrated that myths can ground other-than-
national collectives, such as political communities built around the leader. 
7.1 Main Contributions and Reliability of Results 
Firstly, this thesis has made a significant theoretical contribution to the post-foundational literature 
on myth, anchored in a Laclaudian and psychoanalytic understanding. I have emphasized and 
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elaborated on the temporal aspect of myth, which has implications for the understanding of myth 
as constitutive of meaning-making per se. This perspective has been missing from post-
foundational literature on this subject, which has emphasized the spatial aspect. I have bridged this 
gap by relying on Laclaudian discourse theory and Stavrakakian psychoanalysis, which allowed me 
to elaborate further on temporality through fantasies, enjoyment (jouissance), objets petit a and bring 
them in a dialogue with discourse-theoretical concepts such as empty signifiers and affective 
investment as the force of discourse. This symbiosis of concepts explains how alternative 
discourses (in the form of myths as new objectivity and empty signifiers) grip subjects, offer them 
a space for affective investment of their demands, and the fulfillment of fantasies that the 
hegemonic order has not delivered on. 
Secondly, the combination of methodological frameworks that I used in my empirical analysis, can 
be claimed as a contribution as well. I have brought the three post-Laclaudian methods of analyzing 
discourse together: the psychoanalytically inspired analysis of fantasy that draws from traditional 
Essex school discourse analysis, the Brussels school and the Helsinki school. I did so by borrowing 
concepts from each and looking at both the form and the force of discourse, language, materiality 
and affectivity. This has allowed me to pay attention to the modes in which the categories of 
discourse, materiality and affectivity intersect, which could be used as a benchmark for other studies 
that aim to explore myths as constitutive of meaning-making. The framework elaborated in Chapter 
3 can even be used outside of the scope of analyzing myths, whenever a research design aims to 
tackle the intersecting nature of language, materiality and affectivity. Thus, it contributes to further 
developing post-Laclaudian methodology by consolidating previously disparate frameworks and 
sensitizing additional concepts from cultural studies, such as structures of feeling or politics and 
stickiness of emotions. The combination of a Butlerian, Laclaudian and a Žižekian perspective on 
discourse was attempted in 2000 with the book Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, edited by Butler, 
Laclau and Žižek, which resulted in Laclau and Žižek not speaking to one another. Perhaps this 
study is also an attempt to revive the dialogue between performativity theory (underpinned by 
materiality), discourse theory and psychoanalysis, through particular attention to the points in 
which they converge, rather than diverge. Both the ontological framework and the empirical 
analysis of this thesis relate to the second contribution I have mentioned in the introduction (see 
subchapter 1.2). 
Thirdly, I have made an empirical contribution as well, particularly in the field of Southeast 
European area studies, since this type of discursive-material-affective analysis has not been applied 
to the case study of Serbian-Kosovar relations. This aspect relates to the first and third 
contributions I mentioned in the introduction (see also subchapter 1.2), namely on the ontology of 
myths and the conceptualization of the Brussels dialogue as a contact zone. This perspective is 
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important because it allows us to move away from discussions of the “Kosovo myth”, to 
discussions of myths more generally and how they sustain different projects that aim to become 
realized. It is a macro-discursive analysis, whereby discourse analysis of this type of question has 
so far only occurred through the lens of critical discourse analysis (CDA). As CDA distinguishes 
between discursive and other social practices, it offers a limited and detail-oriented approach to 
analysis. While the macro-level approach might not be as detailed, it allows for a holistic analysis 
of a social phenomenon, in which both materiality and affectivity can be brought together through 
a discourse analysis, since this approach does not distinguish between discursive and other social 
practices. Materiality as well as affectivity inevitably underlie any discursive articulation (creating a 
“holy trinity” for discourse-theoretically inspired analysis). Additionally, understanding the Brussels 
dialogue through the lens of a contact zone allowed me to focus on the opportunities and 
constraints it offered to certain members of the SNS (and the Serbian Government more generally) 
as a protagonist in re-articulating the meaning of Kosovo in Serbia, which is part of a growing 
literature and has implications for future studies of the politics of Serbia. It discusses the 
transforming nature of entrenched discourses and points to the fact that even the most sedimented 
discourses are only contingently grounded. 
As for the reliability of obtained results, it was ensured by relying on a multitude of sources, ranging 
from government and parliamentary documents, agreements signed (or initialed) between Serbia 
and Kosovo, international resolutions, to media texts portraying the most significant points of 
debate and the subjects behind such articulations. They are sufficient to answer my primary 
research questions, which is to look at the ways the Serbian Government has re-articulated its claim 
to Kosovo discursively, materially and affectively. Had I brought in additional sources, especially 
from the media landscape, I do not expect the results to have changed, since overall, there was a 
high degree of congruence between the messages carried by different outlets. Since I have only 
relied on direct statements issued by the Government representatives, a potentially ideologically 
colored portrayal of events by these outlets can only be mirrored in the choice of messages and 
statements they want to transmit or generate through interviews. This is why I have also relied on 
two ideologically different media outlets, one pro- and one anti-regime. Thus, I maintained a critical 
position towards my empirical material and attempted to strike a balance between using these 
ideologically colored outlets. However, this thesis does not claim to be objective, nor that the 
results of a discourse analysis can be objective. As mentioned in subchapter 3.4, discourse 
theoretical analysis relies on internal validity and the aim is not to generate “objectively valid” 
knowledge according to external parameters, but to critically scrutinize and reflect on the internal 
conditions under which the data was selected and generated and the empirical results emerged. The 
selected theoretical and empirical framework also enhances a critical position, since I have been 
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transparent about how and why I selected certain sensitizing concepts and how I operationalized 
them in the analysis, as well as how I systematized the vast material available in my corpus through 
content analysis and coding. 
7.2 Significance and Limitations of Research 
The significance of this thesis can be summarized on three levels. The first level relates to the 
theoretical contribution of the thesis. I could demonstrate how to conceptualize myths as both an 
ontological and ontic category, by firstly exploring what current theoretical elaborations were 
missing and then filling out those gaps with my borrowing from other strands of literature, such as 
psychoanalysis and affect theory. What followed from this was also an ontic conception of the 
category of myth, which I utilized as the central signifiers of my empirical analysis, the Brussels 
agreement and the idea of partition. 
The second level relates to opening avenues for further explorations of the nexus between 
discursivity, materiality and affectivity, not simply as a theoretical framework, but also as an 
empirical gaze into the case study material. Rather than analytically focusing on one or two of the 
three aspects (which is how this type of analysis is usually conducted), I have considered all three, 
and specifically related them to the category of myth. 
Lastly, the third level relates to my case study, primarily conceptualizing the Brussels dialogue as a 
contact zone, which has had a significant upside in allowing me to focus on certain specific actors 
(protagonists) and the power-relations between them, revealing broader structures that these 
practices are embedded in (what I have termed discursive, material and affective structures). This 
is a valuable perspective because it is a middle way between analyzing subjects and structures, as 
well as structures, affectivities and materialities, illuminating the ways in which they are intrinsically 
tied together rather than separate. Hence, my empirical analysis focused rather on the synergies 
between these three aspects, than on differences, demonstrating this particular nexus in a specific 
empirical analysis. 
Finally, let me discuss the limitations of my thesis, that is, of my research design. This primarily 
relates to the general methodological framework I have chosen to apply, which follows from my 
ontological framework. Through this lens, the analysis remains at a macro level, which inevitably 
means that some micro level details get lost in the analysis. That is, the analysis does not pay 
particular attention to phraseology or illuminates so-called discursive strategies, but instead focuses 
on the interconnectedness of materiality, which subjects’ bodies are part of, their discursive 
production (which always has material effects) and the affective sustainment of entrenched 
structures. In this particular nexus and following from an understanding that all social practices are 
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discursive practices and that the social is only contingently grounded, we cannot speak of causal 
relationships in meaning-making. One articulation does not inevitably follow from any other 
articulation, but the task of this type of analysis is to illuminate how discursive elements are 
connected through articulations, practices and relations between them. That is, we are looking at 
the logic behind certain articulatory practices, not at whether the subjects that articulate them do 
so intentionally or not. Intentionality is a problematic category in discourse theory as well as 
psychoanalysis, because it relates to issues of “freedom” of subjects, subjects that can only be truly 
“free” under certain conditions. As the theoretical framework has elaborated, they can be free in 
the moments of disarticulating from dislocated structures, but bearing in mind that such freedom 
is always a momentary phenomenon. Thus, freedom is not a quality that the subject possesses, but 
an articulation that is not constrained by the weight of the dislocated structure it aims to destabilize. 
Consequently, even the introduction of the idea of partition is not an entirely voluntary act, since 
it is based on previously available discussions on partition that circulated in the Serbian political 
discourse since the 1990s. Thus, this type of analysis can leave some readers dissatisfied with the 
way the empirical material is discussed and with the conclusions drawn from it. However, all of 
this follows from the theoretical framework as defined in the beginning, which is always based on 
certain ontological assumptions that should not be in contradiction with the methods used in 
empirical analysis. 
Had I adopted a more traditional way of doing discourse analysis, for instance critical discourse 
analysis, then I would not have had to distinguish between discursive and social practices. However, 
this would not have allowed me to take a holistic – ontological and ontic – look at my central 
theoretical and analytical category, which is myth. Only discourse theory offers an ontological 
conception of the category of discourse, which has several implications for my study. By 
maintaining an ontological impetus, I was able to further develop the theory on myths by 
distinguishing between its ontological and ontic dimension and elaborate how it emerges from 
dislocations, which enabled me to claim that myths are constitutive of meaning-making. We always 
need myths in political discourse to make sense of crises, to imaginarize alternatives and to 
condense affective investment in those alternatives into an empty signifier, which drives any 
imaginarized project further. Without myths, we would be unable to escape the constraints of our 
social world. Additionally, by adopting discourse theory, it allowed me to analyze 
rhetoric/language, materiality and affectivity through the single lens of discourse, which allowed 
me to develop my discursive-material-affective framework of analysis. This framework does not 
place a significant emphasis on the agency of individual actors, so had I not adopted discourse 
theory, the entire framework of this thesis would have had to rethink the motivations and strategies 
behind certain actions, which I do not believe should be the task of discourse analysis. Rather, I 
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wanted to point to general regimes of practice, to sedimented discourses (be it social imaginaries, 
structures of feeling, or institutions) and see how they are sustained, but also look into how they 
can be changed through re-articulations. This inevitably involves a change of the political frontiers 
that constitute a given discourse, which was also demonstrated in the analysis. However, what fell 
out of the scope of analysis was an emphasis on the agency and intentionality of subjects, since this 
framework recognizes that these are not clear-cut categories and sees agency as constrained. 
7.3 Avenues for Future Research 
The most obvious avenue for future research starts from the elaboration of my theoretical and 
methodological framework on myth. The understanding of myth as an ontological category has 
implications for further theoretical elaborations in discourse theory, in which for instance the role 
of tropology or rhetoric (and later writing by Laclau (2014)) can be further explored in connection 
to spatiality, temporality and the Imaginary that myths are part of. I have already suggested that 
myths act to either metaphorically conceal or paradigmatically substitute dislocated orders, so a 
theoretical discussion on the broader implications of a Laclaudian understanding of rhetoric, 
specifically related to the three Lacanian orders (the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary), would 
be necessary. Through this exploration we could better understand the connection between 
materiality, the Real, discursivity (the Symbolic) and affectivity and imaginarization (the Imaginary), 
which this thesis could not devote greater attention to because of the specific emphasis on myths. 
However, the understanding of myth as positioned in a tension between the Imaginary and 
Symbolic order opens up this discussion, so the logical next step is to bring in the Real more 
broadly, not only in terms of dislocation and temporality. 
On the other hand, the methodological framework with its emphasis on the nexus between 
discursivity, materiality and affectivity could potentially be applicable to other cases in the world, 
where dislocations are evident but the dislocated orders are still maintained through various 
practices. This could be the Israel-Palestine conflict, or the recently revived military conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The conception of a political 
contact zone can also be applied onto other cases in the world, whenever political talks aimed at 
bringing disparate and opposing discursive-material-affective structures closer together are 
conducted. The emphasis on cultural conceptions of the Other and the need to re-articulate 
sedimented notions about the Other should be inscribed into any such negotiation, since if there 
is anything that this thesis has demonstrated, it is that the Other can only be re-articulated 
agonistically long term if talks can address sedimented narratives and structures. 
Another avenue for future research that this thesis has opened is the implications of the 
polarization of the political landscape in Serbia, specifically with the SNS gaining even more power 
228 
 
with the most recent election in June 2020 that the majority of opposition parties have boycotted. 
The opposition as well as the EU have often criticized the current regime in Serbia in terms of how 
they address media freedom, political critique and free contestation of opposing ideas, corruption 
and nepotism, as well as addressing organized crime, which is seen as a contributing factor to the 
power and reach of the current regime instead of an opposing one. The discussions about the 
murder of Oliver Ivanović have demonstrated that, because the Kosovo authorities accused one 
of the crime leaders from Northern Kosovo of the murder, after which he fled into Serbia proper. 
It is speculated that he is protected by Vučić’s regime. All these issues have implications for the 
democratization processes in Serbia, that is, the shrinking of democratic space for debate, as well 
as critique of the regime. This connection to democracy is not something I have focused on in the 
thesis per se, apart from mentioning Castaldo’s (2020) work and problematizing how myths relate 
to community-building following a democratic, agonistic logic. This is something that could be 
expanded on in the future, specifically in connection with the SNS and their way of articulating the 
Kosovo question in relation to EU integration and compliance with the acquis. After all, Vučić 
initially secured broad European support with his handling of the Kosovo issue, but this has had 
long-term implications for the state of democracy in Serbia. Hence, further exploration of SNS’s 
Kosovo politics and its connection to democracy in Serbia is needed, as well as a broader 
exploration of the shrinking of democratic space in Serbia since the SNS took power in 2012, which 
would contribute to a growing literature on the SNS in Serbia. 
A further angle that could be investigated is a detailed analysis of the Brussels dialogue discourse 
in Kosovo itself. Specifically, if one recognizes Northern Kosovo and its leadership’s unwillingness 
to integrate into the Kosovo framework as a dislocation to Kosovo’s claim of having consolidated 
statehood in the entire territory, then this could act as a fruitful comparison to the Serbian case. 
One could investigate what specific myths drive Kosovo’s political discourse further and if they 
relate to the Serbian one, or how they relate to Kosovo’s EU integration path (an angle I could not 
explore due to lacking Albanian language skills). After all, this thesis advocates for an ontological, 
not only ontic, conception of myth, which means that the framework could be applied anywhere 
where one can recognize a dislocation. In this sense, it would be useful to look at what imaginaries 
and structures of feeling underpin Kosovo’s discourse on statehood, since it is not a typical and 
straightforward case of performing statehood internationally, as Visoka (2018) has demonstrated, 
and domestically, as I have demonstrated elsewhere (Vulović 2020). Additionally, a comparison of 
national myths and whether they get re-articulated into current political projects aimed at the future 
would be fruitful, since it would not only demonstrate the similar working mechanisms of political 
discourses in both Kosovo and Serbia, but also potentially point to a common ground between 
them, showing that they might not be so different from one another as the political elites in these 
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two cases like to emphasize. Research has already begun to point out these underlying similarities 
between the Serbian and Kosovan re-articulations of their past, not describing the rivalry between 
them through difference, but through the sharing of common goals and desires (see Hehir and 
Lanza 2021). 
Given that my research design articulates an ontological understanding of political discourse, it 
could have implication for how we do research on Kosovo-Serbia relations and national myths in 
general. It demystifies national myths as having great longevity and being resistant to change, since 
this thesis has demonstrated that, through performativity and re-articulation, even the most 
sedimented imaginaries, or national myths, can change by virtue of their elements being embedded 
into alternative discursive constellations and projects. Every sedimentation is only a contingent 
sedimentation, as discourse theory teaches us. Hence, this thesis might provide an impetus for 
researchers to go beyond historic legacies and entrenched narratives, and explore the moments of 
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